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The doctrine of privity of contract broadly provides that a contract should 
neither benefit nor burden parties external to the contract. This thesis can be 
divided into two parts: the first on privity itself, and the second on its 
exceptions. 
The first part contains a historical analysis of the development of privity, 
leading to the provision of a definition of privity in modern Scots law. It also 
examines whether privity is compatible with the leading theories of Scots 
contract law (will theory, promissory theory, and assumption theory) and 
considers the relationship between privity and third party rights. The 
interaction between privity and delict has proved controversial in various 
situations involving third-party loss. Accordingly, this part analyses the 
intersection between privity and delictual liability. The first part also identifies 
and assesses the policy considerations that have justified statutory 
exceptions to privity. It concludes with discussion on whether privity does and 
should continue to exist in Scots law.  
The second part provides a taxonomy of concepts which operate where:  
1. There is an extra-contractual party  
2. Which has suffered loss caused by non-performance or defective 
performance of a contract 
3. And it lacks a contractual right to recover its losses 
4. And the concept provides a means of recovery for the extra-
contractual party, and/ or a means by which the contracting party 
which did not cause the loss can recover on behalf of the extra-
contractual party. 
The four relevant concepts are: contracts for the benefit of another; 
transferred loss; ad hoc agency; and undisclosed agency. The thesis 
analyses each concept in turn, examining its relationship with privity, contract 
theory, and delictual liability. Policy considerations supporting each exception 
are identified and assessed. The conclusions of the thesis address whether 
these concepts can be recognised as justifiable exceptions to privity. The 
question of whether external network liability should be recognised as a new 
exception to privity is also considered.     
Whilst the thesis focuses on Scots law, comparative reference is made 
throughout to English law. This is because the development of contracts for 
the benefit of another, transferred loss, and undisclosed agency is closely 







Lay Summary  
This thesis examines a legal rule, privity of contract, and exceptions to the 
rule. Privity of contract means that a contract is only between the contracting 
parties. In other words, parties external to the contract cannot force the 
parties to fulfil their contract, and the parties to the contract cannot require an 
external party to perform under their contract.  
In terms of the privity rule itself, the thesis provides historical research on the 
development of the rule in Scots law and considers both case law and 
academic works to offer a precise definition of the rule. There are a number 
of exceptions to the privity rule in legislation. The thesis examines these in 
order to identify the unifying policy justifications behind the exceptions, and 
consequently the reasons which justify deviation from the privity rule. The 
thesis also considers the relationship between the privity rule and the law of 
delict (the law that a person must exercise a duty of care to prevent harm to 
others).   
The second half of the thesis examines four concepts which have been 
created by judges, rather than introduced in Scots law through legislation:  
• Contracts for the benefit of another: A enters into a contract with B for 
the purpose of benefiting C. For example, A books a holiday for 
herself and C with package holiday provider B. A can recover 
damages from B for C’s loss if the contract is not properly performed.  
• Transferred loss: A contracts with B. B works on A’s property (for 
example, B renovates A’s house). A transfers the property to C. C 
then discovers a defect in B’s work. A can recover damages for C’s 
loss under his contract with B.  
• Undisclosed agency: A engages B to act as her agent (i.e. for B to 
make contracts on A’s behalf). B concludes a contract with C without 
disclosing that she is working for A, and C believes she has entered a 
contract directly with B. Once A’s identity and existence is revealed, A 
and C can sue one another under the contract.  
• Ad hoc agency: A has not employed B as his agent, but B is treated as 
A’s agent for the purposes of a specific contract between B and C, to 
allow A to enforce the contract.    
The thesis ascertains whether each concept is an exception to the privity 
rule, considers its compatibility with Scots law as a whole, and determines 
whether there are adequate policy justifications to support the existence of 
the concept.   
The conclusions of the thesis address whether the privity rule and each 
concept should be recognised in Scots law. The thesis also considers when 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1. Overview of chapter 1 
This introductory chapter summarises the key research questions and 
explains why privity and its exceptions are of practical and doctrinal 
importance in Scots law. The chapter also describes the methodology and 
concludes with an overview of the thesis.  
1.2. Key research questions   
The two main aims of the thesis are to analyse and define the privity doctrine 
in Scots contract law, and to provide a taxonomy of concepts which operate 
where:  
1. There is an extra-contractual party  
2. Which has suffered loss caused by non-performance or defective 
performance of a contract 
3. And it lacks a contractual right to recover its loss 
4. And the concept provides a means of recovery for the extra-
contractual party, and/ or a means by which the contracting party 
which did not cause the loss can recover on behalf of the extra-
contractual party. 
In defining privity, the thesis analyses historical and modern case law and 
commentary on the doctrine to discuss whether privity is compatible with 
Scots contract theory and the principles of freedom to contract and freedom 
of contract. The relationship between privity and delict has proved 
controversial in situations involving third party loss, and so the thesis also 
examines the relationship between these two areas of Scots law. The thesis 
addresses whether privity does and should exist, and identifies the policy 
reasons which justify the creation of exceptions to privity. 
For the purposes of the taxonomy, the four relevant concepts are: contracts 
for the benefit of another, transferred loss, ad hoc agency, and undisclosed 
agency. The thesis also assesses whether network theory could and should 
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be recognised in Scots law, because network theory is a normative concept 
which meets the specifications outlined above.  
Third party rights are not considered, because the third party has a 
contractual right (i.e. the third party right) to recover its loss. The thesis does 
not address exclusion clauses, which allow for protection from liability rather 
than a means by which to recover loss.1 Issues of unjustified enrichment are 
also excluded from the work. The thesis addresses third party loss due to 
defective or non-performance of contracts, rather than situations in which the 
third party wishes to recover a gain made by a contracting party at its 
expense.2 Additionally, the thesis considers claims made by or on behalf of 
parties external to contracts, and so it is not relevant to this work to consider 
whether a contracting party can make an unjustified enrichment claim against 
an external party. 
The thesis considers whether these concepts are exceptions to the privity 
doctrine, determines whether the concepts are compatible with contract 
theory, and considers whether there are justifiable policy reasons in support 
of each concept. It also assesses whether any of the concepts ought to be 
classified as delictual, rather than contractual.  
The key research questions are therefore:  
1. What does ‘privity of contract’ mean in Scots law?  
2. Does and should Scots law recognise the privity doctrine?  
3. How does the privity doctrine interact with delictual liability?  
4. Which policy reasons justify the creation of exceptions to the privity 
doctrine?  
                                                          
1 Discussion on exemption clauses and privity is, however, found in: R Merkin, “Third Party 
Immunity granted under Contract” in R Merkin (ed), Privity of Contract: The Impact of the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (LLP, London/ Hong Kong, 2000) 67; JLR Davis, 
“Privity and Exclusion Clauses” in P Kincaid (ed), Privity: Private justice of public regulation 
(Ashgate, Dartmouth, 2001) 284. 
2 For an overview of the law of unjustified enrichment in Scots law, see NR Whitty and D 
Visser, “Unjustified Enrichment” in K Reid, R Zimmermann and D Visser (eds), Mixed Legal 
Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 400 at 404-406. 
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5. Are contracts for the benefit of another, transferred loss, ad hoc 
agency, and undisclosed agency:  
a. Compatible with the privity doctrine;  
b. Compatible with Scots contract theory;  
c. Classifiable as a form of delictual liability; and 
d. Justifiable in terms of policy considerations supporting each 
concept?  
6. Would Scots law’s doctrinal recognition of network theory be:  
a. Compatible with the privity doctrine;  
b. Compatible with Scots contract theory;  
c. Classifiable as a form of delictual liability; and 
d. Justifiable in terms of policy considerations?  
The thesis offers law reform proposals which would ensure that the privity 
doctrine in Scots law and the aforementioned concepts are satisfactory from 
both a structural and systematic perspective. The law must be clear, 
coherent, and capable of being applied in practice. Accordingly, the current 
law is assessed against these criteria, and the suggestions for reform meet 
these criteria.  
1.3. Justification for the topic of the thesis  
Walker comments, in respect of contract law generally, that: 
“Unfortunately it is increasingly the practice of unplanned and 
unconsidered legislation to make particular rules for particular kinds of 
contract or contracts in particular circumstances, and accordingly to 
multiply the number of specialties and of exceptions to general 
principles and rules of contract.”3  
This observation can certainly be applied to the state of the law on privity and 
its exceptions. Scots law recognises a number of exceptions to privity,4 
however, the wide range of situations in which privity is bypassed leaves the 
privity doctrine and its exceptions in a state of confusion. The danger is that 
                                                          
3 DM Walker, The law of contracts and related obligations in Scotland (T & T Clark, London, 
3rd edn, 1995) 3.4.  
4 Statutory exceptions are discussed in subsection 3.2.3. and section 5.2. 
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privity is hollowed out by its exceptions to the extent that it eventually 
collapses. Thus far, no attempts have been made in Scots law to synthesise 
the justifications for exceptions to privity. Indeed, as discussed in chapter 2,5 
there is a lack of consensus in Scots law as to whether the privity doctrine 
exists at all. The question thus arises as to whether Scots law recognises 
privity, and, if so, in which situations exceptions are and should be applied. 
The thesis provides doctrinal clarity on these issues, offering conclusions on 
the existence of the privity doctrine, the four concepts identified above, and 
policy considerations which justify new exceptions to privity.  
The thesis is therefore of practical and doctrinal importance, because it 
addresses the current confusion and lack of coherence in the law. The 
following subsections explain why doctrinal clarity would be beneficial to both 
contracting parties and third parties.  
1.3.1. The protection of contracting parties  
It is crucial that contracting parties can ascertain the existence and extent of 
their liabilities towards extra-contractual parties. Trebilcock notes that a strict 
privity doctrine completely excludes the possibility for third parties to claim 
legal rights under contracts,6 but the “opposite extreme” of delimiting the 
class of third party beneficiaries too broadly “could deter socially beneficial 
contractual relationships.”7 In other words, if contracting parties are unable to 
anticipate the costs of liability to external parties, they will enter into fewer 
socially beneficial transactions.8 This is because liability towards third parties 
affects the financial value of any commercial project or transaction, as well as 
the cost of insurance required to cover potential third party claims. 
Brownsword observes that modern commerce necessitates a business 
culture of confidence rather than fear, and “this is where the law of contract 
                                                          
5 See, in particular, subsection 2.3.1. 
6 The benefits of recognition of third party rights and other exceptions to privity are discussed 
in section 5.2. 
7 M Trebilcock, “The Doctrine of Privity of Contract” 2007 57(2) University of Toronto Law 
Journal 269 at 272. See also R Brownsword, Contract law: themes for the twenty-first 
century (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2nd edn, 2006) 8.   
8 Trebilcock (n 7) at 274.  
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makes a key contribution to the social and economic life of the nation.”9 The 
current lack of clarity on the status of privity in Scots law unnecessarily 
jeopardises parties’ confidence in Scots law transactions, whereas a clearly 
defined privity doctrine provides “peace of mind”10 for contracting parties to 
conduct business with an accurate understanding of their likely liabilities to 
third parties.    
Whilst contracting parties should not be permitted to contract with no regard 
for the consequences of their dealings for third parties,11 the law should 
provide sufficient clarity to protect them from unexpected liabilities. 
Otherwise, parties will justifiably choose to contract outwith Scots law. The 
thesis balances the competing considerations of the ability of contracting 
parties to accurately predict the risks and liabilities involved in their 
transactions, and the protection of third parties from the impact of contractual 
activities. The key contribution of the thesis is a practically workable 
framework for the former to anticipate their liability towards the latter. It is 
therefore of practical relevance in ensuring that contracting parties can apply 
clear, well-defined legal doctrine to predict liability which will result from 
defective or non-performance of a contractual obligation.  
1.3.2. The protection of third parties  
Third parties are impacted by defective or non-performance of a contract in 
many circumstances. Wilson offers various examples:12 in Glanzer v 
Shepard,13 public weighers, under contractual instruction from the seller, 
gave the buyer an incorrect certificate of weight, and the buyer overpaid in 
his contract with the seller; in Junior Books v Veitchi,14 a party was left with a 
defective floor due to the negligence of a sub-contractor with whom it was not 
                                                          
9 Brownsword, Contract law (n 7) 8. 
10 J Morgan, Great debates in contract law (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2012) 275. 
11 This is discussed in sections 5.3 and 5.4.   
12 These cases are discussed in WA Wilson, “Mapping Economic Loss”, in DM Walker and 
AJ Gamble (eds), Obligations in Context: Essays in Honour of David M Walker (W Green, 
Edinburgh, 1990) 141 at 143.  
13 Glanzer v Shepard (1922) 233 NY 236.  
14 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520.   
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in a direct contractual relationship; in The Aliakmon,15 a buyer sought to 
recover the price of goods lost due to defective performance of a contract of 
carriage between the carrier and seller. It is questionable in each case 
whether the external party can recover losses resulting from defective or non-
performance of a contract, and, if they can recover, whether the liability owed 
is contractual or delictual. It is imperative that third parties can easily predict 
whether they can recover their losses. Precise laws on the situations in which 
privity can be bypassed would allow third parties to make an informed 
decision as to whether they should bring a claim against one of the 
contracting parties. The thesis provides clarity as to when and how third 
parties can recover loss caused by defective or non-performance of a 
contract. This will protect third parties by allowing them to apply practically 
workable law to recover their losses in such situations. The thesis also 
proposes reforms to various concepts which would allow them to better 
reflect a policy of protecting third parties.  
1.3.3. Summary  
Clear, workable law on the privity doctrine and its exceptions is thus crucial 
from the perspective of both contracting and extra-contractual parties. The 
provision of a taxonomy of the exceptions to privity is therefore of practical 
importance.  
Devlin observes that:  
“Rigidity and a regular pattern are pleasing to the legal mind, and so 
as soon as he can the lawyer sets up a system of principles and rules 
from which he is reluctant to depart. He may start close to his subject, 
but because it is alive, illogical and contrary, it is likely to slip and 
slither out of the pattern he devises for it. The danger in any branch of 
the law is that it ossifies.”16 
As discussed in chapter 2,17 the privity doctrine has not been subject to 
‘maintenance’ in recent times. Its boundaries have not been discussed and 
                                                          
15 Leigh and Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd (The Aliakmon) [1986] AC 785.  
16 P Devlin, Samples of Law-making (Oxford University Press, London, 1962) 30-31. 
Emphasis added. 
17 See in particular subsections 2.3.1 and 2.4.2.1.  
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refined as new exceptions have been created, resulting in a lack of 
coherence in the law. It appears that the law has evolved to meet practical 
concerns without full consideration of its ‘bedrock’ of privity. Consequently, 
the law on privity has ‘ossified’, and the extensive range of exceptions means 
that the law is uncertain. Accordingly, the thesis’s explanation of the role of 
privity in Scots law and identification of justifications for new exceptions 
contributes to the doctrinal clarity and coherence of Scots law. Ibbetson 
notes the “startling” lack of studies on the privity doctrine in historical English 
law.18 Whilst there are now a number of English texts on the doctrine,19 this 
work constitutes the first in-depth Scots study of privity and its exceptions. 
The thesis therefore offers a significant doctrinal contribution to Scots law.   
1.4. Methodology  
There are four methodological strands in the research: doctrinal, theoretical, 
comparative, and historical. These are explained in turn in the following 
subsections.  
1.4.1. Doctrinal analysis  
Chapters 2 and 3 constitute a doctrinal examination of the privity doctrine. 
This is the foundation of the thesis: it will not be possible to taxonomise 
exceptions to privity without a thorough understanding of the privity doctrine 
itself. Chapter 4 provides a doctrinal analysis of the relationship between 
contract and delict in situations involving third party loss, and Chapter 5 
examines statutory exceptions to privity and their underlying policy 
justifications. Subsequent chapters on contracts for the benefit of another, 
transferred loss, ad hoc agency, and undisclosed agency gather and 
synthesise materials and commentary on each concept.   
                                                          
18 D Ibbetson, “English Law before 1900” in J Hallebeek and H Dondorp (eds), Contracts for 
a Third-Party Beneficiary: A Historical and Comparative Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Leiden, 2008) 93 at 93.  
19 The leading examples are P Kincaid (ed), Privity: Private justice of public regulation 
(Ashgate, Dartmouth, 2001) and M Furmston and GJ Tolhurst, Privity of Contract (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2015).  
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The key contribution of the thesis to doctrinal scholarship is therefore the 
provision of a full analysis of the privity doctrine in Scots contract law, 
including its relationship with delict, and an examination of concepts which 
allow for recovery of extra-contractual losses, both statutory and common 
law. 
1.4.2. Theoretical analysis 
The thesis involves theoretical analysis on the question of whether the privity 
doctrine itself, as understood in Scots law, is compatible with the dominant 
theories of Scots contract law and the principles of freedom to contract and 
freedom of contract. Contracts for the benefit of another, transferred loss, ad 
hoc agency and undisclosed agency are also analysed from the perspective 
of whether they are compatible with Scots contract theory. This is to ensure 
that the theoretical classification of privity and each concept is compatible 
with Scots law as a whole, workable in practice, and theoretically sound.   
Network theory is a normative exception to privity in the sense that it is a 
theoretical model. It has not been expressly recognised or applied to date in 
Scots law.  Chapter 10 provides a theoretical analysis addressing whether a 
form of network theory, external network liability, could and should be 
recognised in Scots law. The chapter includes comment on the compatibility 
of the concept with Scots contract theory.   
1.4.3. Comparative law  
Whilst the thesis focusses primarily on Scots law, it also contains extensive 
research and analysis on English law. Scots and English law share many 
statutory exceptions to privity,20 and Scots law’s acceptance of transferred 
loss21 was based on an English House of Lords case.22 The Scots and 
English laws on undisclosed agency and contracts for the benefit of another 
                                                          
20 For further discussion, see JN Adams, D Beyleveld, and R Brownsword, “Privity of 
Contract – the Benefits and Burdens of Law Reform” 1997 60(2) Modern Law Review 238 at 
243, and section 5.2.  
21 McLaren Murdoch & Hamilton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group 2003 SCLR 323. 
22 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518.  
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are also closely intertwined.23 It is not, however, intended that the thesis 
constitutes a full and detailed comparison between Scots and English law. 
Rather, English law is consulted and distinguished from Scots law where 
necessary.  
Chapter 10, on network theory, assesses the work of German academic 
Gunther Teubner, because Teubner’s work is the source of this theory.24 
German law is not, however, consulted in other chapters.  
There are therefore elements of comparative law within the thesis, but it is 
not a comparative project. The purpose of the thesis is to provide a study of 
privity and its exceptions in Scots law.   
1.4.4. Historical law 
The thesis contains an in-depth historical analysis of the development of the 
privity doctrine in Scots law. As such, it constitutes the first work to fully 
consider the historical and current definition of privity in Scots contract law. 
To a lesser extent, the thesis also examines the historical development of 
undisclosed agency, in order to understand its doctrinal and policy 
background. Extensive historical research is not provided in respect of 
contracts for the benefit of another, transferred loss, and ad hoc agency, 
because these concepts are relatively novel.  
1.5. The scope of ‘loss’ 
The thesis does not seek to contribute to the doctrinal understanding of ‘loss’ 
in Scots contract law. Rather, it identifies and analyses the situations in which 
third parties are adversely affected by defective or non-performance of 
contractual obligations, and ascertains whether resulting losses ought to be 
                                                          
23 See sections 9.2 and 6.2 respectively.  
24 G Teubner, Networks as Connected Contracts (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011). The text is 
a translation of the German original: G Teubner, Netzwerk als Vertragsverbund. Virtuelle 
Unternehmen, Franchising, just-in-time in sozialwissenschaftlicher und juristischer Sicht 
(Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2004). 
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recoverable. Defective or non-performance of a contract may result in third 
party loss in terms of personal injury, damage to property, or financial loss.25  
1.6. Overview of the thesis  
Chapters 2 and 3 provide a historical analysis of the privity doctrine, argue 
that privity does exist in Scots law, and explain that privity is compatible with 
Scots contract theory and the principles of freedom to contract and freedom 
of contract. It is submitted in chapter 3 that recognition of third party rights 
alongside privity is logically sound.  
Chapter 4 addresses the contentious relationship between the privity doctrine 
and delictual liability. It concludes that delictual recovery of a third party’s loss 
does not constitute an exception to privity. The chapter also finds that 
concurrent liability in contract and delict in situations involving extra-
contractual loss is and should be permissible.    
Statutory exceptions to privity are identified and examined in chapter 5. It is 
argued that exceptions to privity should be recognised where doing so 
upholds the intentions of the contracting parties, or where doing so reflects a 
sound policy consideration. The policy considerations identified in the 
examination of the statutory exceptions are: physical or financial protection of 
weaker parties, ensuring recovery of loss caused by breach of contract, and 
commercial necessity.  
Chapters 6 (contracts for the benefit of another), 7 (transferred loss), 8 (ad 
hoc agency), and 9 (undisclosed agency) assess whether each concept is 
compatible with the privity doctrine and Scots contract theory, whether it 
could be explained in terms of delictual liability, and whether it is supported 
by sound policy considerations. The thesis concludes that: 
• Contracts for the benefit of another should be recognised in Scots law 
as a passive form of third party rights. The concept is compatible with 
privity and Scots contract theory.  
                                                          
25 See discussion in R Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) ch 
3.   
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• Transferred loss in its current form is not an exception to privity, but it 
is incompatible with contract theory. It could potentially be 
taxonomised as a delictual concept, but this would not be doctrinally 
satisfactory. Transferred loss should be reformed to allow the third 
party to bring a contractual action in its own name. If this reform was 
permitted, transferred loss would operate as an exception to privity. It 
would, however, be underpinned by sound policy considerations, 
allowing the concept to be recognised as a justifiable exception to 
privity.  
• Undisclosed agency and ad hoc agency should be abolished, because 
they both deviate from privity and contract theory with no sound policy 
justification. Further, neither concept can be explained in terms of 
delictual liability.  
In chapter 10, it is argued that external network liability should be recognised 
in Scots law. Whilst it is not compatible with privity, Scots contract theory, or 
delictual liability, there are sound policy considerations which justify the 
doctrinal recognition of external network liability. It should therefore be 







Chapter 2: The Privity Doctrine 
2.1. Overview of chapter 2 
This chapter defines the privity doctrine. It provides a historical overview of 
the use of the word ‘privity’ in its ordinary and legal meanings and examines 
the historical development of the doctrine in Scots and English law. The 
chapter considers both purposes of the privity doctrine: protecting contracting 
parties from liability towards third parties and protecting third parties from 
being burdened under contracts to which they are not party.26  
2.2. Definitional issues 
This section concerns the linguistic development of the term ‘privity’, both 
within and outwith the context of Scots private law.   
2.2.1. Historical development of the word ‘privity’  
In the English language, the word ‘privity’ was taken from the French 
privauté, meaning ‘privacy’.27 Historically, when one took a walk in private, 
the journey was called a ‘privity-walk’.28 Whilst there are no entries for ‘privity’ 
in the Scottish National Dictionary,29 the Dictionary of the Older Scottish 
Tongue30 yields several results, all with connotations of privacy, secrecy, 
intimacy, or seclusion. These definitions are reflected in the ordinary modern 
                                                          
26 Both aspects of privity are outlined in: A Mason, “Privity – A Rule in Search of Decent 
Burial?” in P Kincaid (ed), Privity: Private justice of public regulation (Ashgate, Dartmouth, 
2001) 88 at 88.  
27 VV Palmer, The paths to privity: a history of third party beneficiary contracts at English law 
(Austin & Winfield, San Francisco, 1992) 7, citing S Johnson, Dictionary of the English 
Language (J & P Knapton, London, 1755) “Privity”. See also J Baker, “Privity of Contract in 
the Common Law before 1680” in EJH Schrage (ed), Ius quaesitum tertio (Duncker & 
Humblot, Berlin, 2008) 35 at 35.    
28 “Privity: compounds” in the Oxford English Dictionary (online edition, available at: 
http://www.oed.com/ and accessed 3 July 2018). For further discussion of the earlier usage 
of the term, see Palmer, Paths to privity (n 27) 6. 
29 The Scottish National Dictionary (online edition, available at: 
http://www.dsl.ac.uk/results/privity and accessed 3 July 2018). 
30 The Dictionary of the Older Scottish Tongue (online edition, available at: 
http://www.dsl.ac.uk/results/privity and accessed 3 July 2018). 
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meaning of the word, which indicates secret matters or plans, private 
thoughts, counsel, or business affairs, privacy, and close familiarity.31   
2.2.2. Use of ‘privity’ in the context of contract law  
The contractual meaning of ‘privity’ is relatively clear. The Oxford English 
Dictionary (‘OED’) offers the following definition of privity in its contractual 
sense:  
“the limitation of a contractual relationship to the two parties making 
the contract, which prevents any action at law by an interested third 
party such as a beneficiary.”32  
This definition broadly aligns with legal commentary.33 This aspect of the 
privity doctrine does not prevent a contract from conferring incidental benefits 
on third parties.34 For example, a contract between a landowner and an 
architect for an inner-city housing development may have a positive effect on 
local homeowners, in terms of increased housing prices and a greater supply 
of amenities. Whilst privity does not prevent these incidental benefits, it 
prevents third parties from enforcing contracts which incidentally benefit 
them. 
However, the OED definition only accounts for one aspect of the privity 
doctrine, namely, preventing third parties from claiming on or attempting to 
enforce a contract to which they are not party. The second aspect of privity 
prevents extra-contractual parties from being burdened by contractual 
                                                          
31 “Privity” in Oxford English Dictionary (n 28) (accessed 3 July 2018). See also the entries 
therein for “privy”.   
32 “Privity” in Oxford English Dictionary (n 28) (accessed 3 July 2018). 
33 See, for example, P Kincaid, “Preface” in P Kincaid (ed), Privity: Private justice of public 
regulation (Ashgate, Dartmouth, 2001) xi at xi; A Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law 
of Contract (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) §45; P Sutherland, “Third-Party 
Contracts” in H MacQueen and R Zimmermann, European Contract Law: Scots and South 
African Perspectives (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2006) 201 at 204. The views 
of further commentators are examined below (see, in particular, subsections 2.3.1. and 
2.4.2.2.). 
34 Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 8.23. The authors assume that Scots law does not 
recognise the privity doctrine (8.20), but their comments on the scope of privity apply equally 
in Scotland.  
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obligations. The nuances of both aspects of the privity doctrine in Scots and 
English law are discussed further below.35   
Privity in contract is sometimes denoted by the Latin maxim res inter alios 
acta aliis nec nocet nec prodest.36 The thesis uses the terms ‘privity’, ‘privity 
of contract’, and ‘the privity doctrine’.  
2.2.3. Privity without contract?  
Various Scots authorities indicate that it is possible for parties to be ‘in privity’ 
without being in a direct contractual relationship. In 1933, the Lord Justice-
Clerk (Lord Alness) considered that the Road Traffic Act 1930 section 36(4), 
which provided that insurers were liable in respect of third parties falling 
within the scope of those covered by their policies, may establish privity of 
contract between the insurance company and an injured third party.37 More 
recently, Lord Skerrington commented that “there was no privity of contract 
except between the parties who contracted directly or indirectly with each 
other.”38 Lord Moncrieff39 and Lord Cuninghame40 note (respectively) that 
brokers and agents may create privity between third parties and their clients/ 
principals. However, these cases represent a small minority of the total 
number of cases discussing privity in Scots law.  On the whole, Scots case 
law indicates that privity refers only to a direct relationship between 
contractual parties.41  
                                                          
35 The first aspect is discussed further below at subsection 2.3.2, and the second at section 
subsection 2.3.3.  
36 ‘A thing done between others does not harm or benefit others.’ See TB Smith, Short 
Commentary on the Law of Scotland (W Green, Edinburgh, 1962) 773. 
37 Greenlees v Port of Manchester Insurance Co. 1933 SC 383 at 397 per Lord Justice-Clerk 
(Alness). He did, however, find that the provision did not establish a direct right of action on 
the part of the third party. 
38 Emphasis added. Stuart v Potter, Choate & Prentice (Outer House, unreported) per Lord 
Skerrington, produced in Stuart v Potter, Choate & Prentice 1911 1 SLT 377 at 379. See 
also Lord Skerrington’s comments in Bertram, Gardner, & Co.'s Trustee v King's 
Remembrancer 1920 SC 555 at 562. 
39 Lamont, Macquisten & Co. v Inglis (1903) 11 SLT 409 at 409 per Lord Moncrieff.  
40 Farrar and Rooth and Mandatory v North British Banking Co. (1850) 12 D 1190 at 1193 
per Lord Cuninghame.  
41 A discussion of these cases follows at subsection 2.3.1  
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At least one English judge has indicated that privity may arise outwith a direct 
contractual relationship. In Collis v Selden, Bovill CJ questioned whether 
there was “any contract or privity between the plaintiff and defendant out of 
which a liability could arise”.42 This could be taken as implying that the 
notions of privity and contract are separate. However, this can also be 
construed as referring to ‘privity of contract or proximity between’ the plaintiff 
and defendant. None of the judgments cited appear to be intended to make 
substantive comment on the privity doctrine itself. Rather, the statements 
were made in the context of determining which of the parties may owe liability 
based on the presence of contractual ties. Arguments based on the creation 
of privity outwith a direct contract were dismissed in Clavering, Son & Co. v 
Hope.43 The Scots and English authorities implying that privity might arise 
between non-contractual parties appear therefore to be discussing only 
whether the parties are closely interlinked despite their lack of contractual 
relationship.   
2.2.4. Uses of ‘privity’ which are not relevant to the thesis 
Numerous cases mention ‘privity’ without necessarily referring to privity of 
contract. The non-legal use of the word ‘privity’, in the sense of proximity or 
nearness, is found in many Scots44 and English45 cases. In England, it has 
been adopted judicially as a synonym for ‘private’.46 In a Scottish case, a 
man purchased two flats in neighbouring tenement properties and wished to 
build a door from the common stair in one property directly into his flat in the 
neighbouring property. This was successfully prevented by another user of 
the common stair on the grounds that creating the door would interfere with 
the “privity” in the common stair.47 Perhaps the most prevalent extra-
contractual use of the term ‘privity’ in the Scottish courts is as a synonym for 
                                                          
42 Collis v Selden (1867-68) LR 3 CP 495 at 497 per Bovill, CJ. 
43 Clavering, Son & Co. v Hope (1897) 4 SLT 300 at 302 per Lord Stormonth Darling.  
44 See, for example, Henry v Gladstone 1933 SC 283 at 309 per Lord Murray and Alastair 
M’Iain M’Donald v Miss Elizabeth Moore Menzies M’Donald and Miss Adriana M’Donald 
(1879) 6 R 521 at 537 per Lord Gifford.  
45 Henry Munster v Richard Cobden Cox (1885) 10 App. Cas. 680 at 686 per Earl of 
Selborne LC. 
46 Residuum of Sir Francis Englefields Case (1573) 4 L 169.  
47 Gellatly v Arrol (1863) 1 M 592 at 602 per Lord Benholme. 
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‘knowledge’ or ‘concern’.48 The term has been used similarly in England.49 In 
The King v Ward,50 for example, a young woman eloped to Scotland with the 
“privity” of her aunt, who was the subject of an action to have her returned to 
England.  
In terms of other legal doctrines, privity of contract ought not to be confused 
with privity of estate. The latter refers to situations in which two or more 
parties have legal rights and obligations in respect of the same estate (i.e. 
their estates cover the same immovable property).51 The concept developed 
due to the difficulties privity posed to landlords where leases were transferred 
from one tenant to another. If the second tenant defaults, privity normally 
prevents the landlord from suing that tenant, but privity of estate allows the 
landlord to sue the new tenant.52 This concept has been recognised and 
discussed judicially in Scotland,53 and is recognised in English case law54 
and commentary, for example, as one of the four main forms of privity 
                                                          
48 Scots cases include: Watson v George Gibson & Co 1908 SC 1092 at 1096-1097 per Lord 
Stormonth-Darling; Lunnie v Glasgow and South-Western Railway Co. (1906) 8 F 546 at 550 
per Lord Kyllachy; Potter v Bartholomew (1847) 10 D 97 at 108 per Lord Cuninghame W; 
Willox v Young or Farrell (1847) 9 D 766 at 778 per Lord Jeffry; Samuel Stirling and others v 
Robert Forrester (1821) III B 575 at 585. 
49 See, for example: Versloot Dredging BV and another v HDI Gerling Industrie Versicherung 
AG and others [2016] UKSC 45 at 60 and 62 per Lord Hughes; Barclays Bank plc v Ente 
Nazionale di Previdenza ed Assistenza dei Medici e degli Odontoiatri [2016] EWCA Civ. 
1261 at para 22 per Moore-Bick LJ; The Midland Insurance Company v Smith and Wife 
(1881) 6 QBD 561 at 567- 568 per Watkin Williams J.  
50 The King v Ward (1762) 1 Blackstone W 386. 
51 Law Commission, Report on Landlord and Tenant Law: Privity of Contract and Estate 
(Law Com No 74, 1993) 2.1-3.  
52 R Merkin, “The Burden of Contracts and the Doctrine of Privity” in R Merkin (ed), Privity of 
Contract: The Impact of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (Informa Law, 
London/ Hong Kong, 2000) 79 at 4.2. Bankton acknowledged the English concept of privity 
of estate: AM Bankton, An institute of the law of Scotland in civil rights: with observations 
upon the agreement or diversity between them and the laws of England (Stair Society, 
Edinburgh, 1994 reprint of the 1751 edition) 1.201.6. See also Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph. 
774 and GJ Bell, Principles of the law of Scotland vol 1 (10th edn. 1889, reprinted by Law 
Society of Scotland, Butterworths, Edinburgh, 1989) 895A.  
53 Spiers and Others v Morgan (1901) 9 SLT 162 at 164 per Lord Kincairney; Earl of Zetland 
v Hislop and Others (1882) 9 R (HL) 40 at 48 per Lord Watson.  
54 Budana v The Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust and Another [2017] EWCA Civ. 1980 
at para 55 per Gloster LJ; Pye v Stodday Land Ltd and another [2016] EWHC 2454 at para 
32 per Norris J; Titterton v Cooper (1882) 9 QBD 473 at 489 per Brett LJ; Bridget Ann 
Papendick v William Bridgwater (1855) 5 E & B 166 at 176 per Lord Campbell; The Marquis 
of Anglesey v Lord Hatherton and Another (1842) 10 M & W 218 at 247 per Rolfe B.  
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identified by Coke.55 A similar concept, “privity of tenure”, is discussed in 
Johnston v Irons.56 
Bankton refers to privity in blood.57 For example, the privileges afforded by 
infancy can be used by “the infant himself, and his representative privies in 
blood”.58  
Privity has also been used to indicate an individual’s proximity to a crime, 
resulting in liability for the commission of that crime.59 A court’s ‘privity of 
jurisdiction’ refers to the competence of a court to hear a particular case.60  
None of these uses of the term are relevant to the examination of privity in 
contract law, and so are not discussed further in the thesis.  
2.3. The privity doctrine in Scots law  
This section considers the historical development of both aspects of privity in 




                                                          
55 E Coke, A Commentary upon Littleton (Brooks, Oxford, 15th edn, 1794) vol II, Lib 3, Cap 
8, sec 461, 271a. See also Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 7.06.    
56 Johnston v Irons 1909 SC 305 at 312 and 316 per Lord President Dunedin. See also 
discussion on the concept of “horizontal privity” in US law in M Lewyn, “The Puzzling 
Persistence of Horizontal Privity” 2013 27(3) Probate and Property 32. According to this 
doctrine, the burden of a restrictive covenant usually runs with the land only if the parties to 
the original covenant are in ‘horizontal privity’, or, in other words, they have an interest in the 
same land.   
57 Bankton, Institute (n 52) 1.200.5 and 2.243.9.  
58 Ibid. 1.200.5. In English law, see Coke, Commentary (n 55) vol II, Lib 3, Cap 8, sec 461, 
271a; John Stowel, Esquire v George Zouch, Lord Zouch Saintmaure and Cautelupe (1563) 
1 P 353 at 363. 
59 Jameson v Barty (1893) 1 Adam 92 at 95 per The Lord Justice-Clerk (Lord Kingsburgh): 
“privity to the act of poaching”; and Mackenzie & Johnston (1846) Ark. 135 at 136 per Lord 
Justice-Clerk (Lord Hope): “If there was privity, even by so slight a communication with the 
actual thief as a nod or a wink, that would make the party so privy, guilty of theft art and 
part”.   
60 For example, Fitzpatrick v Glasgow District Licensing Board and Another 1978 SLT (Sh. 
Ct.) 63 at 64 per Sheriff Principal R. Reid, QC, citing Lundie v Magistrates of Falkirk (1890) 
18 R 60 at 65-66 per Lord President Inglis. See also the Judiciary of Scotland’s Glossary 
definition of ‘Privitative jurisdiction’, available at: http://www.scotland-
judiciary.org.uk/29/0/Glossary/a#P and accessed 3 July 2018. 
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2.3.1. Historical development of privity in Scots law 
The privity doctrine is manifested in numerous contexts in Scots law. For 
example, a creditor may not sue its debtor’s debtor,61 and a party cannot sue 
on a contract purely on the grounds that it has a financial interest in its 
fulfilment.62 The doctrine is recognised by the Scottish Law Commission,63 
and privity is also expressly acknowledged in academic commentary. Walker 
encompasses both aspects of privity in his statement that it is:  
“clear and well-settled, that under a contract between two parties no 
third party either acquires rights or comes under duties by virtue of the 
contract. Consequently no third party can, in general, sue for 
performance of a contract or for damages for breach thereof, nor be 
sued for performance or for damages.”64  
According to Gloag, one cannot assume from a party’s decision to enter into 
a contractual obligation the intention to be bound to: 
“anyone who may think that the fulfilment of that obligation would be 
advantageous to him, and hence it is a general rule that only the 
parties to a contract have a title to sue upon it.”65  
Thomas Smith observes that a “contract can neither benefit nor bind a 
stranger to it.”66 Similarly, Rankine notes that the lack of privity of contract 
between a lessor and sublessee means that “no rights or obligations can 
arise directly between them on the footing of contract”.67 A clear declaration 
of the doctrine’s existence in Scots law can be found in the most recent 
edition of Gloag and Henderson:  
“Scots law recognises the principle of privity of contract. In the 
ordinary case the only persons whose rights and liabilities are affected 
                                                          
61 Henderson v Robb 1889 16 R 341; Gill’s Trs v Patrick 1889 126 R 403; Prudential 
Assurance Co v Cheyne 1884 11 R 871. 
62 Finnie v Glasgow and South-Western Railway Co (1857) 20 D (HL) 2 at 4 per Lord 
Cranworth.  
63 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Third Party Rights in Contract (Scot Law 
Com DP No 157, 2014) 2.13. 
64 Walker, Contracts (n 3) 29.1.  
65 WM Gloag, The law of contract: a treatise on the principles of contract in the law of 
Scotland (W Green, Edinburgh, 2nd edn, 1929) 218. See also 219.  
66 Smith, Short Commentary (n 36) 773.  
67 J Rankine, Principles of the law of Scotland (W Green, Edinburgh, 20th edn, 1903) 197. 
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by a contract are the contracting parties. Strangers to the contract 
have no right to sue upon it and incur no liabilities under it.”68 
MacQueen has, however, firmly stated that there is “no equivalent [in Scots 
law] to the common law doctrine of privity”,69 seemingly because Scots law 
recognises third party rights and assignation.70 The relationship between 
third party rights and privity, including MacQueen’s comments, is discussed 
in chapter 3.71 It is noted at this stage that academic acceptance of privity in 
Scotland is not absolute.  
Scots law lacks a definitive judicial statement on the existence and exact 
meaning of privity in contract. Nonetheless, the concept is accepted judicially. 
Some judges, though not mentioning privity by name, recognise the principle 
that third parties cannot generally sue upon a contract to which they are not 
party. For example, Lord Low states that:  
“If the company alone had been pursuers, I should have had difficulty 
in sustaining the title, because there was never any contract between 
them and the defenders. But the individual pursuers are in a different 
position, because they are the very parties with whom the contract 
was admittedly made”.72 
Other judges have expressly used the term ‘privity of contract’. In Borders 
Regional Council v J Smart & Co. (Contractors) Ltd., for example, it was said 
that:  
“There was no privity of contract between the first parties and 
Macdougalls. There was accordingly no question of the first parties 
having any recourse against Macdougalls.”73 
                                                          
68 H MacQueen and Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson: The Law of Scotland (W 
Green, Edinburgh, 14th edn, 2017) 8.01.  
69 HL MacQueen, The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia: Obligations: 
Contract (vol 15) (hereafter “SME”), (LexisNexis/ Law Society of Scotland, London/ 
Edinburgh, 1995) para 814. See also Norrie’s statement that “Scots law has never been 
troubled by the English concept of privity of contract”: K Norrie, “Professional Negligence” in 
JM Thomson (ed), Scottish Universities Law Institute: Delict (Thomson/ W Green, 2007) ch 
19 at 19.11.  
70 MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 814.  
71 See, in particular, subsection 3.2.2. 
72 MacLaren and Others v Mayberry and Others (1904) 11 SLT 636 at 637 per Lord Low.  




This understanding of privity – that extra-contractual parties cannot accrue 
enforceable benefits under a contract and cannot bring contractual claims 
against those with whom they lack a direct contractual relationship – is long-
accepted in Scots law. According to a judgment given by Lord Brougham in 
1837:  
“All conditions annexed to the enjoyment of property… are to be 
strictly construed as against the granter and in the grantee's favour, 
but especially as between the granter and parties who have no privity 
of contract with him”.74 
Similarly, Lord Adam has recognised the difficulty in ascertaining the basis of 
a contractual claim by a pursuer against a defender, “there being no privity of 
contract between them”.75 Throughout the nineteenth century, there are 
numerous other Scots law cases which assume the validity of privity of 
contract, and rely upon the doctrine to prevent recovery by extra-contractual 
parties.76 Tulloch v Davidson refers to the absence of “privity of contract 
between the parties, out of which legal liability could be inferred, or right of 
action could emerge”.77 This indicates that the right to sue in contract must 
stem from privity. Further, it is clear that privity of contract cannot be implied 
without the existence of a valid and enforceable contract. 78 Towards the end 
of the nineteenth century, Lord Adam stated that:  
“the fact that A has employed B to do something for the benefit of C, 
does not confer on C a right of action against B for any loss which he 
may have sustained through B’s negligence, and for the plain reason 
that there is no privity of contract between B and C. That is exactly 
what this case comes to.”79 
                                                          
74 Tailors of Aberdeen v Coutts (1837) 2 SM 609 at 667 per Lord Brougham.  
75 William Robertson v James Ross & Company (1892) 19 R 967 at 970 per Lord Adam. 
76 For example: Blumer v Scott (1874) 1 R 379 at 386 per Lord Ardmillan; Morier and Others 
v Brownlie and Others (1895) 3 SLT 27 at 29 per Lord Low; Edinburgh United Breweries, 
Limited, and Others v James A. Molleson and Another (1894) 21 R (HL) 10 at 16 per Lord 
Watson.  
77 Tulloch v Davidson (1858) 20 D 1045 at 1056-1057 per Lord Cowan.  
78 McEwan v Campbell and Others (1853) 16 D 117 at 125 per Lord Ivory. 
79 Tully v Ingram (1891) 19 R 65 at 75-76 per Lord Adam.  
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Judicial commentary indicates that privity was used to prevent actions on the 
part of third parties. Privity appears, therefore, to have been viewed by 
judges in this period as an exclusionary device. 
Privity has been similarly recognised throughout the twentieth century. The 
last century has not seen a great deal of judicial discussion on the nuances 
of the doctrine. Rather, its validity and existence as a requisite for title to sue 
has been accepted and applied.80 Whilst Lord Thankerton accepts that 
parties may demonstrate patrimonial interest other than by privity,81 it is clear 
in the case law in the twentieth century that privity was recognised as a 
requirement to sue on a contract. In 1964, Lord Sorn recognised the 
“ordinary rules of privity” in Eagle Lodge, Limited v Keir and Cawder Estates, 
Limited.82 
It should be noted that Lord Deas’ comments in one First Division case may 
cast doubt upon the existence of the privity doctrine in Scots law. In the case, 
a Dundee company had arranged for goods to be delivered to a company in 
Glasgow by a railway company. When the Dundee company became 
bankrupt, the railway company declined to deliver the goods to the Glasgow 
company. The question arose as to whether the Glasgow company could sue 
the railway company for the goods, and Lord Deas commented that:  
“The general principle recognised in England seems to be that you 
can go only against the company with whom the contract was made, 
and that there being no privity of contract with the other company… it 
is incompetent to go against them. I am not, at present, prepared to 
say that that is the law of Scotland, but I should desire to give very 
grave and deliberate consideration to the question before coming to a 
decision upon it.”83 
                                                          
80 George Heriot's Trust v Carter and Others (1902) 10 SLT 514 at 516 per Lord Pearson; 
Anderson v Dickie 1915 SC (HL) 79 at 81 per Lord Kinnear and at 90 per Lord Dunedin; 
Michelin Tyre Company Limited v Macfarlane (Glasgow) Limited (in Liquidation) 1916 2 SLT 
221 at 226 per Lord Skerrington; McHale v Fife Coal Company Limited 1947 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 
77 at 78 per Sheriff John A Lille KC; MacDougall v MacDougall's Executors 1994 SLT 1178 
at 1183 per Lord Cameron of Lochbroom.  
81 Aberdeen Varieties Ltd v James F Donald (Aberdeen Cinemas) Ltd 1940 SC (HL) 52 at 55 
per Lord Thankerton. 
82 Eagle Lodge, Limited v Keir and Cawder Estates, Limited 1964 SC 30 at 45 per Lord Sorn. 
83 Scottish Central Railway Co. v Ferguson & Co. (1863) 1 M 750 at 756 per Lord Deas.  
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He also refers to “what [the English] call a ‘privity of contract’”, perhaps 
implying that Scots law does not recognise privity. It is unclear whether he 
intended for his comments to be applied to Scots law only in the context of 
company liability, or whether his comments cast doubt on the existence of 
privity in Scots law generally. If the correct interpretation is the latter, 
however, the case can be viewed as an ‘outlier’: the vast majority of Scots 
cases which mention privity assume that it is recognised in Scots law. 
Another ‘outlier’ is Clark Contracts Ltd v The Burrell Co (Construction 
Management) Ltd (No 2), in which Sheriff Taylor referred to privity as “an 
English problem”.84 However, he does not expressly exclude the possibility 
that Scots law recognises privity to some extent, and he also refers to 
“England’s approach to the doctrine of privity of contract.”85 One could infer 
from this statement that Scots law takes a different, less problematic 
approach to privity.  
Perhaps the strongest judicial statement in favour of privity is its 
acknowledgement in United Dominions Trust v Taylor as “fundamental to the 
common law of contract”.86 In the case, the defender’s interpretation of the 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 section 75(1) was rejected by Sheriff Principal 
Reid on the ground that it contravened privity.87 The provision states that: 
“[if] the debtor under a debtor-creditor-supplier agreement… has, in 
relation to a transaction financed by the agreement, any claim against 
the supplier in respect of a misrepresentation or breach of contract, he 
shall have a like claim against the creditor, who, with the supplier, 
shall accordingly be jointly and severally liable to the debtor”.  
The pursuer had loaned the defender money for the purchase of a car from a 
supplier. Due to the defective state of the car, the defender informed the 
pursuer that he viewed the contract as breached, and the pursuer sued the 
defender for return of the loan payments. The defender argued that his 
                                                          
84 Clark Contracts Ltd v The Burrell Co (Construction Management) Ltd (No 2) 2003 SLT 
(Sh. Ct.) 73 at para 7 per Sheriff Taylor.  
85 Ibid. at para 37 per Sheriff Taylor. 
86 United Dominions Trust v Taylor 1980 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 28 at 31 per the Sheriff Principal R 
Reid QC. 
87 Ibid. This was followed in Forward Trust Ltd v Hornsby and Windermere Aquatic Ltd 1995 
SCLR 574 per Sheriff Simpson. 
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rescission affected both the contract of sale with the supplier of the car, and 
the loan agreement with the pursuer. Sheriff Principal Reid concluded that 
the suggestion that the provision could create “linked transactions” containing 
contracts with different parties and interdependent fates was not compatible 
with privity of contract.88 Whilst his judgement as a whole has been subject to 
academic criticism,89 his statement that privity is fundamental to Scots 
contract law has not. 
Privity has also been recognised more recently, in the current century. For 
example, Lord Reed recognises that landlords cannot sue sub-tenants 
directly due to privity of contract.90 Further, Lord Eassie has acknowledged 
Duke of Queensberry's Exrs91 as an authority for the rule that there is “no 
privity of contract between [a] landlord and [a] subtenant”,92 describing privity 
as a “well established rule”.93 Lord Drummond Young referred in 2006 to the 
“ordinary principles of privity of contract”.94 
Recently, in a case in which a finance company entered into a contract with 
contractors for a new head office and sought to claim for defective work, Lord 
Drummond Young stated that:  
“privity of contract prevents any direct contractual action by the party 
who suffers the loss [i.e. the finance company] against sub-contractors 
or works contractors, or any member of the professional team.”95  
This is also reflected in earlier Outer House construction cases involving 
chains of contracts between contractors, sub-contractors, sub-sub-
                                                          
88 United Dominions Trust v Taylor 1980 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 28 at 31 per Sheriff Principal R Reid 
QC.  
89 See discussion in Durkin v DSG Retail Ltd 2010 SC 662 at para 41 (submissions for the 
second respondents). 
90 Douglas Shelf Seven Ltd v Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd and Kwik Save Group Plc 
[2007] CSOH 53 at para 577 per Lord Reed.  
91 Duke of Queensberry's Executors v Maxwell (1831) 5 W & S 771.  
92 Sears Properties Netherlands BV v Coal Pension Properties Ltd 2001 SLT 761 at 765 per 
Lord Eassie.  
93 Ibid. at 766 per Lord Eassie. 
94 Laurence McIntosh Limited v Balfour Beatty Group Limited and The Trustees of the 
National Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197 at para 33 per Lord Drummond Young. See 
also A Warrender, “Title to sue and assignation” April 18 2007 Contract Journal 32.  
95 Scottish Widows Services Ltd v Harmon/ CRM Facades Ltd (in liquidation) 2010 SLT 1102 
at para 1 per Lord Drummond Young. 
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contractors, and so on.96 The principle that chains of contracts cannot create 
privity outwith the context of a direct contractual relationship is also found in 
earlier cases involving feu duties.97 
Whilst the ‘fundamentals’ of privity are impliedly accepted, there is a dearth of 
judicial comment on the nuances of the doctrine and the situations in which it 
may be circumvented. Only a small handful of cases emphasise that privity is 
an inherent part of Scots law. In MacLachlan v Sinclair & Co.,98 for example, 
Sheriff Dundas relied on Erskine’s Principles in his assumption that privity of 
contract is accepted in Scots law.99 However, privity is not expressly 
recognised in any of the main Scots Institutional Writings. It is perhaps the 
case that privity is viewed judicially as a matter of common sense, and Scots 
judges have not felt any great need to emphasise its existence and validity.   
Accordingly, it can certainly be said that Scots law recognises the privity 
doctrine, but its academic and judicial acceptance is neither absolute nor 
uncontroversial. In light of the lack of judicial statement on privity’s exact 
definition and scope, privity holds a tenuous position in Scots law. It is not 
clear from the above examples that the judges who apply the doctrine have 
considered privity in any depth, nor that they wish for their statements to be 
taken as a firm endorsement of privity in Scots contract law. Academic 
support for privity is stronger, encompassing a range of firm statements 
defining and recognising the doctrine, although some do not recognise privity 
in Scots law.  
 
                                                          
96 Balfour Beatty Ltd v Britannia Life Ltd 1997 SLT 10 at 16 per Lord Penrose. See also JB 
Mackenzie (Edinburgh) Ltd. v Lord Advocate 1972 SC 231 at 237 per Lord Kissen.  
97 In Sandeman v The Scottish Property and Building Society and Others (1885) 10 App. 
Cas. 553, for example, it was found that there was no privity of contract between a prime 
superior and sub-feuer, and consequently the latter party was bound to pay only the mid-
superior (with whom he was in a direct contractual relationship).   
98 MacLachlan v Sinclair & Co. (1897) 5 SLT 155. 
99 J Erskine, Principles of the law of Scotland (Bell & Bradfute, Edinburgh, 19th edn, 1895) 
2.6.14: “There being no privity of contract between the landlord and the sub-lessor, neither 
party can bring a direct action on the contract [between the tenant and sub-lessor]” (cited in 
MacLachlan v Sinclair & Co. (1897) 5 SLT 155 at 157 per Sheriff Dundas).  
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2.3.2. Benefiting the third party 
The academic and judicial material discussed above demonstrates that 
privity in Scots law bars third parties from suing under contracts to which they 
are not party. There are two possible interpretations of these cases and 
academic opinions. It could be that the external parties may not derive 
contractual rights under contracts to which they are not party, or they could 
be excluded from deriving any rights from the contract.  
Some of the statements considered above are ambiguous. For example, it 
has been said that a lack of privity means that the external party did not have 
“any recourse” against one of the contracting parties.100 In another case, it 
was stated that, where there is no privity, the external party cannot “go 
against” the contracting parties.101 These judicial comments do not expressly 
explain whether the external party is barred from making only contractual 
claims, or whether their lack of privity means that they cannot make a claim 
of any nature against the contracting parties.  
However, Lord Drummond Young has clearly stated that privity “prevents any 
direct contractual action” by external parties.102 Walker’s definition also 
clearly provides that the effect of privity is that “no third party can, in general, 
sue for performance of a contract or for damages for breach thereof”.103 
These comments indicate that privity bars contractual claims only.  
There is no definitive statement in Scots law that privity bars all legal claims 
by external parties against contracting parties. Further, parties to a contract 
cannot treat their contractual relationship as a protective shield against any 
and all legal claims which external parties might have against them. For 
example, privity would not protect contracting parties against their obligations 
                                                          
100 Borders Regional Council v J. Smart & Co. (Contractors) Ltd. 1983 SLT 164 at 172 per 
Lord Brand. 
101 Scottish Central Railway Co. v Ferguson & Co. (1863) 1 M 750 at 756 per Lord Deas.  
102 Scottish Widows Services Ltd v Harmon/ CRM Facades Ltd (in liquidation) 2010 SLT 
1102 at para 1 per Lord Drummond Young. Emphasis added.  
103 Walker, Contracts (n 3) 29.1. Emphasis added. 
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to pay costs associated with their transactions.104 Indeed, as is discussed in 
chapter 4, third parties can in certain circumstances claim against contracting 
parties in delict.105 
Accordingly, the first interpretation is correct: privity prevents external parties 
from deriving contractual rights under contracts to which they are not party. 
This is not entirely clear from the relevant case law, but those who do provide 
detailed comment on the matter submit that privity bars contractual claims 
only. Privity therefore (generally) prevents third parties from accruing 
enforceable contractual benefits. 
The thesis addresses situations in which third parties can recover for losses 
sustained due to defective or non-performance of contracts to which they are 
not party where the third party does not have a personal contractual right to 
performance.106 Concepts which operate in these situations are analysed in 
chapters 6-9. There are exceptions to the privity doctrine which arise where 
the third party does have a personal right to performance of the contract. 
These exceptions, their relationship with the privity doctrine, and their impact 
on the Scots definition of privity are discussed further in chapter 3.107  
2.3.3. Burdening the third party  
Scots judicial and academic commentary recognises the second aspect of 
the privity doctrine, which provides that extra-contractual parties cannot be 
burdened by contracts to which they are not party. In Ashley v Muir,108 for 
example, Lord Fullerton mentions that a third party had “no direct 
responsibility [for contractual performance], or what is called ‘privity of 
contract’”.109 Gloag notes that “it is not within the province of contract to 
                                                          
104 For example, the purchaser of a property might come under a duty to pay land and 
buildings transaction tax by virtue of its contract with the seller (see GL Gretton and KGC 
Reid, Conveyancing (W Green, Edinburgh, 5th edn, 2018) 19.01). Privity is no defence to the 
payment of this tax.  
105 This is discussed in section 4.3.  
106 The scope of the thesis is outlined in section 1.3.   
107 These are discussed in section 3.2. 
108 Ashley v Muir (1845) 7 D 524.  
109 Ibid. at 530 per Lord Fullerton.  
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impose any liability upon a third party” because “parties to a contract cannot 
fetter the free will of a third party”.110 McBryde similarly states that it is: 
“axiomatic that a duty could not be imposed on the third party against 
its will, but a right could be conditional on performance by the third 
party.”111  
The impact of this on the ‘burdens’ aspect of privity, and other exceptions to 
the no-burdens rule, are discussed in chapter 5.112   
This aspect of privity is also accepted in English law.113 Professor Neil H 
Andrews comments, for example, that the ‘no burdens’ rule “appears 
sound”.114  
Whilst, as discussed immediately above, the first aspect of privity prevents 
external parties from making contractual claims, it is likely that the second 
aspect of privity is not an exact mirror of this rule. Rather, privity should 
prevent the contracting parties from imposing any form of liability on an 
external party without its consent. The relevant cases and commentary do 
not provide certainty on this point. However, it would be absurd, for example, 
for a contracting party to provide that any claims in delict arising under the 




                                                          
110 Gloag, Contract (n 65) 257.  
111 WW McBryde, The law of contract in Scotland (Thomson/ W Green, Edinburgh, 3rd edn, 
2007) 10.10. See also MacQueen and Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson (n 68) 8.01-
02. 
112 See, in particular, section 5.5. 
113 VV Palmer, “Contracts in Favour of Third Persons in Europe: First Steps Toward 
Tomorrow’s Harmonisation” 2003 11(1) European Review of Private Law 8 at 12; S 
Whittaker, “Reciprocity Beyond Privity” in P Kincaid (ed), Privity: Private justice of public 
regulation (Ashgate, Dartmouth, 2001) 259 at 259-260; G Treitel, Some Landmarks in 
Twentieth Century Contract Law (Clarendon, Oxford, 2002) 48; AG Guest, Anson’s Law of 
Contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 26th edn, 1984) 363; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v 
Selfridges Ltd [1915] AC 847.   
114 NH Andrews, “Does a third party beneficiary have a right in English law?” 1988 8(1) Legal 
Studies 14 at 14.  
39 
 
2.4. Comparative discussion  
This section provides a brief overview of the recognition of privity in other 
jurisdictions. It then discusses the development of the privity doctrine in 
English law, including the interaction between privity and consideration.  
2.4.1. General remarks on comparative law on the privity doctrine 
Continental jurisdictions exhibit a more lenient view on the enforcement of 
third party rights than common law jurisdictions, which have historically 
viewed such rights as violations of the privity doctrine.115 The stance of public 
international law is closer to continental law than the common law.116 
However, the privity doctrine itself is “deeply embedded” in every European 
legal system.117 In civilian jurisdictions, various Codes embodying the strict 
Roman approach to privity118 were revised when the undeniable usefulness 
of mechanisms allowing for third party rights became clear due to the 
expansion of commerce.119 This is relevant to the question of whether privity 
ought to be recognised in Scots and English law. If either jurisdiction departs 
entirely from privity, they will be considered as outliers in European 
comparative legal studies. The lack of certainty associated with a failure to 
recognise privity120 might discourage commercial parties from concluding 
contracts under Scots and English law relative to other jurisdictions. 
2.4.2. English law  
These subsections overview relevant English jurisprudence and academic 
commentary, and address the relationship between privity and consideration.  
 
 
                                                          
115 C Engel, “E Omnes: Why does public international law ignore privity of contract?” 2009 
165(1) Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 24 at 24.  
116 Ibid. at 24.  
117 Palmer (n 113) at 12.    
118 Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 1.03, citing Paul’s Digest 44.7.11 (later qualified in 
Ulp. Digest 45.1.38.20).   
119 Palmer (n 113) at 14-15.   
120 This is discussed further at section 5.3. 
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2.4.2.1. The development of English jurisprudence  
Ibbetson observes the recognition of privity, in the sense that “persons not 
party to the agreement could not sue or be sued on it” in covenant cases as 
early as the thirteenth-century.121 However, Vernon Palmer’s research on the 
status of privity in the sixteenth and seventeenth century reveals that, in the 
1500-1680 period, the courts took a liberal attitude to allowing third party 
actions, such that the “sheer number of actions and liberal results” indicate 
that a strict privity rule did not in fact exist in England prior to 1680.122 
According to Vernon Palmer, this can be attributed to the fact that privity was 
not yet a dominant doctrine in English law.123 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the beneficiary’s right to sue was 
generally ascertained according to whether it had given consideration.124 
There were, however three legal doctrines according to which the third party 
could sue on a contract to which it was not party. Firstly, the ‘promisee in law’ 
theory allowed the third party to sue if it declared that it was, in fact, the 
promisee.125 A second means of assessing the third party’s action in 1500-
1680 was the interest test. Essentially, the party who had an interest in the 
promise had the right to enforce it.126 The rationale was that non-
performance of the contract constituted an injury to the beneficiary’s interest, 
for which it should be compensated.127 Zimmermann draws a parallel 
between the interest theory and the Roman rule that a stipulator could 
                                                          
121 DJ Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2001) 77-78.  
122 VV Palmer, “The History of Privity – The Formative Period (1500-1680)” 1989 33(1) 
American Journal of Legal History 3 at 5. See also Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 
1.07-1.08. 
123 Ibid. at 5. 
124 Ibid. at 6 
125 Ibid.  
126 Ibid.  
127 Ibid. In Hadves v Levitt (1632) Het. 176, for example, the bride’s father (the defendant) 
promised the groom’s father (the plaintiff) that he would pay £200 to the plaintiff’s son after 
he had married the defendant’s daughter. The plaintiff promised to consent to the marriage 
and make a reciprocal grant to the bride. The defendant failed to pay, and the plaintiff 
brought an action in assumpsit, claiming that he was constrained, as a result of the breach of 
promise, to give the couple greater maintenance than otherwise would have otherwise been 
necessary. The plaintiff’s claim was rejected on the grounds that the action was “more 
properly” brought by his son, because he was person “in whom the interest is”. 
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enforce a performance due to a third party only where it had an interest in the 
fulfilment of the performance.128 The third doctrine was the beneficiary test: 
“the party to whom the benefit of a promise accrues may bring the action.”129 
This was used, for example, in Provender v Wood.130 In the case, the plaintiff 
brought an action in assumpsit for a breach of the defendant’s promise to pay 
the plaintiff’s father £20 on the occasion of the marriage of the plaintiff to the 
defendant’s daughter. Yelverton and Richardson JJ allowed recovery on the 
grounds that “the party to whom the benefit of a promise accrews, may bring 
his action.”131 
In light of these doctrines allowing third party recovery, privity was clearly not 
strictly applied in English law during the sixteenth and seventeenth century. It 
is however clear that privity was recognised in some form in England during 
this period, from at least the sixteenth century.132 In Humble v Oliver, for 
example, it was said that an extra-contractual party could not “have 
advantage of the privity, he being a meer stranger to the contract”.133 In 
Living v Edmunds it was similarly noted that an action could not be “grounded 
upon any privity of contract, for both the parties are strangers to it”.134 Privity 
was recognised and applied to prevent third party claims in numerous cases 
in the seventeenth century.135 It was also held that an original lessee 
remained liable despite assignment to a third party, because there remained 
privity of contract with the lessor.136 Accordingly, English law in this period 
                                                          
128 R Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996) 37. 
129 Palmer (n 122) at 6.   
130 Provender v Wood (1628) Het. 30. 
131 See also Disborne v Denabie (1649) R Ab. 30 at 31 per Chief Justice – “it matters not 
from whom the consideration moveth, but who hath the benefit thereby”, and further NG 
Jones, “Aspects of Privity in England: Equity to 1680” in EJH Schrage (ed), Ius quaesitum 
tertio (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2008) 135 at 150-151 and 154-157 for discussion of 
marriage agreements in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries respectively.   
132 Anonymous (1565) 2 D 247b; Alexander v Dyer (1588) CE 169; Overton v Sydal (1594) 
CE 555. Further discussion of case law from this period is found in Jones (n 131) at 136-141.  
133 Humble v Oliver (1593) P 55 at 55. 
134 Living v Edmunds (1597) CE 636. 
135  The Lord Rich v Franke (1610) 2 B & G 202 and March v Brace (1613) 2 B 151, which 
refer to privity of contract between a lessor and lessee. See also Sir John Brett v 
Cumberland (1616) CJ 521 at 522.  
136 Walker v Harris (1793) 145 ER 861. 
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appears to have enforced third party claims in some circumstances, whilst 
simultaneously recognising and enforcing the privity doctrine in other 
cases.137 Two of the leading cases during this time came to contrasting views 
on the enforceability of third party rights: Bourne v Mason,138 in which a third 
party right was unenforceable, and Dutton v Poole,139 in which a third party 
claim was upheld. Towards the end of this 1500-1680 ‘Formative Period’, 
consideration emerged as the dominant means of assessing third party 
actions.140 This replaced the previous tests, and accordingly limited the 
recompense available to third parties at common law.141 In Bourne v 
Mason,142 for example, it was said that:  
“the plaintiff did nothing of trouble to himself or benefit to the 
defendant, but is a meer stranger to the consideration.”  
Alongside the increasing importance of the consideration test, Vernon Palmer 
recognises a “new assumption” 143 in the period between Bourne v Mason144 
and Dutton v Poole145 that third party claims were generally not permissible. 
Flannigan also comments that these cases were the turning point of the 
“complete reversal” from recognition of third party rights, to a much stricter 
application of the privity doctrine.146 Vernon Palmer summarises: 
“During the 16th and 17th century, the beneficiary suing in assumpsit 
succeeded as in no other period. The period ended, however, with the 
formation of a solid privity limitation based upon the consideration 
doctrine. Contemporaries may not have easily appreciated that such a 
significant event had occurred.”147 
During the eighteenth century, the tension between privity and third party 
rights was not yet resolved, and common law outcomes were contradictory. 
                                                          
137 See also Bell v Chaplain (1675) H 321; Bafeild v Collard (1646) 82 ER 882.  
138 Bourne v Mason (1668) 86 ER 5. 
139 Dutton v Poole (1677) 83 ER 523.  
140 Palmer (n 122) at 7.   
141 Ibid. at 7.  
142 Bourne v Mason (1668) 86 ER 5 at 7. See also Clypsam v Morris (1669) 2 Keb. 401 at 
443 and 453. 
143 Palmer (n 122) at 44.  
144 Bourne v Mason (1688) 86 ER 5. 
145 Dutton v Poole (1677) 83 ER 523. 
146 R Flannigan, “Privity: the end of an era” 1987 103(Oct) Law Quarterly Review 564 at 565-
566.   
147 Palmer (n 122) at 52.  
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Judicial opinion in the eighteenth century does not offer a definitive view on 
whether third party rights were enforceable at this stage in the development 
of English law. Crow v Rogers148 upheld Bourne v Mason,149 and Martyn v 
Hind150 followed Dutton v Poole.151  
Similarly, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, an examination of the 
relevant case law reveals that the courts continued to recognise both third 
party rights and uphold the privity doctrine. In this period, third party rights 
were recognised in various cases.152 However, in Inglis v Mansfield, for 
example, it was said that:  
“Between the bankrupt and the trustee there can be no privity such as 
to affect the latter with any personal obligation incurred by the 
former”.153  
The privity doctrine was recognised in this period in the House of Lords154 as 
well as various lower courts.155 As in Scots law, privity appears to have been 
applied in a variety of contexts without extensive judicial consideration as to 
the exact definition and scope of the doctrine. It cannot be said that there 
was a clear, overarching view of privity at this stage of its development in 
English law. Instead, its application was contextual and fact-specific.  
However, the case of Tweddle v Atkinson156 in 1861 marked the point at 
which third parties were prevented from enforcing contractual rights 
construed in their favour.157 Prior to this case, as discussed above, there 
were conflicting judicial opinions on the question of whether third party claims 
                                                          
148 Crow v Rogers (1724) 1 S 592.  
149 Bourne v Mason (1688) 86 ER 5. 
150 Martyn v Hind (1776) 2 Cowp. 437 
151 Dutton v Poole (1677) 83 ER 523. 
152 Flannigan (n 146) at 567; Carnegie v Waugh (1823) 1 LJ (KB) 89. See also 
Philips v Bateman (1812) 16 E 356; Barford v Stuckey (1820) 2 B & B 333.   
153 Inglis v Mansfield (1835) 1 S & Macl. 203 at 338 per Lord Brougham.  
154 Thomas Doolan v The Directors & Co. of the Midland Railway Company (1877) 2 App. 
Cas. 792 at 802 per Lord Blackburn; The Directors, etc., of the Bristol and Exeter Railway v 
Robert Canning Collins (1859) VII C 194 at 91.  
155 Saxby v The Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Railway Company (1868-69) LR 4 
CP 198 at 204 per Lord Keating; Lofft v Dennis (1859) 120 ER 987 at 990 per Lord Campbell 
CJ; Smyth and Two Others v Anderson (1849) 7 CBR 21 at 33 and 42 per Maule J. 
156 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 9 WR 781. 
157 Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 1.14.  
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were enforceable. However, the case has since been treated as a firm 
authority for the unenforceability of third party claims in English law.  
It is notable that the term ‘privity of contract’ does not appear in Tweddle v 
Atkinson.158 Although Wightman J’s judgment notes that “it has always been 
held that no stranger can take advantage of a contract made with another 
person”,159 the case was in fact decided “overwhelmingly in terms of 
consideration”.160 It has accordingly been suggested that the case could be 
treated as authority for the consideration rule, rather than privity.161 However, 
regardless of whether it ought to be treated as an authority for the privity or 
consideration rule (or both), the case was accepted throughout the twentieth 
century as demonstrating that English law had adopted the privity rule. This 
is reflected in “case after case”.162  
There has however been judicial backlash to this interpretation of Tweddle v 
Atkinson.163 Lord Denning states in Smith and Snipes Hall Farm LD v River 
Douglas Catchment Board that privity: 
“is not nearly so fundamental as it is sometimes supposed to be. It did 
not become rooted in our law until the year 1861… It has never been 
able entirely to supplant another principle whose roots go much 
deeper, I mean the principle that a man who makes a deliberate 
promise which is intended to be binding, that is to say, under seal or 
for good consideration, must keep his promise; and the court will hold 
him to it, not only at the suit of the party who gave the consideration, 
but also at the suit of one who was not a party to the contract, 
provided that it was made for his benefit and that he has a sufficient 
interest to entitle him to enforce it”.164  
                                                          
158 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 9 WR 781. 
159 Ibid. at 782 per Wightman J. 
160 Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 1.15. See, for example, Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 
9 WR 781 at 764 per Wightman J.   
161 Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 1.19.  
162 Ibid. 2.03, citing Gandy v Gandy (1885) 30 Ch. D 57 at 69 per Bowen J; McCruther v 
Pitcher [1904] 2 Ch. 306 at 308-9 per Vaughan Williams LJ. 
163 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 9 WR 781.  
164 Smith and Snipes Hall Farm LD v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500 at 
514 per Lord Denning. 
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Lord Denning also expressed this view in Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones 
Ltd.165 Steyn J has raised similar concerns, asserting that the “genesis of the 
privity rule is suspect”, originating in a “misunderstanding” of Tweddle.166 He 
stresses that:  
“there is no doctrinal, logical or policy reason why the law should deny 
effectiveness to a contract for the benefit of a third party where that is 
the expressed intention of the parties.”167  
Dillon J similarly describes the rule as “a blot on our law and most unjust”,168 
and Lord Diplock’s view is that privity is “an anachronistic shortcoming that 
has for many years been regarded as a reproach to English private law”.169  
However, most judges during this period recognise the privity doctrine as part 
of English law. In Beswick v Beswick, for example, Lord Reid acknowledged 
Lord Denning’s view that extra-contractual parties should be able to enforce 
rights construed in their favour, but concluded that such rights are not 
enforceable.170 Lord Reid was, however, of the view that legislation ought to 
be introduced to allow such rights to be enforceable and this was supported 
by other members of the judiciary.171 The Law Revision Committee had also 
previously recommended that third parties should be able to enforce rights 
expressly conferred in their favour in contracts to which they are not party.172  
                                                          
165 Scruttons v Midland Silicones [1962] AC 446 at 483 per Lord Denning. See also Elder, 
Dempster & Co Ltd v Paterson, Zochonis & Co Ltd (1924) AC 522; Drive Yourself Hire v 
Strutt [1953] 2 All ER 1475; Adler v Dickinson [1955] 1 QB 158.  
166 Darlington BC v Wiltshire Northern Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 68 at 76 per Steyn J. 
167 Ibid. See also Olsson v Dyson (1969) 120 CLR 365 at 393 per Windeyer J. 
168 Forster v Silvermere Golf and Equestrian Centre (1981) 125 SJ 397. 
169 Swain v The Law Society [1983] 1 AC 598 at 611 per Lord Diplock.  
170 Beswick Appellant v Beswick Respondent [1967] 3 WLR 932 at para 72 per Lord Reid. 
See also Lord Hodson at para 78 and Lord Pearce at paras 92-93.  
171 Ibid. at para 72 per Lord Reid. See also Lord Reid’s comments in Scruttons Ltd v Midland 
Silicones Ltd [1962] AC 446 at 473; Woodar Investment Development Ltd. v Wimpey 
Construction U.K. Ltd. [1980] 1 WLR 277 at 300 per Lord Scarman and at 279-298 per Lord 
Keith of Kinkel.  
172 Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report (Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine of 
Consideration) (Cmd. 5449, 1937) 31.   
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Tweddle was acknowledged as confirming the position of privity in English 
law in Dunlop v Pneumatic Tyre.173 In the case, Viscount Haldane stated that 
English law contained the fundamental principle that:  
“only a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it. Our law 
knows nothing of a jus quaesitum tertio arising by way of contract… A 
second principle is that if a person with whom a contract not under 
seal has been made is to be able to enforce it consideration must 
have been given by him to the promisor or to some other person at the 
promisor's request. These two principles are not recognized in the 
same fashion by the jurisprudence of certain Continental countries or 
of Scotland, but here they are well established.”174 
This was affirmed by the House of Lords in Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones 
Ltd.175 Referring to Lord Denning’s earlier comments, Viscount Symonds 
stated that “certain statements… must be rejected”,176 referring to the 
“fundamental rule that a person not party to a contract cannot sue to enforce 
it.”177  
More recent judgements have, generally speaking, assumed the existence of 
privity of contract without discussing its meaning and origins.178 For example, 
it was said in the High Court of Justice Chancery Decision that an assignee 
could not be held liable for the actions of his assignor under the assignor’s 
contract with a dairy company, because of the lack of privity between the 
                                                          
173 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847 (although Lord 
Dunedin dissented). 
174 Ibid. at 853 per Lord Haldane.  
175 Scruttons v Midland Silicones [1962] AC 446 at 467-468 per Viscount Symonds. 
176 Ibid. at 468 per Viscount Symonds. He refers, for example, to Smith and Snipes Hall 
Farm LD v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500 at 514 per Lord Denning 
(discussed above in this subsection).  
177 Scruttons v Midland Silicones [1962] AC 446 at 469 per Viscount Symonds. 
178 Haberdashers' Aske's Federation Trust Limited and others v Zurich Insurance Plc and 
others [2018] EWHC 588 at paras 41-42 and 56 per Lord Justice Fraser; Signature of St 
Albans (Property) Guernsey Ltd v Wragg [2017] EWHC 2352 at para 72 per HHJ Paul 
Matthews; Sackville UK Property Select v Robertson Taylor Insurance Brokers Limited 
[2018] EWHC 122 at para 47 per Mr Justice Fancourt; George v Countrywide Surveyors Ltd 
[2009] LR PN 141; Western Digital Corp v British Airways Plc [2001] QB 733; Effort Shipping 
Co. Ltd. Respondent v Linden Management S.A. and Others Appellants [1998] 2 WLR 206. 
Dyer observes that the lack of intensive judicial discussion on privity is perhaps because it is 
“so bound up with the concept and definition of contract itself that it is easy to find many 
cases where the principle is assumed and applied, but not many where it is analysed or its 
rationale explored.”: DL Dyer “Pulling the privity thread: will contract law unravel?” 1999 2(2) 
International Trade Law Quarterly 105 at 109.  
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assignee and the dairy company.179 The House of Lords held in 2000 that 
privity of contract prevents the formation of any form of ‘implied’ contractual 
relationship between an employer and a sub-contractor.180  
In summary, privity at an early stage of its development in English law was 
not strictly enforced. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, privity was 
subject to various doctrines allowing third party claims (the ‘promisee in law’ 
theory, the interest test, and the beneficiary test). Privity was however 
judicially recognised during this period, as evidenced by its acknowledgment 
in a number of cases. The tension between privity and third party claims 
remained throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century. In some cases, 
third party claims were denied because of privity, whereas in others the third 
party was able to enforce contracts in his favour. Tweddle v Atkinson181 
appears to signpost an era of recognition of a strict form of privity. Whilst the 
case was decided in terms of consideration rather than privity, it was treated 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as an authority for England’s 
recognition of privity. English judicial opinion was not wholly in favour of a 
strict privity doctrine. However, by the end of the twentieth century, the 
doctrine was strictly applied and deeply entrenched. Accordingly, the Law 
Commission’s proposals to introduce third party rights into English law were 
viewed as a reform of the privity doctrine.182 The impact of the introduction of 
a statutory third party right on the English privity doctrine is further discussed 
in the following chapter.183 
2.4.2.2. Academic commentary   
Various commentators recognise positive attributes of the privity doctrine. 
Collins’ “most significant argument” in favour of privity is that, in the absence 
                                                          
179 Arla Foods UK plc v George Barnes, Mary Barnes, David Barnes, Withgill Farm Limited, 
Peter Willes, D H Willes & Partners (a firm) [2008] EWHC 2851 at para 49 per Sir Edward 
Evans-Lombe. The question of whether burdens are assignable in Scots law is discussed at 
subsection 5.5.1.1. 
180 Lafarge Redlands Aggregates Ltd (formerly Redland Aggregates Ltd) v Shephard Hill 
Civil Engineering Ltd. [2000] CLC 1669 at 1670 per Lord Hope of Craighead. 
181 Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 9 WR 781. 
182 Law Commission, Report on Privity of contract: Contracts for the benefit of third parties 
(Law Com No 242, 1996) 1.2.   
183 See, in particular subsection 3.2.2.2. 
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of the doctrine, contracting parties could incur liability for non-performance to 
an unlimited number of extra-contractual parties, resulting in indeterminate 
liability.184 He also notes that where privity is commercially obstructive, 
devices such as collateral contracts may be used to prevent direct challenge 
to the doctrine whilst protecting the expectations of the parties.185 Sir Anthony 
Mason186 and Kincaid187 point out that privity embodies the concept of 
contracts as bargains (i.e. the principle that a contract can only confer rights 
and obligations on those who make the bargain). Kincaid also argues that it 
is not necessarily unjust to refuse third party claims, given that contractual 
promises are not made to or paid for by third parties.188   
However, most commentators recognise that privity should not be strictly 
construed, and some argue that privity does not and should not exist in 
English law. Flannigan discusses how:  
“a dogmatic approach has been necessary for the continued survival 
of the privity doctrine in its present form because… there is precious 
little to support the doctrine or to show it to be a ‘good and useful’ 
rule.”189  
He criticises Viscount Haldane’s comments190 for their lack of doctrinal 
justification and his failure to examine earlier case law.191 Flannigan further 
argues that courts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries failed to 
recognise earlier cases permitting third party claims, and this has led to the 
modern recognition of privity.192 JA Andrews’ similar view is that privity lacks 
a historical basis in English law.193 These commentators are correct that 
English law does not exhibit a strong historic privity doctrine, and its relatively 
                                                          
184 H Collins, The law of contract (LexisNexis, London, 4th edn, 2003) 275.  
185 Ibid. 309. The interaction between privity and concepts which bypass privity in 
accordance with the intentions of the contracting parties is discussed at subsection 3.2.2.3. 
186 Mason (n 26) at 90.  
187 P Kincaid, “Privity and Private Justice in Contract” in P Kincaid (ed), Privity: Private justice 
of public regulation (Ashgate, Dartmouth, 2001) 60 at 60. See also Mason (n 26) at 92.   
188 Kincaid (n 187) at 60. 
189 Flannigan (n 146) at 564. 
190 See above at (n 174).   
191 Flannigan (n 146) at 572.  
192 Ibid. at 565.   
193 JA Andrews, "Section 56 Revisited" [1959] 23 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 179 at 
188-189.   
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recent firm recognition has stemmed from an acceptance of consideration in 
English law. The mere fact of privity’s tenuous roots, however, does not lead 
to the conclusion that privity should not be recognised in any context in 
English law. 
Vernon Palmer noted, prior to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999, that English law’s strict approach to privity cannot be explained as a 
matter of logic or justice,194 and Merkin stresses that privity has “proved to be 
inconvenient in commerce and unjust in private relationships.”195 Flannigan 
submits that privity is incompatible with a doctrine of unconscionability, 
referring to the idea that contract law should generally prevent contractual 
injustice and abuse of bargaining power.196 He reasons that “everyone 
agrees that [privity] is productive of unfairness and hardship”,197 and it is 
obviously unfair that privity allows a promisor in breach of contract to receive 
the “windfall benefit” of evading responsibility.198 These comments, however, 
fail to acknowledge the fact that privity allows security and predictability to 
contracting parties.199 Arguments based on the impact of privity on the 
fairness and justice of transactions which affect third parties must also 
account for the perspective of contracting parties. Further, Kincaid was 
critical of the Law Commission’s view that privity produced unjust results,200 
arguing that “the third-party rule is about justice, and the exceptions [to 
privity] are about commercial convenience or efficiency.”201  
In summary, the majority of commentators accept that the privity doctrine is 
in itself a sensible principle, but they recognise that it should not be absolute. 
                                                          
194 Palmer, Paths to privity (n 27) 4.    
195 R Merkin, “The Enforcement of Promises made for the Benefit of a Third Party” in R 
Merkin (ed), Privity of Contract: The Impact of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999 (Informa Law, London/ Hong Kong, 2000) 21 at 2.1.  
196 See, for example MA Eisenberg, “The Bargain Principle and Its Limits” 1982 95(4) 
Harvard Law Review 741 at 799-800.  
197 Flannigan (n 146) at 592.  
198 Ibid.  
199 This is discussed in subsection 1.3.1 and section 5.3.  
200 Report on Privity of contract (n 182) 3.5. 
201 Kincaid (n 187) at 68.  
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The question of whether privity ought to continue to exist in Scots and 
English law is further discussed in chapter 5.202 
2.4.2.3. Privity and consideration    
Unlike Scots law, which does not require consideration in the formation of 
contractual obligations,203 the consideration rule is well-established in 
England.204 In English law, there is a “long-standing debate” on whether 
privity and consideration are essentially identical concepts, both serving the 
same function of preventing third parties from claiming on contracts to which 
they are not party.205 As such, consideration was previously considered an 
“insurmountable obstacle” to the enforcement of third party rights.206  
This raises the question of whether privity is an application of the rule that 
those who do not provide consideration cannot enforce the contract, or 
whether privity operates independently from consideration, preventing the 
third party from enforcing the contract regardless of whether it supplies 
consideration.207 Whilst early English assumpsit cases concerned neither 
consideration nor privity, by the end of the sixteenth century the courts took 
the view that an action in assumpsit was dependent on consideration.208 The 
reasons for this development are “obscure”, although Merkin surmises that 
this reflects the influence of equity and the belief that quid pro quo should be 
required in the formation of contracts.209 In dealing with assumpsit cases, the 
courts accepted by the beginning of the eighteenth century that the doctrine 
of consideration is based on detriment on the part of the promisee, rather 
                                                          
202 See, in particular section 5.3.  
203 MacQueen and Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson (n 68) 1.12 and 5.03.  
204 Barber v Fox (1682) 2 WS 134 at 137.  
205 Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 2.26. See also S Swaminathan, “The great Indian 
privity trick: hundred years of misunderstanding nineteenth century English contract law” 
2016 16(1) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 160.  
206 W Müller-Freienfels, “The undisclosed principal” 1953 16(3) Modern Law Review 299 at 
305.  
207 R Merkin, “Historical Introduction to the Law of Privity” in R Merkin (ed), Privity of 
Contract: The Impact of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 (Informa Law, 
London/ Hong Kong, 2000) 1 at 1.10.  
208 Ibid. at 1.11-12 and 1.14; Baker (n 27) at 42-43.  
209 Merkin (n 207) at 1.13.  
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than any benefit to the promisor.210 There are various sixteenth and 
seventeenth century cases in which third parties successfully brought actions 
in assumpsit.211 However, it was asserted in other cases that the promisee 
rather than the third party is the correct claimant.212 Some cases which could 
have been resolved in terms of privity expressly turned on consideration.213 
The early cases therefore tended to resolve third party claims in terms of 
consideration rather than privity.  
The concepts of privity and consideration became more closely interlinked in 
later years. As discussed above, consideration is perhaps the cause of 
English law’s recognition of privity.214 This is a logical assessment of the 
early case law. Whilst the courts did not expressly rely on the privity doctrine, 
the fact that consideration could only be provided by a contracting party 
emphasises that contractual benefits (receipt of consideration and 
enforceability of the right to receive consideration) and contractual burdens 
(obligations to provide consideration) accrued only to contracting parties. The 
link between privity and consideration was expressly developed in Bourne v 
Mason.215 In the case, privity was framed in terms of the absence of 
consideration.216  
However, privity developed as a standalone doctrine throughout the 
nineteenth century.217 It is now generally accepted that privity and 
consideration are separate tests to be used in ascertaining whether 
contractual obligations are enforceable.218 Accordingly, a third party may be 
                                                          
210 Merkin (n 207) at 1.16-19; Manwood v Burston (1587) 2 L 203.  
211 Rippon v Norton (1602) CE 849; Provender v Wood (1627) Het. 30; Hadves v Levit 
(1632) Het. 176. These cases are discussed in Merkin (n 207) at 1.21.  
212 Jordan v Jordan (1594) CE 369; Taylor v Foster (1600) CE 776. 
213 Gilbert v Ruddeard (1607) D 272b; Ritler v Dennet (1606) 1 K 44. 
214 See the summary of Palmer’s discussion above at subsection 2.4.2.2. and further Merkin 
(n 207) at 1.21 and Ibbetson (n 18) at 111-113. 
215 Bourne v Mason (1668) 86 ER 5. 
216 Discussed above at subsection 2.4.2.1.  
217 Jones v Robinson (1847) 1 Ex. 454; Alton v Midland Railway (1865) 19 CBNS 219; Price 
v Easton (1833) 4 B & Ad. 433. See also Swaminathan (n 205) at 173-177; Guest, Anson’s 
Law of Contract (n 113) 86.  
218 Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 2.27; Mason (n 26) at 89; Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre 
Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847; Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] AC 
446 at 469 per Viscount Simonds.  
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unable to enforce a contractual obligation because it has not provided 
consideration under the contract and/ or because it is not a party to the 
contract. In practice, the third party will likely be excluded from enforcing the 
contract in English law on the grounds of both a lack of consideration and a 
lack of privity. However, the third party could potentially provide consideration 
under the contract (for example, through part-funding one party’s 
performance) without intending to become a full contracting party. It is 
therefore logical to maintain the distinction between the two doctrines. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently acknowledged that consideration 
“has nothing to do with the doctrine of privity.”219 
Further, the modern conception of consideration in English law is logically 
incompatible with the privity doctrine. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
consideration continued to be thought of as a detriment to the promisee.220 In 
the modern law, however, consideration must move to the promisor.221  
Allowing the consideration to take the form of the benefit to the promisor 
does not require that only the person providing consideration may sue on the 
contract – a third party could, according to the modern definition, provide the 
consideration.  The reason third parties are barred from suing on contracts to 
which they are not party (generally speaking) must therefore be privity.222  
Finally, it is noted that recognition of consideration is not a prerequisite for 
the recognition of privity. Consideration is a common law concept which 
affects the formation of contracts, but does not prevent the imposition of a 
general rule against third party claims on contracts. Roman law recognised 
privity without enforcing a consideration requirement,223 and it appears that 
Scots law does the same. 
                                                          
219 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi; ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67 at 
para 296 per Lord Toulson.  
220 Crow v Rogers (1724) 1 S 592.   
221 Merkin (n 207) at 1.35.  
222 Ibid. at 1.36; R Merkin, “The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999” in R Merkin 
(ed), Privity of Contract: The Impact of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 
(Informa Law, London/ Hong Kong, 2000) 91 at part VI.  
223 Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 1.03.  
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2.5. Concluding remarks  
This chapter provides the first extensive Scots law study of the privity 
doctrine in Scots law, examining its judicial and academic development in 
detail. Whilst there are numerous meanings and uses of the term ‘privity’, this 
research considers privity in its contractual sense only. The contractual 
definition of privity encompasses two aspects: preventing third parties from 
accruing enforceable contractual benefits under contracts to which they are 
not party and protecting third parties from the imposition of obligations. Both 
aspects of privity are now accepted in both Scots and English case law, 









Chapter 3: Compatibility of Privity and its Exceptions with Scots 
Contract Law  
3.1. Overview of chapter 3 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of various concepts which appear to 
contravene the benefits aspect of privity, namely, agency and third party 
rights. In particular, the chapter explains the relationship between privity and 
third party rights. The chapter then addresses privity’s compatibility with 
Scots contract law, in terms of the dominant theories of contract and the 
principles of freedom to contract and freedom of contract. 
3.2. Exceptions to the privity doctrine 
This section examines privity’s interaction with agency and third party rights. 
It also provides a brief overview of concepts which are exceptions to privity 
but are not relevant to the thesis.  
3.2.1. Agency/ mandate224 
It is said that agency: 
“refers to a relationship… in terms of which the principal instructs the 
agent to act on his behalf in order to produce legally binding effects for 
the principal.”225 
Thomas Smith226 and the Law Commission227 treat agency as an exception 
to privity. This initially appears to be a reasonable assumption. The agent 
negotiates with the third party, but the principal, rather than the agent, 
benefits from this interaction. Accordingly, the principal seems to be 
circumventing privity in enforcing its benefits stemming from the transaction 
between the agent and the third party.   
                                                          
224 In essence, mandate is gratuitous, and agency is not. See LJ Macgregor, The law of 
agency in Scotland (W Green, Edinburgh, 2013) 2.01; Smith, Short Commentary (n 36) 774; 
JD Stair, The institutions of the law of Scotland (G Hamilton and J Balfour, Edinburgh, 3rd 
edn, 1759) 1.12.1. Undisclosed agency is discussed in chapter 9.   
225 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 2.01.   
226 Smith, Short Commentary (n 36) 773. See also Guest, Anson’s Law of Contract (n 113) 
161. 
227 Report on Privity of contract (n 182) 2.15.  
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However, the agent does not in fact contract with the third party. The agent 
merely negotiates with the third party with the purpose of concluding a 
contract between the third party and principal.228 Indeed, Thomas Smith 
recognises that agency is an “aspect of representation.”229 The ‘true’ 
contracting parties throughout the transaction are thus the principal and third 
party. The privity doctrine is irrelevant, because the agent is at all times a 
representative of the principal only, and so the contract is between the 
principal and third party. 
Further, MacQueen comments that treating the principal as party to the 
contract, rather than the agent, is “perfectly consistent” with Scots contract 
law because this is “clearly the intention” of the parties concerned, including 
the third party.230 There is an assumption that the agent is only an 
intermediary, and not a contracting party, although it can be liable to the third 
party in certain circumstances.231 This also aligns with the three parties’ 
contractual intentions. Accordingly, the parties have the flexibility to agree 
that the agent may be liable to the third party, for example, in the event of the 
principal’s non-payment.232 Generally speaking, however, the agent is a 
representative of the principal, contracting on the principal’s behalf without 
personally accruing the benefits or burdens of the contract. Therefore, there 
is no question of the principal bypassing privity to sue on the contract, 
because it is the contracting party.  
                                                          
228 See further Merkin (n 195) at 2.26; ADM Forte and JP van Niekerk, “Agency” in K Reid, R 
Zimmermann and D Visser (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: 
Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2004) 240 at 257-258.   
229 Smith, Short Commentary (n 36) 774. Smith uses this terminology to denote the fact that 
agency is one of a number of legal concepts which allow a person to act on behalf of 
another. He indicates, for example, that mandate and negotiorum gestio are also 
encompassed within this term. See also Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 3.27.  
230 MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 816. See also Walker, Contracts (n 3) 29.4 
231 For example, the agent will be personally bound where the factual situation indicates that 
it intended to contract in its own capacity: Walker, Contracts (n 3) 29.5. It will also usually 
owe liability to the third party if it refuses to identify its principal or purports to act for a 
principal who does not exist: Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 2.04. It is noted, however, that the 
case of Halifax Life Limited v DLA Piper Scotland LLP [2009] CSOH 74 has cast doubt on 
the scope of this rule - for discussion, see LJ Macgregor, “New Scottish Agency Case”, 
Edinburgh Centre for Commercial Law blog, 26.06.2009, available at: 
http://www.ecclblog.law.ed.ac.uk/2009/06/26/new-scottish-agency-case/.  
232 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.01. 
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3.2.2. Third party rights 
A third party right arises where the contracting parties intend to confer a 
personal, enforceable contractual right on the third party.233 This contrasts 
with the concepts considered in the thesis, which allow contractual 
performance to be enforced in favour of third parties in the absence of a right 
voluntarily conferred by the contracting parties. Third party rights should, 
however, be treated as an exception to privity because the third party is able 
to enforce contractual performance. This subsection defines third party rights 
and examines the interaction between privity and third party rights.   
3.2.2.1. The Scots third party right 
Third party rights are long-accepted in Scots law234 and now exist in statutory 
form, following the enactment of the Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) 
Act 2017. The Scots third party right, formerly known as a jus quaesitum 
tertio,235 arises where the contracting parties intend to confer a benefit on a 
third party, and the contract contains an undertaking that at least one of the 
contracting parties will do or not do something for the third party’s benefit.236 
Such intention can be express or implied.237 
                                                          
233 The intention of the contracting parties is recognised as a requirement for the formation in 
both Scots and English law (as discussed below in subsections 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2 
respectively).   
234 Hogg notes that, from 1591 onwards, Morison’s Dictionary has listed case reports under 
the heading ‘jus quaesitum tertio’: M Hogg, Promises and contract law: comparative 
perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 305 (footnote 71). An example 
of early case law is: Wood v Moncur (1591) Mor. 7719 at 7719: “albeit the defender was no 
contractor, yet there was a provision made in the same in his favours.” Similar statements 
are found in: Renton v Ayton (1634) Mor. 7721 and Supplicants v Nimmo (1627) Mor. 7740. 
See also T Hope, Major Practicks (Neill & Co, Edinburgh, 1608–1633) 2.3.37; J Erskine, An 
institute of the law of Scotland (Law Society of Scotland, Butterworths, Edinburgh, 8th edn, 
1871) 3.1.8; Stair, Institutions (n 224) 1.10.5. 
235 McBryde, Contract (n 111) 10.01. The contracting parties were referred to as the debtor 
and stipulator (the former being responsible for delivering the performance to the third party), 
and the third party was the tertius: MacQueen, SME (n 69) paras 824-825. The term ‘jus 
quaesitum tertio’ literally means ‘the third party has acquired a right’, and the Scottish Law 
Commission suggested that the term was adopted by Stair due to the influence of civilian 
jurisprudence: Scottish Law Commission, Memorandum on Constitution and Proof of 
Voluntary Obligations: Stipulations in Favour of Third Parties (Memorandum No 38, March 
1977) 2.  
236 Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act 2017 section 1(1)(a)-(b).  
237 Ibid. section 2(3).  
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In order to provide an enforceable third party right, the contracting parties 
must ensure that the contract adequately identifies the third party.238 A third 
party may acquire a right even if it was not in existence or did not fall within 
the class of those intended to benefit from the third party right when the right 
was created.239 
Prior to the Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act 2017, there was a 
lack of consensus on whether an enforceable Scots third party right must 
necessarily be irrevocable.240 The Scottish Law Commission identified 
irrevocability as a “central issue of law reform”241 in their recent Report on 
Third Party Rights.242 The resulting legislation now provides that contracting 
parties may confer a revocable or modifiable third party right.243 
It is acknowledged that the Scots third party right has been treated as a form 
of unilateral promise by some historical and modern commentators.244 
However, it is submitted that the modern third party right is not promissory,245 
and the analysis in the remainder of this section assumes that the nature of 
the third party’s right is a contractual benefit. 
 
 
                                                          
238 Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act 2017 section 1(3).  
239 Ibid. section 1(4). 
240 In Sir John Baird v Creditors of Mr Hugh Murray (1744) Mor. 7737, for example, a party 
was contractually obliged to transfer money to another’s next of kin, but because this 
arrangement was revocable, the situation did not give rise to a jus quaesitum tertio. See also 
Carmichael v Carmichael's Executrix 1920 SC (HL) 195 at 200 per Lord Dunedin and JT 
Cameron “Jus Quaesitum Tertio: The True Meaning of Stair I.x.5” 1961 Juridical Review 103 
at 118. Opposing views, according to which a third party right need not be irrevocable, 
include Hogg, Promises and contract (n 234) 305-306; DN MacCormick “Jus Quaesitum 
Tertio: Stair v. Dunedin” 1970 Juridical Review 228 at 236-241; and Gloag, Contract (n 65) 
242.   
241 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Third Party Rights (Scot Law Com No 245, July 
2016) 2.16 and chapter 5.  
242 Irrevocability of third party rights is discussed in-depth in chapter 5 of the Report (n 241).   
243 Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act 2017 sections 2(4) and 3. This is subject to 
section 6, which provides for the third party’s protection from revocation in certain 
circumstances.  
244 See, for example, Hogg, Promises and contract (n 232) 284 
245 A promissory analysis of third party rights is addressed in L MacFarlane, “The Nature of 
Third Party Rights: Lessons from German Law” in S Lorenzmeier and D Miler (eds), The 
New Law (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2018) 27 at 28-30.  
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3.2.2.2. The English third party right  
English law did not allow for third party rights prior to the Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act 1999.246 Various judges indicated that the barrier to 
recognition of third party rights posed by the privity doctrine was 
unsatisfactory.247 However, whilst the Law Revision Committee had 
previously recommended the introduction of an English third party right,248 
this did not result in legislation, and the House of Lords declined to recognise 
third party rights at common law in Beswick v Beswick.249 English law 
eventually provided for a statutory third party right with the enactment of the 
1999 Act, following the Law Commission’s Report on Privity of Contract.250    
In terms of the formation requirements of the English third party right, the 
contracting parties must, as in Scots law, expressly or impliedly intend to 
confer an enforceable benefit on the third party.251 The third party must be 
identified by name or as a member of a class of beneficiaries, but does not 
need to be in existence when the contracting parties create the right.252 The 
contracting parties may not revoke the right where the third party 
communicates its assent to receiving the right, the promisor is aware that the 
third party has acted in reliance on its right, or it is reasonable to expect that 
                                                          
246 This was certainly the case immediately before the Act, it is debateable whether this was 
the case historically: see above at subsection 2.4.2.1.  
247 Woodar Investment Development v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 277 per 
Lord Salmon at 291 and Lord Scarman at 300; Forster v Silvermere Golf and Equestrian 
Centre Ltd (1981) 125 SJ 397 per Dillon J; see also above at section 2.4.2.1. and discussion 
in GWF Dold, Stipulations for a Third Party (Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1948) 98 and 
AM Tettenborn, “Third party contracts - pragmatism from the Law Commission” 1996(Dec) 
Journal of Business Law 602.   
248 Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report (n 172), discussed in J Beatson, 
“Reforming the Law of Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties: A Second Bite at the 
Cherry” 1992 45(2) Current Legal Problems 1.  
249 Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58; Memorandum on Stipulations in Favour of Third Parties 
(n 235) 3.   
250 Report on Privity of contract (n 182). The Report and its draft Bill are summarised in NH 
Andrews, “Reform of the Privity Rule in English Contract Law: The Law Commission’s 
Report No. 242” 1997 56(1) Cambridge Law Journal 25. See also C MacMillan, “A Birthday 
Present for Lord Denning: The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999” 2000 63(5) 
Modern Law Review 721.  
251 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 section 1(2).  
252 Ibid. section 1(3).  
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the promisor had foreseen that the third party would rely on the right and the 
third party has done so.253 The right is otherwise revocable.  
3.2.2.3. Third party rights and the privity doctrine 
There are three positions taken in commentary on the relationship between 
third party rights and the privity doctrine.  
Firstly, the Scottish Law Commission indicate that the jus quaesitum tertio:  
“is not… an exception grafted onto the general rule of contract law that 
strangers to a contract cannot sue upon it, but rather the application of 
a general principle of Scots law that pollicitation (in our ascribed 
sense) creates obligations – at least in those relationships which other 
systems would recognise as obligations in favour of third parties.”254 
Secondly, there are those who view third party rights as an exception to 
privity. For example, Gloag describes the Scots third party right as an 
exception to the privity doctrine, justified on the basis that the third party must 
show that the right to enforce the contract has been conferred upon it.255 This 
view is also found in judicial opinion.256 Lord Skerrington, commenting on the 
parties’ obligations under a lease, states that “it confers a jus quaesitum upon 
the pursuer… although there is no privity of contract between them”.257 This 
indicates that he viewed third party rights as an exception to privity. Furmston 
and Tolhurst frame England as “a jurisdiction that has a general legislative 
exception to the privity rule”258 and the Law Commission also view third party 
rights as an exception to privity.259 
The third opinion is that of MacQueen. He asserts that there is no Scots 
privity doctrine, because of Scotland’s recognition of third party rights and 
                                                          
253 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 section 2(1).  
254 Memorandum on Stipulations in Favour of Third Parties (n 235) 12.  
255 Gloag, Contract (n 65) 218. See also 235 and McBryde, Contract (n 111) 10.01.   
256 D & J Nicol v Dundee Harbour Trustees 1915 SC (HL) 7 at 13 per Lord Dunedin; 
Laurence McIntosh Limited v Balfour Beatty Group Limited and The Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197 at para 35 per Lord Drummond Young. 
257 Taylor v The Auchinlea Coal Company Limited 1912 2 SLT 10 at 12 per Lord Skerrington. 
258 Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 1.01 (referring to the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999).  
259 Adams, Beyleveld, and Brownsword (n 20) at 263. The relevant Law Revision Committee 
document is the Sixth Interim Report (n 172).  
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assignation.260 Lord Kingarth stated (prior to the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999) that privity of contract prevented recognition of third party 
rights in English law,261 and it is Thomas Smith’s view that: 
“[being] free from doctrines of ‘consideration’ and ‘privity of contract’ 
Scottish law developed a doctrine of jus quaesitum tertio at an early 
stage.”262  
Confusingly, however, Smith also refers to the “primary rule” that only 
contracting parties can enforce contracts.263 He further states that third party 
rights are recognised as an exception to privity where “it can be shown that 
the agreed object of a contract between A and B was to benefit a third 
party”.264  
Does the fact that Scots law has long-recognised third party rights mean that 
it does not recognise the privity doctrine? It is wrong to state that Scots law 
has historically strictly adhered to privity, given its acceptance of third party 
rights and the fact that express judicial recognition of privity is relatively 
recent. In light of the numerous judicial references to privity discussed in the 
previous chapter,265 however, it is submitted that MacQueen’s comment is 
inaccurate, because Scots law does recognise the privity doctrine. His 
statement was made prior to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, 
and so he is correct that privity previously prevented recognition of third party 
rights in English law. However, it is clear that Scots law has (judicially) 
accepted privity since at least the nineteenth century, and that third party 
rights are an exception to the doctrine. It may be that MacQueen would now 
acknowledge the existence of privity in Scots law. He is one of the editors of 
the most recent edition of Gloag and Henderson, in which it is stated that: 
                                                          
260 MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 814.  
261 Holmes v Bank of Scotland 2002 SLT 544 at para 17 per Lord Kingarth.  
262 Smith, Short Commentary (n 36) 778. 
263 Ibid. 777. 
264 Ibid. 778.  
265 See subsection 2.3.1.   
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“The rule that the contracting parties alone have the right to enforce 
their contract suffers exception in cases where it is shown that their 
object or intention was to advance the interests of a third party.”266   
There is no logical reason why a legal system could not enforce the privity 
doctrine as a general, overarching principle subject to exceptions. This 
approach to privity was recognised in Roman law, which upheld the privity 
doctrine but recognised a number of exceptions.267 In Scots law, it appears 
that third party rights operate as an exception in accordance with the 
intentions of the contracting parties. Accordingly, the second view is an 
accurate view of Scots law. Third party rights are an exception to privity, but 
the existence of third party rights means that the ‘character’ of the privity 
doctrine in Scots law is affected, because privity in Scotland has never been 
absolute. The Scots third party right will not be subject to in-depth further 
analysis throughout the thesis, because it has previously been fully 
analysed268 and it is compatible with the current law, including the privity 
doctrine. 
The English third party right is similarly compatible with privity. Lord Denning 
states that privity has always been subject to the rule that promises ought to 
be binding, even if they are made in favour of a third party.269 Further, during 
the Hansard debates on the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Bill, the Lord 
Chancellor (Lord Irvine of Lairg) recognised that English law upholds privity, 
but that the Bill should give effect to the “simple and straightforward principle” 
                                                          
266 MacQueen and Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson (n 68) 8.04. This appears to 
recognise that third party rights are an exception to privity. See also (n 68) above.  
267 Zimmermann, Obligations (n 128) 34-40; P du Plessis, Borkowski’s Textbook on Roman 
Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 4th edn, 2010) 259-260; Ulp. Digest 45.1.38.17; Ulp. 
D. 13.7.13 pr.      
268 A selection of relevant works includes: Cameron (n 240);  L Loewensohn, “Jus quaesitum 
tertio: a comparative and critical survey” 1940 56 Scottish Law Review 77 and 104; W 
McBryde, “Jus Quaesitum Tertio” 1983 Juridical Review 137; MacCormick (n 240); HL 
MacQueen, “Third Party Rights in Contract: Jus Quaesitum Tertio” in K Reid and R 
Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland, vol 2 (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2000) 220; A Rodger, “Molina, Stair and the Jus Quaesitum Tertio” 1969 Juridical 
Review 128.     
269 Smith and Snipes Hall Farm LD v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500 at 
514 per Lord Denning, discussed above at subsection 2.4.2.1. See also P Kincaid, “The UK 
Law Commission’s Privity Proposals and Contract Theory” 1994 8(1) Journal of Contract 
Law 51 at 57: whilst Kincaid comments that the enforcement of third party rights is not 
justified by contractual intention alone, he acknowledges that the contracting parties’ 
intention to benefit the third party is contained in their promise to it.     
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that the will of the parties should be respected.270 Indeed, it was said during 
the debates that the “theme” of the Bill was allowing contractual intentions to 
be effected.271 
3.2.3. Other exceptions to the privity doctrine  
There are various specific statutory exceptions to the privity doctrine, for 
example in the context of insurance and carriage of goods by sea.272 Where 
a statutory provision affords title to sue outwith a contract, such title will not 
be negated due to an argument of lack of privity.273 The statutory exceptions 
provide a specific right of enforcement for the third party and result from 
extensive policy-based examination of the circumstances in which the 
exception is required. Some of the statutory exceptions are examined further 
in chapter 5,274 which assesses the policy considerations justifying deviation 
from the privity doctrine.  
Walker lists the following examples of common-law exceptions to the privity 
doctrine: transfer by negotiation;275 transmission of contract on death;276 
transmission to or against successors in office;277 transmission on dissolution 
of a firm;278 transmission of the granting of trust deeds;279 transmission of 
                                                          
270 Hansard Debates on the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Bill, 3 Dec 1998: Column 
6056, 3.43pm, Lord Chancellor (Lord Irvine of Lairg).  
271 Ibid. 2 Feb 1999: Column 1431, Lord Chancellor (Lord Irvine of Lairg). For further 
discussion, see H Beale, “A Review of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999” in A 
Burrows and E Peel (eds), Contract Formation and Parties (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010) 225 at 246-247.    
272 For a discussion of these provisions, see: Adams, Beyleveld, and Brownsword (n 20) at 
243. Discussion of statutory exceptions to privity more generally is found in D Ibbetson, 
“English Law: Twentieth Century” in J Hallebeek and H Dondorp (eds), Contracts for a Third-
Party Beneficiary: A Historical and Comparative Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2008) 
115 at 126-127.   
273 See, for example, Lord Murray’s statement that “It is clear that privity of contract affords 
no test of the validity of such a claim. The claim rests upon statute.” The text of Lord 
Murray’s Note from Interlocutor is provided in Waddell v Howat 1924 SLT 468. See also S 
Whittaker, “Privity of Contract and the Tort of Negligence: Future Directions” 1996 16(2) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 191 at 215.   
274 See section 5.2.  
275 Walker, Contracts (n 3) 29.36.  
276 Ibid. 29.39. 
277 Ibid. 29.41. 
278 Ibid. 29.42. 
279 Ibid. 29.43. 
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contract on the appointment of a receiver;280 transmission of contract on the 
liquidation of companies;281 and contracts running with land or transmitting 
with goods.282 These are not considered further, because they cannot be 
used to recover extra-contractual losses. 
3.3. Compatibility of privity with the current law 
Previous sections have demonstrated that the privity doctrine is accepted in 
Scots and English law, although the fact that both jurisdictions uphold third 
party rights illustrates that privity is subject to the intentions of contracting 
parties. This section addresses whether the privity doctrine is compatible with 
the dominant theories of Scots contract law and the fundamental principles of 
freedom to contract and freedom of contract 
3.3.1. Overview of the dominant theories of contract in Scots law 
This subsection provides an overview of the dominant theories of Scots 
contract law: the will, promissory and assumption theories of contract. The 
thesis will not seek to provide an extensive overview of the competing 
theories of Scots contract law (this is outwith the scope of the work), but it will 
ascertain whether the privity doctrine and its exceptions are compatible with 
these three theories. Accordingly, this chapter does not consider every theory 
of contract which has been discussed in relation to Scots law.   
3.3.1.1. Will theory  
Whilst there is a “bewildering array of contract theories” in Anglo-American 
law generally, Scots law exhibits an “essentially uniform contract theory”.283 
Stair’s view that contracts are based on the agreement of the contracting 
parties to be bound by obligations to one another284 is “largely 
unchallenged.”285 
                                                          
280 Walker, Contracts (n 3) 29.45. 
281 Ibid. 29.46.  
282 Ibid. 29.47.    
283 M Hogg, “Competing Theories of Contract: An Emerging Consensus?” in LA DiMatteo 
and Q Zhou, Commercial Contract Law: Transatlantic Perspectives (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2013) 14 at 14.  
284 Stair, Institutions (n 224) 1.10.6.    
285 Hogg (n 283) at 15.  
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According to Stair:  
“Conventional obligations do arise from our will and consent; for, as in 
the beginning hath been shown, the will is the only faculty constituting 
rights, whether real or personal.”286  
Stair states that there are three acts of will: desire (a tendency or inclination 
of the will towards its object), resolution (the decision to do what is desired), 
and engagement.287 This view is reflected in other Institutional Writings.288 
For example, Bell notes that a “full and perfect” obligation requires, on the 
part of the obligor, “a deliberate consent and engagement to him who is to 
have the right of exacting performance”.289 Erskine has similarly commented 
that a contract is a: 
“voluntary agreement of two or more persons, by which something is 
to be given or performed upon one part, for a valuable consideration, 
either present or future, on the other part.”290  
The will theory is also recognised in modern commentary. Gloag, for 
example, remarks that “the will to be bound to some obligation, actual, or 
implied by law, is necessary before contractual obligation can exist.”291 
The importance of contractual will is also upheld in English law. Atiyah 
remarks that:  
“the modern lawyer… sees little or no difference between saying that 
the parties voluntarily enter into a transaction to which the law 
                                                          
286 Stair, Institutions (n 224) 1.10.1: obediential obligations arise from the will of God, and 
conventional from the will of man.    
287 Ibid. 1.10.2. Bell similarly recognises three acts of will: deliberation, resolution, and 
engagement; noting that the law will enforce obligations at the engagement stages only: GJ 
Bell, Principles of the law of Scotland vol 1 (4th edn, 1839, reprinted by the Edinburgh Legal 
Educational Trust, Edinburgh, 2010) 7.  
288 Walker, Contracts (n 3) 3.1. 
289 GJ Bell, Commentaries on the law of Scotland and on the principles of mercantile 
jurisprudence vol 1 (7th edn, 1870, reprinted by T&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1990) I, 313. See 
also his statement that “In most codes of jurisprudence, with a view to the sure establishing 
of that consent which is of the essence of all contracts and obligations, there have been 
appointed certain requisites and solemnities, as at once evincing the deliberate act of 
consent and the authenticity of the contract.” (I, 335). He has further commented that: ““To a 
perfect obligation (besides the proof requisite), it is necessary that there shall be a deliberate 
and voluntary consent and purpose to engage” (Bell, Principles (n 287) 10).  
290 Stair, Institutions (n 224) 3.1.16.   
291 Gloag, Contract (n 65) 16. See also Hogg, Promises and contract (n 234) 169.  
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attributes certain consequences, and saying that the consequences 
themselves are the creation of the will of the parties.”292  
The will theory is treated in the thesis as the dominant theory of Scots 
contract law, and influential in English law.  
3.3.1.2. Promissory theory  
According to promissory theory, contracts consist of reciprocal promises.293 
Hogg outlines the two main sub-types of promissory theories of contract.294 
Firstly, Contractarianism bases the duty to adhere to promises in a social 
contract, and provides that individuals adhere to promises on the rational 
basis that this facilitates trust amongst members of society.295 
Contractualism, on the other hand, views promise as an “institutional 
obligation” based on the rule that promises must be kept, which derives from 
the basic moral principle of fairness.296 One of the most notable proponents 
of a promissory theory of contract in recent times is Fried, although Bix 
comments that Fried’s work Contract as Promise297 is likely restricted to an 
analysis of US law.298 
Thomas Smith notes that the distinction between unilateral promissory 
obligations and bilateral contractual obligations dates back to Roman and 
canon law.299 Scotland has long-recognised the enforceability of unilateral 
promises.300 
                                                          
292 PS Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979) 
406.    
293 SA Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) 43-44. 
294 Hogg, Promises and contract (n 234) 93-95.   
295 Ibid. 93-94.  
296 Ibid. 94; J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press, Massachussetts, reissue edn, 
2005) 112.   
297 The most recent edition is: C Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual 
Obligation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2nd edn, 2015). Bix refers to the previous 
edition: C Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1990).  
298 BH Bix, “Theories of Contract Law and Enforcing Promissory Morality: Comments on 
Charles Fried” 2012 45(3) Suffolk University Law Review 719 at 721.   
299 TB Smith, “Pollicitatio – Promise and Offer: Stair v. Grotius” 1958 Acta Juridica 141 at 
141. See also MA Hogg, “Promise: the neglected obligation in European private law” 2010 
59(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 461 at 463-464.   
300 For an overview of the development of the law of promise in Scotland, see WDH Sellar, 
“Promise” in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland, vol 2 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 252.  
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In Scotland, the will theory is dominant,301 although Hogg casts third party 
rights in promissory terms.302 Hogg also notes that firm offers likely consist of 
an offer and a promise to keep an offer open.303 
Kincaid argues that English law currently embodies the promissory theory.304 
Atiyah notes that it “has had no serious rival” in the last century,305 and 
Stephen Smith also favours promissory theory.306 Brownsword and 
Hutchison explain that promissory theory can account for situations involving 
both ‘direct’ promises to third parties (in which contracting party A promises 
contracting party B that it will confer a benefit on third party C, and A 
promises C that it will confer a benefit on C) and ‘indirect’ promises (A 
promises B that it will benefit C, but does not make such a promise to C).307  
Atiyah acknowledges elements of promissory theory in English law.308 His 
view is that the promissory theory is “alive and well”309 despite the fact that it 
requires qualification and modification in the context of analysing certain 
consumer and family arrangements.310 
Promissory theories are not incompatible with will-based accounts of contract 
law. This is because promises are, in Scots law, historically rooted in 
unilateral declarations of the promisor’s will.311 Thomas Smith’s view is that 
pollicitatio continue to constitute expressions of unilateral will,312 and, more 
                                                          
301 See above at subsection 3.3.1.1.  
302 Hogg, Promises and contract (n 234) 284.   
303 Hogg (n 299) at 465. 
304 It is noted that Kincaid equates the will, promise, and assumption theories: “If the three 
terms do not mean exactly the same thing, they are variations on a common theme.” Kincaid 
(n 269) at 52.  
305 PS Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990) 12. See also PS 
Atiyah, “Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations” 1978 94(Apr) Law Quarterly 
Review 193 at 194.    
306 Smith, Contract Theory (n 293) 60-68.  
307 R Brownsword and D Hutchison, “Beyond Promissory Principle and Protective 
Pragmatism” in P Kincaid (ed), Privity: Private justice of public regulation (Ashgate, 
Dartmouth, 2001) 126 at 130.  
308 PS Atiyah, “The theoretical basis of contract law – an English perspective” 1981 1(2) 
International Review of Law and Economics 183 at 189-190.  
309 Atiyah, Essays (n 305) 13.  
310 Ibid. 12.  
311 Smith (n 299) at 142 and 145, citing Stair, Institutions (n 224) 1.1.12, 1.10.3-7. Stair’s 
promissory views appear to include promises in favour of third parties: 1.10.5 notes jus 
quaesitum tertio as the main example of promises which do not require acceptance.  
312 Smith (n 299) at 142 at 147.  
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generally, Scots law “has accepted a general doctrine of obligation by 
unilateral declaration of will”.313 Hogg has recently acknowledged that a 
promise is “constituted by the act or declaration of will of one party alone, this 
making it a type of unilateral juridical act (or unilateral legal transaction).”314 
Referring to English law, Stephen Smith comments that “contracts are 
promises or, if not promises, then agreements or something similar”.315 
Indeed, will theory was dominant in nineteenth-century English contract 
theory, and promissory theory is thought to be a “contemporary, if somewhat 
narrower” branch of will theory.316  
3.3.1.3. Assumption theory  
The most notable advocate for assumption theory is the New Zealand 
commentator Coote.317 According to Coote:  
“Contractual obligations are not imposed by the law ab extra but are 
those which at formation the parties have assumed, that is, have taken 
upon themselves. Whether there has been such an assumption falls to 
be determined objectively.”318 
In Scots law, Hogg considers that there are elements of the assumption 
theory in the work of Stair, explaining that Stair understood the “essence” of 
contract law to be the recognition of contractual parties’ voluntary 
undertakings.319 Hogg also notes that Scots lawyers more generally would 
perhaps agree with Coote’s view that contract law involves the assumption of 
legal duties.320 Indeed, Hogg has described Coote’s theories as taking a: 
“commendable approach to the importance of personal liberty and 
freedom of action, stressing… the voluntary intention of the parties as 
the constitutive means of assuming an obligation.”321  
                                                          
313 Smith (n 299) at 142 at 149. See also Smith, Contract Theory (n 293) 57.  
314 Hogg (n 299) at 462.  
315 Smith, Contract Theory (n 293) 168. See also 44 and 56. Atiyah similarly states that a 
contract “consists of an exchange of promises… with the intention of creating a binding 
deal”: Atiyah (n 305) at 194. See also 195.   
316 Smith, Contract Theory (n 293) 56.  
317 B Coote, Contract as assumption: essays on a theme (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010).  
318 B Coote, Contract as Assumption II (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2016) 1.  
319 M Hogg, “Publication Review: Contract as Assumption” 2011 15(2) Edinburgh Law 
Review 315 at 316. See also Hogg (n 283) at 27. 
320 Hogg (n 319) at 316.  
321 Ibid. at 316-317.  
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Save for these comments, the assumption theory has not gained 
considerable recognition in Scotland. Phang argues that various English 
cases can be explained in terms of the assumption theory.322 On the whole, 
however, assumption theory has gained less traction in English law than will-
based theories and promissory theory. 
Assumption theory is compatible with will-based theories of contract.   
According to the theory, contracting parties voluntarily agree to uphold 
contractual obligations.323 In other words, they voluntarily assume their 
respective contractual obligations because they intend to do so. Coote 
explains that an enforceable contract consists of promises or undertakings “in 
respect of which legal contractual obligation has been assumed by means 
that the law recognises as effective for that purpose”, such that the party’s 
intention to assume its obligations under the contract is treated as incidental 
to its intention to contract.324 Hogg surmises that Coote:  
“does not reject out of hand promissory ideas about contract law, but 
rather suggests that what is crucial to a legally relevant promise is that 
the promisor is assuming an obligation in the act of promising”.325  
Thus, like the will theory, contractual obligations can only arise with the 
parties’ consent. 
3.3.1.4. Summary  
These theories all share a core element of consent, demonstrating a uniform 
understanding that a contract in Scots and English law is based on voluntary 
obligations. A particularly clear statement of the consensual nature of 
contracts is provided by Stephen Smith:  
“The core offer-acceptance rule thus provides, in principle anyway, 
that contracting parties control the contract-making process: both the 
existence and the content of contractual duties are up to the 
parties.”326 
                                                          
322 A Phang, “Contract as Assumption – The Scholarship and Influence of Professor Brian 
Coote” 2011 27(3) Journal of Contract Law 247 at 250-255.  
323 Hogg (n 283) at 27. 
324 Coote, Assumption II (n 318) 11.  
325 Hogg (n 319) at 317.  
326 Smith, Contract Theory (n 293) at 168. 
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These theories are also compatible with modern statements of contract as 
“agreement”.327 If the contracting parties have voluntarily agreed to perform 
under the contract, they are bound by their own will to do so. Similarly, they 
can be said to have agreed to fulfil their promises to one another, and they 
have agreed to perform under their voluntarily assumed obligations.   
The remainder of this thesis will not offer a view on which of the theories of 
contract outlined above (will, promissory, or assumption) is preferable. 
Rather, the work will proceed on the basis that contractual obligations are 
consensual in nature, and based on the will of the contracting parties, 
because this aspect of contract law is shared by each of the theories.  
3.3.2. Compatibility of privity with contract theory  
It has been said that privity of contract is “difficult to accommodate” in will-
based theories, because it is not entirely clear why the will of contracting 
parties should be restricted to the extent that third parties can gain rights.328 
Hogg states that there is “no convincing answer” to this question.329 Kincaid 
asserts that the intention of the contracting parties does not create the third 
party’s right to sue – rather, the right is attached by law. He argues that the 
parties’ intention is relevant to the “fact and content” of the contract, but not 
the creation of rights outwith the contract.330 It is however difficult to follow 
Kincaid’s logic. The third party right is a term in the contract, and as such the 
obligation on the part of the debtor to perform in favour of the third party is 
part of the content of the contract to which the parties have consented. 
Kincaid’s argument is based on his view of contracts as bargains. He asserts 
that the legal relationship between the contracting parties is constituted by 
promises within the setting of a bargain and cannot encompass third 
parties.331 This ignores the fact that at least one of the contracting parties has 
bargained for contractual performance in favour of the third party.  
                                                          
327 In English law, see Burrows, Restatement (n 33) §2. In Scots law, McBryde notes that “In 
practice, lawyers talk of agreement”: McBryde, Contract (n 111) 1.07.   
328 Hogg (n 283) at 36.  
329 Ibid.  
330 Kincaid (n 187) at 63-64. See also 74.  
331 Ibid. at 63.   
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Third party rights are conferred according to the intentions of the contracting 
parties, and so the will of the parties is not circumvented where third parties 
enforce their rights. This reflects that the Scots conception of privity is 
compatible with the will theory: it does not prevent the recognition of third 
party rights where this accords with contractual intention. MacQueen notes 
that, generally speaking, only the contracting parties will benefit under their 
contract, subject to their contrary intentions.332 He elaborates that the:  
“purpose of contract law is to give effect to the legitimate intentions of 
the parties, and in Scots law, if the intention is to confer enforceable 
rights upon third parties, that will be given effect”.333  
Crucially, the Scottish Law Commission has recently stated that privity is an 
“important principle”, but it “yields to one even more fundamental”: giving 
effect to the intentions of contracting parties.334 These statements reflect that 
the privity rule in Scots law accounts for will-based theories of contract law, in 
that it is subject to contractual intention. This explains why Scots law has 
historically recognised the jus quaesitum tertio, and has introduced a 
statutory third party right, alongside its recognition of privity. Privity and the 
will theory are not contradictory. Rather, the former is subject to the latter. 
Privity is a default effect of contracting, which can be disapplied by the 
contracting parties’ intentions.  
In terms of the relationship between the privity doctrine and promissory 
theory, Flannigan argues that there is no theoretical justification for privity in 
systems adhering to promissory theory. According to Flannigan, if promises 
(and promisors) are to be taken seriously, we must “show respect” by 
allowing third parties to enforce promises made in their favour.335 Sir Anthony 
Mason’s stance is that promissory theory is “even more opposed to the privity 
                                                          
332 MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 814.  
333 Ibid. See also Gloag, Contract (n 65) 218-219. 
334 Discussion Paper on Third Party Rights (n 63) 2.15. The Law Commission similarly 
comment that in situations in which the law refuses to uphold third party rights where the 
contracting parties intend for them to arise, this “frustrates their intentions, and undermines 
the general justifying theory of contract”: Report on Privity of contract (n 182) 3.1. See also 
Sutherland (n 33) at 205.    
335 Flannigan (n 146) at 587.   
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rule than the will theory”.336 He does not discuss why this is the case, but 
refers to Macneil’s comment that privity is “unrelated to social needs”.337 As 
discussed in chapter 1,338 privity allows contracting parties to predict their 
liability towards external parties. Efficient contracting can be construed as a 
social good. If external parties were permitted to sue on contracts as they 
choose, this would result in increased costs for contracting parties who would 
be forced to defend such actions. This would be disadvantageous for 
commercial parties, and so applying the privity doctrine to limit the ability of 
external parties to enforce contracts promotes contractual efficiency. Sir 
Anthony Mason is therefore incorrect to suggest that privity and promissory 
theory are incompatible because privity does not promote social needs. It is 
submitted that the privity doctrine is compatible with the promissory theory, 
because privity reflects the principle that promises are usually only 
enforceable by those to whom they are directed. Further, Stephen Smith 
comments that privity aligns with promissory theory:  
“The privity rule is consistent with this view because promissory 
obligations are personal obligations. A promise is created by 
communicating an intention to undertake an obligation to someone—
the promisee—and the obligation thus created is in principle owed to 
that person alone.”339 
The Scots privity doctrine is also compatible with assumption theory. 
Contracting parties who wish to voluntarily assume obligations towards third 
parties are permitted to do so, thus upholding contractual intention.   
In summary, privity is compatible with the dominant theories of Scots contract 
law, because the doctrine is not absolute but, rather, applies in accordance 
with the intentions of the contracting parties. The fact that privity yields to the 
intentions of the contracting parties, permitting the creation of third party 
rights, means that it is compatible with the will theory, promissory theory, and 
assumption theory.  
                                                          
336 Mason (n 26) at 99.  
337 I Macneil, Contracts: Exchange Transactions and Relations (Foundation Press, St. Paul, 
Minnesota, 2nd edn, 1978) 333 (cited in Mason (n 26) at 99). 
338 See, in particular, subsection 1.3.1.    
339 Smith, Contract Theory (n 293) 60.  
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3.3.3. Freedom to contract and freedom of contract  
This subsection outlines the principles of freedom of contract and freedom to 
contract in Scots law. It then analyses whether privity is compatible with 
these principles.   
3.3.3.1. Freedom to contract and freedom of contract in Scots 
contract law  
The principle of freedom to contract can be distinguished from freedom of 
contract: the former refers to a party’s choice to enter into a contract, and the 
latter concerns freedom as to the content of one’s contracts.340 
The freedom to contract (or not) as one chooses is a fundamental principle of 
Scots law. Stair refers to:  
“that freedom we have of disposal of ourselves, our actions and 
things, which naturally is in us, is by our engagement placed in 
another, and so engagement is a diminution of freedom, constituting 
that power in another, whereby he may restrain or constrain us to the 
doing or performing of that whereof we have given him power of 
exaction”.341  
Freedom of contract is also an important contractual principle in Scots law. 
Bankton notes that conventional obligations arise: “from the will of the 
parties, in matters wherein they are otherwise free, which happens by 
contracts among them.”342  
3.3.3.2. Compatibility of privity with freedom to contract and 
freedom of contract  
The privity doctrine is compatible with the principles of freedom to contract 
and freedom of contract. Regarding freedom to contract, privity ensures that 
parties owe obligations only to those with whom they contract, thus reflecting 
the parties’ freedom to choose their contracting partners, and not to contract 
with others.  
                                                          
340 MacQueen and Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson (n 68) 9.10.  
341 Stair, Institutions (n 224) 1.10.1.   
342 Bankton, Institute (n 52) 1.11.1. 
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Allowing for exceptions to privity in line with the intentions of the contracting 
parties is also compatible with freedom of contract. In the case of third party 
rights, the contracting parties have voluntarily curtailed their freedom by 
binding themselves to perform in favour of the third party. Indeed, Gloag 
comments that a contracting party can consent to “the curtailment of his 
ordinary liberty of action” in respect of contractual rights owed to another who 
“need not necessarily be the other party to the contract.”343 The privity 
doctrine allows contracting parties to provide for third party rights in their 
contracts, thus controlling the content and scope of their contractual 
obligations.  
3.3.4. Summary 
The Scots privity doctrine operates subject to the intentions of the contracting 
parties. Privity will generally apply to prevent claims made by external 
parties, but the contracting parties can override the doctrine if they so intend 
by providing for third party rights. This qualified doctrine is compatible with 
the leading theories of Scots contract law as well as the principles of freedom 
to contract and freedom of contract.  
3.4. Comments on English law  
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 has been described as 
delivering a “body blow”344 to the privity doctrine. However, it is submitted 
that the Act has merely ensured that the application of the doctrine is subject 
to the intentions of the contracting parties, as required by the will theory.  
Whilst will theory is not necessarily the dominant theory of contract in English 
law,345 recognition of third party rights has been justified by reference to the 
                                                          
343 Gloag, Contract (n 65) 218.  
344 Nisshin Shipping Co Ltd v Cleaves & Co Ltd [2003] EWHC 2602 at para 1 per Colman J. 
Merkin has also described the Act as the “abolition of the privity doctrine”: Merkin (n 222) at 
5.9.  See also E McKendrick, “Breach of Contract and the Meaning of Loss” 1999 52(1) 
Current Legal Problems 37 at 56 and N Andrews, “Strangers to Justice No Longer: The 
Reversal of the Privity Rule under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999” 2001 
60(2) Cambridge Law Journal 353 at 354.   
345 See the discussion above at subsection 3.3.1.1.   
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intentions of contracting parties.346 Further, Vernon Palmer suggests that the 
English reception of will theory in the nineteenth century “changed the face of 
English contract” and allowed for a second conception of privity based on will 
theory rather than consideration.347 This second theory of privity was based 
on the premise that obligations were sourced in promises rather than 
consideration, and so, as third parties were recipients of promises, they 
should be able to directly enforce their rights.348 He comments that, had will 
theory had an earlier reception in English law, its recognition may have 
“logically” resulted in a more liberal approach to privity, such that third party 
rights were permitted.349  
Accordingly, the privity doctrine in English law is compatible with contract 
theory on the same grounds as the Scots doctrine. Will theory is not violated 
by privity, because, following the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999, parties can exert their contractual intention by providing for an 
enforceable third party right. Privity is also compatible with a promissory 
theory of contract law. As third party rights are permitted in English law, the 
contracting parties can confer an enforceable promise on the third party if 
they so intend. They are similarly permitted to voluntarily assume obligations 
in favour of third parties, upholding the assumption theory. It is recognised in 
English law that allowing third party rights extended the freedom of 
contracting parties to bind themselves to uphold obligations owed to third 
parties.350  
Finally, the idea that privity has ‘evaporated’ due to the development of third 
party rights in England does not account for the numerous concepts which 
                                                          
346 Report on Privity of contract (n 182) 3.1; C Mitchell, “Privity reform and the nature of 
contractual obligations” 1999 19(2) Legal Studies 229 at 235-236. See also Darlington 
Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 68 at 75-76 per Steyn LJ; A Phang, 
“On Justification and Method in Law Reform – The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) 1999” 
2002 18(2) Journal of Contract Law 32 at 28.    
347 Palmer, Paths to privity (n 27) 175.  





have been framed as statutory exceptions to privity.351 Third party rights in 
English law were in fact an addition to the large body of existing exceptions 
to privity. Indeed, MacMillan acknowledges that the Contracts (Rights of 
Third Parties) Act 1999 “does not abolish the privity rule but merely reforms it 
in certain circumstances”.352 The view that third party rights legislation has 
abolished privity in English law is incorrect. Privity remains a default rule in 
Scots and English law, barring recovery by third parties unless they can rely 
on a specific statutory or common law exception to privity. These exceptions 
mitigate the unjust results of rigid adherence to the doctrine.353  
3.5. Concluding remarks  
This chapter has examined the relationship between privity, third party rights, 
Scots contract theory, and the principles of freedom to contract and freedom 
of contract. In particular, the chapter has shown that it is inaccurate to state 
that Scots or English law has exhibited a strict approach to privity throughout 
the last few centuries. Whilst there is a dearth of definitive commentary on 
the point, both jurisdictions recognise the privity doctrine subject to the 
intentions of the contracting parties. Both jurisdictions uphold third party 
rights where the contracting parties intend for the right to be enforceable at 
the suit of the third party. Accordingly, it can be said that, in both Scots and 
English law, the privity doctrine is subject to the principle that the intentions of 
the contracting parties should be upheld. This has been accepted in Scotland 
since at least the nineteenth century.354 In England, the ‘blemishes’ on the 
legal landscape, consisting of cases which refused to enforce third party 
rights, appear to have arisen because the courts gave greater weight to the 
                                                          
351 Beale also comments that Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd; St 
Martin’s Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 went 
“some way to mitigating privity’s effects” (H Beale, “Privity of Contract: Judicial and 
Legislative Reform” 1995 9(1) Journal of Contract Law 103 at 104). This case, which was 
heard before the passage of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, is an early 
authority on the transferred loss doctrine, and is further discussed at subsection 7.2.2. 
352 MacMillan (n 250) at 721.   
353 Discussed further at section 5.3.  
354 See above at subsection 2.3.1. 
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fact that the third party had not provided consideration than the importance of 
upholding contractual intention.355  
A strict application of privity would be incompatible with the leading theories 
of contract in Scots and English law, but the recognition of third party rights in 
both jurisdictions ensures that privity applies in line with the intentions of the 
contracting parties. Privity is thus compatible with the will, promissory, and 
assumption theories. In both Scots and English law, privity means that the 
parties can confer an enforceable benefit on a third party if they so intend. It 
has also been shown that privity is compatible with the principles of freedom 
to contract and freedom of contract in both jurisdictions.  
  
                                                          






Chapter 4: The Interaction between the Privity Doctrine and Delictual 
Liability 
4.1. Overview 
This chapter briefly outlines the current law of delict and tort, in terms of the 
recoverability of losses for personal injury, damage to property, and pure 
economic loss. It then considers cases in which the imposition of delictual 
liability appears to bypass the privity doctrine, and analyses relevant 
commentary on the intersection of delict and contract in such situations. The 
chapter assesses whether delict should be classed as an exception to privity, 
and whether privity does and should prevent a third party from suing in delict 
in respect of the impact of defective contractual performance.  
This chapter does not contain separate subsections on English law, as seen 
in the previous chapters, because the relevant Scots and English laws are 
closely intertwined and are consequently examined together. The term ‘delict’ 
is used to refer to both delict and tort when discussing common elements of 
Scots and English law. ‘Tort’ refers specifically to English law. 
4.2. Delict 
This section defines delict, distinguishing it from contract, and summarises 
the law on delictual recovery of damages for physical and economic loss.  
4.2.1. Defining delict 
According to Walker, a delict is  
“voluntary conduct, by act or omission, by one person, with the 
requisite state of mind, in breach of a duty, imposed on that person by 
general rules of law, owed in the circumstances by that person to 
another person, causing that other unjustifiable harm by the 
infringement of a legally protected interest”.356  
                                                          




A delict results in an obligation to repair the damage caused.357 The “basis” 
of delictual liability is accordingly culpa, or fault.358   
Delict is distinguished from contract because the latter involves consensual 
obligations.359 Delictual obligations (not to cause harm by unjustifiably 
infringing on another’s interests, and to provide compensation for harm 
unjustifiably done) are imposed by law, regardless of the will of the parties.360 
The primary contractual obligation (to perform in accordance with the 
contract) arises due to the parties’ agreement.361  The secondary obligation 
(to provide compensation for breach) is imposed by law, but only arises due 
to the primary obligations, to which the parties consent, and can generally be 
excluded by the parties’ agreement.362 Contractual liability is based on the 
contracting parties’ intentions, whereas delictual liability is imposed 
involuntarily. This is reflected in Stair’s distinction between conventional 
obligations (i.e. contract), and obediential obligations arising by force of 
law.363   
4.2.2. The law on recovery for personal injury and damage to property  
In terms of personal injury, the crucial case is, of course, Donoghue v 
Stevenson,364 in which Mrs Donoghue suffered shock and gastroenteritis 
after consuming ginger beer from a bottle containing a decomposing snail. 
She was prevented from suing the manufacturer of the beverage due to 
privity of contract, but successfully sued in delict. In the case, Lord Atkin 
outlined the neighbour principle, according to which: “[you] must take 
                                                          
357 Bankton, Institute (n 52) 1.4.26; J Thomson, Delictual Liability (Bloomsbury, Haywards 
Heath, 5th edn, 2014) 1.1; Walker, Delict (n 356) 4-5.  
358 Thomson, Delictual Liability (n 357) 3.1. 
359 WJ Stewart, Delict (Thomson/ W Green, Edinburgh, 4th edn, 2004) 1.2. In English law, 
see Brownsword, Contract law (n 7) 197 and A Robertson, “On the Distinction between 
Contract and Tort” in A Robertson (ed), The Law of Obligations: Connections and 
Boundaries (UCL Press, London, 2004) 87 at 87-91 and 93.   
360 Walker, Delict (n 356) 13 and 52; Stair, Institutions (n 224) 1.1.3 and 1.9.1. 
361 Walker, Delict (n 356) 13-14; Stair, Institutions (n 224) 1.1.3. 
362 Walker, Delict (n 356) 13-14; Stair, Institutions (n 224) 1.1.3. The ability of contracting 
parties to exclude liability for breach of contract is subject to statutory restrictions (see, for 
example, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 section 31).  
363 Stair, Institutions (n 224) 1.3.2. 
364 Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 44 per Lord Atkin.  
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reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.”365 
The Nicholas H366 indicates that a test of whether it is fair, just, and 
reasonable to impose a duty of care applies in cases involving damage to 
property. In the context of business-to-consumer contracts, the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987 now provides for strict statutory liability in respect of 
defective products.367  
4.2.3. The law on recovery for pure economic loss 
The law on delictual recovery for economic loss is not settled.368 Unlike 
personal injury and damage to property cases, foreseeability alone is 
insufficient to result in a duty of care in respect of pure economic loss.369 
Following Murphy v Brentwood DC,370 claims in respect of pure economic 
loss are not generally permitted.371 There are, however, four categories of 
cases in which pure economic loss is sometimes recoverable.372 These are 
considered in turn in the following subsections.  
Scots and English law on the topic is similar; an “unsurprising case of insular 
convergence.”373 The duty of care is used as a ‘screening device’, preventing 
claims by those to whom the duty is not owed, and its scope is determined by 
judicial policy choices.374  
 
                                                          
365 Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31. 
366 Marc Rich and Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd (The Nicholas H) [1996] AC 211. 
This has been applied in Scotland: British Telecom v Thomson 1997 Rep. LR 23; Coleridge 
v Miller 1997 SLT 485. 
367 See subsection 5.2.7. 
368 Stewart, Delict (n 359) 10.01; G Wagner, “Comparative Tort Law” in M Rimann and R 
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2008) 1003 at 1015. 
369 Wagner (n 368) at 1019.   
370 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398. 
371 See discussion in M Bussani and VV Palmer, “The liability regimes of Europe – their 
façades and interiors” in M Bussani and VV Palmer (eds), Pure Economic Loss in Europe 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) 120 at 140. 
372 Stewart, Delict (n 359) 10.02.  
373 Bussani and Palmer (n 371) at 142.  
374 Ibid. at 124-125 and 142.  
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4.2.3.1. Hedley Byrne liability 
In Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd,375 a “major step” in the 
expansion of liability for pure economic loss,376 the defendants were liable for 
loss resulting from the pursuer’s reliance on their negligent misstatement. 
There was no contract between the parties, but liability was based on their 
sufficiently proximate ‘special relationship’. Such a relationship arises where 
the pursuer reasonably relies on the defendant’s statement, and it is 
reasonable that the defender knows that the pursuer will rely on that 
statement.377 The rationale of the case has applied in Scotland since Martin v 
Bell-Ingram.378 There have been various formulations of the Hedley Byrne 
rule, but Lord Morris’ dicta reflect “the current view”379 of the principles 
stemming from the case: 
“if in a sphere in which a person is so placed, that others could 
reasonably rely upon his judgment or his skill or upon his ability to 
make careful enquiry, a person takes it upon himself to give 
information or advice to, or allows his information or advice to be 
passed on to, another person who, as he knows or should know, will 
place reliance upon it, then a duty of care will arise.”380 
Hedley Byrne has also been applied in cases involving physical damage 
arising from defective performance381 and non-performance382 of contractual 
obligations. Whilst the case has been subject to criticism,383 it continues to 
provide a means of recovering pure economic loss.  
                                                          
375 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
376 Wagner (n 368) at 1018. See also P Mitchell, “Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners 
Ltd (1963)” in C Mitchell and P Mitchell, Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010) 171 at 171.   
377 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 at 539 per Lord Pearce.  
378 Martin v Bell Ingram 1986 SLT 575; Stewart, Delict (n 359) 10.03.  
379 LJ Powell and T Stewart, Jackson and Powell on Professional Liability (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 7th edn, 2012) 17.028. 
380 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 at 503 and 514 per Lord 
Morris.    
381 Phelps v Hillingdon LBC [2000] 3 WLR 747. 
382 Barrett v Ministry of Defence [1995] 1 WLR 1217. 
383 A Goodhart, “Liability for Innocent but Negligent Misrepresentation” 1964 74(2) Yale Law 
Journal 286; G Dworkin, “The Value of a Banker’s Reference” 1962 25(2) Modern Law 




4.2.3.2. Bright-line non-liability cases 
This form of liability is defined as “loss which arises as a consequence of 
physical injury to the person or property of another”, and is also referred to as 
‘secondary’ or ‘derivative’ loss.384 In other words, the ‘bright line’ refers to the 
firm denial of liability for any economic losses which stem from another’s 
injury.385 In Allan v Barclay,386 for example, an employer could not recover for 
loss of his employee’s services when the latter was injured by the defender. 
Similarly, the House of Lords did not permit a delictual claim in respect of a 
company’s economic loss caused by damage to a property which the 
company did not own.387 There have however been a number of isolated 
cases in which recovery was permitted, or carefully considered. Stewart388 
offers several examples such as Nacap Ltd v Moffat Plant Ltd,389 in which a 
pursuer was working on a pipe. The defender damaged the pipe at a time at 
which the pursuer was professionally responsible for the pipe, and the 
pursuer could recover in respect of its loss sustained due to the damage. 
These cases all require the narrow circumstance of the pursuer’s ownership 
or possession of the property in question.390 
4.2.3.3. Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd391 liability 
This form of liability is an extension of Hedley Byrne liability.392 In Henderson 
v Merrett Syndicates,393 Lord Goff of Chieveley commented that the principle 
of Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd394 was not confined to 
negligent misstatements, but “extends beyond the provision of information 
                                                          
384 AB Wilkinson and AD Forte, “Pure Economic Loss – A Scottish Perspective” 1985 
Juridical Review 1 at 8.  
385 Stewart, Delict (n 359) 10.08.  
386 Allan v Barclay (1864) 2 M 873.  
387 Simpson & Co v Thomson (1877) 5 R (HL) 40.  
388 Stewart, Delict (n 359) 10.08.  
389 Nacap Ltd v Moffat Plant Ltd 1987 SLT 221. See, more recently Cruden Building & 
Renewals Ltd v Scottish Water [2017] CSOH 98. 
390 Stewart, Delict (n 359) 10.08-09, citing Lord Penzance’s obiter remarks in Simpson & Co 
v Thomson (1877) 5 R (HL) 40.  
391 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145.  
392 Mitchell (n 376) at 171.    
393 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145.  
394 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
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and advice to include the performance of other services”.395 The case 
concerned insurance syndicates. Such syndicates share the profits and risks 
of underwriting insurance policies, and are managed by underwriting agents. 
Those who invest in the syndicates are known as ‘names’, and the liability of 
the names is unlimited. Following a series of hurricanes in the USA, the 
syndicate demanded that the names covered their proportionate share of the 
losses associated with meeting the insurance pay-outs. The names sued the 
underwriting agents on the grounds that they had mismanaged the 
syndicate’s funds. It was found that a duty of care was owed by underwriting 
agents to the names for the running of syndicates because the agents had 
assumed responsibility for the names.396 This form of liability can extend to 
physical or economic loss.397  
4.2.3.4. White v Jones398 liability 
White v Jones399 is the leading ‘disappointed beneficiary’ case. Such cases 
arise where a beneficiary does not receive its intended inheritance because 
the testator’s legal representative does not properly execute the testator’s 
instructions. Disappointed beneficiaries may not make contractual claims in 
Scots law.400 Whilst Scots law did not previously recognise delictual claims 
on the part of disappointed beneficiaries,401 Robertson v Bannigan402 
permitted such claims.403 In a recent similar case, Antonio Caliendo Barnaby 
                                                          
395 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 at 180 per Lord Goff of Chieveley. 
396 Ibid. at 168 per Lord Goff of Chieveley. See further discussion in S Hedley, “Negligence – 
Pure Economic Loss – Goodbye Privity, Hello Contorts” 1995 54(1) Cambridge Law Journal 
27 at 27-28.  
397 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 at 180 per Lord Goff of Chieveley. 
398 White v Jones [1995] 1 AC 207. 
399 Ibid. 
400 Tully v Ingram (1891) 19 R 65; Raes v Meek (1889) 14 App. Cas. 558. Robertson v 
Fleming (1861) 23 D (HL) 8. See further Stewart, Delict (n 359) 22.7; Norrie (n 69) at 19.19. 
401 Robertson v Fleming (1861) 23 D (HL) 8; Weir v JM Hodge 1990 SLT 266; MacDougall v 
MacDougall’s Executors 1994 SLT 1178. 
402 Robertson v Bannigan 1965 SC 20. 
403 In Scots law, White v Jones [1995] UKHL 5 was later accepted in Robertson v Watt & Co 
(Inner House, 4 July 1995, unreported); Holmes v Bank of Scotland 2002 SLT 544; and 
McLeod v Crawford 2010 SLT 1035. For further discussion see S Waddams, “Breaches of 
Contracts and Claims by Third Parties” in JW Neyers, E Chamberlain and SGA Pitel, 
Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2007) 191 at 
191-198.    
85 
 
Holdings LLC v Mishcon de Reya LLP,404 the defendant solicitors were found 
to have assumed responsibility for the third party claimant’s interests. It is not 
necessary that the intended beneficiary demonstrates that the client’s 
testamentary intention remained constant until death.405 Where the solicitor’s 
duty to the testator is contrary to their potential duty to the intended 
beneficiary, a duty of care will not be owed to the latter.406 It was 
acknowledged in White v Jones407 at the Court of Appeal that liability might 
be owed where a solicitor is instructed to complete the transfer of a gift 
during the client’s lifetime.408 The principle has been similarly applied where a 
solicitor did not complete the variation of a lease,409 and it has been held that 
a company operating a will-making service owes a duty of care to 
disappointed beneficiaries, despite the fact that the company is not a firm of 
solicitors.410 
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates411 liability does not apply in disappointed 
beneficiary cases. In Henderson v Merrett Syndicates,412 the names had 
relied on the underwriting agents to properly manage the syndicate funds. In 
disappointed beneficiary cases, however, the beneficiary has not relied on 
the solicitor’s performance.413 Even if the solicitor can be said to have 
assumed responsibility for the beneficiary (as the agents assumed 
responsibility for the names), this form of liability is not applicable.  
 
                                                          
404 Antonio Caliendo Barnaby Holdings LLC v Mishcon de Reya LLP [2016] EWHC 150. The 
case cites Gorham v British Telecommunications plc [2000] 4 All ER 867 at para 33 per 
Lightman J: where a solicitor “is retained by one party and there is a conflict of interest 
between the client and the other party to a transaction, the court should be slow to find that 
the solicitor has assumed a duty of care to the other party to the transaction, for such an 
assumption is ordinarily implausible.” 
405 Humbleston v Martin Tolhurst Partnership (A Firm) [2004] EWHC 151. 
406 Powell and Stewart, Professional Liability (n 379) 11.055. See also Clarke v Bruce Lance 
Co (1988) 4 PN 129; Bacon v Howard Kennedy [1999] PNLR 1. 
407White v Jones [1995] 1 AC 207.  
408 Ibid. at 227A-227B per Sir Donald Nicholls VC. 
409 Clarke v Bruce Lance (1988) 4 PN 129.   
410 Esterhuizen v Allied Dunbar Assurance Plc [1998] 2 FLR 6.  
411 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145.  
412 Ibid.  
413 Thomson, Delictual Liability (n 357) 7.5-6.  
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4.2.3.5. Implications for professional liability generally  
In terms of professional liability generally, Scots law recognises the spondet 
peritiam artis principle, which demands that a person who professes a skill 
must answer for the failure to deliver it.414 This principle did not initially permit 
third party claims. According to Bell: “one who professes any art is, in 
general, liable only to his employer, and not to those who may have been 
intended to benefit by his work”.415 However, the modern law has expanded 
the scope of this principle. Norrie states that: 
“there is little doubt that a professional person when a defender is 
subject to a rather differently determined, and higher, standard than a 
non-professional person”.416  
The standard of care imposed “is that which it is reasonable to expect from a 
professional person”.417 In the context of construction, for example, 
foreseeable injury caused by defects can give rise to liability,418 and 
construction professionals are under a duty not to cause physical damage 
both to the property they are working and to other properties adjacent to or 
nearby their worksites.419 Previously, the key test in ascertaining whether 
accountants and auditors are liable for negligent misstatements was the 
three-fold test developed in Caparo,420 together with the assumption of 
                                                          
414 Stewart, Delict (n 359) 1.2; Norrie (n 69) at 19.22. The historical law is discussed in CB 
Labatt, “Negligence in Relation to Privity of Contract” 1900 16(2) Law Quarterly Review 168 
at 173. See also Bell, Principles 1889 (n 52) 153. The relevant English law is overviewed in 
AJE Jaffey, “Contract in tort’s clothing” 1985 5(1) Legal Studies 77 at 79-87.  
415 Bell, Principles 1889 (n 52) 154.  
416 Norrie (n 69) at 19.20.   
417 Ibid. 
418 Powell and Stewart, Professional Liability (n 379) 9.074; Eckersley v Binnie Partners 18 
Con. LR 1. It is said that “Where the defendant is involved in an activity which, if he is not 
careful, will create a foreseeable risk of personal injury to others, the defendant owes a duty 
of care to those others to act reasonably having regard to the existence of that risk” (Perrett 
v Collins [1998] 2 Lloyds Rep. 255 at 261 per Lord Hobhouse). 
419 Powell and Stewart, Professional Liability (n 379) 9.076; North West Water Authority v 
Binnie [1990] 3 All ER 547.   
420 The test is: whether the imposition of liability is fair, just, and reasonable; whether the 
harm was reasonably foreseeable; and whether there was a proximate relationship. See 
Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 and discussion in Powell and Stewart, 
Professional Liability (n 379) 17.027. 
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responsibility test.421 According to Caparo,422 accountants are generally 
under a duty to take reasonable care in preparing their accounts and reports, 
though they are not liable for casual remarks in general conversation, 
statements made outwith their work, and statements made in a personal 
capacity.423 Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle refines the scope of liability by 
making the accountant’s knowledge that the accounts were to be submitted 
to the third party claimant a condition of liability.424 Further, accountants are 
liable only in respect of transactions for which they had knowledge that the 
accounts were required.425 The ‘special relationship’ dicta in Hedley Byrne426 
has influenced the development of liability of accountants and auditors,427 
and the actuarial profession.428  
The Supreme Court has however recently found that Caparo429 has been 
wrongly determined in case law to date. In Steel and Another v NRAM 
Limited,430 it was determined that a two-part test applies: it must have been 
reasonable for the third party to rely on the representation,431 and the 
representor should have reasonably foreseen that the third party would do 
so.432 
4.2.4. Concurrent actions in contract and delict 
In recent years, concurrent liability has been the subject of judicial and 
academic interest.433 It is clear that Scots law recognises concurrent liability, 
                                                          
421 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 at 181 per Lord Goff of Chieveley, 
White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 per Lords Goff of Chieveley and Browne-Wilkinson. See 
further Powell and Stewart, Professional Liability (n 379) 17.027. 
422 Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. 
423 Ibid. at 655 per Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle. 
424 Ibid. at 662 per Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle. 
425 Ibid., and further Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 at 486 per 
Lord Reid (the relevant test is whether the professional ought to have known of the potential 
impact).  
426 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
427 Powell and Stewart, Professional Liability (n 379) 17.028. 
428 Ibid. 18.022-023. 
429 Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. 
430 Steel and Another v NRAM Limited (formerly NRAM Plc) [2018] UKSC 13.  
431 Ibid. at paras 32 and 35 per Lord Wilson.  
432 Ibid. at paras 19, 23, and 32 per Lord Wilson.  
433 M Hogg, Obligations (Avizandum, Edinburgh, 2nd edn, 2006) 3.63. See also M Hogg, 
“Concurrent liability in the Scots law of contract and delict” 1998 Juridical Review 5.    
88 
 
and that a contractual relationship is not a barrier to the imposition of 
delictual obligations between the contracting parties.434 
Hogg comments that, whilst Stair did not discuss concurrency in his 
Institutions, his view of delict as a prior, obediential obligation is consistent 
with the idea that delictual obligations will be owed by parties unless 
excluded by contract,435 thus permitting the concurrency of claims in contract 
and delict.436 Walker explains, for example, that a passenger injured in a 
railway accident can sue in respect of his injuries for breach of the implied 
contractual term that the train company must carry him safely, and in delict 
for the breach of the company’s general duty of care not to injure him.437  
In England, the early common law was generally hostile to concurrent 
remedies.438 However, concurrency of claims is now permitted in English 
law.439  
Accordingly, delictual claims may arise from contractual relationships in both 
Scots and English law. In the example above, the railway passenger accrues 
the right to make a delictual claim because he has a contractual relationship 
with the transport provider. This demonstrates that privity does not mean that 
the contracting parties derive only contractual rights from their relationship. 
Rather, their contractual connection might also give rise to a delictual duty of 
care.  
4.3. Delict as an exception to privity 
In case law and commentary, delict has erroneously been treated as 
circumventing the privity doctrine. This section briefly summarises the 
                                                          
434 Realstone v Messrs J & E Shepherd [2008] CSOH 31 at para 11 per Lord Hodge. See 
also Norwich Union Life Insurance Society v Covell Matthews Partnership 1987 SLT 452; 
Norrie (n 69) at 19.08 and 19.11; WJ Stewart, A Casebook on Delict (W Green/ Sweet & 
Maxwell, Edinburgh, 2nd edn, 1997) 13.5.12; Hogg, Obligations (n 433) 3.67; F McManus 
and E Russell, Delict: A Comprehensive Guide to the Law in Scotland (Dundee University 
Press, Dundee, 2011) 9.3-4. 
435 Hogg, Obligations (n 433) 3.64. 
436 Ibid.  
437 Walker, Delict (n 356) 14. See also Gray v London and North Eastern Rly Co 1930 SC 
989; Walker, Contracts (n 3) 3.3 and 29.2.  
438 Palmer, Paths to privity (n 27) 202, citing Hambly v Trott (1776) 1 C 371.    
439 See, for example, Wellesley Partners LLP v Withers LLP [2015] EWCA Civ. 1146.  
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relevant case law and commentary, and explains why delict is not an 
exception to privity.   
4.3.1. The development of case law at the intersection of privity and 
delict   
Vernon Palmer identifies the English case of Winterbottom v Wright440 as the 
initial cause of the controversial relationship between tort and privity.441 In the 
case, the coach-driver of a Post Office mail carriage had no claim in respect 
of his personal injuries sustained following the breakdown of a defective 
coach supplied by the defendant to the Post Office. Lord Abinger claimed 
that there is:  
“no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can 
sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road who 
was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar 
action.”442  
Thus, as noted by Vernon Palmer, “originated the famous citadel of privity in 
the field of tort.”443  
This case was not strictly adhered to in later Scots or English case law 
involving personal injury or damage to property. Ibbetson acknowledges 
Donoghue v Stevenson444 as a reversal of the line of cases beginning with 
Winterbottom v Wright445 which denied tortious recovery on the grounds that 
this would violate privity of contract.446 As discussed above,447 concurrent 
                                                          
440 Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 152 ER 402. See also Tollit v Sherstone (1839) 5 M & W 
283.  
441 Palmer, Paths to privity (n 27) 198. See also VV Palmer, “Why privity entered tort” 1983 
27(1) The American Journal of Legal History 85.   
442 Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 152 ER 402 at 404-405 per Lord Abinger.   
443 Palmer, Paths to privity (n 27) 205.   
444 Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31. 
445 Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 152 ER 402. 
446 Ibbetson, Obligations (n 121) 190-193. It was acknowledged in the earlier case of 
McGowan v Barr & Co 1929 SC 461 that there could be a claim in delict on behalf of two 
children who had suffered injury after drinking a bottle of ginger beer which contained a dead 
mouse, despite the fact that there was no privity of contract between the children and the 
manufacturers (Barr & Co). However, it was found that the facts of the case did not give rise 
to a duty of care. See McGowan v Barr & Co 1929 SC 461 at 479 per Lord Anderson. 
Further discussion of the case is available in WW McBryde, “Donoghue v. Stevenson: The 
Story of the ‘Snail in a Bottle’ Case” in DM Walker and AJ Gamble (eds), Obligations in 
Context: Essays in Honour of David M Walker (W Green, Edinburgh, 1990) 13 at 21-22.   
447 See subsection 4.2.4.    
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claims in contract and delict are permissible in Scots (and English) law. This 
has resulted in cases such as Donoghue v Stevenson448 in which the party 
who has suffered the loss succeeds in suing in delict although its claim failed 
(or would likely have been unsuccessful, had it been pled) in contract. Mrs 
Donoghue was not the recipient of a third party right,449 and could not 
therefore have made a contractual claim, but her claim in delict succeeded. 
Similarly, relatives of tenants may not sue contractually on the lease where 
they are injured due to defects in the leased premises,450 but they may sue in 
delict.451 An injured person cannot contractually sue a party employed by its 
employer for defective work which caused the injury, but it can make a 
delictual claim.452 Donoghue v Stevenson453 clarified that the English legal 
“fallacy” providing that a party who owes a contractual duty to one party 
cannot owe delictual liability to another in respect of its contractual 
performance is not part of Scots law.454  In particular, Lord Macmillan stated 
that there is “no reason why the same set of facts should not give one person 
a right of action in contract and another person a right of action in tort.”455   
In terms of pure economic loss, case law reveals a movement towards a 
‘high point’ of permissibility of delictual claims where a contractual claim 
would be denied. This was followed by a stricter approach, according to 
which delictual liability was denied if there was no privity of contract between 
                                                          
448 Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31.  
449 A third party rights claim would have been unsuccessful, because the contracting parties 
(Mrs Donoghue’s friend and Mr Stevenson) did not expressly or impliedly confer a right on 
Mrs Donoghue. See J Steele, Tort Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 3rd edn, 2014) 144. Some indicate that the case should have been pled as a jus 
quaesitum tertio (see, for example, WW McBryde, “Contract law – a solution to delictual 
problems?” 2012 8 Scots Law Times 45 at 45). However, these arguments do not fully 
address the lack of intention in the case (i.e. that the contracting parties did not intend to 
confer a jus quaesitum tertio on Mrs Donoghue).   
450 Cameron v Young [1908] AC 176. 
451 Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 section 3. 
452 Campbell v A & D Morrison (1891) 19 R 282. 
453 Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31. 
454 Memorandum on Stipulations in Favour of Third Parties (n 235) 39-40. See also Stevens, 
Torts and Rights (n 25) 177; R Baker and J Garton, “Cavalier v Pope (1906)” in C Mitchell 
and P Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the Law of Tort (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010) 
153, especially at 153 and 158; and Greene v Chelsea BC [1954] 2 QB 127 at 138 per Lord 
Denning.  
455 Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 64 per Lord Macmillan. See also Edgar v 
Lamont 1914 SC 227; JG Martin Plant Hire Ltd v Macdonald 1996 SLT 1192. 
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the parties. Dutton v Bognor Regis UDC456 was one of the first cases in 
which a tortious claim was permitted to ‘overcome’ privity.457 In the case, it 
was found that any person who had negligently caused risk to the health or 
safety of the occupiers of a building were liable in tort regardless of whether 
any damage had materialised, and regardless of whether they were in a 
contractual relationship with the occupiers. This judgement resulted in a 
“flood” of cases, “exacerbated” by Anns v Merton.458 The ‘high point’ in the 
House of Lords’ decision was Junior Books.459 Following the case, there 
were concerns amongst commentators that contractors would be exposed to 
unlimited liability, and contract lawyers remained dissatisfied with the strict 
approach to the privity doctrine, which excluded contractual claims on the 
part of third party claimants.460 The key concern was that Junior Books461 
allowed claimants to circumvent the privity doctrine by framing their claims in 
terms of negligence rather than contract.462 Thereafter, the courts gradually 
withdrew from this approach. The case was “all but overruled”463 in Murphy v 
Brentwood DC464 and D&F Estates v Church Commissioners for England and 
Wales.465 The latter case restricted tortious liability owed to third parties in 
                                                          
456 Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council [1972] 1 QB 373.  
457 See discussion in J Jenkins and J Duckworth, “The Construction Industry” in R Merkin 
(ed), Privity of Contract: The Impact of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 
(Informa Law, London/ Hong Kong, 2000) 185 at 8.5.   
458 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728. See also Jenkins and Duckworth 
(n 457) at 8.7.  
459 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd 1982 SLT 333. This was the first case to allow 
negligence-based recovery for pure economic loss. See Jenkins and Duckworth (n 457) at 
8.8.  
460 Views of commentators are discussed further below at subsection 4.3.2.  
461 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd 1982 SLT 333. 
462 R Brownsword, “Network Contracts Revisited” in M Amstutz and G Teubner, Networks: 
Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-operation (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009) 31 at 31. Whilst 
Lord Fraser questioned why a contractual case had not been raised against the builders in 
Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd 1982 SLT 333, it is noted that there was no evidence of 
intention on the party of the contracting parties to create a third party right in favour of the 
employer. Accordingly, it is unlikely that a claim based on third party rights would have been 
successful.  
463 Merkin (n 195) at 2.2.  
464 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398. 
465 D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England and Wales [1989] AC 177. See 
also Burnton LJ’s more recent comment in Robinson v PE Jones (Contractors) Ltd [2011] 3 
WLR 815 at 834 that Anns v Merton LBC [1978] AC 728 and Junior Books v Veitchi [1983] 1 
AC 520 “must now be regarded as aberrant, indeed as heretical”.  
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respect of defective contractual performance to claims for personal injury or 
damage to property.  
A separate issue is that, in some instances in Scots law, privity is bypassed, 
and it is unclear whether the relevant contracting party’s liability ought to be 
viewed as contractual or delictual. In Fortune v Young,466 for example, it was 
held that a guarantor of an individual’s financial standing is liable to anyone 
who gives credit to that individual in reliance on the guarantee, even if the 
guarantee is not addressed to any particular person. Whilst this case is 
historic, and has not been followed, it is noted that the judgment is obviously 
unsatisfactory, because the basis of liability ought always to be clear. This 
case is individually problematic and reveals confusion in the doctrinal 
relationship between contract and delict. However, this case is not 
considered further, because it appears to result from inadequate judicial 
reasoning in a particular context and does not provide analysis on the 
concurrency of claims or the relationship between privity and delict.   
The confusion in the interaction between privity and delict is also reflected in 
cases and commentary erroneously referring to privity in the context of 
tortious claims. For example, the Solicitors Journal, discussing George v 
Skivington,467 mentions that the fact that defective hairwash was purchased 
for Mrs George by her husband “was held to create a sufficient privity 
between her and the defendant to support the right of action by her”.468 
Similarly, Robert Stevens argues that privity is “a principle most commonly 
considered within the law of contract, but it is applicable to all rights.”469 He 
applies the notion of privity to tort, noting that, for example, only those with a 
proprietary right over land can sue in delict in respect of nuisance interfering 
with the quiet enjoyment of the land, whereas others, such as licensees 
                                                          
466 Fortune v Young 1918 SC 1.  
467 George and Wife v Skivington (1869) LR 5 Ex. 1. 
468 1870 14 Solicitors Journal 314. In the case, a husband purchased hairwash from the 
defendant, and both parties knew that this was for his wife, Mrs George, who suffered 
extensive injury and hair loss due to the corrosive nature of the hairwash. Mrs George’s 
tortious claim was unsuccessful.  The case is said to be “vindicated” in Donoghue. See 
further D Ibbetson, “George v Skivington” in C Mitchell and P Mitchell, Landmark Cases in 
the Law of Tort (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2010) 69 at 69.    
469 Stevens, Torts and Rights (n 25) 173. See also 174-176.   
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cannot.470 Stevens uses privity to explain concepts such as per quod 
consortium, according to which a husband could recover against an 
individual who caused harm to his wife in respect of the loss of her 
affection.471 These are, however, unusual uses of the term ‘privity’. Stevens 
appears to be discussing the notions of proximity and remoteness in the 
context of tortious liability. Whilst other commentators have not adopted 
‘privity’ terminology in reference to delict or tort, these uses of the concept of 
privity in tortious circumstances risks doctrinal uncertainty. Further, the 
concepts of proximity and remoteness are adequate in discussing tortious 
liability. It is suggested that the term ‘privity’ should not be used in the context 
of tortious or delictual claims, in light of the historical difficulties in 
understanding the relationship between privity and delict. Instead, the normal 
language of delictual claims (i.e. remoteness and title to sue) should be used.  
4.3.2. An analysis of commentary on the intersection between privity 
and delict  
The tortious cases discussed above were decided prior to the passage of the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Accordingly, the cases could 
not, in English law, have been decided on the basis of third party rights. 
Numerous commentators highlight that the move towards the ‘high point’ of 
delictual liability was influenced by the need to correct the perceived rigidity 
of contract law, and the move away from this ‘high point’ was driven by a 
desire to respect the privity doctrine. Jenkins and Duckworth suggest that the 
strict application of privity resulted in judicial intervention through tort to 
“mitigate its rigidity.”472 O’Sullivan describes the disappointed beneficiary 
cases473 as the “most obvious example” of tort law’s use in bypassing “the 
strictures of privity”.474 Similarly, Brownsword notes that:  
                                                          
470 Stevens, Torts and Rights (n 25) 173, citing Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655.  
471 Ibid. 174.  
472 Jenkins and Duckworth (n 457) at 8.5.    
473 An overview of the law on disappointed beneficiary cases is provided above at subsection 
4.2.3.4.  
474 J O’Sullivan, “Suing in tort where no contractual claim will lie – a bird’s eye view” 2007 
23(3) Professional Negligence 165 at 172.  
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“in the context of third-party claims, it is well known that a restrictive 
law of tort can result in pressure being put on contract law, and vice 
versa.”475  
In Scots law, ‘correction’ of the privity doctrine through the imposition of 
delictual liability was not necessary, because Scots law has historically 
recognised third party rights. However, Scots cases permitting delictual 
liability where third party rights were not possible have also been 
characterised as violations of the privity doctrine, and commentators 
recognise an apparent tension between third party delictual claims in respect 
of defective contractual performance and the privity doctrine. For example, 
Swain suggests that, in asking “Who, then, in law, is my neighbour?”, Lord 
Atkin “opened up the way for claims in negligence which in contract would 
run up against the privity rule.”476   
Whilst these commentators might have intended only to point out that 
delictual actions might arise where contractual claims will fail, others have 
been more overt in their treatment of delictual liability as an exception to 
privity. For example, the Law Commission lists the tort of negligence as an 
exception,477 and Merkin remarks that a “boisterous and expansive approach 
to the duty of care in tort could easily have undermined the doctrine of privity 
of contract.”478 Van Heerden states that the boundary between contract and 
tort is breaking down due to the “steady expansion” of the tort of negligence 
in England.479 More recently, Furmston and Tolhurst include tort in their 
discussion of exceptions to privity.480 
                                                          
475 Brownsword, Contract law (n 7) 196-197. See also Palmer, Paths to privity (n 27) 198; 
Mitchell (n 376) at 172; J Fleming, “Comparative Law of Torts” 1984 4(2) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 235.  
476 W Swain, “Third Party Beneficiaries in English Law 1880-2004” in EJH Schrage (ed), Ius 
Quaesitum Tertio (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2008) 331 at 343 (quoting Donoghue v 
Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 44 per Lord Atkin).  
477 Report on Privity of contract (n 182) 2.13-2.14.   
478 Merkin (n 195) at 2.2. See also D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, “Privity, Transitivity and 
Rationality” 54(1) Modern Law Review, 1991 48 at 50-51.  
479 D Hutchison and B van Heerden, “The tort/ contract divide seen from the South African 
perspective” in D Visser (ed), The Limits of the Law of Obligations (Juta & Co Ltd, Cape 
Town, 1997) 97 at 97.   
480 Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 3.03-11.  
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However, these sources do not reflect the definition of privity: it bars external 
parties from making contractual claims only, and has no bearing on whether 
the external party can make a claim in delict. Whilst Stewart notes that the 
existence of the jus quaesitum tertio means that it is in some cases 
unnecessary to apply delictual liability,481 the absence of a third party right 
does not mean that delictual liability in respect of a third party is an 
impossibility.  
The fact that external parties can make delictual claims against contracting 
parties despite the fact that they are barred from bringing contractual actions 
is a clear and justifiable consequence of the privity doctrine. Stewart 
comments that increasing support for Lord Brandon’s dissent in Junior Books 
v Veitchi482 may be due to the fact that it is “grossly unfair” to hold someone 
to a higher standard under delict than they would have been under the 
contract establishing their liability.483 As noted by Lord Goff of Chieveley, “the 
law of tort is the general law, out of which the parties can, if they wish, 
contract”.484  However, a contracting party can only contract out of delictual 
liability owed to fellow contracting parties, not the public at large. This is 
supported by the general rules of professional responsibility, discussed 
above,485 that a professional has a general duty of care to properly carry out 
his work. A contracting party cannot expect that its defective performance of 
a contract can only be subject to claims under the contract itself. Where, 
according to the normal principles of delictual liability, a contracting party 
breaches a duty of care owed to third parties impacted by the contractual 
performance, the third party should be permitted to bring a delictual claim. 
The tension between privity and delictual liability is simply an instance of 
confusion between two separate areas of law. It is likely that this confusion 
has resulted from English law’s strict adherence to the privity doctrine and 
                                                          
481 Stewart, Delict (n 359) 1.2., citing Scott Lithgow Ltd v GEC Electrical Projects Ltd 1989 
SC 412.    
482 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520. 
483 Stewart, Casebook (n 434) 13.4.3. See also Hedley (n 395) at 28-29. 
484 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 at 191 per Lord Goff of Chieveley.   
485 See subsection 4.2.3.5. 
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consequent use of tort law in situations which might otherwise have been 
resolved through the use of third party rights. In Scots law, this is reflected in 
the belief of some commentators that delictual liability should not be imposed 
where there was no possibility of a third party right. There was no logical 
reason for such an approach: delict does not operate according to whether 
there is or is not an opportunity for a contractual remedy, and the law of delict 
does not require the pursuer to have the right to make a contractual claim. 
The boundary between privity and delict may, in situations involving third 
party loss, appear at first to be permeable, given that the third party can (in 
some cases) sue in delict but not in contract. However, this is the result of the 
normal application of the privity together with the rules of delict. The dividing 
line between contractual and delictual recovery is in fact clear. Contractual 
recovery is possible if the requirements of third party rights are met, and the 
third party can recover in delict if its claim meets the requirements for 
delictual recovery.  
Vernon Palmer comments that the relationship between privity and tort is 
“one of the most enigmatic, controversial, and misunderstood phenomena of 
nineteenth century law”.486 The enigma is resolved simply by acknowledging 
that privity bars only contractual claims by non-contracting parties: it ought 
not to have any bearing on the question of whether the contracting party 
might owe a delictual duty of care to the third party. Indeed, Vernon Palmer 
also points out that the “privity doctrine in the field of tort turns out to be a 
haunting tale about a judicially-created phenomenon.”487 The explanation of 
the contract-tort fallacy is that English judges have incorrectly viewed 
themselves as restrained by privity in tortious claims in Winterbottom v 
Wright488 and similar cases,489 and academics have wrongly characterised 
                                                          
486 Palmer, Paths to privity (n 27) 198. Palmer further explains that there are three further 
historical functions of the privity doctrine (schematic, evidentiary, and denoting relationships 
required by writs), but clarifies that these are no longer useful: Palmer, Paths to privity (n 27) 
10.  
487 Palmer, Paths to privity (n 27) 206.  
488 Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 152 ER 402. 
489 Palmer, Paths to privity (n 27) 212.   
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cases expanding the law on negligence as infringing on the privity doctrine. 
Delict is not therefore an exception to privity.  
4.3.3. Further points on delict and contract 
This subsection returns to the distinction between contract and delict first 
introduced above:490 that contract involves consensual obligations, whilst 
delictual liability is imposed by law.  
The Law Commission’s Report on Privity of contract,491 according to 
Catherine Mitchell, reflects a commitment to maintaining the distinction 
between contractual and tortious liability.492 She comments that there is a 
“neat dividing line” between third party beneficiaries who are granted the right 
to sue, and strangers who are not, noting that this defines the boundary 
between those who claims are contractual, and those who must proceed in 
tort.493 Jenkins and Duckworth comment that the 1999 Act does not grant 
third party rights in cases which have been subject to judicial expansion of 
tortious liability.494 This reflects the fact that third party rights are found where 
the parties intend for such a right to arise, whereas delictual liability is 
imposed regardless of the parties’ intentions (subject to the express 
exclusion of delictual liability). The separation between delictual and 
contractual liability must be maintained, because there is a clear difference 
between obligations which arise consensually and obligations which arise by 
operation of law. Recognition in case law and commentary that privity does 
not have an impact on the permissibility of delictual claims would reflect that 
these types of liability are distinct.  
It is acknowledged that contracting parties should be permitted to voluntarily 
alter the delictual duties of care they owe to one another. Generally, the 
parties to a contract can expressly limit their duty of care, the standard of that 
duty of care, and the losses which will be recoverable in the event of breach, 
                                                          
490 See subsection 4.2.1.  
491 Report on Privity of contract (n 182).  
492 C Mitchell, “Searching for the Principles Behind Privity Reform” in P Kincaid (ed), Privity: 
Private justice of public regulation (Ashgate, Dartmouth, 2001) 105 at 112.  
493 Ibid.  
494 Jenkins and Duckworth (n 457) at 8.100.   
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subject to the law that one cannot exclude or restrict liability for death or 
personal injury.495 This allows a great deal of scope for defining their duty of 
care towards each other. If the parties have not made specific provision in 
their contract, then the normal principles of delict should apply. In Gilmour v 
Simpson,496 for example, a painter negligently used a blow lamp, which 
resulted in the destruction of the pursuer’s farmhouse. Thomas Smith notes 
that damages were assessed on the basis of negligence, on the same 
grounds as Hutchison v Davidson,497 a similar case in which there was no 
contractual relationship.498 Unless they have specifically excluded the 
application of delictual liability, there is no reason to claim that parties in a 
contractual relationship owe exclusively contractual liability to one another. 
Regarding third parties, the boundary between contract and delict may 
appear to be blurred by the so-called ‘paracontractual’499 situations. In 
Hedley Byrne v Heller,500 Devlin LJ states that “I have found… in the idea of 
a relationship that is equivalent to contract all that is necessary to cover the 
situation that arises in this case.”501 Similarly, in Junior Books v Veitchi,502 
Lord Fraser states that the exceptionally close proximity between the parties 
is “only just short of a direct contractual relationship.”503 In these cases, 
however, the factor which determines the existence of a duty of care is that 
the relationship between the parties is very close. In other words, the 
paracontractual connection is evidence of close proximity between the 
parties: it does not impact the rules on contractual liability. Wilson’s 
characterisation of these cases as “Contract Leap-frog”504 claims is perhaps 
not wholly descriptive of the third party’s action. The third party’s proximity to 
                                                          
495 G Jackson, The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia: Building Contracts 
(Reissue) (hereafter “SME”), (LexisNexis/ Law Society of Scotland, London/ Edinburgh, 
2012) para 148; noting also the restrictions under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
section 16. See also Part II of the Consumer Rights Act 2015 in the case of consumers.   
496 Gilmour v Simpson 1958 SC 477. 
497 Hutchison v Davidson 1945 SC 395. 
498 Smith, Short Commentary (n 36) 864.  
499 Wilson (n 12) at 147.   
500 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
501 Ibid. at 530 per Devlin LJ.  
502 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520. 
503 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520 at 553 per Lord Fraser.  
504 Wilson (n 12) at 148.  
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the defender is based on the fact that they are connected through a ‘chain’ of 
contracts. The third party could therefore be viewed as ‘leapfrogging’ on to 
the contract between the defender and those with whom the defender is in 
contract, bypassing its own lack of contractual connection. However, the third 
party is not relying on another’s contract to make a contractual claim. Rather, 
it is suing in delict because the circumstances of the contractual connections 
give rise to a proximate relationship between itself and the defender. The fact 
that this relationship has been described as akin to contract does not detract 
from the fact that the liability owed is delictual.  
The relevancy of contractual chains to delictual liability is considered in a 
recent Outer House judgment. In the case of Realstone v Messrs J & E 
Shepherd,505 the pursuer owned land earmarked for housing development. 
The pursuer instructed an architect to prepare plans for the site, and the 
architect subcontracted the work to the defender. The defender’s negligence 
in mis-designating the plot (such that it obtruded on to a roadway) resulted in 
the pursuer’s loss, because the pursuer incurred the cost of repurchasing the 
plot from the party to whom it had sold the plot. Lord Hodge commented that 
he was:  
“not persuaded that the mere existence of a contractual chain from A 
to B to C means in all circumstances that C cannot owe A a duty of 
care to avoid causing A pure economic loss… Nonetheless, there are 
many circumstances in which either the structure of the contracts in a 
contractual chain or the terms of those contracts, or both, will exclude 
a duty of care by C to A in relation to economic loss. One has to look 
at the circumstances of the particular case.”506 
Accordingly, it may be that the contractual relationship between the parties is 
structured so as to protect a particular party against delictual claims, or 
indeed to ensure that delictual redress is available in particular cases. It was 
noted that there was no indication that the pursuer’s delictual claim would 
circumvent any of the contractual agreements.507 However, the existence of a 
contractual chain does not indicate definitively that there is or is not liability in 
                                                          
505 Realstone v Messrs J & E Shepherd [2008] CSOH 31.  
506 Ibid. at para 12 per Lord Hodge.  
507 Ibid. at para 18 per Lord Hodge. 
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a particular case. In the particular case of Realstone v Messrs J & E 
Shepherd,508 the factors which led Lord Hodge to believe that there may be 
liability were the defender’s awareness that the pursuer would use the plans 
prepared, and the extent to which the architect would review the defender’s 
work.509 Lord Hodge also considered whether the defender “voluntarily” 
agreed to produce the plans, and, by doing so, “placed themselves in a 
special relationship with the pursuers which is akin to contract” which may 
result in a duty protect the pursuer against economic loss.510 He surmised 
that the architect’s supervision of the defender would reduce the likelihood 
that the court would find that there was a special relationship between the 
pursuer and defender.511 Lord Hodge notes the reluctance of the judiciary to 
rely on Junior Books.512 However, this judgment illustrates that the concept of 
a ‘special relationship’ continues to be influential in Scots law.  
Of course, in some situations the contracting parties may have structured 
their relationships to avoid contractual connections between certain parties. 
Hogg notes that one issue at play in the boundary between contract and 
delict is the policy against allowing delictual claims to subvert contractual 
relationships and contractual structures adopted by parties.513 In Pacific 
Associates Inc v Baxter,514 the parties made an arrangement such that there 
was no contract between an engineer and a contractor, although their 
employer had entered into separate contracts with the contractor and the 
engineer. Russell LJ said that the:  
“absence of any contract between the contractor and the engineer… is 
not without significance. The tests of proximity and foreseeability may 
be satisfied, but it is not just and reasonable that there should be 
                                                          
508 Realstone v Messrs J & E Shepherd [2008] CSOH 31 at para 18 per Lord Hodge. 
509 Ibid. at para 13 per Lord Hodge. 
510 Ibid. 
511 Ibid.  
512 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd 1982 SLT 333.  
513 Hogg, Obligations (n 433) 3.67.  
514 Pacific Associates Inc v Baxter [1989] 2 All ER 159. 
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imposed on the engineer a duty which the engineer chose not to make 
a contractual one”.515  
This erroneously assumes that the engineer wished its lack of contractual 
connection to be treated as an indication that it wished to neither sue nor be 
sued in delict. It is illogical to assume that a person’s lack of desire to enter 
into a contract with another means that it implicitly abandons any legal right 
of redress through delict when it is adversely affected by the other’s 
professional work. Contracting parties should not be able to exclude liability 
towards third parties by virtue of their contract with each other, because the 
third party has not consented to such limitation.  The lack of contractual 
connection is however relevant to the question of proximity – Walker states 
that “a contract may bring parties into such proximity as to give rise to a 
primary obligation to refrain from harm which might not otherwise have 
arisen”.516 
This is compatible with the dominant commentary on the hierarchy of 
obligations in Scots law more generally. Hogg notes that there are two main 
theories as to how private law obligations should be placed in a hierarchy. 
According to the first, “the 3:1”, contract, promise, and delict are equal, and 
unjustified enrichment is ‘lower’ and thus applicable only in situations in 
which the other three are not.517 Conversely, “the 2:2” provides that delict and 
unjustified enrichment ought to be placed at the top of the hierarchy, because 
they are imposed by the law and can only be excluded if the parties so agree, 
unlike contract and promise which can only arise from the intentions of the 
contracting parties.518 If the first theory is accurate and contract and delict are 
equal, then there is no reason why the doctrine of privity of contract, as a 
contractual rule, should usurp the operation of delictual liability. If the latter 
theory is correct, this strengthens the idea that contracting parties ought not 
                                                          
515 Pacific Associates Inc v Baxter [1989] 2 All ER 159 at 192 per Russell LJ. See also 
Scruttons v Midland Silicones [1962] AC 446 at 470-471 per Viscount Simonds. For further 
discussion, see Jenkins and Duckworth (n 457) at 8.12.  
516 Walker, Delict (n 356) 14, citing Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31 at 64 per Lord 
Macmillan; Vacwell Engineering Co v BDH Chemicals Ltd [1971] 1 QB 88 at 108 per Rees J.  
517 Hogg, Obligations (n 433) 3.19. 
518 Ibid.  
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to evade delictual liability through arguments based on privity, but, rather, 
only through arguments based on contractual consent. Where the parties 
have expressly agreed in their contractual terms that they should or should 
not have the ability to sue one another in delict, this should be upheld. 
However, the existence of a contract between two parties does not prevent 
the parties (or external parties) from claiming in respect of losses suffered as 
a result of defective contractual performance.  
The concurrency of claims is clear:  
“the professional man owes a duty of care ex contractu to clients, and 
duty of care ex lege to persons, including clients, who may 
foreseeably be harmed in mind/ body/ pocket by failure to show 
adequate skill and care in doing his professional work”.519  
Indeed, Labatt recognised in 1900 that it is logically unsound to argue that:  
“a party to the contract, whatever the form of his action, can recover 
only where he could have recovered in a suit directly upon the contract 
[since this] involves the corollary that a stranger to the contract, being 
unable to sue upon it, is precluded from redress altogether.”520 
4.3.4. Reasonable expectation  
The distinction between contractual and delictual liability is further reflected in 
the different expectations which contracting parties and third parties have 
under contract and delict law. Brownsword’s view is that the “baseline” of the 
intersection between contract and delict is reasonable expectation.521 
Delictual liability reflects the expectations of the community in respect of 
compensation for wrongful behaviour, whilst contractual liability recognises 
the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties operating in the 
relevant business sector.522 Specific contractual provisions, Brownsword 
states, can alter contractual expectations only.523 Contracting parties can 
also, of course, determine the extent and scope of delictual liability towards 
                                                          
519 Walker, Contracts (n 3) 3.3. See also Gloag, Contract (n 65) 241. 
520 Labatt (n 414) at 172-173.   
521 Brownsword, Contract law (n 7) 229.   
522 Brownsword, Contract law (n 7) 229. See also First Energy (UK) Ltd v Hungarian 
International Bank Ltd [1993] BCC 533 at 533 per Steyn LJ: a “theme that runs through our 
law of contract is that the reasonable expectations of honest men must be protected.”  
523 Brownsword, Contract law (n 7) 229.  
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one another. However, non-contractual parties have not contractually 
assented to the alteration of their reasonable expectation to redress under 
delict law. A third party will reasonably have the expectation that their third 
party right will be upheld, if so granted by the contracting parties. A third party 
may also be protected by an exclusion of liability clause.524 They will not 
otherwise have the right to sue on, or claim protection under, a contract to 
which they are not party. The lack of direct contractual connection does not, 
however, impact the third party’s reasonable expectation to redress under 
delictual law if it is impacted by defective contractual performance and the 
requirements for a successful delictual claim are met.  
It is therefore reasonable that the contracting parties may alter their own 
delictual expectations under contract. A third party cannot however 
realistically be viewed as foregoing its right to redress in delict under a 
contract to which it is not party. Privity allows the contractual rights and 
liabilities to be defined according to the parties’ intentions, in accordance with 
the reasonable contractual expectations of the contracting parties. Delict 
protects the contracting parties and third parties from harm from which the 
contracting parties ought to protect each other and third parties. Allowing 
privity to prevent delictual claims where the third party had not assented to 
the curtailment of its protection under delictual law unreasonably alters the 
third party’s right to redress. 
It is not immediately obvious why the imposition of delictual liability owed to 
third parties is unreasonable on the basis that a more onerous duty may be 
owed to the third parties than in contract. This is the result of the normal 
application of the law of delict, out of which contracting parties cannot 
contract on behalf of third parties. It is unjust to prevent extra-contractual 
parties from recovering their losses when the only barrier is privity of 
contract, and they did not assent to the contractual limitation of their 
reasonable expectations. 
                                                          
524 See the materials cited in (n 1).   
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4.3.5. Public and private obligations  
Weinrib differentiates between private obligations (involving particular 
relationships between persons) and public obligations (based on the notion of 
“public rightfulness” – that private law should provide redress for infringement 
of one’s interests by another party regardless of any prior relationship 
between the two).525 This serves as a further useful illustration of the 
boundary between contractual and delictual liability in situations involving 
extra-contractual loss. For example, the tort of inducing breach of contract 
provides that a party can be sued where they induce someone to break their 
contract with another.526 In Lumley v Gye,527 a singer was contracted to sing 
at Lumley’s opera house. Gye offered the singer a higher fee and was liable 
in tort for Lumley’s loss caused by the singer’s breach in contract. Weinrib 
discusses how the private element of the tort of inducing breach of contract is 
the contract between the contracting parties, and the public aspect is the 
obligation imposed on the rest of the world to respect that contract.528 This 
could potentially be a useful frame of reference for the distinction between 
contractual and delictual obligations in the context of extra-contractual loss. 
Cases involving delictual liability owed to third parties can more accurately be 
said to arise from public rights rather than contractual personal rights. In 
Donoghue v Stevenson,529 for example, the contract between the café owner 
and the manufacturer could be said to give rise to private contractual rights 
                                                          
525 EJ Weinrib, “Private Law and Public Right” 2011 61(2) University of Toronto Law Journal 
191 at 191-192. 
526 PS Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2015) at 1-2 and 6. See further F 
Sayre, “Inducing breach of contract” 1992 36(1) Harvard Law Review 663 at 669; MR 
Macnair, “Free Association versus juridification” 2011 39(1) Critique 53; Quinn v Leathem 
[1901] AC 495.    
527 Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216. The concept is also accepted in Scots law: J Macleod, 
“Offside Goals and Induced Breaches of Contract” 2009 13(2) Edinburgh Law Review 278 at 
279-280; British Motor Trade Association v Gray 1951 SC 586 at 603 per Lord Russell; 
Couper v Macfarlane (1879) 6 R 683; Exchange Telegraph Co v Giulianotti 1959 SC 19.  
528 Weinrib (n 525) at 204. This case has been criticised on the grounds that “[w]hen I make 
a contract with someone to do something, I do not expect that, by making the contract, the 
whole world comes under an obligation to ensure that it is performed”: D Howarth, “Against 
Lumley v Gye” 2005 68(2) Modern Law Review 195 at 209. See also Merkin (n 52) at 4.1 
and further concerns raised in AP Simester and WMF Chan, “Inducing breach of contract: 
one tort or two?” 2004 63(1) Cambridge Law Journal 132 at 144.     
529 Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31.  
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between them as well as public obligations owed by the manufacturer to 
subsequent purchasers of the goods sold to the café owner.  
This distinction also highlights the doctrinal incoherence of disappointed 
beneficiary cases. The public are not owed a right against all legal 
professionals that the professional must ensure that the public inherit 
according to the wishes of testators.530 This can be contrasted with Robert 
Stevens’ example of a pedestrian who has been injured because a bicycle 
has been manufactured carelessly – in such a case, the question of whether 
there is a contract between, for example, the manufacturer and the cyclist is 
“irrelevant to the claim brought by the pedestrian.”531 The pedestrian has a 
right to safety enforceable in delict against the world, whereas it is not 
immediately obvious why the disappointed beneficiary should have a right to 
surety of inheritance.  
4.4. Concluding remarks  
It is reasonable that contracting parties should be able to expressly exclude 
delictual liability towards one another. However, contracting parties ought not 
to have the ability to disallow delictual recovery on the part of third parties 
where the normal principles of delictual liability would permit their claims. 
Successful third party delictual claims in situations in which a contractual 
claim would not have succeeded should not therefore be viewed as infringing 
on the privity doctrine. Privity does not, and should not, bar delictual claims 
by third parties. The doctrine provides a useful limitation of contractual 
liability, subject of course to its exceptions, but it does not have any bearing 
on the imposition or prohibition of delictual liability. Delict therefore does not 
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Chapter 5: Policy considerations justifying statutory exceptions to 
privity  
5.1. Overview 
As noted in chapter 3,532 there are various statutory exceptions to the privity 
doctrine. This chapter is not intended to provide a list of all statutory 
exceptions to privity, but it discusses a selection of modern and historical 
statutory examples to identify the common policy considerations justifying 
deviation from the ‘no benefits’ aspect of privity. Later chapters will consider 
whether the concepts of contracts for the benefit of another, transferred loss, 
undisclosed agency, and ad hoc agency also reflect these policy 
considerations. 
This chapter also assesses whether privity itself does and should exist in light 
of the numerous justifications for deviating from the doctrine. The final 
section examines exceptions to the ‘no burdens’ aspect of privity and 
identifies the policy considerations which justify deviation from this aspect of 
the rule.      
5.2. Statutory exceptions to privity and their policy justifications 
This section identifies the policy considerations which justify the statutory 
exceptions to privity in the Married Women’s Property Act 1882, the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act 1992, the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 
2010, relevant road traffic legislation, the Defective Premises Act 1972 and 
the Latent Damage Act 1986, the Fire Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774, the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987 Part I, the Package Travel and Linked Travel 
Arrangements Regulations 2018, and third party rights legislation.  
5.2.1. Married Women’s Property Act 1882 
Historical exceptions to privity include the English Married Women’s Property 
Act 1882. The Act aimed to mitigate the effects of a House of Lords 
                                                          
532 See subsection 3.2.3.  
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decision533 that married women could not enter into contracts in their own 
right.534 Section 11, which is still in force, allows a married woman to rely on 
a life insurance policy on her or her husband’s life for her own benefit, 
according to which a trust is created in favour of the person(s) named in the 
policy.535 The requirements are less stringent than the general law of 
trusts,536 providing a straightforward solution in allowing a married woman to 
financially protect herself (and, where relevant, her children) in the event of 
her husband’s death.537 The scope of the Act has been extended to policies 
effected by civil partners for the benefit of their partner and/or their children538 
by the Civil Partnership Act 2004 section 70. The 1882 Act provides for a 
specific statutory exception to privity: the widow can enforce the life 
insurance contract between her husband and the insurance provider despite 
the fact that she is not a party to that contract. The key policy consideration is 
the protection of women from laws which would otherwise cause financial 
hardship.  
This specific statutory right is no longer required. According to the doctrine of 
coverture, a wife’s legal rights and obligations were subordinate to her 
husband’s, such that a married woman could not enter into contracts in her 
own name.539 This doctrine has been abolished, and beneficiaries under life 
insurance contracts can now enforce their rights under the Contracts (Rights 
of Third Parties) Act 1999. Modern life insurance contracts more generally 
also protect third parties from financial hardship.540 Similar Scots legislation, 
the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act 1881, is no longer in force. 
 
                                                          
533 Cahill v Cahill (1883) 8 App. Cas. 420.   
534 Merkin (n 195) at 2.52.  
535 The provision is produced in full in Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 4.04.  
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537 Cousins v Sun Life Assurance Society [1933] Ch. 126 at 133 per Lord Hanworth MR.  
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KJ Kesselring (eds), Married Women and the Law (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
Montreal & Kingston/ London, 2013) 3 at 3 and 6-8.  




5.2.2. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992  
Section 2 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 was enacted because of 
the commercial impracticalities of disallowing a consignee to sue a carrier for 
loss resulting from the breach of a bill of lading to which it was not party.541 
The provision allows the consignee to sue the carrier directly despite the lack 
of privity between them, thus creating a specific statutory exception to privity. 
This ensured that the law was up-to-date in respect of modern carriage 
practices and compatible with the international rules of carriage.542 The Act 
replaced the Bills of Lading Act 1855, which was passed in response to delict 
and tort claims against carriers.543  The 1855 Act allowed the buyer of goods 
a specific remedy against the carrier although it was not privy to the contract 
of carriage.544 The 1992 Act addressed practical deficiencies in the 1855 Act, 
modernising the law and providing a clearer statutory regime.545 
The Law Commissions indicated that their key concern in proposing the 
legislation was:  
“reconciling the interests of all parties to a contract of sea carriage, in 
accordance with the dictates of good sense and commercial 
certainty”.546 
This demonstrates a policy objective of circumventing privity where doing so 
is commercially convenient for the parties concerned. Bradgate and White 
add that the legislation also fulfils the policy objective of ensuring that the 
person who suffers loss recovers compensation from the person who causes 
                                                          
541 T Howard, “The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992” 1993 24(1) Journal of Maritime Law 
and Commerce 181 at 186. See also Merkin (n 195) at 2.73.    
542 R Bradgate and F White, “The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992” 1993 56(2) Modern 
Law Review 188 at 188-189. The changes in the law brought about by the 1992 Act are 
summarised in Howard (n 541) at 188-189.   
543 Bradgate and White (n 542) at 193.  
544 For discussion see Bradgate and White (n 542) at 188-189 and Sevylor Shipping and 
Trading Corp v Altfadul Company for Foods, Fruits & Livestock, Siat Societa Italiana 
Assicurazioni E Riassicurazioni S.P.A. [2018] EWHC 629 at para 42 per Mr Justice Andrew 
Baker.  
545 Bradgate and White (n 542) at 190-191.   
546 Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Report on Rights of Suit in respect 
of Carriage of Goods by Sea (Law Com No 196; Scot Law Com No 130, 1991) 1.10.  
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it,547 highlighting a second justification of ensuring that those who cause loss 
do not escape liability because of privity. 
Section 2 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 can be classified as a 
specific statutory third party right. Clive notes that the 1855 Act was 
unnecessary in Scots law due to the common law recognition of the jus 
quaesitum tertio, “but as a matter of practical politics, it was obvious that it 
would be extended to Scotland”.548 Therefore, the policy objectives achieved 
in recognising third party rights549 more generally apply to the provision.  
5.2.3. Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 
The Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 1930 allowed for the rights of 
an insured person against its insurers to transfer to and vest in an injured 
person to whom the insured person owed liability upon the insured’s 
insolvency.550 The third party’s right following the insolvency of the insured 
could not surpass the insured’s prior right (because the insured’s right was 
transferred). 
This legislation was enacted following a case in which a third party was 
injured in a motor accident by a car owned by an insured company in 
liquidation. The court concluded that the insurance proceeds were to be 
treated as part of the assets of the insured company to be allocated to the 
creditors as a whole.551 Atkin LJ and Lord Hanworth MR indicated that the 
                                                          
547 Bradgate and White (n 542) at 189. They note at 198, however, that this policy objective 
is not perfectly fulfilled, because sellers may suffer loss resulting from breach of contract on 
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Tribute to Professor Sir Thomas Smith QC (Butterworths, Edinburgh, 1992) 47.  
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550 For discussion see MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 841; Law Commission and the Scottish 
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(Law Com No 152 and Scot Law Com No 104, 1998) 1.2-1.5.  
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law ought to be reformed,552 and the 1930 Act was the eventual result. The 
legislation was intended primarily to address situations involving insured but 
insolvent motorists,553 although the scope of the Act was intentionally wider, 
to cover, for example, employees of insolvent employers.554 The Law 
Commissions recognised, in their Discussion Paper preceding the Act, that 
liability insurance protects the financial interests of those to whom the insured 
might owe liability as well as the insured itself.555 The key policy 
consideration behind the Act was, as its title suggests, the protection of third 
parties.556   
The objective of protecting third parties continues to be recognised in the 
new Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 (as amended by the 
Insurance Act 2015 and the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) 
Regulations 2016/570).557 According to these new provisions, the third party 
is now able to proceed directly against the insurer. The previous requirement 
that the claim must be transferred from the insolvent company no longer 
applies.558 This provides a more cost-effective and efficient solution to the 
third party,559 further demonstrating that the purpose behind this legislation is 
the protection of the third party’s interests. 
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559 Forte, SME (n 557) para 904A. 
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5.2.4. Road Traffic Legislation  
Third parties injured in motor accidents did not have a direct right of 
enforcement against the insurer of the person who caused the accident 
under the previous road traffic legislation. In Greenlees v Port of Manchester 
Insurance Co,560 Lord Alness concluded that the Road Traffic Act 1930 
section 36(4) did not provide for a direct right of action on the part of the third 
party injured by the policy holder against the insurer.  Rather, he held that the 
provision requires that the insurer is liable to indemnify all persons and 
classes of persons specified in the policy. The more recent provisions – the 
Road Traffic Act 1988 sections 144, 148(7), and 151 – grant the third party a 
direct right of enforcement.561 Section 151 embodies the previous right of 
direct enforcement on the part of third parties, which was previously 
recognised in the Road Traffic Act 1934.562 In particular, section 151(9)(b) 
requires that insurers satisfy judgments against the insured at the suit of the 
third party. MacQueen acknowledges these provisions as “important”, 
explaining that this strengthens what may have been viewed as a 
straightforward third party right in Scots law.563 The legislation is treated as a 
statutory exception to privity in commentary564 and case law.565 This is 
correct: the third party is able to enforce a claim under the insurance contract 
to which it is not party.  
The Road Traffic Act 1988 is a consolidation statute, and the materials 
produced by the Law Commissions do not discuss the matter of third party 
                                                          
560 Greenlees v Port of Manchester Insurance Co. 1933 SC 383 at 397 per Lord Justice-
Clerk (Lord Alness). 
561 The third party’s direct action under these provisions was recognised and upheld in 
Williams v Baltic Insurance [1924] 2 KB 282.  
562 For discussion, see RM Merkin and J Stuart-Smith, The Law of Motor Insurance (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1st edn, 2004) 5.198.  
563 MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 841.  
564 In England, Henley recognised the provisions in the 1988 Act as exceptions to the privity 
doctrine prior to passage of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999: C Henley, 
“Insurance” in R Merkin (ed), Privity of Contract: The Impact of the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999 (Informa Law, London/ Hong Kong, 2000) 213 at 9.3. See also Merkin (n 
195) at 2.50.   
565 Tattersall v Drysdale [1935] 2 KB 174; Austin v Zurich Insurance [1945] 1 KB 250. 
113 
 
protection.566 However, Merkin describes the purpose of the Road Traffic Act 
1988 section 144 as ensuring “that the victim of a negligent driver is able to 
recover compensation from the driver or his insurers.”567 Whilst, as noted 
above, third parties did not have direct rights of enforcement under the Road 
Traffic Act 1930 section 36, Goddard J notes that this Act was: “aimed at the 
protection of the public by providing that there should be a body of insurers 
behind every driver of a car.”568 Commentary on more recent motor 
insurance regimes in the Road Traffic Acts reflect a policy objective of 
protecting third parties against financial implications of personal injuries and 
damage to property sustained in road traffic accidents.569 
A similar regime, which also circumvents the privity doctrine, is recognised in 
the Motor Insurance Bureau’s Uninsured Drivers Agreement. According to 
this Agreement, the Motor Insurance Bureau will indemnify those who hold 
judgments against uninsured drivers for any damage caused by the driver.570 
The Agreement is between the Motor Insurers’ Bureau and the Secretary of 
State for Transport. Whilst the Bureau refers to its “obligation to handle 
claims in accordance with the Agreements”,571 the obligation owed is to the 
Secretary of State for Transport. A person who has suffered injury and/ or 
                                                          
566 Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Report on The Consolidation of 
Certain Enactments relating to Road Traffic (Law Com No 56; Scot Law Com No 22, 1971); 
Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Report on The Consolidation of the 
Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 and Certain Related Enactments (Law Com No 133; Scot 
Law Com No 85, 1984).   
567 Merkin (n 195) at 2.50.   
568 Tattersall v Drysdale [1935] 2 KB 174 at 181 per Goddard J.  
569 See discussion in MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 841. Merkin (n 195) at 2.50 discusses the 
Road Traffic Act 1988 sections 144, 148(7) and 151. See also Tattersall v Drysdale [1935] 2 
KB 174; Austin v Zurich Insurance [1945] 1 KB 250; Williams v Baltic Insurance [1924] 2 KB 
282. 
570 The most recent document is the Motor Insurance Bureau, 2015 Uninsured Drivers’ 
Agreement England, Scotland, and Wales (applying to accidents on or after 1 August 2015) 
and Supplementary Agreement 2017 (updated definitions), available at: 
https://www.mib.org.uk/making-a-claim/claiming-against-an-uninsured-driver/uninsured-
drivers-agreements/ and accessed 3 July 2018.  The key provision is Article 3(1): “if a 
claimant has obtained an unsatisfied judgment against any person in a Court in Great Britain 
then MIB will pay the relevant sum to the claimant or will cause the same to be so paid.” 
Essentially identical Agreements are also in place in respect of Northern Ireland, Gibraltar, 
the Isle of Man, Jersey, and Guernsey. See also the Motor Insurance Bureau, 2017 
Untraced Drivers Agreement, available at: https://www.mib.org.uk/making-a-claim/claiming-
against-an-untraced-driver/untraced-drivers-agreements/ and accessed 3 July 2018, which 
provides similar protection to the victims of hit-and-run incidents.  
571 2015 Uninsured Drivers Agreement (n 570) 
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damage to its vehicle who seeks to claim under the scheme is a third party to 
the Agreement. The Motor Insurers’ Bureau could technically, therefore, 
attempt to bar a claim on the part of an injured third party on grounds of lack 
of privity, although it has never done so.572 Lord Denning notes that the 
Agreements are “as important as any statute”,573 and Upjohn LJ stresses that 
he could not envisage a privity argument being raised judicially.574 
Accordingly, both the current statutory scheme and the Agreements provide 
for exceptions to privity aimed at protecting third parties from dangerous 
driving.  
5.2.5. The Defective Premises Act 1972 and the Latent Damage Act 1986 
There is a limited measure of protection for third parties in the Latent 
Damage Act 1986 section 3, which applies only in England and Wales.575 
The provision allows a cause of action on the part of a person who acquires 
an interest in property after the date on which a cause of action in negligence 
arises in respect of damage to that property. The action is to be: “treated as if 
based on breach of a duty of care at common law owed to the person to 
whom it accrues”.576 Similarly, the Defective Premises Act 1972 requires that 
dwellings are built in a workmanlike manner, with proper buildings, so that 
they are suitable for habitation.577 Where construction, repair, maintenance, 
or demolition is not properly carried out, a duty of care is owed to those who 
“might reasonably be expected to be affected by defects in the state of the 
premises created by the doing of the work”.578 This duty is not “abated by the 
subsequent disposal of the premises by the person who owed the duty”.579 
The Act also applies only in England and Wales,580 and provides for a duty of 
                                                          
572 Merkin (n 195) at 2.51.   
573 Hardy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1964] 2 QB 745. See also Gardner v Moore [1984] AC 
548.  
574 Coward v Motor Insurers’ Bureau [1963] 1 QB 359. 
575 Latent Damage Act 1986 section 5(4). 
576 Ibid. section 3(2)(a). 
577 Defective Premises Act 1972 section 1(1).  
578 Ibid. section 3(1). 
579 Ibid. 
580 Ibid. section 7(3). 
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care only in respect of physical injury.581 This scheme might allow, for 
example, the resident owner of a home to claim against the builder for 
defects in the property despite the fact that two parties are not in a 
contractual relationship. The scheme therefore allows privity to be bypassed, 
because the owner can make a claim despite its lack of contract with the 
person responsible for the defects.  
Whilst the Defective Premises Act 1972 section 2 provides that a claim 
cannot be made under the Act where there is a right of recovery under an 
“approved scheme”, there are not currently any such approved schemes.582 
The term ‘dwelling’ is not defined in the Act, but has been interpreted as 
meaning a person’s home or one of its homes,583 provided that the building is 
used or capable of being used as a dwelling house, rather than 
predominantly for commerce.584  
It was thought that the 1972 Act was necessary because liability in tort was 
not possible unless the premises were dangerous, and “the proper 
development” of tort law in respect of other defects was potentially “inhibited 
by the erroneous belief that [tortious liability] would necessarily entail an 
extension of the contractual liability for defects of quality.”585  
                                                          
581 Defective Premises Act 1972 preamble.   
582 Powell and Stewart, Professional Liability (n 379) 9.042. Powell and Stewart note that, 
until 31 March 1979, the 10-year protection under the National House-Builders Registration 
Council (now known as the National House Building Council) was the main approved 
scheme. As such the Act has found application in numerous cases including Thompson v 
Clive Alexander and Partners (1992) 28 Con. LR 49; Alexander v Mercouris [1979] 1 WLR 
1270; Bole v Huntsbuild Ltd [2009] EWHC 483; Harrison v Shepherd Homes Ltd [2011] 
EWHC 1811. See also Law Commission, Report on Civil Liability of Vendors and Lessors for 
Defective Premises (Law Com No 40, 1970) 3 and 6-7. 
583 Powell and Stewart, Professional Liability (n 379) 9.043. The Act was interpreted to this 
extent for the purposes of the Housing Act 1988 in Uratemp Ventures v Collins [2001] UKHL 
43.  
584 Caitlin Estates Ltd v Carer Jonas [2005] EWHC 2315, discussed in Powell and Stewart, 
Professional Liability (n 379) 9.043. See also Jenson v Faux [2011] EWCA Civ. 423, which 
provides that the Act does not apply where an existing dwelling is refurbished or renovation 
to the extent that it creates a “wholly different” building from the original.  
585 Law Commission, Report on Defective Premises (n 582) 1-2 and 13-14. As discussed in 
subsection 4.3.1., this was not problematic in Scots case law.  
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Merkin notes the similarities between the 1972 Act and the Consumer 
Protection Act 1987 Part 1.586 It is clear that the two statutes share similar 
policy objectives: protecting consumers.587  
5.2.6. The Fire Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 
The Fire Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 section 83, which is still in force, 
allows insurance companies and other interested parties to prevent tenants 
with short-term leases from claiming the full value of their insurance policies 
in the event of a fire.588 The insurers can instead ensure that the proceeds of 
the policy go towards rebuilding the premises.589 The Act applies only in the 
Cities of London and Westminster.590 This is an exception to privity because 
the insurers and other interested persons can determine that the moneys 
payable under the policy do not directly reach the insured.591 In other words, 
the interested persons are benefited by the policy to the extent that they can 
control the use of funds issued under the policy and have a right to determine 
how the policy is paid out.  
The provision itself refers to the effect of wilful fire-raising on “the lives and 
fortunes of many families [which] may be lost or endangered”. Its aim is thus 
to protect people in the vicinity of such fire-raising from physical and financial 
harm.592 The provision also prevents fraud on the part of those who set alight 
their properties to benefit from insurance policies.593  
 
                                                          
586 Discussed at subsection 5.2.7. See further Merkin (n 52) at 4.23.     
587 Law Commission, Report on Defective Premises (n 582) 1; Law Reform Committee, 
Twenty-fourth Report (Latent Damage) (Cmd. 9390, 1984) 2.11 and 4.21; Stevens, Torts 
and Rights (n 25) 184.   
588 The detailed application of the provision is discussed in Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 
19) 4.10-13.  
589 Merkin (n 195) at 2.56; Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 4.11. 
590 Fire Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 Preamble. It was confirmed in The Westminster 
Fire Office v The Glasgow Provident Investment Society (1888) 13 App. Cas, 699 at 716 per 
Lord Watson that the Act was not intended to apply to Scotland. See further J Rankine, A 
treatise on the law of leases in Scotland (W Green, Edinburgh, 3rd edn, 1916) 232.  
591 Merkin (n 195) at 2.56. See also Henley (n 564) at 9.3.    
592 Furmston and Tolhurst, Privity (n 19) 4.11, citing Royal Insurance Co Ltd v Mylius (1926) 
38 CLR 477 at 492 per Isaacs J.  
593 Merkin (n 195) at 2.56. The preamble refers to “preventing Mischiefs by fire”. 
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5.2.7. Consumer Protection Act 1987 Part I 
The Act implements the Product Liability Directive,594 and provides for strict 
liability on the part of the manufacturer and first importer of defective goods 
where consumers suffer from personal injury and/ or damage to their 
property.595 Merkin notes that the Act is an exception to privity because it: 
“allows the victim to proceed directly against the manufacturer or first 
importer despite the absence of any contractual relationship with that 
person.”596 
Liability in such circumstances may have existed in tort (following Donoghue 
v Stevenson597), however, a tortious claim would not protect the consumer in 
all circumstances due to the difficulty in establishing negligence and the 
causal link between negligence and loss suffered by the claimant.598 
The purpose of this piece of legislation is obvious from its title: it is intended 
to protect consumers from defective goods. The Preamble to the Directive 
repeatedly mentions the need for consumer protection. For example:  
“in situations where several persons are liable for the same damage, 
the protection of the consumer requires that the injured person should 
be able to claim full compensation for the damage from any one of 
them”.599  
                                                          
594 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for 
defective products. 
595 Consumer Protection Act 1987 section 2(1)-(2).   
596 Merkin (n 52) at 4.22. 
597 Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31.  
598 Merkin (n 52) at 4.22. Similar provisions, discussed in Merkin (n 52) at 4.23, apply to 
those injured on another’s land: Defective Premises Act 1972 sections 1 and 4; Occupiers’ 
Liability Act 1957 (duty of care on occupiers of the land towards any person lawfully on the 
land); Occupiers’ Liability Act 1984 (lesser duties towards trespassers).  
599 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for 
defective products, Preamble.  
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Further, neither manufacturers nor first importers can exclude or limit their 
liability under the Act.600 This is referred to in the Preamble to the Directive601 
as a means of achieving “effective protection of consumers”. 
The justification for protecting the consumer at the expense of the parties 
upon whom liability is imposed is the “fair apportionment of the risks inherent 
in modern technological production”.602 At the Bill’s Second Reading in the 
House of Lords, it was also recognised that unsafe goods distort a 
consumer’s ability to participate in a “free and fair market.”603 
The provisions were also recognised to be of benefit to retailers, because 
liability is “channelled” towards others (i.e. manufacturers and importers).604 
The primary aim of the Act, however, is consumer protection.   
5.2.8. Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 
2018  
The recent Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 
2018 replaced the Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours 
Regulations 1992.605 This subsection primarily discusses case law and 
commentary on the 1992 Regulations, due to the large body of materials 
addressing this legislation. The leading case recognising the concept of 
contracts for the benefit of another - Jackson v Horizon Holidays606 - would 
now be resolved using the Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements 
Regulations 2018. Organisers are liable to travellers for defective 
                                                          
600 Consumer Protection Act 1987 section 7.  
601 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for 
defective products, Preamble. 
602 Ibid. 
603 House of Lords Debate on the Consumer Protection Bill, 20 January 1987 vol 483. 
604 Ibid. 
605 The Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018 came into force 
on 1 July 2018 (in accordance with Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements 
Regulations 2018/634). These Regulations implement Directive 2015/2302/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on package travel and linked travel arrangements.  
606 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. Contracts for the benefit of another 
are examined in chapter 6. The similar case of Adcock v Blue Sky Holidays Ltd (Court of 
Appeal, 13 May 1980, Unreported) would also likely be resolved using the regulations. Each 
of five holiday-makers received damages for their loss, after the judge considered how the 
breaches affected each of them individually.   
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performance of the package holiday contract (Regulation 15), and “traveller” 
is defined as “any individual who is seeking to conclude a contract, or is 
entitled to travel on the basis of a contract concluded, within the scope of 
these Regulations”.607 This means that a traveller can sue the organiser 
despite the fact that the two parties are not in a direct contractual 
relationship. A substandard holiday is arguably not comparable to injury 
which could be suffered due to a defective product,608 or, for example, the 
significant financial losses which could result if the relevant parties were not 
protected under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992.609 However, the 
Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018 can still 
be said to protect third parties, and it is relevant to consider the scope of this 
protection and the policy reasons why third parties are so protected in the 
event of disappointing holidays.   
Damages awarded in the relevant cases account for the emotional impact of 
disappointing holidays as well as financial compensation. Stephen Mason 
notes a tendency of ‘special pleading’, for example, damages sought in 
respect of the particular disappointment suffered due to a lost ‘holiday of a 
lifetime’ or ruined wedding anniversary celebrations.610 Lord Denning notes 
that, when holidays fail, consumers are “greatly disappointed and upset” and, 
whilst this disappointment cannot accurately be quantified in monetary terms, 
“it is the task of the judges to do the best they can.”611 In Milner v Carnival 
Plc,612 the plaintiffs booked a holiday on the Queen Victoria’s maiden voyage 
for a total cost of £59,052. They only stayed on board for 28 days of the 
planned 106-day cruise, due to loud, reverberating noise caused by defective 
flooring in their cabin and their dissatisfaction with the proposed alternatives. 
                                                          
607 Emphasis added. The consumer could previously have claimed under the Package 
Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours Regulations 1992 Regulation 14.   
608 The relevant legislation is discussed immediately above at subsection 5.2.7. 
609 See above at subsection 5.2.2. 
610 SM Mason, “Holiday damages: the gravy train slows down” 21 October 1987 Law Society 
Gazette 3002 at 3002. Katyar and Cairns also note that damages for distress, 
disappointment, and inconvenience can “substantially inflate awards over and above the 
actual contract price”: A Katyar and P Cairns, “It’s just not cricket” 1998 9(5) Entertainment 
Law Review 196 at 197.  
611 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468 per Lord Denning.  
612 Milner v Carnival Plc [2010] EWCA Civ. 389.   
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They were financially compensated for wasted expenditure (on visas, 
clothing, etc.), as well as stress, anxiety, loss of enjoyment, and 
disappointment.613 The solatium element of the damages amounted to 
£4,000 for Mr Milner and £4,500 for Mrs Milner. In his judgment, Ward LJ 
observes that damages for disappointment and distress will vary according to 
the significance of the holiday. Honeymoons and trips to attend weddings, for 
example, attract higher damages than “run of the mill” holidays.614 The fact 
that the Milners expected a holiday of a lifetime (an expectation influenced 
heavily by the lavish descriptions of the cruise in Carnival’s brochures615) 
meant that the damages awarded were of “platinum-quality”.616 It appears 
from this case that the Milners had booked their cruise together, although 
Jackson v Horizon Holidays,617 as discussed in chapter 6,618 allows for 
damages to be recovered in respect of those for whom the holiday contract is 
made by the person who made the booking. Essentially, the Regulations and 
relevant case law demonstrate a policy objective of protecting consumers 
against emotional distress caused by ruined holidays.  
It is noted that liability under the Regulations is not strict. In Hone v Going 
Places Leisure Travel Limited,619 the claimant argued that Going Places were 
liable in respect of injuries he sustained during the emergency exit procedure 
on the return flight from his package holiday in Turkey. Due to a bomb scare, 
the flight was diverted to Istanbul for an emergency landing, during which the 
claimant suffered a spinal injury. It was found that Going Places could only 
be liable under Regulation 15 of the Package Travel, Package Holidays and 
Package Tours Regulations 1992 in respect of fault-based obligations, and 
                                                          
613 Milner v Carnival Plc [2010] EWCA Civ. 389. Ward LJ’s judgment, considered as the 
benchmark of assessing holiday damages, advises that damages are to be assessed and 
offered under two heads: diminution in value, and distress and disappointment.  
614 Ibid.    
615 Ibid. at paras 4-7, at which Ward LJ discusses phrasing in the brochures such as “our 
most lavish expression of elegance”. 
616 Milner v Carnival Plc [2010] EWCA Civ. 389. 
617 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468.  
618 See, in particular, subsection 6.2.3.  
619 Hone v Going Places Leisure Travel Limited [2001] EWCA Civ. 947. For discussion see S 
Mason, “Package holiday claims – ‘the short but tortured history of tour operator liability’” 
2001 4 Journal of Personal Injury Law 396 at 401. 
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that the onus was on the claimant to prove fault on the part of the tour 
operator.620 Urbnowicz and Grant suggest that it is “unfortunate” for 
consumers that the legislation is limited in this respect.621 It is submitted, 
however, that this offers a balance between consumer protection and 
exposing the tour operator only to reasonable risks. This can be contrasted 
with the scope of protection available under the Consumer Protection Act 
1987. Consumers ought reasonably to expect that products purchased will 
not cause personal injury or damage to property, and those liable under the 
1987 Act should bear responsibility when this is not the case because the 
product should have been under the control of at least one of those parties. 
Tour operators, however, will not be able to control all of the potential risks to 
their consumers. Further, there are always risks associated with travelling, 
and the consumer cannot expect the tour operator to bear responsibility for 
any and all injuries, damages, or causes of distress.   
5.2.9. Third party rights  
General statutory third party rights now exist in both Scots and English 
law.622 Kincaid criticised the Law Commission’s proposals for the English 
statutory right on the grounds that neither they nor the draft Bill sufficiently 
explained the values embodied by the new third party right.623 However, it is 
                                                          
620 Hone v Going Places Leisure Travel Limited [2001] EWCA Civ. 947 at para 8 per 
Longmore LJ. See also Codd v Thomson Holidays Limited (Court of Appeal, July 7 2000, 
Unreported) (discussed in Mason (n 619) at 402), which did not rely on the Regulations, but 
also makes clear that liability on the part of tour operators is not strict. In the case, a child 
was injured when his finger was caught in a lift door. The door had jammed, and the boy 
reached around the door to pull it towards him. This caused the door to quickly shut, and the 
boy’s finger was caught in the door, causing injury. The plaintiff could not establish liability 
against the tour operator because negligence could not be proved on the part of the hotel 
owners or managers. See also P Urbanowicz and D Grant, “Tour operators, package holiday 
contracts and strict liability” 2001(May) Journal of Business Law 253.  
621 Urbanowicz and Grant (n 620) at 272. For further discussion see S Prager and S Mason, 
“Regulation 15 of the Package Travel Regulations. Where are we now? And where are we 
going?” 2008 4 International Travel Law Journal 149. In the recent case of X v Kuoni Travel 
Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ. 938, the Court of Appeal found that a package tour provider was not 
liable in respect of a sexual assault allegedly committed by an electrician employed at the 
claimant’s hotel. However, Longmore J dissented (at para 14) on the grounds that sexual 
assault meant that the holiday arrangements were not to a reasonable standard under 
Regulation 15(2) of the Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours Regulations 
1992.   
622 See subsections 3.2.2.1 (Scots law) and 3.2.2.2. (English law).   
623 Kincaid (n 269) at 51-52.    
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clear that the key policy aims are contractual efficiency and giving effect to 
contractual intentions.624 It is generally accepted that third party rights offer 
an efficient means of contracting. For example, Vogenauer notes that: 
“From the perspective of law and economics, the contract in favour of 
a third party is a mechanism for increasing efficiency. It enables the 
parties to create an enforceable right for the third party by way of a 
single transaction, as opposed to conferring it first on one of the 
parties and then transferring it to the third party by way of a second, 
separate transaction.”625 
In terms of the use of third party rights in practice, the insurance industry is 
the “most important application” in Scots law, in light of the prevalence of the 
use of third party rights in this context.626 In various jurisdictions, third party 
rights are used in the context of liability insurance, partnership agreements 
for the benefit of a third person, contracts made by municipalities for the 
benefit of inhabitants, indemnification terms in construction contracts, and 
collective labour agreements.627 The Scots jus quaesitum tertio was used 
relatively frequently in contracts for the carriage of goods by sea.628 This 
demonstrates that third party rights offer contractual efficiency in a range of 
contexts and industries.  
Whilst some of the specific statutory third party rights discussed in this 
chapter provide redress against physical harm, neither the Contract (Third 
Party Rights) (Scotland) Act 2017629 nor the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999630 were aimed at such protection. However, the contracting 
parties would be permitted, under either Act, to provide for the third party to 
                                                          
624 Both aims are discussed above at subsection 3.2.2. The relationship between third party 
rights and contractual intention in particular is discussed in subsection 3.2.2.3.  
625 S Vogenauer, “Contracts in Favour of a Third Party” in J Basedow, K J Hopt, R 
Zimmermann and A Stier (eds), The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European Private Law vol 
1 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 385 at 386. Further, Ibbetson outlines various 
doctrinal means of bypassing the former prohibition on third party rights in English law. It is 
clear that these methods (making the third party a contractual party, or creating a collateral 
contract between the promisee and the third party) are less efficient than conferring an 
enforceable third party right: Ibbetson (n 272) at 127-128. See also Treitel, Landmarks (n 
113) 84-89; Trebilcock (n 7) at 271.    
626 MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 841.  
627 Report on Third Party Rights (n 241) 1.13. This list is not exhaustive.   
628 See further Clive (n 547).  
629 Report on Third Party Rights (n 241) 1.13-1.14 
630 Report on Privity of contract (n 182) 3.9-3.27. 
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make a contractual claim in respect of a failure to protect it from physical 
harm.  
5.2.10. Summary  
Parliament has provided statutory exceptions where “injustice has been 
glaring”,631 or, in other words, for “reasons of commercial necessity or 
consumer protection”.632 All of the exceptions considered protect parties who 
would otherwise have no financial recourse due to the privity doctrine. Some 
of the statutory exceptions protect against financial loss, and the Package 
Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018 recognise 
recovery in respect of emotional distress. The diversity of provisions is unified 
by the policy objective of protecting non-contracting parties.  
As summarised in Table 1 on the following page, the dominant policy 
objective behind the statutory exceptions is the protection of weaker parties, 
most often consumers. This is predominantly in terms of financial protection 
but also, in some cases, physical safety. Some are also justified by reference 
to notions of justice, i.e. ensuring recovery of loss caused by breach of 
contract. Only the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992 and the third party 









                                                          
631 Merkin (n 195) at 2.1. 
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633 It is acknowledged that an external party might be in a stronger economic position than 
the contracting party against whom it claims. For example, the personal assets of a wealthy 
consumer injured by a defective good might be greater than the value of the business which 
sold it the product. The analysis in the following sections proceeds on the basis that 
consumers will generally be in a weaker position than commercial contracting parties.  
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5.3. When ought the law to recognise an exception to the privity 
doctrine?  
The wide array of exceptions to the privity doctrine gives rise to the 
conviction that privity is “more honoured in its breach”,634 and cannot be said 
to exist in modern law. Certainly, the sheer number of exceptions to privity 
identified in this chapter and elsewhere in the thesis635 demonstrate that 
privity, if it exists, is certainly not absolute. 
However, third parties should not always be able to recover their losses 
caused by breach of contract. Contracting parties cannot be liable for every 
loss suffered by third parties that are caused by defective performance of 
their contractual obligations. This would make the scope of their liability 
impossible to predict and would make contracting in Scots law inefficient and 
commercially unappealing. It is more logical to recognise privity subject to 
exceptions, rather than refuse to recognise that contracts generally do not 
confer benefits or burdens on external parties. If the latter approach is 
followed (i.e. if it is said that privity ought not to be recognised), the default 
must be that third parties are able to enforce contractual performance and 
claim in contract when they are adversely affected by defective performance. 
This would make it impossible to enter into a contract with an accurate 
impression of the parties to whom one might incur liability, resulting in an 
inefficient and unworkable contract law. Recognition of clearly defined 
exceptions allows for balance between the interests of third parties and 
contracting parties. Third parties are protected in appropriate situations, and 
contracting parties can predict the scope of their liability. Abolishing the 
privity doctrine in its entirety removes control from the contracting parties and 
would allow for recovery of losses in situations where the third party does not 
necessarily merit protection. Dyer comments that privity:  
                                                          
634 Merkin (n 207) at 1.1. See also Merkin (n 222) at 5.2.   
635 See above at section 5.2 and subsection 3.2.3.  
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“may well have arisen as a natural or logical incident of the definition 
of contract itself, rather than as a rule deliberately formulated to give 
effect to deeper policy considerations.”636  
The development of privity in Scots and English law demonstrates the truth of 
this statement.637 Nonetheless, there are clear policy considerations 
supporting the continued recognition of privity: certainty for contracting 
parties and third parties. Flannigan argues that privity is in opposition to an 
economic theory of contract, because “a privity rule is unnecessarily costly 
and results in the misallocation and wasting of resources”, submitting that the 
costs stemming from transactions structured to bypass privity are 
unjustifiable.638 However, as discussed above,639 parties are able to confer 
rights on third parties, and can therefore distribute resources according to 
their intentions in a manner which allows for maximum efficiency in their 
particular transaction.  
The key question is therefore ascertaining when exceptions to privity are and 
should be permitted. This is the focus of the remainder of this section.  
It is submitted that there are two ‘classes’ of exceptions to privity in Scots 
law. The first is traditionally understood third party rights, which arise where 
the contracting parties so intend. This may also encompass some of the 
statutory exceptions (namely, specific statutory third party rights in the 
context of, for example, third party motor insurance).640 The second class of 
exceptions are those justified on the basis of policy considerations which 
outweigh the privity doctrine and the intentions of the contracting parties. This 
method of ascertaining whether exceptions are justifiable is outlined in 
Diagram 1 on the following page.  
                                                          
636 Dyer (n 178) at 109.  
637 The recognition of privity in Scots jurisprudence is examined in subsection 2.3.1. English 
law is discussed in subsection 2.4.2.1.  
638 Flannigan (n 146) at 590. See also Merkin (n 207) at 1.1. Henley has made similar 
arguments in the context of the insurance industry: Henley (n 564) at 9.1.  
639 See above at subsections 3.2.2.1-2 and 5.2.9. 
640 For discussion see MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 841. Not all of the statutory exceptions 
can be explained as legislative third party rights, however. Merkin and Stuart-Smith are 
uncertain as to whether the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 would apply to third 
parties in the context of motor insurance contracts if such parties were not protected by the 




Diagram 1: Determining whether exceptions should be recognised 
It is acknowledged that the policy justifications examined in this chapter are 
not intended to be treated as an exhaustive list of the only considerations 
which can justify present and future exceptions to privity. Other exceptions 
may be justified by reference to considerations not considered within this 
chapter.641 The following section further examines the common policy 
justifications identified in the consideration of the exceptions discussed in 
section 5.2.  
 
                                                          
641 Chapter 9 concludes that undisclosed agency is an exception to privity (subsection 9.3.1.) 
and examines potential justifications for the concept which are not considered in this chapter 
(subsection 9.4.3.).  
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5.4. Unifying policy considerations and their impact on the privity 
doctrine  
This section discusses the interaction between the privity doctrine and its 
statutory exceptions, addressing how to obtain a balance between upholding 
the privity doctrine and bypassing the doctrine on policy grounds. 
5.4.1. Protection of ‘weaker’ parties 
The statutory exceptions all reflect a balance of interests between the third 
party and the contracting party who causes the loss. The contracting party 
ought to be able to predict to whom it will owe liability, but sometimes the 
protection of weaker parties necessitates the imposition of liability in respect 
of third party loss. The latter consideration ought not to easily outweigh the 
former where the law provides for means by which a party can protect itself, 
or could easily have done so. In other words, if the loss could have been 
easily prevented by the third party, the law ought not to interfere with the 
contracting parties’ ability to predict and control their liability, but where it is 
unrealistic for the third party to have secured, for example, a collateral 
warranty, it is easier to justify the imposition of liability.  
The point at which a third party’s loss becomes legally significant (i.e. worthy 
of protecting against) is difficult to pinpoint precisely. Bagchi argues that the 
terms of contracts which inflict third party losses (directly or indirectly) ought 
to be construed narrowly, to allow recognition of third party interests.642 For 
example, she notes that non-compete clauses (known as restrictive 
covenants in Scots law643) concluded between employers and employees 
have negative consequences for third-party competitors of the employer, in 
the form of the loss of opportunity to hire the employee. These clauses 
should, according to Bagchi, be interpreted narrowly considering the negative 
                                                          
642 A Bagchi, “Other People’s Contracts” March 27, 2015, Yale Journal on Regulation, 
Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2586136, available at: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2586136.  
643 A discussion of restrictive covenants in Scots law generally is found in R Bradley, 
“Restrictive covenants” 2014 121(Jun) Employment Law Bulletin 2. See also Gloag, Contract 
(n 65) 569; HL MacQueen and J Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (Bloomsbury 
Professional Limited, West Sussex, 4th edn, 2016) 7.30-47.  
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impact these clauses have on competitor firms.644 Regardless of whether 
such a principle is too broad to be applied to all contracts which have harmful 
consequences for third parties, her argument is not directly applicable to the 
justification of contracts for the benefit of another, transferred loss, 
undisclosed agency, and ad hoc agency. The loss suffered by third parties in 
such contexts do not arise because the contracting parties have concluded a 
contract which harms the interests of the third party. Rather, the third party 
suffers loss because the contract is defectively performed. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to identify a principle similar to that proposed by Bagchi: that third 
parties should be protected from defective contractual performance where 
their protection can be justified.  
It is submitted that the third party’s loss should be recoverable where the 
third party cannot reasonably be expected (or was unable) to protect itself 
against the loss, and the contracting party could reasonably foresee that 
defective performance would negatively impact those in the position of the 
third party. There are thus two aspects of ascertaining whether the third 
party’s loss is recoverable: a) the third party's ability to protect itself, and b) 
whether the third party's loss is reasonably foreseeable to the relevant 
contracting party.  
Regarding the third party’s ability to protect itself, this should be determined 
on a case-by-case basis, examining factors such as the ease with which a 
third party could have taken out insurance in respect of the loss, and whether 
there is a party other than the party who caused the loss who could be sued 
in respect of the loss. Commercial third parties would generally be more likely 
to be expected to have taken out insurance in respect of potential loss than 
consumers. It would also be relevant to consider whether the third party had 
a weak bargaining position in respect of one or both contracting parties. In 
the case of a party purchasing a residential home in a personal capacity, for 
example, the buyer would likely not have had an opportunity to bargain with 
the construction company, and it would be in a significantly weaker 
                                                          
644 Bagchi (n 642) at 3.    
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bargaining position than the seller. Indeed, the Defective Premises Act 1972 
was enacted specifically to provide consumer purchasers with statutory 
protection to counteract their weak bargaining position in respect of 
commercial builders.645 Another consideration is whether the third party 
reasonably expected that the loss would be recoverable. A person who has 
booked a holiday on behalf of itself and its friends, for example, may 
reasonably expect that loss suffered as a result of defective performance of 
the holiday contract would be fully recoverable. However, this factor must be 
balanced with consideration of whether the party in question had access to, 
or ought to have sought, appropriate legal advice. A consumer would not 
normally be expected to have a solicitor read over its package holiday 
contract, whereas commercial parties should arguably be assumed to have 
the requisite funds to access legal advice. A consumer third party is less 
likely to have had access to legal advice, but may have (reasonably) 
assumed that it would be able to recover for their losses caused by latent 
defects in a residential property. These factors indicate that consumers will 
generally be more likely to be protected than commercial parties. However, 
that is not to say that new exceptions to privity could not protect commercial 
parties, and must protect consumers – as stated above, this should be 
considered on a case-by-case basis. Ideally, future statutory exceptions 
should provide for specific tests within the legislation to determine whether 
the external party can rely on the exception. The factors discussed in this 
subsection can be used to determine whether the new exception should be 
enacted.  
The matter of whether the loss is reasonably foreseeable should be 
determined according to the normal application of the test of reasonable 
foreseeability used in calculating damages in contract law more generally.646 
For example, a construction company can foresee that loss caused by a 
                                                          
645 Law Commission, Report on Defective Premises (n 582) 4.  
646 In accordance with the two-part test in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 156 ER 145, the loss 
will be recoverable if it arises in the usual course of things, or if it fell within the reasonable 
contemplation of the contracting parties as a likely result of the breach.  
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latent defect in a building may fall on a party to whom the building is sold 
rather than the landowner with whom it originally contracts.  
5.4.2. Ensuring recovery for losses caused by breach of contract    
A second policy justification for the recognition of statutory exceptions is 
ensuring recovery of loss caused by breach of contract, even where the loss 
does not fall on the person with whom the contract-breaker originally 
contracted. This consideration supports the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1992, the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010, and the Package 
Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018.  
A closely related consideration is ensuring that contractual obligations are 
upheld. This accords with Stair’s statement that “there is nothing more 
natural, than to stand to the faith of our pactions”.647 Whilst the statutory 
exceptions violate the privity doctrine, they do in fact play a role in protecting 
and upholding contracts. Enforcing liability in situations where a third party 
suffers loss at the hands of a contract-breaker ensures that contractual 
promises are kept. The relevant statutory exceptions consequentially can be 
said to support rather than threaten contractual obligations, despite the fact 
that they violate privity and the intentions of the contracting parties. Flannigan 
notes the public interest “in seeing to the enforcement of individual 
agreements in order to maintain the integrity of the contracting process”.648 
However, contractual obligations are of course not always upheld. 
Contracting parties can cancel contracts where they both agree to do so, and 
the interests of third parties are not generally relevant to their ability to 
terminate a contract or alter their contractual obligations. In the case of Finnie 
v Glasgow and South-Western Railway,649  for example, Finnie sought to 
enforce a contract between the railway authority and a local council which 
would have allowed for more efficient transport links for third party 
consumers. He was not able to enforce this contract, because his benefit was 
                                                          
647 Stair, Institutions (n 224) 1.1.21. 
648 Flannigan (n 146) at 583.   




only incidental to the contract and he was not intended to have the right to 
enforce the contract. Public interest in seeing contracts upheld must be 
balanced with the interests of contracting parties in exercising their freedom 
to cancel contracts, and their interests in ensuring that the liability they owe in 
respect of defective or non-performance is predictable and easily defined. 
The view that a failure in contractual performance ought always to be 
remediable regardless of whether the loss falls on a contracting party is not 
currently reflected in Scots650 or English651 law. The fact that a third party will 
suffer loss as a result of defective or non-performance of the contract does 
not justify upholding the contractual obligations contrary to the intentions of 
one or all contracting parties through the recovery of third party loss, unless 
there are other policy considerations which justify the imposition of liability. 
Lord Millett comments that allowing contractual recovery in respect of a 
performance not rendered ought always to be possible, even where the 
performance was due to another, and that developing a wide concept of 
contractual loss would be beneficial.652 However, he does not convincingly 
argue that all losses stemming from defective or non-performance ought to 
be accounted for in circumstances where the loss falls on a third party, and 
he does not assert that the third party itself should have the ability to enforce 
the contract. Accordingly, the policy of ensuring recovery for losses caused 
by breach of contract is a relevant consideration in ascertaining whether 
deviation from privity is justified, but this factor alone does not permit the 
creation of an exception to privity.  
5.4.3. Commercial convenience/ efficiency  
This policy justification is perhaps the least controversial. Contractual 
efficiency and convenience are undoubtedly of benefit to the contracting 
parties. Further, commercial convenience is a worthwhile policy aim in its 
own right, because lower transaction costs increase commercial activity. This 
                                                          
650 This rule is discussed in subsection 6.3.2. (see in particular (n 754)).  
651 Cassell v Broome [1972] AC 1027; McKendrick (n 344) at 37; Stevens, Torts and Rights 
(n 25) 191.  
652 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518 at 587-588 and 591 
per Lord Millet. 
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justification ought to be upheld where there are no adverse consequences to 
third parties in allowing the contracting parties to contract efficiently. For 
example, third party rights save transaction costs,653 and ought to be 
permitted, given that they do not pose any burden to the third party.654  
5.4.4. Upholding the contracting parties’ intentions 
It is relevant to consider a policy consideration competing against the 
justifications reflected in the statutory exceptions: upholding the contracting 
parties’ intentions. Such intentions are expressed in their choice of 
contractual structure and their chosen means of distributing liability.  
The principle that the contracting parties should be able to predict and control 
their liability is not absolute. Some of the statutory exceptions – for example, 
the Consumer Protection Act 1987 Part 1 – apply strict liability, because this 
was viewed as necessary for the protection of consumers. It is submitted that 
the contracting parties’ intentions and chosen contractual structure should be 
overcome where the protection of the third party outweighs the importance of 
allowing their contractual freedom. As above, this is not necessarily the case 
where a collateral warranty could easily have been secured in respect of the 
third party.   
Adams, Beyleveld, and Brownsword state that, where parties enter into 
contracts which are subject to statutory exceptions to privity, their intentions 
to enter these particular species of contract can be assumed to encompass 
an intention to fulfil liability owed under the exceptions.655 This accords with 
the current position in the law that, where a statutory provision affords title to 
sue outwith a contract, this will not be negated due to an argument of lack of 
privity.656 This is logically sound – parties can be assumed to have 
                                                          
653 See subsection 5.2.9.  
654 If the third party views the receipt of a third party right as detrimental (because, for 
example, it does not wish to be associated with one or both of the contracting parties for 
reputational reasons), it can likely reject the right: Report on Third Party Rights (n 241) 6.1-8.  
655 Adams, Beyleveld, and Brownsword (n 20) at 243.  
656 See, for example, Lord Murray’s statement that “It is clear that privity of contract affords 
no test of the validity of such a claim. The claim rests upon statute.” (the text of Lord 
Murray’s Note from Interlocutor is provided in Waddell v Howat 1924 SLT 468). 
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awareness of the legislation which impacts upon their contracts. They 
therefore ought to take steps in contractual negotiations to ensure that 
liability is distributed between the parties in such a way as to acknowledge 
liability which could be owed under relevant legislation. Each individual 
statutory provision has been enacted because other factors outweigh the 
privity doctrine and contractual intention, although, once the legislation is 
enacted, the parties are able to make an active choice as to whether they 
wish to enter a contract to which statutory exceptions to privity apply. This 
allows the parties to exercise their intentions without being ‘blindsided’ by the 
imposition of liability where they would otherwise be protected by the privity 
doctrine. However, consideration of the contracting parties’ intentions 
highlights the need for clear, workable law on the exceptions to the privity 
doctrine, so that they can adequately identify potential third parties to whom 
they might owe liability.  
5.5. Exceptions to the ‘no burdens’ rule  
This section examines concepts which have been identified as exceptions to 
the ‘no burdens’ aspect657 of the privity rule, namely, assignation and forcing 
third parties to comply with arbitration clauses to enforce their third party 
rights. The section assesses whether these concepts are in fact exceptions 
to privity and identifies common policy considerations which justify deviation 
from the ‘no burdens’ rule. This section considers common law exceptions 
because of the lack of relevant statutory exceptions.  
5.5.1. Assignation 
This subsection briefly outlines the law on assignation, and then explains the 




                                                          
657 The ‘no-burdens’ rule is outlined in subsections 2.2.2. and 2.3.3.  
135 
 
5.5.1.1. The law on assignation 
Assignation (also known as ‘cession’ or ‘assignment’658) is long-recognised in 
Scots law.659 In essence:  
“A right arising under a contract may be assigned by the creditor 
(cedent) to a third party (assignee) so as to give that third party a title 
to sue the debtor for performance of the right.”660  
Accordingly, assignation involves the transfer of rights, but (generally) not 
burdens.661 The assignee is not, therefore, a full contracting party.662 It is 
possible to assign obligations, however, the consent of the debtor in the 
assignment transaction (i.e. the cedent’s creditor) is required.663 Assignable 
rights encompass the right to payment or performance under a contract664 as 
well as damages for breach of contract.665 An assignation is completed by 
intimation to the debtor.666 
In terms of the transfer of rights, the debtor need not consent to 
assignment.667 However, delectus personae applies.668 This refers to “the 
choice of a particular person which implies the exclusion of others.”669 In 
accordance with Lord Dunedin’s judgement in Cole v Handasyde, a contract 
is not assignable if it contains an element of delectus personae.670 This may 
                                                          
658 McBryde, Contract (n 111) 12.05; RG Anderson, Assignation (Edinburgh Legal Education 
Trust, Edinburgh, 2008) 1.01. 
659 McBryde, Contract (n 111) 12.01 and 12.05; MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 854.  
660 MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 855.  
661 Anderson, Assignation (n 658) 1.04; McBryde, Contract (n 111) 12.14; MacQueen and 
Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson (n 68) 8.17; G Lubbe “Assignment” in H MacQueen 
and R Zimmermann (eds), European Contract Law: Scots and South African Perspectives 
(Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2006) 307 at 310.   
662 Anderson notes the historical confusion on this point: Anderson, Assignation (n 658) 1.04. 
See also MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law (n 643) 2.88.   
663 Anderson, Assignation (n 658) 1.04; McBryde, Contract (n 111) 12.42; MacQueen, SME 
(n 69) para 856. All of these commentators acknowledge the lack of clarity in Scots law 
regarding the question of when and how an obligation can be assigned.   
664 MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 855, citing Dampskibsaktieselskapet Aurdal v Compania de 
Navegacion La Estrella 1916 SC 882.  
665 MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 855, citing Constant v Kincaid & Co (1902) 4 F 901.  
666 MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law (n 643) 2.87.  
667 Anderson, Assignation (n 658) 1.03; McBryde, Contract (n 111) 12.02.  
668 MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 855; Anderson, Assignation (n 658) 1.03; MacQueen and 
Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson (n 68) 8.16.   
669 McBryde, Contract (n 111) 12.36. See also 12.33 and 12.79.   
670 Cole v Handasyde & Co 1910 SC 68 at 73 per Lord Dunedin. See also International Fibre 
Syndicate Ltd v Dawson (1901) 3 F (HL) 32 at 33 per Lord Robertson. 
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be the case if the contract concerns “a personal service of a peculiar nature”, 
or where a purchaser wishes goods to be made by a particular manufacturer 
due to considerations of, for example, the latter’s character or reputation.671 
McBryde makes clear that whether assignation is restricted on grounds of 
delectus personae depends on the intentions of the contracting parties,672 
and delectus personae can be bypassed through the parties’ agreement.673 
Assignation may also be restricted by the express terms of the contract in 
question.674   
5.5.1.2. Assignation and the privity doctrine  
Thomas Smith states that assignation is an exception to privity, although he 
does not explain this view.675 He is, however, correct. A contract is not 
formed between the assignee and the debtor, but the assignee receives a 
right to claim against the debtor for payment under the contract between the 
debtor and creditor. Where an obligation has been assigned with the consent 
of the debtor, the assignee becomes burdened to the debtor, with whom it is 
not in a contractual relationship. This constitutes an exception to the ‘no 
burdens’ aspect of privity. The debtor also enjoys the benefit of having a right 
against the assignee, despite the fact that the debtor is in fact a third party to 
the assignment agreement between the cedent and assignee. Assignation is, 
therefore, clearly an exception to privity regardless of whether rights or 
obligations are assigned.  
The interaction between privity and third party rights, as discussed in chapter 
2,676 demonstrates that privity is generally applied subject to the intentions of 
the contracting parties. The assignment of obligations requires the active 
consent of the debtor, and so the intentions of both contractual parties (i.e. 
                                                          
671 Cole v Handasyde & Co 1910 SC 68 at 73 per Lord Dunedin. 
672 McBryde, Contract (n 111) 12.36, citing Cole v Handasyde & Co 1910 SC 68 and Berlitz 
School of Languages v Duchêne (1903) 6 F 181.  
673 Anderson, Assignation (n 658) 1.03 citing Stair, Institutions (n 224) 3.1.3.  
674 McBryde, Contract (n 111) 12.38-39; MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 855.   
675 Smith, Short Commentary (n 36) 773. Burrows and Guest make similar comment: 
Burrows, Restatement (n 33) §48; Guest, Anson’s Law of Contract (n 113) 379. Furmston 
and Tolhurst state that assignment is not an exception to privity (Furmston and Tolhurst, 
Privity (n 19) 3.52); the remainder of this subsection explains why their view is incorrect.  
676 See, in particular, subsection 3.2.2.3.  
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the cedent and debtor) is protected. However, the third party clearly consents 
to this burden under the assignation agreement with the creditor. This 
situation would also constitute a deviation from privity in respect of the benefit 
accrued by the debtor, who receives a right under the contract between the 
cedent and assignee. This does not present any new challenge to the 
relationship between privity and contractual intention. Both parties to the 
contract between the cedent and assignee actively consent to the latter 
becoming bound to the debtor. Contractual intention is therefore upheld.  
5.5.2. Arbitration   
The Scottish Law Commission recently addressed the debate on whether a 
third party should be required to engage in arbitration to enforce its third party 
right right if so-provided in the contract, given that the “very essence” of 
arbitration is its consensual nature.677 The Contract (Rights of Third Parties) 
(Scotland) Act 2017 section 9 provides that a third party is to be treated as if 
it was a party to the arbitration agreement referred to in the contract providing 
for its right. The provision is construed as a conditional benefit rather than a 
burden.678  
In England, the Law Commission recommended that third parties ought not 
to be treated as arbitral parties, because this would be seen as imposing a 
duty to follow the arbitral procedure.679 Tettenborn disagreed with this 
proposal, commenting that this would allow the third party’s “having it both 
ways”.680 However, the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 section 8 
provides that third parties are to be treated as parties to any arbitration 
agreement required by contract to enforce their right.681 The provision 
resulted from lobbyists’ arguments that the legislation would be more useful if 
                                                          
677 Report on Third Party Rights (n 241) 7.3-18.   
678 Ibid. 7.5-6, Draft Bill Clause 9 (available at Appendix A of the Report).   
679 Report on Privity of contract (n 182) 14.18.  
680 Tettenborn (n 247) at 610.   
681 For discussion, see MacMillan (n 250) at 733 and C Ambrose, “When can a third party 
enforce an arbitration clause?” 2001 (Sep.) Journal of Business Law 415. See also 
Shipowners' Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (Luxembourg) v Containerships 




the Arbitration Act 1996 could apply to third party rights formed under the 
Act.682 There is a continuing debate on whether ‘arbitration without privity’ 
can be imposed in situations such as multiparty construction contracts.683  
This so-called burden can however be construed as a condition attached to 
the third party’s right. The Scots position is logical: if the third party is to take 
advantage of its right, it must do so in accordance with the conditions 
outlined in the contract as a whole.  
If, however, requiring the third party to undergo arbitration is in fact a burden 
on the third party, this is justified on the grounds of commercial efficiency and 
commercial necessity from the perspective of the contracting parties. 
Ambrose comments that it is a matter of “common sense and principle” that 
the contracting parties should have the ability to make the third party’s right 
conditional on the third party’s consent to the arbitration clause, particularly 
where the contract concerns confidential or otherwise sensitive 
information.684 This would not, of course, justify revision of the general rule 
that contracting parties cannot impose burdens on third parties. Rather, this 
limited deviation from privity is justified on the grounds that the third party 
stands only to gain in receipt of its third party right, and ought to follow the 
contracting parties’ dispute resolution provisions should they wish to enforce 
the right.  
5.5.3. Summary  
These scenarios highlight very narrow instances in which the ‘no burdens’ 
rule is bypassed. The policy considerations underlying deviation from this 
aspect are narrow, encompassing only intention (on the part of the third party 
as well as the contracting parties) and commercial convenience. The law 
ought not to otherwise allow contracting parties to burden third parties, so 
                                                          
682 Report on Third Party Rights (n 241) 7.4. See also Andrews (n 344) at 373-374.  
683 For an overview of the discussion on this issue, see Report on Third Party Rights (n 241) 
7.18; AM Steingruber, Consent in International Arbitration (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2012) 1.13; J Paulsson, “Arbitration without privity” 1995 10(2) ICSID: Foreign Investment 
Law Journal 232.   
684 Ambrose (n 681) at 418.  
139 
 
that the third party’s freedom of contract and financial and personal interests 
are protected.  
5.6. Concluding remarks 
This chapter has identified the policy considerations which justify deviation 
from the privity doctrine, and has explained why, despite the number of 
exceptions, privity must continue to be recognised. The chapter has also 
provided a means of identifying when new exceptions to the benefits aspect 
of privity should be accepted, namely, when the exception reflects the 
intentions of the contracting parties, or when there is a justifiable policy 
reason. Similarly, the chapter also provides a unification of considerations 
which justify deviation from the ‘no burdens’ rule.  
The statutory exceptions to privity indicate that privity and contractual 
intention can and should be bypassed to reflect the following policy 
considerations: protection of third parties from physical and financial harm, 
ensuring loss caused by breach of contract is recoverable, and commercial 
convenience. Regarding the first of these considerations, the third party 
should not always be protected. The loss should only be recoverable where 
the third party cannot reasonably be expected (or was unable) to protect itself 
against the loss, and the contracting party could reasonably foresee that 
defective performance would negatively impact those in the position of the 
third party. The second consideration, ensuring loss caused by breach of 
contract is recoverable, is a relevant consideration but cannot provide the 
sole justification for creating a new exception to privity. Commercial 
convenience provides a suitable justification where the third party is not 







Chapter 6: Contracts for the benefit of another 
6.1. Overview of chapter 6 
This chapter analyses contracts for the benefit of another in Scots law. It 
follows the same structure as chapters 7 (transferred loss), 8 (ad hoc 
agency), and 9 (undisclosed agency). Each chapter defines its respective 
concept and explains the concept’s development in Scots law, offering 
comparative comment where relevant. The chapters then address whether 
the concept is compatible with privity and Scots contract theory, whether the 
concept could and should be explained in terms of delictual liability, and 
whether there are sound policy considerations justifying the existence of the 
concept. Each chapter concludes with discussion on whether the concept 
should continue to be recognised in Scots law.  
This chapter also considers the interaction between contracts for the benefit 
of another and third party rights.  
6.2. Contracts for the benefit of another in Scots law  
This section defines contracts for the benefit of another, explains the 
development of this concept in Scots and English law, and considers the 
potential impact of relevant English case law in Scotland.   
6.2.1. Defining contracts for the benefit of another 
A contract for the benefit of another arises where one of the contracting 
parties enters into a contract for the benefit of an extra-contractual party, and 
may recover damages for that party’s losses resulting from defective 
contractual performance.685 The extra-contractual party cannot recover 
damages for itself.686 
 
 
                                                          
685 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468 at 1473 per Lord Denning. 
686 The contrast between contracts for the benefit of another and contracts providing 
enforceable third party rights is discussed further below at subsection 6.3.1. 
142 
 
6.2.2. Development of contracts for the benefit of another in Scots law  
The authorities on contracts for the benefit of another in Scots law are 
limited. It is however accepted that where A contracts with B for services to 
be provided by B for the benefit of C, the measure of damages recoverable 
by A in the event of B’s breach is the actual loss suffered by C.687 In Blyth & 
Blyth v Carillion Construction Ltd.,688 for example, Lord Eassie explained that 
if a husband contracted with a surgeon for his wife’s treatment, the liability of 
the surgeon for treating the wife negligently should be quantified by the loss 
suffered by her.689 However, the case itself concerned financial damages, 
and there is no definitive authority in Scots law for the recovery of damages 
for another’s physical injury (save for Lord Eassie’s analogy), damage to their 
property, or injury to feelings. Nonetheless, Scots law generally allows for 
contractual damages to be awarded for injury to feelings690 and psychological 
injury.691 Such damages could potentially be recovered in the context of 
contracts for the benefit of another.  
6.2.3. Contracts for the benefit of another in English law  
In English law, contracts for the benefit of another allow recovery of damages 
for injury to feelings as well as financial loss. The leading authority is Jackson 
v Horizon Holidays Ltd,692 in which the plaintiff booked a holiday for himself, 
his wife, and his two toddler sons. The standard of accommodation did not 
meet various contractual conditions, and he recovered damages for the 
distress and discomfort suffered by his family as well as himself. Lord 
                                                          
687 Hogg, Obligations (n 433) 3.198.   
688 Blyth & Blyth v Carillion Construction Ltd 2002 SLT 961. 
689 Ibid. at para 36 per Lord Eassie. In the Outer House, Lord Johnston previously held in 
Rosen v Stephen (1907) 14 SLT 784 that a contractual action was not possible in a case in 
which a father had contracted with a chemist for ringworm treatment for his daughter, and 
the treatment caused her injury. Lord Johnston arrived at this conclusion on the grounds of 
the lack of privity between the daughter and defender. He did not consider whether the father 
could make a contractual claim on his daughter’s behalf.    
690 Graham v Ladeside of Kilbirnie Bowling Club 1994 SLT 1295; Buchanan v Newington 
Property Centre 1992 SCLR 583; Black v Gibson 1992 SLT 1076; Diesen v Samson (1971) 
SLT (Sh. Ct.) 49.  
691 Ward v Scotrail Railways Ltd 1999 SC 255; Logan v Falkirk and District Royal Infirmary 
NHS Trust 1999 GWD 30-1431.  
692 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
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Denning stated that the facts of the case were comparable with situations in 
which, for example, a host contracts with a restaurant for a meal for himself 
and his friends, or where a vicar contracts for transportation for his choir.693 
He describes the concept as “a contract by one for the benefit of third 
persons”.694 According to his judgment, only the party who made the contract 
can sue, and the extra-contractual party cannot recover damages in its own 
name.695 In a similar Court of Appeal case, a contractual party could recover 
damages for disappointment and distress suffered by his friends for whom he 
had booked a skiing holiday.696   
Whilst Jackson v Horizon Holidays697 has been described as “obscure”,698 it 
has not been expressly overruled. Contracts for the benefits of third parties 
are acknowledged judicially in various circumstances. In Panatown Ltd v 
Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd,699 Lord Millet mentions Jackson v Horizon 
Holidays700 as a “broad decision on the measure of damages or as an 
example of a type of contract calling for special treatment”.701 Lord 
Wilberforce makes similar comment, acknowledging that Jackson:702  
“may be supported either as a broad decision on the measure of 
damages… or possibly as an example of a type of contract — 
examples of which are persons contracting for family holidays, 
ordering meals in restaurants for a party, hiring a taxi for a group — 
calling for special treatment.”703 
                                                          
693 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468 at 1472 per Lord Denning. 
694 Ibid. at 1473 per Lord Denning. 
695 Ibid.  
696 Clive Avon Adcock v Blue Sky Holidays Limited 1980 WL 613068, which cited but did not 
rely on Jackson (see the judgement of Lord Justice Cumming-Bruce). See also Thomson v 
RCI Europe [2001] CLY 4275 (in which the claimant recovered damages for distress and 
inconvenience suffered by her and her relatives caused by defective holiday accommodation 
in the USA) and Sutcliffe and Greenwood v Cosmoair [1996] CLY 711 (the claimant had paid 
for a holiday for himself and his partner, and recovered damages in respect of the couple’s 
distress at discovering a dirty swimming pool and damp bed linen). 
697 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
698 Morgan, Great debates (n 10) 277.  
699 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518. 
700 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
701 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518 at 588 per Lord Millet. 
702 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
703 Woodar Investment Development v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 277 at 283 
per Lord Wilberforce. 
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The case has also been applied outwith the context of holiday cases. In 
Buckley v Lane Herdman & Co,704 a married couple sued their solicitor for 
their expenses and distress resulting from the solicitor’s failure to ensure that 
the sale of their house was simultaneous with the purchase of a new family 
home. The stress resulted from the search for accommodation and the fact 
that the only available alternative accommodation was in a noisy and 
unpleasant neighbourhood. Jackson705 was accepted as an authority for 
allowing the recovery of damages for the emotional impact of the breach of 
contract. The couple did not sue for the distress suffered by their children, but 
this arguably could have been accounted for, because damages were 
awarded in respect of the toddler sons’ distress in that case.   
The specific circumstances of Jackson706 now fall within the provisions of the 
Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018. This 
legislation allows consumers to claim in certain circumstances where their 
package holidays are unsatisfactory.707 The European Court of Justice found 
that non-material damages are recoverable under the Directive which 
enacted the previous version of these regulations (the Package Travel, 
Package Holidays and Package Tours Regulations 1992).708 This would 
clearly encompass Mr Jackson’s claim for the distress suffered by his family. 
In the more recent case of Minhas v Imperial Travel Ltd,709 a woman brought 
a claim under the Regulations against the tour operator with whom she had 
contracted for a holiday for herself and her partner. Following Jackson,710 
District Judge Young permitted her to recover damages in respect of the 
impact of unsuitable accommodation on her and her partner.711  It is likely 
that future holiday-makers will rely on the statutory principle in the 
                                                          
704 Buckley v Lane Herdman & Co [1977] CLY 3143. 
705 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
706 Ibid. 
707 See discussion in subsection 5.2.8. 
708 Leitner v Tui Deutschland GmbH & Co KG (C0168/00) [2002] ECR I-2631, March 12 
2002. The relevant Directive is the Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on 
package travel, package holidays and package tours.  
709 Minhas v Imperial Travel Ltd [2003] CLY 2043. 
710 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
711 Minhas v Imperial Travel Ltd [2003] CLY 2043. 
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Regulations that they may recover losses suffered by external parties for 
whom they have contracted, rather than relying on Jackson.712 However, the 
principle from the case remains applicable to the recovery of losses suffered 
outwith holiday contexts, such as those identified by Lord Wilberforce.713  
The concept of contracts for the benefit of another appears to be accepted in 
English law, in light of its recognition in Jackson v Horizon Holidays714 and 
similar cases. However, the exact scope of the concept is unclear. In 
Jackson,715 Lord Denning relied on the case of Lloyds v Harper716 for his 
proposition that, where two parties contract for one of them to perform in 
favour of a third party, the other contracting party can recover for the third 
party’s losses stemming from defective performance, regardless of whether 
there is a fiduciary relationship between that party and the third party.717 The 
claimant in Lloyds v Harper718 was acting as a trustee for the external party 
for whom damages were sought. In Woodar Investment Development Ltd. v 
Wimpey Construction U.K. Ltd.,719 the House of Lords did not accept that 
Lloyds v Harper720 supported the general proposition put forward by Lord 
Denning.721 They did, however, find that Jackson722 could be treated as an 
authority for the narrower proposition that the claimant could recover where 
its personal loss was made worse by disappointment in the fact that relevant 
family members did not enjoy their holiday.723 
The implications of Woodar v Wimpey724 are unclear. Merkin has suggested 
that the judgments highlight that a contracting party can recover only if it is 
                                                          
712 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
713 See (n 703).   
714 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
715 Ibid. 
716 Lloyds v Harper [1888] 16 CD 290. 
717 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468 at 1473 per Lord Denning.  
718 Lloyds v Harper [1888] 16 CD 290. 
719 Woodar Investment Development v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 277. 
720 Lloyds v Harper [1888] 16 CD 290. 
721 Woodar Investment Development v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 277 at 
293 per Lord Russell of Killowen and at 297 per Lord Keith of Kinkel.  
722 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
723 Lloyds v Harper [1888] 16 CD 290. See also Calabar Properties Ltd v Sticher [1984] 1 
WLR 287. 
724 Woodar Investment Development v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 277. 
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“affected” by the third party’s loss.725 This is not reflected in subsequent case 
law. In Forster v Silvermere Golf and Equestrian Centre,726 the defendant 
agreed to build a house which would be occupied rent-free by the plaintiff 
and her children, but did not uphold this agreement. When the defendant 
refused to provide the house, the plaintiff could recover for her own loss, but 
was not able to obtain damages in respect of her children. It is difficult to see 
why Mr Jackson’s suffering caused by the impact on his children’s holiday 
was greater than that of a mother affected by the loss of her children’s future 
home. However, in Forster v Silvermere Golf and Equestrian Centre727 Dillon 
J reasoned that the mother could not recover for her children because she 
had not acted as their trustee or agent,728 rather than considering the concept 
of contracts for the benefit of another. Whilst Merkin’s comment is not 
therefore correct, the qualifications in Woodar v Wimpey729 dilute Lord 
Denning’s wide-ranging principle from Jackson,730 and the scope of the 
concept is accordingly unclear in English law.  
Contracts for the benefit of another are perhaps a remnant from the 
inadmissibility of third party rights in English law. In Hohler v Aston,731 for 
example, Sargant J remarked that the:  
“third parties, of course, cannot themselves enforce a contract made 
for their benefit, but the person with whom the contract is made is 
entitled to enforce the contract.”732  
The relationship between contracts for the benefit of another and third party 
rights is discussed further below.733 
 
                                                          
725 Merkin (n 195) at 2.11.   
726 Forster v Silvermere Golf and Equestrian Centre (1981) 125 SJ 397.  
727 Ibid.  
728 Ibid. at para 258 per Dillon J.   
729 Woodar Investment Development v Wimpey Construction UK Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 277. 
730 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
731 Hohler v Aston [1920] 2 Ch. 420. 
732 Ibid. at 425 per Sargant J.  
733 See subsection 6.3.3.   
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6.2.4. Impact of English case law on Scots law  
The concept of contracts for the benefit of another can certainly be said to 
exist in Scots law. Lord Eassie’s judgment in Blyth & Blyth v Carillion 
Construction Ltd.734 is authority for the principle that a contractual party can 
recover damages for financial loss and personal injury suffered by the party 
for whom the contract was made in the event of defective performance. 
However, it cannot be said with certainty that Jackson735 would be followed in 
future Scots cases in which the pursuer attempts to recover contractual 
damages for the emotional suffering of those for whom the contract was 
made. There is no barrier in Scots law to the recovery of damages in respect 
of suffering and disappointment in disappointing holiday cases or similar 
situations such as Lord Denning’s example of a vicar who books 
transportation for his choir. Scots law may thus follow English law in future by 
allowing damages in such cases. At present, however, the concept of 
contracts for the benefit of another is more fully developed and wider in 
scope in English law as compared to Scots.  
6.3. Compatibility of contracts for the benefit of another with Scots 
law 
This section discusses the interaction between contracts for the benefit of 
another and third party rights, and then considers the compatibility of 
contracts for the benefit of another with privity, contract theory, and delict. 
The final subsection addresses whether the recognition of contracts for the 
benefit of another is supported by relevant policy considerations.  
6.3.1. Interaction between contracts for the benefit of another and third 
party rights 
The Scottish Law Commission has recently described Jackson v Horizon 
Holidays736 as a “possible modern example of a contract with a third-party 
                                                          
734 Blyth & Blyth v Carillion Construction Ltd 2002 SLT 961 at para 36 per Lord Eassie. See 
above at subsection 6.2.2.  




right in favour of young children”.737 However, they distinguish between the 
case and third party rights as traditionally understood in Scots law, noting 
that there are some circumstances in which third parties have “passive 
capacity only,” and are unable to enforce the contracts from which they 
benefit.738 The term ‘passive’ refers to the external party’s inability to enforce 
the contract in its own right, rather than the party’s lack of contractual 
capacity. The external party’s inability to sue on the contract indicates that 
third party rights and contracts for the benefit of another are separate 
concepts. Whilst contracts for the benefit of another can be treated as a 
passive form of third party rights, there is however a key distinction between 
the two concepts. A third party can enforce a third party right in its own name, 
whereas the external party for whom a contract for the benefit of another is 
made cannot.  
The question of whether the external party can enforce its benefit is 
determined according to the intentions of the contracting parties. The 
Scottish Law Commission recognises that: “third parties benefited by 
contracts between others may not have rights to those benefits because the 
contracting parties do not so intend.”739 In the case of both third party rights 
and contracts for the benefit of another, the parties intend to confer a benefit 
on the third/ external party. However, the parties intend for the benefit to be 
enforceable on the part of the third party (in the case of a third party right), 
but not the external party (in the case of a contract for the benefit of another). 
A contract for the benefit of another may arise where, for example, parents 
wish to agree on a child support agreement for the benefit of their child, but 
they do not intend for the child to have the ability to enforce this agreement at 
its own suit. Beale discusses the possibility of passive third parties, 
acknowledging that a contracting party may actively choose for the third party 
not to acquire a right.740 He notes that a person may, for example, engage a 
                                                          
737 Discussion Paper on Third Party Rights (n 63) 2.33. See also Report on Third Party 
Rights (n 241) 1.13, citing Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468 and 
Lougheed v On The Beach Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ. 1538.   
738 Discussion Paper on Third Party Rights (n 63) 2.33.   
739 Report on Third Party Rights (n 241) 1.14.  
740 Beale (n 351) at 108. 
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builder to repair his elderly uncle’s house, without intending for the uncle to 
have any contractual right to enforce the contract with the builder, because 
the uncle can no longer manage his own affairs.741 Beale submits that the 
person who makes the contract should be able to obtain a remedy on behalf 
of his uncle.742  
The Scottish Law Commission did not make clear in their discussion of 
Jackson v Horizon Holidays743 that there is a sharp distinction between 
passive external parties and the recipients of third party rights.744 Whilst the 
Scottish Law Commission’s reforms dealt with ‘active’ third party rights only, 
it is helpful to acknowledge that these concepts are separate. It is suggested 
that the terminology of third party rights should be used where the third party 
is intended to receive an enforceable right, and situations in which the 
external party has a passive capacity only are referred to as contracts for the 
benefit of another.  
Merkin argues that, if contracting parties are able to enforce third party rights¸ 
there is no need for a separate concept of contracts for the benefit of 
another, because such contracts can be viewed as giving rise to enforceable 
third party rights.745 Allowing contracting parties to enforce third party rights 
would undeniably be useful. The Scottish Law Commission, for example, 
acknowledge situations in which a third party is willing to receive the benefit 
conceived in its favour, but is unable to raise an action through, for example, 
a lack of funds or poor health.746 However, it is not clear in Scots law whether 
a contracting party can enforce a third party’s right or recover damages for 
                                                          
741 Beale (n 351) at 108. 
742 Ibid. 
743 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
744 For example, they mention in the Report on Third Party Rights (n 241) 2.14 that a 
“contract with a third-party right in favour of young children might arise when a parent books 
a family holiday for him- or herself and the rest of the family.” It is true that the parents and 
holiday company may intend to confer an enforceable right on the children. However, the 
Report appears to offer this example in reference to Jackson, in which the parties did not 
intend for the children to have an enforceable third party right.  
745 Merkin (n 195) at 2.4.  
746 Memorandum on Stipulations in Favour of Third Parties (n 235) 43. See also McBryde, 
Contract (n 111) 10.10. 
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defective performance or non-performance of the right.747 This contrasts with 
contracts for the benefit of another. It is clear from Jackson v Horizon 
Holidays748 and similar cases749 that the contracting party who makes the 
contract can recover damages for the third party’s loss. Further, the crucial 
distinction remains that, in the case of contracts for the benefit of another, the 
external party cannot enforce its own right. Accordingly, third party rights and 
contracts for the benefit of another would remain as distinct concepts even if 
it was clarified that contracting parties could enforce third party rights. 
Contracts for the benefit of another should, however, be viewed as a passive 
form of third party rights. 
6.3.2. Compatibility of contracts for the benefit of another with the 
privity doctrine 
As discussed immediately above, contracts for the benefit of another are a 
passive form of third party rights. The Scots third party right is accepted as 
an exception to the privity doctrine.750 This does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion, however, that contracts for the benefit of another are an 
exception to the privity doctrine. It is submitted that contracts for the benefit 
of another do not operate as an exception to privity.  
As discussed in chapter 2,751 privity prevents an external party from enforcing 
contractual obligations in contracts to which it is not party. Regarding 
contracts for the benefit of another, the external party cannot at any stage 
enforce the benefit in its favour, nor does it receive the damages recovered in 
respect of its loss. The cases discussed in previous chapters did not consider 
the impact of the privity rule on a contracting party’s ability to recover 
damages on behalf of the person benefited by the contract. However, 
                                                          
747 This was not clarified in the Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act 2017. See also 
MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 839; Memorandum on Stipulations in Favour of Third Parties (n 
235) 42. In English law, it is clear that the contracting party not bound to perform in the third 
party’s favour can enforce the third party right: Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 
section 1(7).  
748 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
749 See discussion above at subsection 6.2.3.  
750 This is discussed above at subsection 3.2.2.3.  
751 See, in particular, subsections 2.2.2 and 2.3.1. 
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Burrows states that privity “plainly does not prevent the contracting party… 
enforcing the contract even though the contract is one for the benefit of a 
third party.”752 This is correct, because the purpose of the ‘benefits’ aspect of 
the privity doctrine is to protect the contracting parties against contractual 
claims from external parties to whom they did not intend to owe liability. 
Privity is not therefore breached when a contracting party is permitted to 
make a contract to benefit another and can recover damages where the 
contract is not properly performed. 
A parallel can be drawn between contracts for the benefit of another and 
contracts conferring incidental benefits on third parties. Regarding the latter, 
completion of the contract results in a positive outcome for external parties, 
but the contracting parties do not intend for this incidental benefit to be 
enforceable on the part of the external parties or the contracting parties. This 
does not breach privity, because the external parties cannot enforce the 
incidental benefit.753 The benefit to the external party conferred under a 
contract for the benefit of another is intended to be enforceable by the party 
who contracts for the external party. However, this benefit is also, from the 
perspective of the external party, merely an incidental benefit. The external 
party cannot interfere in the operation of the contract, and it cannot claim 
damages for himself when the contract is not properly performed. The 
external party cannot therefore bypass privity to claim in respect of its 
incidental benefit. 
Contracts for the benefit of another are therefore compatible with the privity 
doctrine. However, the concept usefully highlights the scope and boundaries 
of privity in Scots law, by demonstrating that privity is not breached where a 
contracting party can enforce a term in a contract in favour of an external 
party. In contrast, third party rights are an exception to privity because the 
third party can enforce the right in its own name. Privity permits the 
contracting parties to create an enforceable contractual obligation involving 
                                                          
752 Burrows, Restatement (n 33) §46.  
753 See also subsection 2.2.2.  
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performance in favour of an external party, provided that the external party 
can enforce this obligation only if it is the recipient of a third party right.  
There is a general rule in Scots and English law that damages cannot be 
recovered in respect of a loss which falls on a third party.754 This reflects that 
damages are compensatory.755 The rule can be distinguished from the privity 
doctrine: privity excludes third parties from receiving enforceable benefits 
under the contract and from being burdened under the contract, whereas the 
‘third party loss’ rule prevents the contracting parties from recovering losses 
which they do not suffer. The two rules are, however, obviously closely 
related, because they both reflect the general principle that contracts should 
not concern external parties.756   
Whilst contracts for the benefit of another do not contravene privity, a 
secondary consideration is whether the concept is an exception to the rule 
that a contracting party can recover only for its own losses. This matter is 
relatively clear-cut in the context of financial loss. If, for example, a person 
books a holiday for four people, it can recover the full value of the holiday, 
rather than simply a quarter of the price. The financial value of the holiday is 
impacted by the number of people for whom the booking was made, in terms 
of the number of hotel rooms, flights, etc. The person who concludes the 
contract and has paid for the holiday is clearly the person who is ‘out of 
pocket’, and the financial loss falls entirely on the person who paid for the 
holiday. Where the person who made the contract receives damages in 
                                                          
754 Albacruz (Cargo Owners) Respondents v Albazero (Owners) Appeallants - The Albazero 
[1977] AC 774 at 846 per Lord Diplock; Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge 
Disposals Ltd; St Martin’s Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1994] 
1 AC 85 at 114 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. See also B Coote, “The Performance Interest, 
Panatown, and the Problem of Loss” 2001 117(Jan) Law Quarterly Review 81 at 81; GH 
Treitel, “Damages in respect of a third party’s loss” 1998 114(Oct) Law Quarterly Review 527 
at 527.    
755 In other words, a party should not be able to recover compensation when it itself has not 
suffered a loss. See Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey Construction U.K. Ltd 
[1980] 1 WLR 277 at 291 per Lord Salmon. 
756 See J Cartwright, “Damages, Third Parties, and Common Sense” 1996 10(3) Journal of 
Contract Law 244 at 244-245 and A Burrows, “No Damages for a Third Party’s Loss” 2001 
1(1) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 107 at 107-108. 
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respect of all or part of its monetary value, they are therefore recovering their 
own financial loss.  
In cases in which the contracting party is permitted to recover damages for 
solatium, as in Jackson v Horizon Holidays757 and the similar cases 
discussed above, it is less clear that the contracting party is recovering its 
loss only. If a person has booked a holiday for four people and suffers a 
breach of contract, it does not suffer four times as much disappointment as a 
person who booked a solo trip. Rather, the disappointment is felt by each of 
the group individually. The emotional impact of the loss of enjoyment of a 
holiday cannot realistically be said to fall solely on the contracting party. The 
House of Lords, as noted above, determined that Jackson758 applies only 
where the contracting party’s disappointment is worsened because of its 
friends’ or family’s distress. It could therefore be argued that the contracting 
party is simply recovering additional damages for its own disappointment. 
However, the contracting party’s disappointment at the failure to deliver the 
joint experience for which it had contracted cannot be conflated with the 
disappointment suffered by the external parties themselves. In Jackson,759 
Lord Denning expressly explained that the sum awarded encompassed 
damages in respect of the wife and children’s disappointment.760 The fact 
that the damages were awarded in respect of the distress of those parties, 
rather than the added distress suffered by Mr Jackson, demonstrates that the 
contracting party was permitted to recover damages on behalf of others. 
Whilst contracts for the benefit of another are, therefore, an exception to the 
rule that a contracting party cannot recover another’s losses, the implications 
of this are unfortunately outwith the scope of the thesis.761  
 
                                                          
757 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
758 Ibid. 
759 Ibid. 
760 Ibid. at 1473 per Lord Denning.  
761 The potential for further research on this point is discussed at subsection 11.3.  
154 
 
6.3.3. Compatibility of contracts for the benefit of another with contract 
theory 
Whilst contracts for the benefit of another differ from third party rights in that 
they do not constitute an exception to privity, both concepts are compatible 
with contract theory on the grounds of contractual intention. As noted above, 
enforcement of the third party right (in the case of a third party right) and the 
benefit to the external party (in the case of a contract for the benefit of 
another) depends on the intentions of the contracting parties.762 
Contracts for the benefit of another are therefore easily framed in terms of 
voluntary obligations, because they involve benefits conferred on easily 
recognisable external parties whom both contracting parties agree should 
benefit from contractual performance. Additionally, the contracting parties 
agree that the party who contracts for the external party’s benefit can recover 
damages in respect of defective contractual performance. Liability in respect 
of the external party’s loss reflects the will of both contracting parties. This is 
compatible with will theory. It can also be said that the contracting parties 
have voluntarily assumed responsibility for the external party, in accordance 
with the assumption theory.  
In terms of the promissory theory, Brownsword and Hutchison explain that 
this theory can account for situations involving both ‘direct’ promises to third 
parties (in which contracting party A promises contracting party B that it will 
confer a benefit on third party C, and A promises C that it will confer a benefit 
on C) and ‘indirect’ promises (A promises B that it will benefit C, but does not 
make such a promise to C).763 The ‘direct’ promises appear to describe third 
party rights, and the ‘indirect’ promises cohere with the Scots and English 
understanding of contracts for the benefit of another. The latter could be 
explained in terms of promissory theory because the promise made by one 
contracting party to perform in favour of the external party is upheld. In other 
words, the obligation to confer a benefit on the external party could be 
                                                          
762 See subsections 6.3.1 and 3.2.2.1-2.   
763 Brownsword and Hutchison (n 307) at 130.   
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framed as a promise made by the relevant contracting party to the party who 
made the contract for the external party. 
In summary, contracts for the benefit of another are compatible with contract 
theory on the same grounds as third party rights:764 both concepts uphold 
contractual intention.  
6.3.4. Contracts for the benefit of another and delict 
According to Hodgson, Jackson v Horizon Holidays765 is a contractual 
anomaly which ought to have been decided according to the law of tort.766 
However, he bases this argument on the privity doctrine, arguing that privity 
prevents enforceable rights on the part of third parties. Hodgson was correct, 
at the time his article was published, that privity in English law prevented third 
party claims.767 However, it has been demonstrated in this chapter that the 
concept does not breach the privity doctrine. It is possible to frame contracts 
for the benefit of another in terms of voluntary obligations, and the concept 
need not be examined in terms of delictual liability.  
It is noted that contracts for the benefit of another can be distinguished from 
the disappointed beneficiary cases considered in chapter 4.768 In those 
cases, the relevant parties (the solicitor and the testator) did not intend to 
confer a benefit on the third party which was enforceable on the part of one 
of the contracting parties.  
6.3.5. Policy considerations justifying contracts for the benefit of 
another  
As discussed in chapter 5, third party rights reflect a policy aim of contractual 
efficiency.769 Contracts for the benefit of another can also be justified on this 
                                                          
764 Third party rights are compatible with contract theory because they arise in accordance 
with the intentions of the contracting parties: subsections 3.2.2.1-2.   
765 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
766 J Hodgson, “Jackson v Horizon Holidays - a case of mistaken identity?” 1992 1 
Nottingham Law Journal 27 at 29 and 34-35.  
767 Hodgson wrote the relevant article prior to the passage of the Contracts (Rights of Third 
Parties) Act 1999.  
768 See subsection 4.2.3.4.  
769 This is discussed in subsection 5.2.9.  
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basis. The concept allows for the contracting party to transact once for all 
relevant parties, and for the benefits of the contract and right of redress to 
accrue to it in respect of all the parties for whom the contract was made. This 
is more efficient than requiring separate transactions in respect of each party 
whom the contracting party wishes to benefit. Both third party rights and 
contracts for the benefit of another therefore offer an efficient means of 
contracting to both commercial parties and those operating outwith the 
course of business. The two concepts also reflect a policy aim of ensuring 
that the intentions of contracting parties are upheld.770 
The policy aim of protecting external parties does not apply where the 
contracting party recovers its own financial loss. However, contracts for the 
benefit of another permit recovery of loss for another’s distress and 
disappointment, demonstrating a policy consideration of protecting external 
parties from this type of loss. For example, the clear policy objective behind 
the Package Travel and Linked Travel Arrangements Regulations 2018 is the 
protection of consumer holiday-makers, including those for whom package 
holiday contracts are concluded.771 The other situations outwith the context of 
holidays identified by Lord Denning, to which the doctrine of contracts for the 
benefit of another may apply (for example, a substandard meal booked by 
one person on behalf of a group) may not involve the same level of 
disappointment as a ruined holiday. However, the underlying principle is the 
same: where a contract made by one person on behalf of one or more others 
is defectively performed, the contract-maker ought to be able to recover 
damages in respect of disappointment and distress. This indicates a policy 
consideration of protecting external parties from distress and disappointment 
suffered due to defective performance of a contract. 
The concept also reflects a policy aim of encouraging efficient means of 
protecting external parties more generally. This chapter has mentioned the 
examples of a man who contracts with a builder for repairs to his uncle’s 
                                                          
770 See above at subsection 6.3.1. 
771 See the discussion on the Regulations in subsection 5.2.8. 
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home, and parents who make a child support agreement providing for their 
child.772 In both cases, the external party is unable to enforce a contractual 
obligation in its own right. Contracts for the benefit of another allow for their 
protection without requiring, in these examples, the nephew to obtain a 
power of attorney when he might wish to simply provide financial assistance 
to his uncle, and for a parent to enforce the agreement without proceeding 
with an action in the child’s name. As such, contracts for the benefit of 
another are a useful mechanism for adults with incapacity, children, and 
other vulnerable parties.  
As discussed above, it is not entirely clear that Scots law would allow 
recovery for damages for distress and disappointment suffered by an 
external party.773 In future cases, however, Scots law may follow Jackson v 
Horizon Holidays774 and uphold claims for distress and disappointment 
suffered by external parties, in order to recognise this policy aim.  
There is a lack of clarity in Scots and English law as to whether the 
contracting party who claims on behalf of the third party must account to the 
third party for the losses recovered. None of the cases discuss a duty on the 
part of the contracting party to return a portion of the damages recovered to 
the party who suffered the loss. In familial situations, such as Jackson v 
Horizon Holidays,775 this issue would generally not be controversial. It is likely 
that a person who recovers damages on behalf of their family would 
distribute the damages to its relevant family members. However, issues may 
arise where the contracting party recovers on behalf of friends or colleagues. 
The contracting party may have been reimbursed proportionally by each 
person for whom the contract was made (for example, each of their travel 
companions paid their portion of the fares directly to the contracting party). If 
the person who made the contract receives a sum of damages in respect of 
the ruined holiday, the damages should surely be returned, on a proportional 
                                                          
772 See subsection 6.3.1. 
773 See subsection 6.2.2. 




basis, to the external parties. In light of the fact that the distribution of 
damages may not be problematic in all situations (particularly in familial 
contexts), it is submitted that the person who has made the contract should 
not automatically be required to proportionally distribute the damages. 
However, where a third party does not receive damages in respect of their 
loss from the contracting party, they should be able to claim this from the 
contracting party. The person who makes the claim can be treated as acting 
as an agent on behalf of those who suffered the loss. It is not required in 
Scots law that the agent and principal conclude a formal agency contract, 
and Scots law permits an agent to simultaneously conclude a contract on 
behalf of its principal and itself.776 
Contracts for the benefit of another can also be said to support a policy 
consideration of ensuring that loss caused by breach of contract is 
recoverable. Recovery of damages for disappointment suffered by external 
parties in cases such as Jackson777 ensures that the contracting party in 
breach is held accountable for the extent of loss caused by their failure to 
fulfil their contractual obligations. Where the contracting party has agreed to 
provide a benefit to parties on whose behalf the contract is made, recovery of 
damages for the impact of defective performance on external parties ensures 
that the obligation to perform in favour of the external party is upheld. This in 
turn ensures that the loss caused by the breach of contract is recoverable.  
These considerations are not required to justify contracts for the benefit of 
another as an exception to privity, because they do not breach the doctrine. 
However, these policy justifications could potentially be used to explain the 
concept’s deviation from the rule against recovery of another’s losses.  
6.4. Concluding remarks    
In this chapter, it has been shown that contracts for the benefit of another are 
a passive form of third party rights, although the concept should be 
distinguished from third party rights on the basis that the contracting parties 
                                                          
776 See subsection 9.2.1. and section 8.3.  
777 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468.  
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do not intend for the external party to have an enforceable benefit. Contracts 
for the benefit of another are not an exception to the privity doctrine, and are 
compatible with Scots contract theory on the same grounds as third party 
rights. Further, contracts for the benefit of another are supported by sound 
policy considerations: contractual efficiency, upholding contractual intention, 
ensuring recovery for loss caused by breach of contract, and protecting 
external parties.  
The concept of contracts for the benefit of another is wider in English law 
than Scots law, in that English law permits the recovery of damages for 
distress and disappointment suffered by external parties. Scots law should 
follow Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd778 in recognising the general principle 
that contracting parties can recover damages accounting for distress and 
disappointment as well as financial and physical loss. In both Scots and 
English law, the law should be clarified to ensure that an external party can 
claim damages recovered on its behalf from the contracting party.  
 
  
                                                          






Chapter 7: Transferred loss 
7.1. Overview of chapter 7 
This chapter defines transferred loss and summarises its development in 
Scots and English law. It then addresses whether transferred loss is 
compatible with Scots contract and delict law, whether there are sound policy 
considerations supporting its existence in Scots law, and whether it should 
continue to be recognised in Scots law.  
7.2. Transferred loss in Scots and English law  
This section discusses the development of transferred loss in both Scots and 
English law, because the case law in the two jurisdictions is closely 
intertwined. Firstly, transferred loss is defined. The following subsections 
then focus on three contentious issues in the development of the transferred 
loss doctrine: whether the loss falls on the contracting party or the third party; 
the role of contractual intention; whether a transferred loss claim must be a 
‘last resort’; and whether the contracting party or the third party should be 
able to claim in respect of the loss.  
7.2.1. Definition of transferred loss 
Where loss results from a breach of a contract between A and B, but the loss 
has somehow (wholly or partly) ‘transferred’ to C, there is a legal ‘black hole’. 
The transferred loss doctrine attempts to resolve these black holes by 
allowing contracting party A to advance a claim against B in respect of C’s 
loss.779 In the English House of Lords case of Panatown Ltd v Alfred 
McAlpine Construction Ltd,780 for example, McAlpine was employed by 
Panatown to build on land owned by UIPL. The work was defective. Although 
                                                          
779 McLaren Murdoch & Hamilton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group 2003 SCLR 323 at 
para 33 per Lord Drummond Young; J Dykes Ltd. v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd. 1982 
SC (HL) 157 at 166 per Lord Stewart; Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v Michael 
Craig [2015] CSOH 4 at para 29 per Lord Doherty; The Most Honourable Alexander George 
Gordon, Marquess of Aberdeen and Temair v Messrs Turcan Connell 2008 [CSOH] 183 at 
para 45 per Lady Smith; Jackson, SME (n 495) para 158; Hogg, Obligations (n 433) 3.174; J 
Thomson, “Restitutionary and performance damages” 2001 8 Scots Law Times (News) 71 at 
73-74.   
780 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518.  
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Panatown did not suffer loss, the company sought to recover UIPL’s 
expenses incurred in repairing the building.  
C cannot, under the laws on transferred loss, recover damages on its own 
behalf. Rather, A must sue on C’s behalf, and transfer any damages 
recovered to C.781 The term ‘legal black hole’ was first used in Scotland by 
Lord Stewart in J. Dykes Ltd. v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd.782 
7.2.2. The party on whom the loss falls 
The relationship between transferred loss and the rule against recovery of 
another’s loss783 is relevant to the question of whether transferred loss 
contravenes the privity doctrine.784 Whilst privity prevents the external party 
from accruing contractual rights under the contract, and the external party in 
transferred loss situations does not claim in its own right, the fact that the 
third party’s loss is recoverable may indicate that transferred loss operates as 
a functional equivalent of an exception to privity. This subsection addresses 
the question of the party on whom the loss falls.  
In both jurisdictions, transferred loss is viewed as an exception to the rule 
that a contracting party generally cannot recover for a third party’s loss.785 
The initial Scots case from which the transferred loss doctrine can be 
sourced is Dunlop v Lambert.786 The House of Lords held that where goods 
are lost at sea, a consignor can recover substantial damages even where the 
goods, when they are lost, are the property of the consignee. The case has 
                                                          
781 McLaren Murdoch & Hamilton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group 2003 SCLR 323 at 
para 42 per Lord Drummond Young; J Dykes Ltd. v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd. 1982 
SC (HL) 157 at 177 per Lord Keith of Kinkel; The Most Honourable Alexander George 
Gordon, Marquess of Aberdeen and Temair v Messrs Turcan Connell 2008 [CSOH] 183 at 
para 46 per Lady Smith; Hogg, Obligations (n 433) 3.188.   
782 J Dykes Ltd. v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd 1982 SLT 50 at 54 per Lord Stewart. 
More detailed discussion of the various terminology used in transferred loss cases is found 
in N Davidson, “The law of black holes?” 2006 22(1) Professional Negligence 53 at 53-55.   
783 This rule is discussed in subsection 6.3.2.  
784 The relationship between transferred loss and privity is discussed further below at 
subsection 7.3.1.   
785 Mason (n 26) at 96. 
786 Dunlop v Lambert (1839) Macl. & R 663.  
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since been applied in situations where the consignee has neither title nor 
risk, and does not have a right of possession to the goods.787  
Dunlop v Lambert788 was affirmed by the House of Lords in The Albazero,789 
which also concerned the carriage of goods. The Dunlop exception was 
modified in The Albazero790 to the extent that it ought not to apply to 
contracts which expressly state or imply that the carrier will enter into a 
separate contract (for example, a bill of lading) with the future owner.791 Lord 
Diplock’s speech emphasised that the parties must have contemplated that 
the breach will affect a third party rather than the party which has the 
contractual right of recovery.792 Where the exception applied, the parties 
were accordingly “treated in law” as having entered into a contract “for the 
benefit of all persons who have or may acquire an interest in the goods 
before they are lost or damaged”.793  
The rule developed in Dunlop v Lambert794 and The Albazero795 was initially 
recognised only in the context of carriage of goods. It was later applied to 
building contracts in the House of Lords case of Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v 
Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd; St Martin’s Property Corporation Ltd v Sir 
                                                          
787 B Coote, “More light on Dunlop v. Lambert” 1988 57(2) Cambridge Law Journal 250 at 
250. See also C Mackenzie, The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia: Carriage: 
Carriage by Sea (Reissue) (hereafter “SME”), (LexisNexis/ Law Society of Scotland, London/ 
Edinburgh, 2002) para 42. 
788 Dunlop v Lambert (1839) Macl. & R 663.  
789 Albacruz (Cargo Owners) Respondents v Albazero (Owners) Appeallants - The Albazero 
[1977] AC 774. 
790 Ibid. 
791 Ibid. at 823 per Ormrod LJ.  
792 Ibid. at 847 per Lord Diplock.  
793 Ibid.  
794 Dunlop v (1839) Macl. & R 663.  
795 Albacruz (Cargo Owners) Respondents v Albazero (Owners) Appeallants - The Albazero 
[1977] AC 774. 
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Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd796 and by the Court of Appeal in Darlington BC v 
Wiltshier Northern Ltd.797 
In St Martin’s Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd,798 
Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd799 and GUS Property Management 
Ltd v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd,800 the contracting parties were 
granted substantial damages for cost of repair in respect of losses suffered 
by third parties. In St Martin’s Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine 
& Sons Ltd,801 the House of Lords offered two possible grounds for the award 
of substantial damages: the so-called ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ grounds. 
According to the narrow ground, the loss falls on the third party, and the 
contracting party recovers on the third party’s behalf.802 In contrast, the broad 
ground provides that the loss ultimately falls on the contracting party, who 
recovers for its own loss.803  
Judicial opinion diverges on whether the broad or narrow ground is the 
correct basis for the award of damages. The broad ground was first put 
forward by Lord Griffiths in St Martin’s Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert 
McAlpine & Sons Ltd.804 The narrow ground was adopted and applied by the 
majorities in Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd805 and Panatown Ltd v 
                                                          
796 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd; St Martin’s Property 
Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 at 115 per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson. 
797 Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 68. For further discussion see M 
Furmston, “Damages for loss suffered by someone else” 1996 6(6) Construction Law 201; 
Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd; St Martin’s Property Corporation 
Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 at 115 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.  
798 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd; St Martin’s Property 
Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85.  
799 Ibid. at 115 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 1 
WLR 68.  
800 GUS Property Management Ltd v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd 1982 SC (HL) 157. In 
the case, the stated reason for the third party’s lack of title to sue was that it was not the 
owner of the relevant property. 
801 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd; St Martin’s Property 
Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85.  
802 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518 at 529 and 535 per 
Lord Clyde.   
803 Ibid. at 543-546 per Lord Goff of Chievely and at 586-592 per Lord Millet.  
804 St Martin’s Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85. 
805 Ibid.; Darlington BC v Wiltshier Northern Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 68. 
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Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd.806 In Panatown,807 the majority favoured 
the narrow ground, but Lords Goff of Chieveley and Millet’s dissenting 
speeches indicated agreement with Lord Griffith’s broad ground.808 The 
broad ground has found favour with some academic commentators,809 and 
the performance interest has been recognised in various cases.810  
The broad ground was rejected in both St Martin’s Property Corporation Ltd v 
Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd811 and Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine 
Construction Ltd812 because a breach of contract does not constitute loss in 
and of itself, and the loss was consequently viewed as falling on the third 
party.813 Lord Clyde, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle and Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
upheld the narrow ground as defined in St Martin’s Property Corporation Ltd 
v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd.814 In a recent Supreme Court case, the 
court, hearing an English appeal, discussed the transferred doctrine but 
refrained from clarifying whether the narrow or broad ground was correct.815 
In Scots law, the concept of a damages ‘black hole’ was expressly accepted 
in the Outer House case of McLaren Murdoch & Hamilton Ltd v The 
Abercromby Motor Group.816 Lord Drummond Young’s recognition of the 
                                                          
806 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518.  
807 Ibid.  
808 Ibid. at 543-546 per Lord Goff of Chievely and at 586-592 per Lord Millet. See further the 
analysis in G Hawkes, “Emerging From a Black Hole” 2003 38 Scots Law Times 285 at 285. 
809 Thomson (n 779); IND Wallace, “Third party damages: no legal black hole?” 1999 
115(Jul) Law Quarterly Review 394; Coote, Assumption II (n 318) 50-51.  
810 Earlier cases recognising the performance interest include: Woodar Investment 
Development Ltd. v Wimpey Construction U.K. Ltd. [1980] 1 WLR 277; Jackson v Horizon 
Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468; Radford v De Froberville [1977] 1 WLR 1262; and Ruxley 
Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC 344.  
811 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd; St Martin’s Property 
Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85.  
812 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518. See also Hawkes (n 
808) at 285.  
813 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518 at 533-534 per Lord 
Clyde.  
814 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd; St Martin’s Property 
Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85. 
815 Swynson Ltd v Lowick Rose LLP [2017] UKSC 32 at para 17 per Lord Sumption and 
paras 53-54 per Lord Mance. The case was not decided on the basis of transferred loss.  
816 McLaren Murdoch & Hamilton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group 2003 SCLR 323.  
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doctrine in that case has been affirmed in subsequent cases.817 His 
acceptance of transferred loss in McLaren Murdoch818 was based on the 
English House of Lords case of Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction 
Ltd,819 which Lord Drummond Young describes as “wholly consistent with 
principles of Scots law.”820 He rejected the broad ground on the basis that a 
contracting party cannot seek substantial damages where it has not suffered 
a loss.821 The transferred loss claim is consistently referred to as a 
“Panatown claim” in Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v Michael 
Craig,822 demonstrating that Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction 
Ltd 823 remains the leading case in both Scots and English law.  
The narrow ground is therefore dominant in Scots law. English judicial 
opinion is more mixed, and so the question of whether the loss falls on the 
contracting party or the third party is not settled in English law.  
7.2.3. The role of contractual intention  
Following Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v Michael Craig,824 it is 
unclear whether the transferred loss doctrine operates in accordance with the 
intentions of the contracting parties in Scots law. In the case, Lord Doherty 
states that the transferred loss doctrine provides that the law ought to permit 
redress despite the absence of privity where it can be ascertained from the 
“imputed intention of the contracting parties” that the contract should benefit 
the third party.825 Lord Doherty indicates that intention on the part of the 
                                                          
817 The Most Honourable Alexander George Gordon, Marquess of Aberdeen and Temair v 
Messrs Turcan Connell 2008 [CSOH] 183 at para 45 per Lady Smith; Axon Well Intervention 
Products Holdings v Michael Craig [2015] CSOH 4 at para 29 per Lord Doherty. 
818 McLaren Murdoch & Hamilton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group 2003 SCLR 323. 
819 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518. See Hawkes (n 793) 
at 285.  
820 McLaren Murdoch & Hamilton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group 2003 SCLR 323 at 
para 42 per Lord Drummond Young. See also Thomson (n 779).  
821 McLaren Murdoch & Hamilton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group 2003 SCLR 323 at 
paras 40-41 per Lord Drummond Young.  
822 See, for example, Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v Michael Craig [2015] 
CSOH 4 at para 25 per Lord Doherty. 
823 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518.  
824 Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v Michael Craig [2015] CSOH 4. 
825 Ibid. at para 45 per Lord Doherty. The interaction between transferred loss and the privity 
doctrine is discussed below at subsection 7.3.1.  
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contracting parties that the third party’s loss is recoverable can be express or 
implied.826 However, this appears to contradict Lord Drummond Young827 and 
Lady Smith’s828 previous judgments, in which they comment that damages in 
‘black hole’ cases are conferred as a matter of general legal policy regardless 
of the intentions of the contracting parties.829 
At the Court of Appeal stage in Alfred McAlpine v Panatown830 the court took 
a ‘contract-based approach’. It was found that a claim for damages in respect 
of a third party’s loss ought to be successful where the contracting parties 
intended or contemplated that the contracting party not in breach should 
have the right to make such a claim.831 However, this was subject to 
academic criticism,832 and English case law now recognises contractual 
intention is not necessary for the transferred loss doctrine to apply. For 
example, Lord Clyde states in Panatown833 in the House of Lords that 
transferred loss cannot be based on the contracting parties’ intentions 
because they “may in reality not have applied their minds to the point” of 
whether the plaintiff contracting party should be able to recover for losses 
sustained by third parties.834 
                                                          
826 Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v Michael Craig [2015] CSOH 4 at para 45 per 
Lord Doherty.  
827 McLaren Murdoch & Hamilton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group 2003 SCLR 323 at 
para 42 per Lord Drummond Young.  
828 The Most Honourable Alexander George Gordon, Marquess of Aberdeen and Temair v 
Messrs Turcan Connell 2008 [CSOH] 183 at para 45 per Lady Smith.  
829 See also Hogg, Obligations (n 433) 3.188. The contradiction between Lord Doherty’s 
judgment and earlier Scots cases on transferred loss is discussed in L MacFarlane, “Black 
Holes and Revelations on the Transferred Loss Doctrine” 2015 19(3) Edinburgh Law Review 
388.   
830 Alfred McAlpine v Panatown [1998] CLC 636. 
831 Ibid. per Evans LJ. For discussion see Treitel (n 754) at 530 and Coote (n 787) at 251. 
832 Treitel (n 754) at 530-532. Treitel states that such an approach offers an “unhelpful” 
general principle which can only be applied following construction of the contract, and argues 
that this is not in coherence with cases which have previously upheld the general rule that 
one may not recover damages for breach of contract in respect of another’s losses (such as 
Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58; White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207; and Carr-Glynn v 
Frearsons [1997] 2 All ER 614).  
833 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518.  
834 Ibid. at 530 per Lord Clyde.   
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In one Scots case, Clark Contracts Limited v The Burrell Company 
Construction Management Limited (No 2),835 Sheriff Taylor submitted that 
‘black-hole’ cases could in Scots law be resolved by imposition of a jus 
quaesitum tertio. This was however dismissed in McLaren Murdoch & 
Hamilton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group.836 Lord Drummond Young 
noted that, for a third party right to apply, the contracting parties must intend 
to benefit the external party in question, and this is not the case in transferred 
loss situations.837 This is reflected in recent comment from the Scottish Law 
Commission (‘SLC’). Their recent Discussion Paper on Remedies for Breach 
of Contract recognises that third party rights may provide a solution where 
the contracting parties objectively intend to provide an enforceable right for 
the party on whom the loss falls.838 However, the SLC’s Report on Third 
Party Rights states that transferred loss operates in cases in which third party 
rights could not apply.839 ‘Black hole’ situations can arise where the 
contracting parties do not intend for the party who suffers the loss to have an 
enforceable remedy,840 whereas a third party right is conferred only where 
the contracting parties so intend. Transferred loss is therefore distinct from 
third party rights in Scots and English law.  The fact that transferred loss can 
apply where the contracting parties could have conferred a third party right 
enforces the fact that transferred loss does not operate according to the 
parties’ intentions. If they intended to benefit the third party, they could have 
done so by conferring a third party right. They chose not to do so, but the law 
nevertheless imposes a means of recovering the third party’s loss.  
                                                          
835 Clark Contracts Limited v The Burrell Company Construction Management Limited (No 2) 
2002 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 73. Unberath has made similar comment regarding English law: H 
Unberath, “Third party losses and black holes: another view” 1999 115(Jul) Law Quarterly 
Review 535 at 536-537.  
836 McLaren Murdoch & Hamilton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group 2003 SCLR 323. 
837 Ibid. at para 39 per Lord Drummond Young.  
838 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Remedies for Breach of Contract (Scot 
Law Com DP No 109, 1999) 9.5.  
839 Report on Third Party Rights (n 241) 6.16. 
840 Ibid. 1.22 and 6.16. This is discussed further below at subsection 7.3.2. 
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The consensus in both Scots and English law is therefore that intention on 
the part of the contracting parties that third party losses are recoverable is 
not required to apply the transferred loss doctrine.  
7.2.4. Transferred loss as a ‘last resort’ 
The transferred loss doctrine is a ‘gap filler’ in Scots law. According to Lord 
Drummond Young, it does not apply where the third party has other means of 
redress.841 Transferred loss is also viewed as a last resort in English law. For 
example, Lord Clyde recognises in Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine 
Construction Ltd 842 that third party rights and agency are not always a fruitful 
means of redress in situations where a party suffers extra-contractual loss, 
and indicates that this was a factor in the justification for the development of 
the transferred loss doctrine.843  
However, it is not clear when exactly it can be said that the third party has no 
other means of redress and is therefore able to rely on a transferred loss 
claim. In Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd,844 the transferred 
loss claim was unsuccessful because the third party had a right of action 
against the party in breach under a duty of care deed (‘DCD’) to which it was 
party.845 Coote notes that the contract between the contracting parties would 
offer the third party a far higher level of protection than the DCD if the third 
party could claim under the contract, raising the question of how great the 
difference in protection of the contracting parties and third party must be 
before transferred loss no longer applies.846  
                                                          
841 McLaren Murdoch & Hamilton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group 2003 SCLR 323 at 
para 42 per Lord Drummond Young; Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v Michael 
Craig [2015] CSOH 4 at para 30 per Lord Doherty. See also MacQueen, SME (n 69) para 
863.   
842 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518. 
843 Ibid. at 523 per Lord Clyde. See also Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge 
Disposals Ltd; St Martin’s Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1994] 
1 AC 85 at 115 per Lord Brown-Wilkinson and Coote (n 741) at 88-89.  
844 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518. 
845 Ibid. at 531 per Lord Clyde; at 558 per Lord Goff of Chieveley; at 574 per Lord Jauncey of 
Tullichettle; at 577-8 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; and at 582 per Lord Millet.  
846 Coote (n 754) at 88.  
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In Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v Michael Craig,847 the defender 
claimed that the third party in question had other non-contractual direct 
means of redress to recover the loss. Namely, it could make a delictual claim 
based on the defender causing unlawful loss,848 or a claim based on the fact 
that the defender had acted as a de facto director of the third party company 
and consequently owed it a fiduciary duty of care.849 Lord Doherty recognised 
that where the contracting parties:  
“provide for or contemplate the third party being given a distinct 
entitlement directly to sue a defender, the parties are likely to be taken 
to have intended to have excluded the option of a Panatown claim 
being made.”850  
He stressed that, in some circumstances, a non-contractual remedy may 
therefore exclude a transferred loss claim.851 However, Lord Doherty also 
comments that, in situations where the contracting parties have made no 
provision for the third party, or have not contemplated potential remedies for 
the third party, a non-contractual remedy must provide “equivalent means of 
redress and equivalent prospects of success to an action for damages for 
breach of contract” in order to exclude a transferred loss claim.852 He 
considered that the third party would achieve a more satisfactory means of 
redress through transferred loss than the suggested non-contractual 
methods, because the latter would present the company with “greater 
difficulty and uncertainty”.853 This view was based on the fact that it would 
prove challenging to show that the defender was acting as a de facto director 
of FZE.854 Further, a delictual claim, unlike a contractual Panatown claim, 
would not be based on strict liability.855 Lord Doherty’s reference to 
                                                          
847 Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v Michael Craig [2015] CSOH 4.  
848 Ibid. at para 12 per Lord Doherty. 
849 Ibid. at para 14 per Lord Doherty. 
850 Ibid. at para 38 per Lord Doherty, citing Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd 
[2001] 1 AC 518 at 530, 531-532, and 536 per Lord Clyde; 567-568 per Lord Jauncey of 
Tullichettle; 576-577 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; and 582-583 per Lord Millet. 
851 Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v Michael Craig [2015] CSOH 4 at para 42 per 
Lord Doherty. 
852 Ibid. 
853 Ibid. at para 45 per Lord Doherty. 
854 Ibid. at para 36 per Lord Doherty. 
855 Ibid. at para 45 per Lord Doherty. 
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‘equivalent’ remedies is striking. This contrasts with Lord Drummond Young’s 
view of transferred loss as a remedy of last resort.856  
It is therefore accepted in Scots and English law that transferred loss ought 
to be used as a last resort, where the third party does not have another 
means of recovering the loss. However, the scope of this principle is unclear 
and appears to be in the process of development. The question of when the 
third party cannot be said to have an alternative means of redress is not yet 
settled given Lord Doherty’s recent judgment.   
7.2.5. The party who can recover the loss 
As noted above, it is clear that the third party cannot recover its loss in its 
own name.857 This is, however, controversial. The Scottish Law Commission 
recently considered reform of the transferred loss doctrine.858 They found that 
consultees generally agreed with their view that it is preferable for the third 
party to have a direct claim against the contracting party responsible for the 
loss.859 However, it was concluded that the recommendations in their Report 
could not encompass:  
“a satisfactory solution to the difficulties raised by [the third party’s] 
present inability to recover transferred loss directly without much 
further investigation of the various commercial and other contexts in 
which the issue may arise.”860  
They have not therefore made any recommendations as to reform of the 
doctrine, but have identified the need for further research.861 
Hawkes notes that families and companies in the same group “might have no 
hesitation in doing the decent thing” in terms of handing over damages 
recovered in respect of third party loss, but he questions the practical 
implications of allowing the contracting party to recover where its relationship 
                                                          
856 McLaren Murdoch v The Abercromby Motor Group 2003 SCLR 323 at para 42 per Lord 
Drummond Young.  
857 See above at subsection 7.2.1. 
858 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Review of Contract Law: Formation Interpretation, 
Remedies for Breach, and Penalty Clauses (Scot Law Com No 252, March 2018) ch 18.  
859 Ibid. 18.36-41.  
860 Ibid. 18.56.  
861 Ibid. 18.58. 
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with the third party is at arm’s length.862 He also questions what would 
happen if the contracting party were to become insolvent prior to transferring 
the damages to the third party: “are we forced into a constructive trust 
situation with all the difficulties that entails?”863 Sir Anthony Mason also notes 
that the third party is reliant on the promisee for damages to compensate for 
its loss.864 Unberath observes that the common interest identified in the 
majority of transferred loss cases merely evidences why the contracting party 
with title to sue is willing to pursue the action on the part of the third party.865 
It is not satisfactory to allow the right of action as a matter of happenstance, 
when the interests of the contracting party and third party align – particularly 
as such a situation is likely to occur where both are commercial parties, and 
transferred loss situations may clearly arise where the third party is in a much 
weaker position.866 It is clearly more practicable for the third party to have the 
ability to recover its own loss. The transferred loss doctrine can hardly be 
said to solve the problem of ‘black holes’ if the third party’s recovery is 
dependent on the goodwill of the contracting party. It is thus submitted that 
the doctrine should be reformed to permit the external party to recover in its 
losses in its own name. This would ensure that the transferred loss doctrine 
is logically coherent, and results in consistent outcomes.  
7.3. Compatibility of transferred loss with Scots law  
This section considers whether transferred loss is compatible with privity, 
contract theory, and delict, and whether there are justifiable policy 
considerations in support of the concept.  
 
                                                          
862 Hawkes (n 808) at 286.  
863 Ibid. The difficulties of constructive trusts in Scots law are discussed in GL Gretton, 
“Constructive Trusts: I” 1997 1(3) Edinburgh Law Review 281 and GL Gretton, “Constructive 
Trusts: II” 1997 1(4) Edinburgh Law Review 408. See also Coote, Assumption II (n 318) 42, 
in which Coote also briefly rules out an agency analysis of transferred loss.  
864 Mason (n 27) at 96.   
865 Unberath (n 835) at 540.  




7.3.1. Compatibility of transferred loss with the privity doctrine  
There are two approaches to the recovery of loss using the transferred loss 
doctrine. According to the narrow ground, the contracting party claims 
against the party in breach and recovers damages for the loss suffered by 
the third party on the third party’s behalf.867 The broad ground provides that 
loss caused by breach of contract falls on the contracting party, who recovers 
damages in respect of defective performance on its own behalf.  As noted 
above, the narrow ground is firmly accepted in Scots law, whereas English 
judicial opinion is less clear.868 Subsection 7.3.1. further discusses whether 
the broad or narrow ground is preferable in terms of policy and pragmatic 
considerations. It then assesses the implications of both grounds for the 
compatibility of transferred loss with the privity doctrine.   
7.3.1.1. The broad and narrow grounds: policy and pragmatic 
reasoning 
Wallace favours the broad ground because there is “ample authority” against 
allowing a third party to recover for losses stemming from breach of 
obligations for which it has provided no consideration, whereas the 
contracting party will have done so.869 However, consideration is not a 
requirement in Scots contract law.870 Further, the Scots and English laws on 
third party rights do not impose a requirement that the third party must have 
paid consideration to the contracting party due to perform in its favour.871 
Consideration is not therefore a convincing argument for the broad ground.  
Others feel that the broad ground should be recognised because it gives 
effect to the contracting party’s performance interest,872 i.e. “the interest of a 
                                                          
867 See above at subsection 7.2.1.   
868 See above at subsection 7.2.2.  
869 Wallace (n 808) at 403. See also Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals 
Ltd; St Martin’s Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85 at 
112 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.  
870 See subsection 2.4.2.3., and in particular (n 203).  
871 The formation requirements of Scots and English third party rights are discussed at 
subsections 3.2.2.1. and 3.2.2.2. respectively.  
872 Coote (n 754) at 82.  
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promisee in obtaining performance”.873 Lord Griffiths argues that the loss falls 
on the contracting party because it must, following the breach, make 
payment in order to gain the benefit of the contract (by meeting the cost of 
repair and by bringing the subject of the contract in line with its contractual 
standard).874 This is supported by a paragraph in Treitel’s Law of Contract, in 
which it is stated that the promisee recovers for the loss it sustains in 
ensuring that the third party receives its benefit.875 It is thought that various 
cases demonstrate authority for the recognition of the performance 
interest.876 Thomson submits that this is consistent with Scots law, in which 
“the importance of performance has long been recognised.”877 He argues that 
the primacy of the performance obligation in Scots contract law is evidenced 
by the weight given to specific implement, and the fact that damages are 
measured by the cost of alternative performance or the cure of defective 
performance where specific implement is impossible or refused.878 Coote 
submits that the alternative approach of allowing the promisee to recover 
only nominal damages “offends common sense, and that usually signals a 
fallacy somewhere in the reasoning.”879  
Whilst, in light of Thomson’s comments, it is clear that Scots law recognises 
the performance interest, a contracting party cannot generally recover 
damages where it has not suffered a loss.880 Recognition of the performance 
interest cannot therefore extend to awarding substantial damages where the 
loss falls on an external party, and so the performance interest could not 
justify the broad ground in Scots law. The analysis is also inadequate in 
                                                          
873 Coote, Contract as assumption (n 317) at 131. 
874 Alfred McAlpine v Panatown [1998] CLC 636; Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge 
Disposals Ltd; St Martin’s Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1994] 
1 AC 85 at 96-98 per Lord Griffiths.   
875 GH Treitel, The Law of Contract (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 9th edn 1995) 546. See also 
Coote (n 754) at 82-83; Unberath has stated that: “It is the contract, or at least a part of it, 
which is not being performed and that in itself ought to justify redress”: Unberath (n 835) at 
537.  
876 See, for example, Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC 344; 
Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518 at 590-91 per Lord Millett 
and at 546 per Lord Goff of Chieveley; and further discussion in Coote (n 754) at 83.  
877 Thomson (n 779) at 74. 
878 Ibid. at 72 (noting Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC 344).   
879 Coote (n 787) at 252.  
880 See subsections 5.4.2. and 6.3.2.   
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explaining transferred loss in English law. The function of transferred loss is 
to prevent damages ‘black holes’,881 which arise precisely because the third 
party suffers loss. There may be strong arguments for the recognition of the 
performance interest generally, but this does not resolve the fact that it is the 
third party, rather than the contracting party, who suffers loss. Giving effect to 
the performance interest recognises the interests of the contracting party, but 
the focus should be on the third party, because it is the party on whom the 
loss caused by defective performance falls. Additionally, a contracting party 
need not ‘make good’ the loss suffered by the third party unless it is 
contractually obliged to do so by the third party. As such, it cannot be said 
that the loss falls on the contracting party simply because it does not receive 
the performance due under the contract.     
Wallace notes that recovery under the broad ground can be extended only to 
defective or incomplete performance of contracts for the supply of work and 
materials, excluding forms of breach or loss arising due to “some affinity of 
interest” between the contracting party and the third party.882 For example, 
the extent of loss resulting from delay in performance will depend on the 
circumstances of the party affected.883 Similarly, Unberath notes that it is 
difficult to apply the broad ground in the recovery of consequential loss, 
because this is “not a necessary concomitant of the right to performance as 
such.”884 If the loss is treated as the contracting party’s, then the value of the 
loss recoverable must be calculated from the perspective of the contracting 
party. The broad ground does not permit the impact of the breach on the third 
party to be taken into account. Accordingly, an advantage of the narrow 
ground is that is allows a “more logical basis” 885 for the recovery of the actual 
loss suffered by the third party due to factors such as losses caused by 
delay.  
                                                          
881 This is discussed above at subsection 7.2.1. 
882 IND Wallace, “Defects and third parties: no peace for the wicked?” 1999 15(4) 
Construction Law Journal 245 at 260  
883 Ibid. at 261. 
884 Unberath (n 835) at 540; Coote (n 754) at 95.  
885 Wallace (n 882) at 261. See also Mason (n 26) at 95. 
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Wallace suggests that the narrow ground demands a restrictive and “non-
existent ‘contract basis’” for recovery of third party losses in situations where 
this will not have been contemplated, citing the example that a transfer of a 
development project to a different entity in the company group could not have 
been anticipated in the construction contract in St Martin’s.886 He further 
comments that allowing a contracting party to recover for a third party’s loss 
in ‘black hole’ situations “may open the floodgates in other areas of 
commerce to capricious or complicated damages claims of every kind.”887 
However, as is discussed further below,888 the operation of transferred loss 
does not depend on whether the contracting parties have contemplated the 
third party’s loss. Further, the ‘floodgates’ argument is difficult to justify given 
that the contracting party in breach will not suffer any additional liability if the 
loss is treated as the third party’s. Rather, the party in breach must make 
good the loss only once: to the other contracting party, if it falls on it, or to the 
third party, if the loss has transferred.  
The narrow ground is also demonstrated to be more logical on examination 
of the relevant case law. Coote points out that, in Panatown,889 the relevant 
land at all material times belonged to UIPL, and so Panatown could not have 
been said to suffer from a loss recoverable in damages either at common law 
or in accordance with the Dunlop exception.890 Additionally, Hawkes points 
out that the “very transaction which initiates [the third party’s] involvement – 
the transfer of the property – [is] at the hand of [the contracting party].”891 
Accordingly, he argues that the third party sustains a “distinct but related 
loss” at the point at which it pays the contracting party a sum greater than the 
building’s value.892 In transferred loss situations, it is simply unrealistic and 
illogical to describe the loss as the contracting party’s when the loss clearly 
                                                          
886 Wallace (n 808) at 405 (citing St Martin’s Property Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine 
& Sons Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85).   
887 Wallace (n 808) at 405.  
888 See subsection 7.3.2. 
889 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518.  
890 Coote (n 754) at 89.   
891 Hawkes (n 808) at 286. 
892 Ibid. at 286.  
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falls on the third party. Treating the loss as the contracting party’s is a legal 
fiction, and this is unnecessary in light of the narrow ground.  
Accordingly, it appears that the most logical and pragmatic view of the 
transferred loss doctrine is the narrow ground, because the loss clearly falls 
on the third party.   
7.3.1.2. The narrow ground: compatibility with privity  
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that the narrow ground is firmly 
accepted in Scots law.893 Whilst there is a lack of consensus as to whether 
the broad or narrow ground is dominant in English law, it was shown in the 
immediately preceding subsection that the narrow ground provides a more 
logical explanation for the transferred loss doctrine.894 It is clear that the 
broad ground does not contravene privity: the loss is treated as the 
contracting party’s, and so there is no question of the third party benefiting 
under the contract.895 The relevant issue is, however, whether the narrow 
ground is compatible with the privity doctrine.  
There has not been a great deal of express judicial discussion on the 
transferred loss doctrine and the question of privity. Relevant judgments 
identify the potential tension between the privity doctrine and recovery of the 
third party’s loss. Most recently, in Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings 
AS v Michael Craig,896 Lord Doherty states that the “rationale” of Panatown is 
that:  
“the law will not tolerate a loss caused by a breach of that provision to 
go uncompensated through an absence of privity between the party 
suffering the loss and the party causing it”.897  
                                                          
893 See subsection 7.2.2.  
894 Above at subsection 7.3.1.1. 
895 For further comment, see Coote (n 754) at 90.   
896 Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings AS v Michael Craig [2015] CSOH 4. 
897 Ibid. at para 45 per Lord Doherty, citing Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd 
[2001] 1 AC 518 at 535 per Lord Clyde.  
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Lord Drummond Young identifies “the significance of the doctrine of privity of 
contract to the problem of the legal black hole.”898 However, these judgments 
do not expressly describe the operation of transferred loss in accordance 
with the narrow ground as an exception to the privity doctrine. Academic 
commentators have also noted that transferred loss potentially impacts on 
the English understanding of privity, but have refrained from expressly 
describing the concept as an exception to privity. Coote, commenting on 
Panatown,899 states that “placing the loss with UIPL meant that, while a claim 
for damages arose, the problem was at root one of privity and the rights of 
third parties.”900 Unberath mentions the Court of Appeal judgment in 
Panatown as a “focus of attention in the privity debate”901 and Treitel makes 
similar comment.902  
Transferred loss is certainly a greater ‘threat’ to privity than contracts for the 
benefit of another. As discussed in the previous chapter, contracts for the 
benefit of another are not an exception to privity because both parties intend 
to confer a benefit on the third party, and one of the contracting parties can 
accordingly recover for the third party’s loss.903 In contrast, transferred loss 
involves the recovery of the third party’s loss where the contracting parties do 
not intend for the contracting party to have the ability to do so. In transferred 
loss situations, permitting recovery of the loss appears to confer a benefit on 
the third party, in that its loss is accounted for and, if the contracting party 
agrees, damages are returned to the third party. However, privity prevents 
the conferral of benefits enforceable on the part of the third party without the 
consent of the contracting parties.904 Privity impacts the third party’s rights 
and liabilities under a contract, rather than the contracting parties’ ability to 
recover for the third party’s loss. The narrow ground permits recovery of the 
                                                          
898 McLaren Murdoch & Hamilton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group 2003 SCLR 323 at 
para 38 per Lord Drummond Young. See also Gunnar Slemming v Henry A Ross 2010 WL 
3166665 per Sheriff Principal Sir Stephen ST Young Bt QC.  
899 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518. 
900 Coote (n 754) at 92. See also 81 and 83-84. 
901 Unberath (n 835) at 535.   
902 Treitel (n 754) at 532.  
903 See subsection 6.3.2.  
904 This is discussed in subsections 2.3.1-2 and 2.4.2.1. 
179 
 
third party’s loss, but the third party cannot make a claim. The fact that only 
the contracting party can recover the loss therefore means that privity is not 
circumvented.  
It was suggested in subsection 7.2.5. that the transferred loss doctrine should 
be reformed to allow the third party to recover the loss in its own name. If this 
was permitted, transferred loss would operate as an exception to the privity 
doctrine, because the third party would have the right to make a contractual 
claim under a contract to which it was not party. The question of whether this 
would be a justifiable deviation from privity is discussed further below.905   
7.3.2. Compatibility of transferred loss with contract theory  
It is evident from both case law and commentary that transferred loss is 
applied regardless of (and sometimes contrary to) the intentions of the 
contracting parties.906 The only exception is Lord Doherty’s recent statement 
that transferred loss is based on the “imputed intention of the contracting 
parties… that a third party should benefit from a provision of the contract.”907 
This view is not consistent with the previous body of case law. It remains to 
be seen whether Lord Doherty’s views will be adopted by the Inner House or 
the Supreme Court. Further, his judgement does not justify his finding that 
transferred loss may be based on the imputed intentions of the contracting 
parties. At any rate, he appears to recognise that transferred loss is not 
based on the actual intentions of the contracting parties.  The present state of 
the law is that transferred loss stems from involuntary obligations. It cannot 
therefore be said to cohere with the will theory.  
In transferred loss cases, the party who has caused the third party’s loss 
does not make a promise (to the other contracting party or the third party) 
that the party not in breach will have a claim to recover damages for the third 
party. The party in breach does not voluntarily assume liability in respect of 
                                                          
905 See subsection 7.3.4. 
906 See above at subsection 7.2.3. 




the third party’s loss. Transferred loss is therefore compatible with neither the 
promissory nor assumption theories of contract.908  
If the transferred loss doctrine was reformed to allow the third party to 
recover its loss, the concept would continue to be incompatible with Scots 
contract theory. The contracting parties in transferred loss situations do not 
intend for the third party to have the right to recover its loss, and so the 
concept would not comply with the will theory. Similarly, it could not be said 
that the contracting parties made a promise to the third party to allow it to 
recover damages for its losses, nor that the parties voluntarily assume 
liability in respect of the third party. The reformed transferred loss doctrine 
would not therefore be compatible with promissory or assumption theory.  
7.3.3. Compatibility of transferred loss with delict 
Transferred loss is generally treated in commentary as a contractual concept. 
For example, McBryde refers to contract law as delict’s “older sibling” which 
can address defects in the law on delict, citing transferred loss cases as an 
example of beneficial contractual action.909 Unberath suggests that a 
contractual action may be preferable where the transferred loss claim deals 
with a delay in performance, or is based on the plaintiff’s expectation 
interest.910 Whilst the standard of care is normally the same in contract and 
delict,911 contract is a consensual obligation, and it is therefore, in contract, 
possible to bind oneself to a higher standard of duty than that mandated by 
the delictual standard of reasonable care.912 Judicial opinion also reflects a 
contractual analysis. In Scots law, a transferred loss claim has been 
permitted where a delictual action could have been made but may not have 
been as lucrative as a contractual claim.913 Accordingly, the contracting party 
                                                          
908 It should be noted that Coote has argued that transferred loss is compatible with the 
assumption theory of contract. However, this is based on his acceptance of the broad 
ground, which, as discussed above (subsection 7.3.1.1.) is not a logical or realistic 
assessment of transferred loss. See Coote, Assumption II (n 318) 50-51. 
909 McBryde (n 449) at 46.  
910 Unberath (n 835) at 537.  
911 McManus and Russell, Delict (n 434) 9.5. 
912 Ibid.  
913 Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings AS v Michael Craig [2015] CSOH 4 at para 36 
per Lord Doherty.   
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in breach has been forced to comply with a higher standard than that 
required in delict.  
However, the benefits of a contractual claim do not justify treating the right to 
recover the third party’s loss as a contractual action. Transferred loss 
applies, as has been discussed,914 regardless of the intentions of the 
contracting parties, and a contractual analysis is thus not necessarily 
suitable. Some commentators impliedly treat transferred loss as delictual – 
for example, Bussani and Vernon Palmer refer to the contracting party 
responsible for the loss as the “tortfeasor”.915 Jackson also argues that delict 
law should be expanded to permit recovery of the third party’s loss in ‘black 
hole’ situations.916 This subsection addresses whether transferred loss could 
be accounted for within the law of delict, because a contractual analysis is 
clearly not wholly satisfactory.  
An initial point is that a delictual claim would not bypass the contractual 
allocation of risk. Unberath states that because tortious liability involves the 
imposition of original, as opposed to derivative liability, this would appear to 
deviate from the parties’ contractual framework in transferred loss 
situations.917 However, there is no need to construe the contract between the 
parties as an automatic desire to exclude any subsequent liability stemming 
from a foreseeable transfer of property. Whilst an exclusion clause in the 
contract should be upheld,918 the existence of the contract should not exclude 
the possibility of a delictual duty of care arising in respect of those to whom 
the loss is transferred. Essentially, in the words of Bussani and Vernon 
Palmer, transferred loss claims are “liability neutral”:919 the party responsible 
                                                          
914 See above at subsections 7.2.3. and 7.3.2.  
915 Bussani and Palmer (n 371) at 10-12. See also Stevens, Torts and Rights (n 25) 595. 
916 Jackson, SME (n 495) para 158, citing the results of Caparo Industries plc v Dickman 
[1990] 2 AC 605, Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398, and D & F Estates 
Ltd v Church Comrs for England [1989] AC 177 as evidence that claims in respect of third 
party loss should be permitted where the loss is caused by a contracting party.  
917 Unberath (n 835) at 537. See also Leigh and Sillavan Ltd v Aliakmon Shipping Co Ltd 
(The Aliakmon) [1986] AC 785 at 817-818 per Lord Brandon of Oakbrook. 
918 Unberath (n 835) at 537.     
919 M Bussani and VV Palmer, “The notion of pure economic loss and its setting” in M 
Bussani and VV Palmer (eds), Pure Economic Loss in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003) 3 at 12.   
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for the loss is liable only for the amount which would have been due had the 
relevant property remained in the patrimony of the other contracting party.  
The initial hurdle to a delictual understanding of transferred loss is that pure 
economic loss is only exceptionally recoverable in tort.920 The means of 
recovering pure economic loss, outlined in chapter 4,921 are considered in 
turn.  
Firstly, Hedley Byrne liability cannot apply in transferred loss situations, 
because this form of liability allows for recovery for loss resulting from 
reliance on negligent misstatements, rather than the transfer of property. 
Henderson v Merrett liability is a similarly unsuitable analysis, because 
transferred loss cases do not involve the third party’s reliance on the 
contracting party’s performance of a particular service.  
Additionally, it is not possible to treat transferred loss as an exception to the 
rules on bright line liability.922 The existing exceptions to this rule rest on the 
very narrow circumstance of the pursuer’s possession or ownership of the 
property which is damaged. In some transferred loss cases, the damage 
occurs at a time at which the property is in the possession of the contracting 
party who is not responsible for the third party’s loss, rather than the third 
party.923  
An analysis of transferred loss based on White v Jones liability initially 
appears to be a more promising means of explaining transferred loss. In both 
transferred loss and disappointed beneficiary cases, the purpose of imposing 
liability is because it is the only means of holding the contract-breaker to 
account.924 Additionally, it has been claimed that Lord Goff of Chieveley 
introduced a theory of transferred rights into English law in the case of White 
v Jones.925 However, the transferred loss situations differ from those 
                                                          
920 Unberath (n 835) at 537.  
921 See subsection 4.2.3.  
922 This form of liability is defined at subsection 4.2.3.2.  
923 This was the case in, for example, Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd 
[2001] 1 AC 518. 
924 An overview of disappointed beneficiary cases is provided at subsection 4.2.3.4. 
925 Stevens, Torts and Rights (n 25) 177-178.   
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involving disappointed beneficiaries in that the contracting party in the former 
case does not contract with the objective of securing any benefits for another 
party. In other words, the testator contracts in order to benefit the beneficiary, 
and the loss results from the solicitor’s failure to perform under the contract. 
In transferred loss cases, in contrast, the contracting party contracts for its 
own benefit, but the loss ultimately transfers to the third party. Further, a key 
policy objective of disappointed beneficiary cases is upholding the 
contractual intent of the testator,926 and transferred loss claims do not stem 
from the lack of realisation of the will of the contracting party who can recover 
for the third party’s loss.   
The remaining option is to consider the principle of Junior Books v Veitchi,927 
the ‘high point’ in the recoverability of pure economic loss.928 For Junior 
Books liability to apply, the person who causes the loss and the person who 
suffers the loss must be connected by a series of contracts and it must be 
reasonably foreseeable that the loss will result from the careless act.929 
Additionally, the party who causes the loss must know three things: the 
identity of the person who suffers the loss; that the person who has suffered 
the loss is in a contract with the person with whom they are also in contract; 
and that economic loss on the pursuer’s part will follow from careless 
performance of the contract.930 The limits of this form of liability are 
demonstrated in D&F Church Commissioners.931 In this case, there was no 
contractual link, because the pursuers did not have a lease until after the 
sub-contractor’s breach, and the defenders did not know the pursuer’s 
identity. When the contracting parties originally contract in transferred loss 
cases, the party responsible for the loss will likely be aware of the fact that 
the contract could be assigned, or that the property in question could at any 
stage be assigned to someone else, but it cannot know that its defective 
performance will result in loss to the particular person on whom the loss 
                                                          
926 See above at subsection 4.2.3.4. 
927 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520.  
928 Junior Books liability is discussed in subsection 4.3.1. 
929 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520. 
930 Ibid. For analysis see Thomson, Delictual Liability (n 357) 4.20. 
931 D & F Estates Ltd v Church Commissioners for England and Wales [1989] AC 177. 
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eventually falls. In other words, there is a lack of proximity. Accordingly, it 
does not appear that Junior Books liability could be imposed in transferred 
loss situations. 
Extending Junior Books liability to cover transferred loss cases would be 
possible if the requirement that the contracting party is aware of the potential 
loss on the part of the third party was not enforced where it is foreseeable 
that the loss may be transferred to another. Unberath states that there is no 
need in such cases for a contemplation requirement, because the debtor is 
protected by the remoteness rule, and the risk of liability is the same 
regardless of whether it is subject to a claim by the promisee for his own loss 
or in the context of a transferred loss claim.932 For example, a cost of cure 
rendered by the third party in a construction case would be recoverable in 
accordance with the remoteness rule, but it would not matter that the 
contracting parties had not contemplated whether a third party might suffer 
this loss instead of the promisee.933 The primary policy argument for allowing 
delictual claims in transferred loss situations is that, as stated by Bussani and 
Vernon Palmer, refusing such claims allows the tortfeasor responsible for the 
loss to “benefit from the accidental operation of rules which by pure chance 
exclude him from liability” against those on whom the loss falls.934 The 
principal reason for the development of transferred loss is to prevent black 
holes,935 and treating the concept as delictual could enable this policy 
objective to be upheld without violating contract theory.  
As discussed, however, Junior Books936 itself is not highly regarded.937 The 
revival of the case, and particularly making it wider in scope, would be a 
controversial step. The general trend of the law of delict is that recovery of 
pure economic loss is permitted in circumstances where the pursuer is a 
“particular individual”, and their interests are “distinctly contemplated by the 
                                                          
932 Unberath (n 835) at 544. 
933 Ibid. at 545.  
934 Bussani and Palmer (n 919) at 12. See also C von Bar, The Common European Law of 
Torts vol 1 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000) 510-511.   
935 See above at subsection 7.2.1. 
936 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520. 
937 The case is discussed in subsections 4.3.1.-2.  
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defendant at close range”.938 Imposing delictual liability in transferred loss 
situations would not reflect this focus of delictual law. The immediately 
following subsection addresses whether transferred loss is supported by 
justifiable policy reasons, and whether a reformed transferred loss doctrine 
would be a justifiable exception to privity. If transferred loss could be treated 
as a contractual concept, this would avoid unnecessarily jeopardising the 
clarity and coherence of delictual liability by reviving Junior Books.939 If delict 
evolves in future in Scots law to return to a more positive view of Junior 
Books liability, then this form of liability could provide a logical explanation for 
transferred loss. Regarding the current law, however, a delictual analysis is 
unsuitable, regardless of whether the contracting party or the third party can 
recover for the loss.  
7.3.4. Policy considerations justifying transferred loss  
There are two dominant policy considerations reflected in the development of 
transferred loss: preventing third party losses from falling into damages ‘black 
holes’ and ensuring that the loss caused by breach of contract is recoverable, 
such that the contract-breaker does not escape liability. This subsection 
examines whether these policy considerations could support a reformed 
transferred loss doctrine as a justifiable exception to privity.  
The first justification, that transferred loss prevents ‘black holes’, is 
emphasised in case law. Lord Drummond Young comments that these are 
“clearly undesirable; in a well-regulated legal universe black holes should not 
exist.”940 This was affirmed in Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v 
Michael Craig.941 English law also highlights this policy consideration. For 
example, Lord Clyde makes similar comment in Panatown Ltd v Alfred 
                                                          
938 Bussani and Palmer (n 371) at 141.    
939 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520. 
940 McLaren Murdoch & Hamilton Ltd v The Abercromby Motor Group 2003 SCLR 323 at 
para 33 per Lord Drummond Young.  
941 Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v Michael Craig [2015] CSOH 4 at para 29 per 
Lord Doherty. See also The Most Honourable Alexander George Gordon, Marquess of 




McAlpine Construction Ltd.942 In terms of academic commentary, Jackson 
considers that transferred loss developed because:  
“to do otherwise would leave a 'black hole' where the party suffering 
the loss would have no title to sue, but the party with title to sue would 
have suffered no loss.”943 
The second policy consideration supporting the transferred loss doctrine is 
ensuring recovery of loss caused by breach of contract, even where the loss 
does not fall on the person with whom the contract-breaker originally 
contracted.944 In Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd v Amec Construction Scotland 
Ltd,945 which was not decided on the basis of transferred loss, it was noted 
that GUS Property Management Ltd v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd,946 
Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd,947 and Panatown 
Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd948 reflect a “hostility” of the common 
law to ‘black holes’, and that the policy of the law may be:  
“moving in the direction of recognising that the day-to-day working out 
of ordinary family and commercial relationships should not, without 
good reason, be held to relieve a wrongdoer of an apparently justified 
liability.”949  
Academic commentators have adopted similar positions. Unberath points out 
that awarding damages for third party loss in ‘black hole’ situations is 
“justified in terms of substantive justice”.950 Hawkes identifies the two main 
objectives of the courts in advancing the transferred loss doctrine: preserving 
an orderly legal universe in which those who breach contracts pay damages 
for their wrongdoing, and preserving the underlying fabric of contract law.951 
                                                          
942 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518 at 523 per Lord Clyde. 
943 Jackson, SME (n 495) para 158. 
944 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518 at 587-588 and 591 
per Lord Millet. See discussion in H Unberath, Transferred Loss: Claiming Third Party Loss 
in Contract Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2003) 144 and 192. 
945 Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd v Amec Construction Scotland Ltd [2005] CSOH 162 
946 GUS Property Management Ltd v Littlewoods Mail Order Stores Ltd 1982 SC (HL) 157. 
947 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd; St Martin’s Property 
Corporation Ltd v Sir Robert McAlpine & Sons Ltd [1994] 1 AC 85.  
948 Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518. 
949 Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd v Amec Construction Scotland Ltd [2005] CSOH 162 at para 20 
per Lord Emslie.  
950 Unberath (n 835) at 543. 
951 Hawkes (n 808) at 288.   
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The Scottish Law Commission refers to the recognition of this policy in 
transferred loss contexts as “sound and rational”.952 Todd similarly notes that 
imposing liability in defective building cases promotes professional 
accountability on the part of builders, engineers, and architects.953  
However, as discussed in chapter 5, not all losses stemming from defective 
or non-performance should be accounted for in circumstances where the loss 
falls on a third party.954 It is not accepted in Scots law that a loss stemming 
from defective performance ought always to be recoverable.955 Accordingly, 
whilst ensuring recovery of losses caused by breach of contract is a valid 
consideration in the development of the transferred loss doctrine, this factor 
alone cannot provide a justification for the doctrine.  
The commentary and case law on the avoidance of black holes does not 
focus on the protection of the third party from financial loss. Whilst the narrow 
ground is accepted in Scots law, such that it is clearly recognised that the 
contracting party is permitted to recover the third party’s loss, the protection 
of external parties does not appear to have played a significant role in the 
development of transferred loss. The judicial focus seems to have been on 
avoiding the injustice of the situation as whole, rather than protecting the 
affected third parties. This is surprising, because the recovery of damages in 
many transferred loss situations could have been based on the protection of, 
for example, consumer home-buyers affected by a breach of the contract 
between the builder and initial land owner. A particularly close parallel could 
be drawn between a transferred loss doctrine based on consumer protection 
and the latent damages and defective premises legislation discussed in 
chapter 5.956 The majority of transferred loss cases are between commercial 
parties, including many involving transfers of property within, for example, 
                                                          
952 Report on Contract Law (n 858) 18.28.  
953 S Todd, “Policy Issues in Defective Property Cases” in JW Neyers, E Chamberlain and 
SGA Pitel, Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 
2007) 199 at 214.   
954 See subsection 5.4.2. This is noted in reference to the development of transferred loss in 
Davidson (n 782) at 58.  
955 This is discussed in subsection 6.3.2. 
956 See, in particular, subsection 5.2.5.    
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company groups,957 and so consumer protection cannot provide a wholesale 
justification for a reformed doctrine. Additionally, consumer home-buyers will 
generally have protection under the National House Building Council 
warranty scheme.958 However, the protection of external parties is a relevant 
policy consideration, and the reform of transferred loss to permit third party 
claims could be justified on this basis. Those who are not protected by NHBC 
warranties should generally be able to make a claim against the party who 
caused their loss.  
Arguably, however, transferred loss situations arise where the third party 
ought to have protected itself from the risk of loss. We must consider whether 
transferred loss could be replaced with more widespread use of collateral 
warranties. These operate as contracts between their granter and grantee, 
and may serve the same purpose as transferred loss, evading ‘black holes’ 
by imposing contractual duties on the granter of the warranty.959 Whilst there 
is some uncertainty as to the exact definition of a collateral warranty in Scots 
law,960 these are “an important feature of modern practice in the construction 
industry”.961  Collateral warranties allow for a right of action between parties 
who, due to their choice of legal structure, are not in a contractual 
relationship.962 When building works are performed defectively, the party on 
whom the loss falls will not generally be the employer in the building contract. 
This is because the employer will usually have passed on its interest in the 
building to the party on whom the loss falls, or the building will have belonged 
                                                          
957 For example, Axon Well Intervention Products Holdings v Michael Craig [2015] CSOH 4.   
958 Further information on these schemes, see NHBC warranty and insurance cover, 
available at: http://www.nhbc.co.uk/Warrantiesandcover/ and accessed 29 December 2018.  
959 Scottish Widows Services Ltd v Harmon/CRM Facades Ltd (in liquidation) 2010 SLT 1102 
at paras 1 and 17 per Lord Drummond Young. For discussion of the law from an English 
perspective, see Powell and Stewart, Professional Liability (n 379) 9.061.   
960 Report on Third Party Rights (n 241) 1.28, citing Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Carlyle 
[2013] CSIH 75, 2014 SC 188 (overturned [2015] UKSC 13).  
961 Scottish Widows Services Ltd v Harmon/CRM Facades Ltd (in liquidation) 2010 SLT 1102 
at para 1 per Lord Drummond Young.  
962 Ibid. at para 17 per Lord Drummond Young. See also Glasgow Airport Limited v Kirkman 
and Bradford [2007] CSIH 47 at para 7 per Lord Kingarth.  
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to that party throughout the development.963 Murphy v Brentwood DC964 
curtailed the prospect of delictual liability in such situations, and privity 
prevents the party on whom the loss falls from a direct contractual action.965 
Consequently, according to Lord Drummond Young:  
“in order to ensure that the party who suffers actual loss has a right of 
action against any party who has provided defective work or against 
any member of the professional team who has acted negligently, the 
practice has grown up of taking collateral warranties from all of those 
who carry out work under the project.”966  
It certainly seems that parties would be well advised to utilise collateral 
warranties to prevent ‘black hole’ situations.967 However, as was seen in the 
discussion of the relevant cases,968 contracting parties do not always use 
collateral warranties, and the transferred loss doctrine may be applied when 
they have not done so.  
It is easier to justify the imposition of liability on part of the contract breaker in 
some situations than in others, depending on the position of the third party. 
Where the parties are closely related companies (for example, where the 
party who suffers the loss is a subsidiary of the original party to the contract) 
they ought to have closely considered their financial and legal obligations 
together, and, because they were in a position to obtain legal advice, they 
arguably should have had the foresight to secure a collateral warranty. 
Additionally, where all three parties involved in a transferred loss situation are 
                                                          
963 Scottish Widows Services Ltd v Harmon/CRM Facades Ltd (in liquidation) 2010 SLT 1102 
at para 1 per Lord Drummond Young. In Macdonald Estates Plc v Regenesis (2005) 
Dunfermline Ltd 2007 SLT 791, for example, collateral warranties had been used to confer 
on tenants in units of a shopping centre the right to claim against the developer of the site for 
any defects in their units, where they had a direct contractual claim only with the owner of 
the centre.  
964 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398.  
965 Scottish Widows Services Ltd v Harmon/CRM Facades Ltd (in liquidation) 2010 SLT 1102 
at para 1 per Lord Drummond Young. 
966 Ibid.  
967 It should be noted that collateral warranties may themselves be construed as exceptions 
to the privity doctrine: see further discussion in Merkin (n 195) at 2.3; Jenkins and Duckworth 
(n 457) at 8.69-8.73; Shanklin Pier Ltd v Detel Products Ltd [1951] 2 KB 854. Collateral 
warranties arise where the third party has actively been granted a right to enforce contractual 
obligations, and so they fall outwith the scope of this work. The relationship between 
collateral warranties and the privity doctrine is not considered further.   
968 In Panatown Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd [2001] 1 AC 518, for example, the 
parties did not grant a collateral warranty to the third party.    
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commercial entities, it is difficult to identify any particular party as the 
‘weaker’ party who needs or deserves the law’s protection. In contrast, where 
the third party buys a home in a personal capacity and discovers a defect, it 
is easier to draw a parallel between this situation and the statutory 
exceptions aimed at preventing loss on the part of consumers. The Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act 1992 does, however, provide protection for commercial 
parties even where the party in question could have protected itself through 
insurance. Sometimes, perhaps, third parties should be protected even 
where they could have protected themselves. In a transferred loss context, 
the protection could extend to parties unconnected to the original contracting 
parties, even if the third party was also a commercial entity. Wallace argues 
that transferred loss can be explained on the basis of a close affinity of 
interest between the contracting party seeking to recover the loss and the 
third party.969 However, it appears that the opposite is true: the recovery of 
the loss is more easily justified where it falls upon a party who could not 
easily have protected itself. Indeed, as Unberath points out, the common 
interest of the parties identifiable in the relevant cases is coincidental.970 
In terms of the requirement that the loss recovered must not be too 
remote,971 Unberath notes that “the type and possibility and also the extent 
[of loss] actually suffered must be within the contemplation of the parties.”972 
Further, given that the loss is essentially suffered by the third party instead of 
the promisee,973 it should not be outwith the contemplation of the contracting 
parties that the third party might suffer the loss which would have fallen on 
the promisee had it not been transferred. The recoverability requirement 
would not therefore be problematic.  
                                                          
969 Wallace (n 882) at 260.  
970 Unberath (n 835) at 540.  
971 See subsection 5.4.1.   
972 Unberath, Transferred Loss (n 944) 210. See also Todd (n 953) at 225-229.  
973 Unberath, Transferred Loss (n 944) 210 and 211.  
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In terms of the other policy justifications considered in chapter 4, transferred 
loss cannot be justified on the basis that it upholds the intentions of the 
contracting parties, because it operates regardless of their intentions.  
If the third party could claim against the contracting party in breach, 
transferred loss would be supported by the policy considerations of protecting 
external parties, preventing ‘black holes’, and ensuring recovery for loss 
caused by breach of contract. As such, reforming transferred loss to permit 
the third party to recover in its own right allows the doctrine to be recognised 
as a justifiable exception to privity. This would also avoid the current 
conceptual difficulties974 regarding whether the contracting party who 
recovers the loss holds the funds for the third party in trust, and whether it 
has a duty to transfer the damages to the third party. 
The thesis examines the privity doctrine and accordingly does not consider 
in-depth the rule providing that a contracting party cannot recover for 
another’s losses. Nonetheless, it is noted that allowing the third party to 
recover in its own right would also remove the tension between transferred 
loss and this rule. If transferred loss continues to be recognised in its current 
form (i.e. allowing a means for the contracting party to recover the third 
party’s loss), the policy consideration of ensuring that loss caused by breach 
of contract is recoverable might offer a justification for its deviation from this 
rule. However, the fact that the third party cannot currently recover the loss in 
its own right clearly does not reflect a policy consideration of protecting third 
parties. 
7.4. Concluding remarks   
Transferred loss in its current form is not an exception to privity. Whilst it is 
compatible with the privity doctrine, it operates regardless of the intentions of 
the contracting parties, and is therefore incompatible with the main theories 
of Scots contract law. Classifying transferred loss as a delictual remedy 
                                                          
974 See, for example, discussion in N Palmer and G Tolhurst, “Compensatory and Extra-
compensatory Damages: Linden Gardens and the ‘Lord Griffiths’ Principle” 1998 13(2) 
Journal of Contract Law 143 at 149-151.  
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would account for the fact that the contracting parties do not consent to 
transferred loss liability. However, such classification would require 
transferred loss to be framed in terms of Junior Books liability. This would not 
be desirable, because Junior Books liability is controversial and no longer 
fully accepted by the judiciary or in academic commentary.  
The transferred loss doctrine would be more logical and practicable if the 
third party could recover its loss in its own name. If transferred loss was 
reformed in this manner, it would be supported by sound policy 
considerations, namely, the protection of weaker parties and ensuring 
recovery for loss caused by breach of contract. These reasons justify 
deviation from the privity doctrine. The current laws on transferred loss 
cannot be justified by reference to a policy consideration of protecting 
external parties. Transferred loss should therefore continue to be recognised 
as a contractual remedy in Scots (and English) law, but should be reformed 
such that the third party can claim against the contracting party directly for 
losses suffered due to defective performance of the contract.  
A statutory regime applying to situations which are currently resolved through 
the transferred loss doctrine would provide greater certainty to the 
contracting parties. This would also allow for the opportunity to reform the 
current law, which is unnecessarily restrictive in terms of allowing recovery 
only where the contracting party is willing to raise proceedings and return the 




Chapter 8: Ad hoc agency 
8.1. Overview of chapter 8  
This chapter considers the doctrine of ad hoc agency, which was developed 
relatively recently in Scots law by Lord Drummond Young. It begins by 
defining ad hoc agency and outlining its development in Scots law. The 
chapter then assesses whether ad hoc agency is compatible with Scots 
contract law (in terms of its interaction with privity and contract theory), delict, 
and the law of agency more generally. The final sections consider the policy 
justifications for and against the recognition of ad hoc agency, and whether it 
should continue to be recognised in Scots law.  
8.2. Definition and development of ad hoc agency in Scots law  
The concept of ad hoc agency was introduced into Scots law by Lord 
Drummond Young in three cases: Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 
2),975 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland 
Limited,976 and Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the 
Trustees of the National Library of Scotland.977 This section describes the 
development of the law on ad hoc agency in these three cases. It then 
discusses the reception of the doctrine in more recent cases, and comments 
on the extent to which the doctrine can be said to be accepted in Scots law. 
The section also makes brief comment on English law. 
8.2.1. Lord Drummond Young’s introduction of ad hoc agency  
In Whitbread Group plc,978 Lord Drummond Young defined ad hoc agency as 
“an agency relationship that comes into existence for the purpose of a single 
transaction only”.979 This can be illustrated by reference to the facts of the 
case in question. Whitbread was the tenant of a pub in Edinburgh. Fairbar 
                                                          
975 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
976 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
977 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
978 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
979 Ibid. at para 13 per Lord Drummond Young.  
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Ltd paid Whitbread’s rent to the landlord, Goldapple. The issue arose as to 
whether this payment was a valid transaction which prevented the operation 
of an irritancy of the lease for non-payment of the rent. At the time of the 
payment, Fairbar was occupying the pub, but the obligation to pay the rent 
remained Whitbread’s. Whilst Whitbread and Fairbar had concluded a 
Business Transfer Agreement to transfer Whitbread’s goodwill and assets to 
Fairbar, this expressly recognised that Whitbread remained obliged to pay 
the rent. This was because the lease had not been assigned (and could not 
be assigned without Goldapple’s consent). It was accepted that a cheque 
sent to Fairbar, which was credited to Goldapple’s account, was intended to 
discharge Whitbread’s obligation to pay the rent, but Goldapple sought to 
return the cheque. Lord Drummond Young found that Goldapple should have 
accepted the cheque, because Fairbar was acting as an ad hoc agent for 
Whitbread and its cheque was a valid payment of Whitbread’s rent.980 As 
such, Goldapple was not permitted to refuse payment on the grounds that it 
was tendered by Fairbar rather than Whitbread.981 
According to Lord Drummond Young, the fact that Whitbread debts were paid 
using Fairbar funds and with Fairbar cheques in accordance with the 
Business Transfer Agreement was consistent with Fairbar acting as 
Whitbread’s agent for such payments.982 It was also relevant that the 
payment was clearly intended to discharge Whitbread’s obligation to pay the 
rent.983 He clarified that ad hoc agency may not have been a suitable remedy 
had Fairbar attached any conditions to the payment of the cheque but, 
because it did not do so, he found that the payment of the cheque should be 
viewed in isolation.984 In other words, the straightforward payment of 
Whitbread’s rent indicated that Fairbar was acting as Whitbread’s agent for 
                                                          
980 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281 at paras 19 and 48 per Lord 
Drummond Young. 
981 Ibid. at para 19 per Lord Drummond Young. 
982 Ibid.  
983 Ibid. 
984 Ibid.  
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the purpose of satisfying Whitbread’s obligations under the lease with 
Goldapple.  
Whitbread Group plc985 applied ad hoc agency to a situation in which one 
party had paid another’s debt. Lord Drummond Young applied the doctrine to 
situations unrelated to the payment of another’s debt in two later cases, 
Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the 
National Library of Scotland986 and John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v 
Westminster Properties Scotland Limited.987 
In Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the 
National Library of Scotland,988 the pursuer was a joinery company which had 
originally traded as a partnership (Laurence McIntosh and Sons). In 1998 the 
partnership entered into a Works Contract with Balfour Beatty concerning the 
refurbishment of the National Library of Scotland. In 2000, the pursuer 
company was incorporated, and it was intended that this business would take 
over the business of the partnership. However, the partnership’s rights and 
obligations were not validly transferred. The company simply sent letters 
concerning debts arising from the partnership’s contracts in its name and with 
its bank details.  When the company raised an action in respect of the Works 
Contract, Balfour Beatty argued that the company did not have title to sue 
under that contract. Accordingly, an assignation was effected which 
transferred the partnership’s rights and interests under the Works Contract to 
the company. This was intimated to Balfour Beatty and backdated to post-
date the company’s action.989 However, it was found that the assignation did 
not retrospectively cure the company’s lack of title to sue, because title to sue 
must usually exist at the date at which the action is raised.990  
                                                          
985 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) (2005 SLT 281). 
986 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
987 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
988 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
989 Ibid. at para 11 per Lord Drummond Young. 
990 Ibid. at para 14 per Lord Drummond Young. 
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Lord Drummond Young found that the fact that letters were sent in the 
company’s name in respect of money owed to the partnership, and that a fax 
in respect of the Works Contract was sent on the partnership’s writing paper 
but signed on behalf of the company, could “readily be explained through the 
principle of ad hoc agency”.991 He went on to explain that ad hoc agency 
could be used in situations other than remedying a lack of title to sue 
following the incorporation of a company, partnership, or sole trader, 
demonstrating his flexible view as to the applicability of the doctrine. He 
states that:  
“Within groups of companies, it is relatively common to find one 
company performing tasks for another company within the group. This 
may take many different forms; for present purposes, an example that 
is relevant is that one company may perform debt collection functions 
on behalf of other companies within the group. In such a case, the 
debts do not become due to the debt-collecting company; they remain 
due to the original contracting party, but the debt-collecting company 
acts as an agent for the contracting party in obtaining payment of the 
debts. . . Arrangements of this nature are found not only within groups 
of companies. . . at the level of natural persons, they are frequently 
encountered within a family. Nor are ad hoc agency relationships 
confined to routine tasks such as the collection of debts; they may also 
extend to more complex matters such as conducting negotiations over 
the performance of a contract.”992 
The third case in which Lord Drummond Young developed ad hoc agency is 
John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland 
Limited.993 The facts of the case are similar to Laurence McIntosh.994 Stirling, 
a sole trader, had entered into a construction contract with the defenders in 
respect of refurbishment works at the defender’s property in St Annes. After 
the contract was concluded, Mr Stirling formed a new company, M & S 
Contracts, which he intended would take over the contracts he had 
                                                          
991 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197 at para 15 per Lord Drummond Young. He went on to 
say in para 17 that “all of the tasks that the present pursuers, the company, appear to have 
performed on behalf of the partnership can most readily be explained through the concept 
of ad hoc agency.” See also para 19.  
992 Ibid. at paras 16-17 per Lord Drummond Young.  
993 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
994 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
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concluded as a sole trader. However, the sole trader’s rights and liabilities 
were not validly assigned to the company. When the company attempted to 
refer a dispute connected with the contract to adjudication, Westminster 
Properties argued that the company was not party to the contract and lacked 
title to sue.995 Lord Drummond Young used ad hoc agency to allow the 
actions of the company (writing letters, sending invoices, etc.) to be treated 
as acts performed by the company as an ad hoc agent for the sole trader. In 
the case, he reiterated that the doctrine could be applied to situations 
involving company groups.996 
8.2.2. Subsequent judicial comment on the ad hoc agency doctrine  
Following these three cases, the concept of ad hoc agency has not been 
subject to further development in Scots law and, as is discussed further 
below,997 it has not been wholly welcomed by commentators. The doctrine 
has been mentioned only three times in subsequent cases. In Hill v 
Hunter,998 Lord Stewart stated that the petitioner:  
“easily persuades me that the concept of ad hoc agency explains how 
payments by a third party, typically a company in the same group or a 
spouse, go to discharge another’s debt”.999  
However, he found that the concept did not resolve the facts of the case at 
hand.1000 Whilst Lord Stewart did not expressly criticise the doctrine, these 
brief comments cannot be said to wholly endorse ad hoc agency. In the 
earlier case of Fleming Builders Ltd v Mrs Jane Forrest or Hives,1001 Lord 
Menzies made brief reference to ad hoc agency, but again did not offer 
substantive comment on the doctrine’s merits, and the case was not decided 
                                                          
995 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117 at paras 1-7 per Lord Drummond Young.  
996 Ibid. at para 16 per Lord Drummond Young.  
997 See subsections 8.4.4-5.  
998 Hill v Hunter [2015] CSOH 36.  
999 Ibid. at para 17 per Lord Stewart.  
1000 Ibid. In the case, the pursuer sought suspension of two charges for payments served by 
his ex-wife in respect of child maintenance and spousal support.  
1001 Fleming Builders Ltd v Mrs Jane Forrest or Hives, Mr William Forrest [2008] CSOH 103. 
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on the basis of the concept.1002 More recently, Lord McEwan allowed a proof 
before answer to ascertain whether one of the parties to the action before 
him was acting as an ad hoc agent in the same manner as in Whitbread 
Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2),1003 although he did not give his views on 
the doctrine.1004 There appears to be willingness on the part of other 
members of the judiciary to acknowledge and discuss ad hoc agency in 
Scots law, but it is not a deeply entrenched and universally recognised 
doctrine. Other judges have not, to date, offered positive comments on the 
merits of ad hoc agency.   
Indeed, it appears that the concept of ad hoc agency has not been used in 
cases in which it could have allowed title to sue. In the case of Rodewald v 
Taylor,1005 the defenders received rental payments for a property, known as 
the Corshellach, which was owned by the pursuer. The pursuer asserted that 
the defender was acting as her agent in receiving the payments. However, 
the defender claimed that she was not an agent, and was instead letting out 
and collecting rent for Corshellach in return for rent-free occupation of 
another property. Lord Bannatyne found that the pursuer had failed to prove 
that there was an agency contract between the two parties.1006 Arguably, the 
case could have been addressed in terms of ad hoc agency, but this was 
raised by neither the parties to the dispute nor Lord Bannatyne.  
Macgregor argues that Lord Drummond Young was clearly “using agency as 
a concept to achieve justice on the facts of the case”1007 in Whitbread.1008 
She observes that despite the “compelling facts”1009 of Rodewald v 
                                                          
1002 Fleming Builders Ltd v Mrs Jane Forrest or Hives, Mr William Forrest [2008] CSOH 103 
at paras 102 and 106 per Lord Menzies. The part of the defender’s argument based on ad 
hoc agency is found at para 86. Ad hoc agency was not discussed because Lord Menzies 
was not satisfied that the pursuers had received the letter which had purportedly been 
delivered by an ad hoc agent.  
1003 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
1004 Scobie Farms v Greenyards Garden Centre Limited [2016] CSOH 75.  
1005 Rodewald v Taylor [2010] CSOH 5.  
1006 Ibid. at paras 33 and 34 per Lord Bannatyne. 
1007 L Macgregor, “Agency” in G Black, D Cabrelli, M Hogg, and L Macgregor, Contract law 
update, 2010-2012 (Trinity Law, Edinburgh, 2012) 129 at 130.  
1008 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
1009 Macgregor (n 1007) at 130-131.   
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Taylor,1010 ad hoc agency was not discussed, and the case therefore 
indicates that the concept is “stuck on the starting blocks.”1011 Macgregor has 
also noted that the lack of discussion of ad hoc agency in Cramaso LLP v 
Ogilvie-Grant, Earl of Seafield and others (in which an individual, Mr Erskine 
entered into a contract in his own name, then formed Cramaso LLP, which 
did not have title to sue on that contract).1012 She notes that Lord Reed’s 
decision not to utilise ad hoc agency meant that there was “no… concern 
here that agency principles have been manipulated.”1013 The fact that the 
judges (and counsel) in these cases refrained from discussing the 
applicability of ad hoc agency does indeed indicate that the doctrine has not 
‘caught on’ in Scots law.  
In English law, the term ‘ad hoc agency’ has been used to refer to situations 
in which an agent is employed on a short-term basis.1014 For example, 
Sedley LJ mentions in Shogun Finance v Hudson1015 that a dealer was not a 
finance company’s “general” agent, but may have been the agent for “some 
ad hoc purpose.”1016 These cases make no reference to Lord Drummond 
                                                          
1010 Rodewald v Taylor [2010] CSOH 5. 
1011 Macgregor (n 1007) at 132. See also Macgregor’s similar comments regarding Rodewald 
v Taylor [2010] CSOH 5 in LJ Macgregor, “Establishing agency: Rodewald v Taylor [2010] 
CSOH 05”, Edinburgh Centre for Commercial Law blog, 22.04.2011, available at: 
http://www.ecclblog.law.ed.ac.uk/2011/04/22/establishing-agency-rodewald-v-taylor-2010-
csoh-05/.    
1012 Cramaso LLP v Ogilvie-Grant, Earl of Seafield and others [2014] UKSC 9. For full 
discussion of the case, see L Macgregor, “Moors the pity: the case of the missing grouse. 
Cramaso LLP v Ogilvie-Grant, Earl of Seafield and others” 2015 19(1) Edinburgh Law 
Review 112.    
1013 Macgregor (n 1012) at 118.  See further discussion at below at subsection 8.4.5.  
1014 See, for example, UBS AG (London Branch), UBS Global Asset Management (UK) Ltd v 
Kommunale Wasserwerke Leipzig GMBH [2017] EWCA Civ. 1567 at para 88 per Lord 
Briggs of Westbourne; Gaydamak v Leviev [2012] EWHC 1740 at para 244 per Vos J; 
Osteopathic Education and Research Ltd (t/a European School of Osteopathy) v Purfleet 
Office Systems Ltd (formerly NCS Management Ltd) [2010] EWHC 1801 at para 29 per 
Judge Richard Seymour QC (sitting as a Judge of the High Court); MBNA Europe Bank v 
Thorius [2010] ECC 8 at para 39 per Judge Smart. 
1015 Shogun Finance v Hudson [2002] QB 834.  
1016 Ibid. at para 16 per Sedley J, citing Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance Ltd [1969] 1 
AC 552 at 573 per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest and Mercantile Credit Co Ltd v Hamblin 
[1965] 2 QB 242 at 269 per Pearson LJ. See also Sedley J at para 17, at which he explains 
that the dealer was not the agent for the purpose of the whole hire-purchase agreement, but 
he was the ‘ad hoc agent’ in respect of specific acts connected with the agreement (for 
example, ascertaining the hirer’s identity and sending copies of the hirer’s driving licence to 
provide proof of identity).  
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Young’s dicta and simply appear to refer to cases involving agency for a 
single transaction or for a very short time period. Both types of agency are 
permissible in Scots law and are dealt with under the law of agency 
generally.1017 There does not appear to be an English equivalent of ad hoc 
agency as developed in Lord Drummond Young’s judgments.  
In summary, ad hoc agency enjoys only a very limited degree of recognition 
in Scots law. Lord Drummond Young’s three Outer House judgements are 
not binding, and so it cannot currently be said that the doctrine is accepted in 
Scots law. Ad hoc agency has been briefly acknowledged in other cases, 
although it has not been subject to a great deal of judicial discussion outwith 
Lord Drummond Young’s judgments. The Outer House judgments have not, 
however, been overruled. It is therefore relevant to consider whether the 
doctrine ought to continue to develop in Scots law, potentially as a 
recognised exception to the privity doctrine.  
8.3. Whether agency is contractual and/ or consensual  
The matter of whether ad hoc agency is compatible with the Scots law of 
agency more generally is discussed later in this chapter.1018 In order to 
address this issue, this subsection examines the issue of whether agency in 
Scots law is contractual and/ or consensual. A contractual conceptualisation 
of agency requires that the agency relationship between principal and agent 
was constituted in contract. According to a consensual definition of agency, 
the relationship need only be consensual and does not require a written or 
oral contract.  
8.3.1. Contractual and consensual views of agency  
It is likely that the drafters of the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) 
Regulations 1993 view agency as contractual. Macgregor notes that whilst 
there is no express statement in the Regulations on the nature of the agency 
                                                          
1017 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 3.05.  
1018 See subsection 8.4.5.  
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contract, individual Regulations indicate a contractual analysis.1019 The 
contractual nature of agency in Scots law is discussed by Bell1020 and 
Thomas Smith.1021 There are also clear judicial statements providing for the 
contractual nature of agency,1022 for example, Lords Salvesen and Ormidale 
in Graham & Co v United Turkey Red Co,1023 Lord Milligan in Lothian v 
Jenolite,1024 Lord McCluskey in Trans Barwil Agencies (UK) Ltd v John S 
Braid & Co Ltd,1025 and Lady Dorrian in Connolly v Brown.1026  
More recently, in the case of Rodewald v Taylor,1027 the pursuer based her 
claim on the establishment of an agency contract. Lord Bannatyne 
responded with discussion of the requirements of such a contract,1028 and 
decided that the pursuer had failed to sufficiently prove the existence of an 
agency contract. Macgregor notes that the case may however appear 
unremarkable in the context of the debate on whether agency is contractual, 
given that Lord Bannatyne’s discussion of agency contracts reflected the 
pursuer’s argument.1029 Accordingly, Lord Bannatyne’s dicta do not directly 
support a contractual conception of agency, but they certainly do not 
contradict a contractual analysis.  
Macgregor further comments that there has been insufficient development in 
Scots law on the question of whether agency might arise in terms of a 
unilateral grant of authority from the principal to the agent, as opposed to a 
                                                          
1019 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 2.16. She cites, for example, Regulation 13, which provides 
that both the agent and principal are “entitled to receive from the other, on request, a signed 
written document setting out the terms of the agency contract”.    
1020 Bell, Commentaries (n 289) I, 506. See discussion in LJ Macgregor, “Defining Agency 
and Its Scope (I)” in L DiMatteo and M Hogg, Comparative Contract Law: British and 
American Perspectives (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 381 at 383 on the 
development of a contractual approach to agency in Bell’s works.  
1021 Smith, Short Commentary (n 36) 774. 
1022 These cases are cited and discussed in Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 2.07.   
1023 Graham & Co v United Turkey Red Co 1922 SC 533 at 546 per Lord Salvesen and at 
549 per Lord Ormidale. 
1024 Lothian v Jenolite Ltd 1969 SC 111 at 120 per Lord Milligan. 
1025 Trans Barwil Agencies (UK) Ltd v John S Braid & Co Ltd 1988 SC 222 at 230 per Lord 
McCluskey. 
1026 Connolly v Brown 2007 SLT 778 at para 54 per Lady Dorrian.  
1027 Rodewald v Taylor [2010] CSOH 5, discussed above at subsection 8.2.  
1028 Ibid. at para 33 per Lord Bannatyne. 
1029 Macgregor (n 1007) at 130.  
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bilateral contract.1030 Her own definition of agency does not rule out the 
possibility that agency might be constituted by means other than contract: a 
“relationship, usually created by contract, in terms of which the principal 
instructs the agent to act on his behalf in order to produce legally binding 
effects for the principal”.1031 She concludes that, in Scots law, agency is 
generally but not always contractual.1032 Gow, another Scottish commentator, 
asserts that a contract is not required for the formation of an agency 
relationship.1033 He offers the example of a father asking his son to shop for 
him. The son clearly does not have the contractual capacity to enter into a 
relationship which could be termed an ‘agency contract’ between him and his 
father, but the son does consent to acting as an agent.1034 The fact that those 
without contractual capacity can act as agents appears to contradict a 
contractual theory of agency. Further, the modern Scots law of agency was 
based on mandate,1035 which was consensual in nature but not 
contractual.1036 The views of these commentators, and the historical context 
of mandate, cast doubt on a purely contractual conception of agency in Scots 
law.  
The definition in the leading English text on agency does not provide that 
agency must be contractual:  
“Agency is the fiduciary relationship which exists between two 
persons, one of whom expressly or impliedly manifests assent that the 
other should act on his behalf so as to affect his relations with third 
parties, and the other of whom similarly manifests assent so to act or 
so acts pursuant to the manifestation.”1037  
Macgregor points out that this definition emphasises consent, rather than 
contract, stating that “although it is usual for agency to be created by contract 
                                                          
1030 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 2.19. 
1031 Ibid. 2.01 (emphasis added).   
1032 Ibid. 2.19. 
1033 JJ Gow, The mercantile and industrial law of Scotland (W Green, Edinburgh, 1964) 516.  
1034 Ibid. 516.  
1035 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 2.07.  
1036 Ibid. Stair wrote that mandate was perfected by sole consent on the part of the mandant 
(matched by the mandatar’s consent or acceptance): Stair, Institutions (n 224) 1.12.1. 
1037 PG Watts (ed), Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency, (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 21st edn, 
2018) 1.001.  
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in English law, a contract is not necessary.”1038 McKendrick further indicates 
that, in English law, the principal’s consent to the exercise of authority by the 
agent is sufficient.1039 It has also been acknowledged in an English House of 
Lords case that the “relationship of principal and agent can only be 
established by the consent of the principal and the agent.”1040 The consent 
theory is accepted by McMeel.1041 He notes that the consent theory is 
however likely subject to a qualification: the question is not whether the agent 
and principal consent to their agency relationship, but whether there is an 
objective appearance of consent (in line with recent cases on the objective 
interpretation of contracts).1042 McMeel suggests that agency has historically 
been viewed as consensual in English law because agency did not develop 
as a standalone doctrine but, rather, evolved “hand-in-hand with the 
elaboration of [consensual] contractual doctrine.”1043 
It is thus clear in English law that agency need not be contractual, but must 
be consensual. This is accepted both judicially and in academic commentary. 
In Scots law, the consensus is that agency is always contractual, although 
various commentators and judges appear to permit a consensual definition of 
agency. Macgregor has indicated that the Scots position could change in 
future,1044 and it may be that Scots law will come to firmly accept that agency 
does not necessarily need to be based on contract. The current state of the 
law, however, is that consent is required in both legal systems.  
                                                          
1038 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 2.09. See also Macgregor (n 1020) at 384.   
1039 E McKendrick (ed), Goode on Commercial Law (LexisNexis UK, London, 4th edn, 2016) 
2016 182 footnote 16, relying on Yasuda Fire and Marine Insurance Co of Europe Ltd v 
Orion Marine Insurance Underwriting Agency Ltd [1995] QB 174 at 185 and 186 per Colman 
J. In the case, Colman J also states at 185 that whilst “modern commercial transactions 
agencies are almost invariably founded upon a contract between principal and agent, there 
is no necessity for such a contract to exist”. He also refers to Garnac Grain Co. Inc. v H.M.F. 
Faure & Fairclough Ltd. [1968] AC 1130 at 1137 per Lord Pearson. See further R Powell, 
The law of agency (Pitman, London, 2nd edn, 1961) 7. 
1040 Garnac Grain Co. Inc. v H.M.F. Faure and Fairclough Ltd [1968] AC 1130 at 1137 per 
Lord Pearson. 
1041 G McMeel, “Philosophical foundations of the law of agency” 2000 116(Jul) Law Quarterly 
Review 387 at 388.   
1042 Ibid. at 389. McMeel acknowledges that in “the vast majority of cases, the principal's 
actual intention and the appearance of his intention will coincide.”  
1043 Ibid. at 402.  
1044 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 2.13.  
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8.3.2. Non-consensual views of agency 
It should be acknowledged that there is a limited body of commentary 
supporting the view that agency is non-consensual. This is argued by Forte 
and van Niekerk,1045 who submit that consent in agency contracts is a 
“fiction”.1046 Their argument focuses on South African law, but they have also 
applied their comments to Scots law.1047 However, Macgregor notes that 
Forte and van Niekerk cite only one Scottish case in support of their 
proposition that agency is non-consensual.1048 In that case, it was found that 
the parties had formed an implied agency contract, although it was noted 
that, had the court been unable to find a contract, the purported agent’s fee 
may have been claimed back through unjustified enrichment.1049 Macgregor 
comments that whilst unjustified enrichment may have been a potential 
means of recovery, it “is surely unusual to use a case where the court so 
clearly found that a contract existed to support a non-consensual analysis of 
agency.”1050 She concludes that a non-consensual view of agency “reflects 
neither historical development nor business practice in Scotland.”1051 Indeed, 
Forte and van Niekerk’s views do not represent the majority view even in 
South Africa. Kerr, for example, writes that in most cases, the agent’s 
authority will be “obtained… as a result of entry into a contract with the 
principal.”1052 He does not state categorically that agency relationships must 
be governed by contract, however, he views consent on the part of both 
parties as necessary for the grant of actual authority.1053   
                                                          
1045 Forte and van Niekerk (n 228) at 245-246. 
1046 Ibid. at 246. 
1047 Ibid. at 240. 
1048 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 3.03. The case cited is Barnetston v Peterson (1902) 5 F 86. 
1049 Barnetston v Peterson (1902) 5 F 86 at 90 per Lord Trayner.  
1050 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 3.03. 
1051 Ibid. 2.21. 
1052 AJ Kerr, Law of Agency (LexisNexis, South Africa, 4th edn, 2007) 4-5, citing Joel 
Malamed and Another v Cleveland Estate Malamed and Another [1984] 2 All SA 110 at 
166C-D per Corbett JA: “An act of representation needs to be authorised by the principal. 
Such authorisation is usually contained in a contract.” 
1053 Kerr, Agency (n 1052) 6.  
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McMeel submits that the key competitor to the consent theory of agency law 
is the power-liability theory.1054 This theory is sourced in Hohfeld’s premise 
that:  
“The creation of the agency relation involves, inter alia, the grant of 
legal powers to the so-called agent, and the creation of correlative 
liabilities in the principal. That is to say, one party P has the power to 
create agency powers in another party A - for example, the power to 
convey X's property, the power to impose (so-called) contractual 
obligations on P, the power to ‘receive’ title to property so that it shall 
vest in P, and so forth.”1055 
Dowrick summarises that this refers to an agent’s invested power to alter the 
principal’s legal ties with third parties, and the principal’s corresponding 
liability to fulfil these ties.1056 McMeel comments that this neat analysis 
encompasses all types of agency, whereas the consensual theory struggles 
to account for agency by necessity and agency by operation of law.1057 
However, he argues that the question of whether the agent is empowered to 
act for the principal is one of public policy, and:  
“once it is admitted that evidence of the principal's consent to the 
agent wielding power on his behalf is a sufficient public policy reason 
to recognise agency, there is serious danger of the ‘power-liability’ 
model collapsing into the qualified consensual approach.”1058  
This is entirely logical. The power liability theory alone does not account for 
the reasons why the agent is empowered by the principal, and, in the majority 
of cases, the agent has the power to bind the principal in legal relationships 
with third parties because the principal consents to being bound. Indeed, 
McMeel notes that the two theories may not contradict one another: the 
qualified consensual theory explains the normative bedrock of agency (i.e. 
consent), and the power liability theory explains the triangular relationship 
                                                          
1054 McMeel (n 1041) at 388.  
1055 WN Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (Yale 
University Press, Newhaven, 1923) 51-52.  
1056 FE Dowrick, “The Relationship of Principal and Agent” 1954 17(1) Modern Law Review 
24 at 36. McMeel lists other commentators who subscribe to this theory in McMeel (n 1041) 
at 393, including BS Markesinis and RJC Munday, An Outline of the Law of Agency 
(Butterworths, Oxford, 4th edn, 1998) 8-11.    
1057 McMeel (n 1041) at 392 and 395. 
1058 Ibid. at 396. 
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between the principal, agent, and third party.1059 The theory identified as a 
competitor to the consent theory is in fact compatible with a consensual 
account of agency, because the power liability model does not expressly 
provide that the agent’s power is not sourced in the principal’s consent.  
It is noted that apparent authority1060 can operate to bind a principal where it 
did not consent to liability to the third party.1061 However, Macgregor explains 
that this simply illustrates that the generally consensual perception of Scots 
agency has yielded in the case of apparent authority to the interests of third 
party protection.1062 Accordingly, apparent authority is an exception to the 
general rule that agency contracts are consensual.  
8.3.3. Summary  
Whilst there is ongoing debate in Scots law as to whether agency must 
necessary be contractual, the majority consensus is that agency in Scots law 
is contractual in nature. There is a limited body of Scots commentary which 
indicates that it may be possible to view agency transactions as consensual 
in nature. In English law, the consensual theory is dominant. Neither 
jurisdiction accepts a non-consensual view of agency. The conclusions of this 
section are used to address the question of whether ad hoc agency is 
compatible with the Scots law of agency as a whole,1063 which in turn informs 
the issue of whether the doctrine should be recognised in Scots law.  
8.4. Compatibility of ad hoc agency with Scots law  
This section examines the compatibility of ad hoc agency with privity, 
contract theory, and delict. It also examines the policy considerations for and 
against the recognition of ad hoc agency.  
 
                                                          
1059 McMeel (n 1041) at 410 and 396-399.   
1060 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 2.21.  
1061 Ibid. 
1062 Ibid.  
1063 See subsection 8.4.5. 
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8.4.1. Compatibility of ad hoc agency with the privity doctrine 
Neither case law nor commentary considering ad hoc agency has 
commented on its interaction with privity. However, it is clear that the concept 
operates in certain situations as an exception to the privity doctrine. Whilst 
Lord Drummond Young argues that the ad hoc agent is making a claim for 
the principal, this is a legal fiction, as will be discussed further below.1064  
In reality, the ad hoc agents in the two later cases, Laurence McIntosh Ltd v 
Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National Library of 
Scotland1065 and John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties 
Scotland Limited,1066 are enforcing the contracts between the so-called 
principals and third parties for their own benefit. In the case of John Stirling 
t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited,1067 for 
example, the new company was able to enforce the contract between the 
sole trader and the defender, despite the fact that the new company was not 
party to the contract. In Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd 
and the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland,1068 it is similarly clear 
that the company could enforce the contract made by the partnership. If ad 
hoc agency is to be recognised in Scots law, there must be valid policy 
reasons for its deviation from the privity doctrine.  
The earliest ad hoc agency case, Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd,1069 
did not deviate from privity. Fairbar was not attempting to enforce a clause in 
the contract between Goldapple and Whitbread, nor did Fairbar benefit under 
the contract between them. However, Lord Drummond Young has developed 
ad hoc agency in a manner which contravenes privity in the later cases. By 
creating the ad hoc agency doctrine, Lord Drummond Young has therefore 
                                                          
1064 See immediately below at subsection 8.4.2. 
1065 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
1066 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
1067 Ibid.  
1068 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
1069 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
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also developed a new exception to privity. He did not acknowledge this in his 
judgments in Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the 
Trustees of the National Library of Scotland1070 and John Stirling t/a M & S 
Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited.1071 
8.4.2. Compatibility of ad hoc agency with contract theory 
There is also a lack of commentary on the interaction between ad hoc 
agency and contract theory. However, Macgregor and Whitty question 
whether the concept complies with the requirements of agency more 
generally, in terms of whether the principal and ad hoc agent consent to the 
formation of an agency contract.1072 They describe Lord Drummond Young’s 
views on consent in Whitbread Group plc1073 as “unusual”, because he 
appears to treat the payment of the debt as sufficient to create the agency 
contract between Whitbread and Fairbar without considering whether the two 
parties consent to forming such a contract.1074 They observe that payment “in 
itself does not create a contract of agency – it simply acts as evidence from 
which inferences of intention can be made.”1075 They also note that the 
directors of Laurence McIntosh Ltd would have been “surprised” had they 
been told, prior to the case, that they were acting as agents for the inactive 
partnership.1076  
Essentially, in each of the cases, it is not clear that the party deemed to have 
acted as an ad hoc agent intended to do so, nor that it entered into an 
agency contract with the purported principals. Macgregor and Whitty note 
that agency can be inferred on the basis of the parties’ conduct,1077 and 
                                                          
1070 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
1071 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
1072 The question of whether agency more generally is contractual or consensual was 
discussed above at section 8.3; it was concluded that agency in Scots law must be 
consensual but need not be contractual.  
1073 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
1074 LJ Macgregor and Niall R Whitty, “Payment of Another’s Debt, Unjustified Enrichment 
and ad hoc Agency” 2011 15(1) Edinburgh Law Review 57 at 79.   
1075 Ibid. 
1076 Ibid. at 80.   
1077 Ibid. at 77-78. See also above at section 8.3. 
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Scots law recognises agency relationships created for one-off or limited 
purposes.1078 However, they stress that there was no conduct or agency 
contract in the ad hoc agency cases which could be said to give rise to an 
agency relationship.1079 There is no presumption in favour of agency, and, 
where the agency relationship is implied, a high standard of proof is 
imposed.1080 They comment that the approach to the requisite standard of 
proof seems, in the cases they cite, to be “much stricter than Lord Drummond 
Young’s approach.”1081 Indeed, Lord Drummond Young recognised in 
Whitbread1082 that there was “no actual intention on the part of the persons 
who issued the cheque that Fairbar should act as agent for Whitbread.”1083 In 
Laurence McIntosh1084 it was similarly accepted that the claim document was 
prepared by a party who had not considered whether the company had title 
to sue.1085 Lord Drummond Young indicates that this:  
“reinforces the inferences that no assignation was intended and that 
the claim document was presented by the company as an ad hoc 
agent for the partnership.”1086  
Neither the partnership nor the company could be said to have intended to 
conclude an assignation, and it is doubtful that either can be said to have 
intended to enter into an agency agreement. There is no logical reason to 
bypass the requirement that agency in Scots law is consensual, but protect 
the formalities of assignation. In John Stirling,1087 Lord Drummond Young 
justified his ad hoc agency analysis on the basis that it allowed the original 
contracting party to:  
                                                          
1078 Macgregor and Whitty (n 1074) at 77-78.  
1079 Ibid. at 78.  
1080 Ibid. (citing a number of cases including Eastern Marine Services (and Supplies) Ltd v 
Dickson Motors Ltd 1981 SC 355 at 357-359 per Lord Grieve).   
1081 Macgregor and Whitty (n 1074) at 78.  
1082 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
1083 Ibid. at para 19 per Lord Drummond Young. See also Macgregor and Whitty (n 1074) at 
80.  
1084 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
1085 Ibid. at para 18 per Lord Drummond Young.  
1086 Ibid. 
1087 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
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“remain in place as the subject of the contractual rights and 
obligations, whilst the correspondence bears the meaning that was 
obviously intended by the parties regarding the rights and obligations 
arising under the contract.”1088  
Whilst both the company and sole trader in the case can be said to have 
intended to transfer the rights and liabilities of the former to the latter, neither 
intended to enter into an agency relationship. Any such intention is artificially 
implied. Rather, they intended to transfer the rights and liabilities under the 
contract and failed to properly do so.  
Macgregor and Whitty recognise that the manipulation of the requirement 
that the principal and agent must consent, through contract or otherwise, to 
an agency relationship might “threaten the role of consent in the formation of 
agency relationships.”1089 It thus appears that the development of the 
doctrine has created a new exception to the formation requirements of 
agency law,1090 and cannot be explained on the basis of the intentions of the 
parties to the so-called agency contract. 
The lack of consent to form an agency contract has implications for the 
compatibility of ad hoc agency with the will theory. The theory requires 
consent on the part of the contracting parties, and it is clear that the principal 
and ad hoc agent do not consent to form an agency contract, or for the ad 
hoc agent to act as an agent for the principal. The lack of consent means that 
there is no theoretically valid basis for forcing the third party to perform in 
favour of the ad hoc agent, and that ad hoc agency is not compatible with the 
will theory. Similarly, it cannot be said that the ad hoc agent promised to 
conclude any transactions for the principal, nor that it voluntarily assumed the 
responsibilities of an agent in respect of the principal. Ad hoc agency cannot 
therefore be explained in terms of promissory or assumption theory.  
                                                          
1088 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117 at paras 16 and 20, at which Lord Drummond Young distinguished between the 
parties’ general correspondence and a letter of intention to refer the dispute to adjudication.  
1089 Macgregor and Whitty (n 1074) at 80.   
1090 The implications of this are discussed further below at subsection 8.4.5. 
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The interaction between ad hoc agency and contract theory is also 
problematic from the perspective of the third party. The third party initially 
intended to contract with the principal only, and ad hoc agency forces the 
third party to perform in favour of the agent, with whom it has not consented 
to contract. This contravenes the will theory. In terms of the promissory 
theory, it cannot be said that the third party has made a promise to the ad 
hoc agent, because it did not have knowledge of the agent’s existence at the 
time at which it entered into the contract with the principal. For the same 
reason, it cannot be argued that the third party has voluntarily assumed an 
obligation to perform in favour of the principal. The concept is not therefore 
compatible with assumption theory.   
In summary, ad hoc agency is incompatible with contract theory as well as 
the requirements of agency law more generally. Ad hoc agency cannot 
therefore, in the contexts in which it contradicts privity, be justified on the 
basis that it upholds the intentions of the contracting parties.  
8.4.3. Compatibility of ad hoc agency with delict  
The third party’s liability to the ad hoc agent cannot stem from an agency 
contract meeting the consent requirement of agency law, or the third party’s 
own consent to contract with the agent. The liability on the part of the third 
party is involuntary, and it is therefore relevant to ascertain whether the third 
party’s liability could be classed as delictual.  
A delictual classification would require that there is a duty of care on the part 
of the third party in respect of the ad hoc agent. There is no legal basis for 
such a duty of care. When the third party contracts with the principal, it does 
not assume responsibility for the ad hoc agent in terms of Hedley Byrne 
liability.1091 This is because the third party had no reason to believe at the 
point it contracted with the principal that its performance under the contract 
may impact on the ad hoc agent, and so there can be neither an assumption 
                                                          
1091 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
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of responsibility nor a ‘special relationship’ as required under Hedley 
Byrne1092 liability. 
In chapter 7,1093 it is submitted that Junior Books liability could potentially be 
imposed in transferred loss situations, if that form of liability was extended to 
allow for recovery where the contracting party not aware of the specific third 
party. This could not be extended to ad hoc agency. In each of the ad hoc 
agency cases, the third party was engaged to provide a particular service to 
the principal. It is not foreseeable to the third party that the entire contract 
could be transferred to the ad hoc agent. The concept is not therefore 
compatible with delictual liability.  
8.4.4. Policy considerations justifying ad hoc agency  
The development of ad hoc agency has been justified on the basis that this 
reflects commercial reality. According to Lord Drummond Young, the facts of 
Whitbread1094 demonstrate that:  
“the acts of large companies are frequently performed by the relatively 
junior employees acting under the corporate structures that have been 
set up to govern a multiplicity of transactions, with no regard to any 
particular transaction. In those circumstances it is in my opinion quite 
unrealistic to attempt to attribute a specific intention to any individual 
or group of individuals. The corporate intention must be determined 
objectively, by examining both the individual transaction and the 
corporate structures under which it was effected.”1095 
This led Lord Drummond Young to conclude that there was, in Whitbread 
Group plc,1096 a “clear corporate intention” that Fairbar would act for 
Whitbread for the purposes of paying Whitbread’s debt. In Laurence 
McIntosh,1097 he stated that a reasonable person would construe the claim 
document in that case as: 
                                                          
1092 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
1093 See subsection 7.3.3.  
1094 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
1095 Ibid. at para 19 per Lord Drummond Young.  
1096 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
1097 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
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“being presented through the company but acting as agent for the true 
contracting party, the partnership. As a matter of commercial reality, 
that would plainly be a sensible way to proceed, avoiding the need for 
a formal assignation but permitting the active trading entity, the 
company, to progress matters on behalf of the true contracting 
party.”1098  
In John Stirling,1099 he similarly commented that commercial contracts must 
be given a “commercially sensible construction”.1100 Lord Drummond Young’s 
motivation for developing ad hoc agency is, accordingly, ensuring a 
commercially sensible and fair outcome.  
This is reflected in the views of other commentators. Warrender, for example, 
notes that Lord Drummond Young’s finding of ad hoc agency in John 
Stirling1101 reflected that the arrangement between the parties “constituted 
normal commercial practice”.1102 This would adhere to the justification of 
commercial necessity underpinning some of the statutory exceptions.  
However, it is not clear that ad hoc agency is commercially convenient for all 
parties concerned. In the cases which contravene privity, the operation of ad 
hoc agency was certainly convenient for the new commercial entities (the 
new companies in Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the 
Trustees of the National Library of Scotland1103 and John Stirling t/a M & S 
Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited1104). However, the 
benefits of ad hoc agency to the respective defenders are unclear. In both 
cases, the defenders would not have expected to owe liability to the new 
                                                          
1098 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197 at para 18 per Lord Drummond Young.  
1099 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
1100 Ibid. at para 17 per Lord Drummond Young.  
1101 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
1102 A Warrender, “The name of the game” September 19 2007 Contract Journal 47 at 47. 
See also T Bingham, “It ain't necessarily so” 2007 41 Building 82 and “‘Dispute or difference’ 
and corporate personality” 2007(Nov) Building Law Monthly 1, which discuss John Stirling t/a 
M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] CSOH 117 and ad hoc 
agency in neutral terms, seemingly accepting the doctrine without comment or criticism as a 
justifiable part of Scots law.    
1103 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
1104 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
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entities, and the operation of ad hoc agency results in an adverse outcome 
for these parties, as they are forced to uphold contracts with the new entities. 
Indeed, it cannot be said that ad hoc agency is of benefit to the original 
partnership and sole trader (in in Laurence McIntosh Ltd1105 and John 
Stirling1106 respectively), because these parties were not in existence at the 
time at which the case was decided. On examination of the operation of ad 
hoc agency in the relevant cases, it is not therefore possible to justify the 
concept’s deviation from privity on the grounds of commercial convenience. 
Whilst it is not relevant to the question of whether the concept is justifiable as 
an exception to privity, it is also submitted that Whitbread1107 fails to reflect a 
policy of fairness and commercial convenience. In the case, Goldapple 
sought to return the cheque because it was concerned that acceptance of 
payment from Fairbar would be construed as consent to Whitbread’s 
assignation of the lease.1108 Lord Drummond Young recognises that this was 
a reasonable concern, but states that this could have been addressed by 
writing to either Fairbar or Whitbread to clarify that payment could not be 
treated as acceptance that the lease had been assigned.1109 Goldapple was 
in this case seeking to protect its own interests, and, given that Whitbread1110 
was the first case in which ad hoc agency was introduced, it could not have 
foreseen that it would be perceived by Lord Drummond Young as refusing to 
interact with an agent. The outcome seems neither fair1111 nor commercially 
convenient from Goldapple’s perspective.  
                                                          
1105 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
1106 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
1107 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
1108 Ibid. at para 17 per Lord Drummond Young. Goldapple did not wish to permit assignation 
because it had little information on Fairbar’s financial position and suitability as a tenant, 
whereas Whitbread was a large, well-known company whom Goldapple felt it could trust. 
Accordingly, the Managing Director of Goldapple instructed his employees not to do anything 
which could be perceived as acceptance of Fairbar as a new tenant. 
1109 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281 at para 19 per Lord 
Drummond Young. 
1110 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
1111 It is acknowledged that the outcome would have been fair if the decision was based on 
the law relating to payment of another’s debt. The case did not consider this issue. See 
below at subsection 8.4.5. 
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It is true that Scottish courts have, in recent years, recognised interpretations 
of contracts reflecting commercial common sense.1112 However, the meaning 
of commercial common sense in the context of contractual interpretation 
reflects, as noted by Lorna Richardson,1113 Lord Neuberger’s dicta in Arnold 
v Britton1114 that the meaning of any contractual clause must be assessed in 
light of “the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the 
time that the document was executed”.1115 The parties to the relevant 
contracts in the ad hoc agency cases would not have known that the 
contracts would later be relied upon by a different party seeking to step into 
the shoes of the original contracting party. The construction favoured by Lord 
Drummond Young does not therefore reflect a principle of commercial 
common sense but, rather, an unrealistic manipulation of the facts at hand.  
8.4.5. Policy considerations against the recognition of ad hoc agency  
This subsection examines the interaction between ad hoc agency and the 
law of agency more generally, as well as addressing the doctrine’s impact on 
the laws of assignation and separate legal personality. It also examines 
whether ad hoc agency was in fact a necessary development to achieve the 
result in Whitbread.1116 These issues are considered in turn.  
As discussed above,1117 ad hoc agency is an exception to the general rules 
of agency as well as an exception to privity, because the ad hoc agent and 
the principal cannot be said to consent to an agency contract. Macgregor 
cautions against the manipulation of agency in this respect, stating that whilst 
agency can be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances, it would be:  
“dangerous… to over-emphasise the ease with which agency can be 
created in a modern context… The litigation involving ad hoc agency 
illustrates that the ease with which agency can be established leaves it 
                                                          
1112 L Richardson, “Commercial Common Sense Revisited: Further Developments in 
Contract Interpretation and Commercial Leasing” 2016 20(3) Edinburgh Law Review 348; L 
Richardson, “Commercial Common Sense in Contract Interpretation: Further Views from the 
Inner House” 21(3) Edinburgh Law Review 2017 423.  
1113 Richardson, “Common Sense Revisited” (n 1112) at 344.  
1114 Arnold v Britton [2015] 2 WLR 1593.  
1115 Ibid. at para 15 per Lord Neuberger.  
1116 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
1117 See subsection 8.4.2.  
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open to abuse for wider policy aims. This is unfortunate, and will 
inevitably add confusion to the legal rules governing the creation of 
agency.”1118 
It is correct that ad hoc agency’s disregard for the general principles of 
consent in agency law creates unnecessary confusion and jeopardises the 
theoretical clarity of agency law. Further, the concept contradicts other 
aspects of the law of agency. Lord Drummond Young indicates in John 
Stirling1119 that ad hoc agency could only apply to legal acts which did not 
require formality (such as entering into correspondence, delivering invoices, 
and giving contractual notice). The correct party would, according to Lord 
Drummond Young, be required for matters involving formal processes 
including litigation and adjudication.1120 It is not clear why there should be 
such a distinction. Agents are normally restricted within the confines of their 
authority, rather than whether the acts they undertake require legal formality. 
Macgregor and Whitty note that this ‘formality limitation’ means that an ad 
hoc agent’s authority is more restricted than that of a normal agent, which 
means that ad hoc agency is a “new and different species of agency.”1121 
This limitation does not therefore reflect the normal rules of agency law. This 
high degree of judicial creativity further jeopardises the clarity of the law of 
agency. The law should be accessible to contractual parties and doctrinally 
clear. Ad hoc agency contradicts these policy aims because it casts 
confusion on the law of agency as a whole.  
Ad hoc agency also contradicts the law on assignation and separate legal 
personality. In Laurence McIntosh,1122 Lord Drummond Young expressly 
refrained from taking a “liberal view” of the law on assignation, because the 
question of whether assignation was successful impacted upon the parties’ 
rights of retention and set-off.1123 However, the operation of ad hoc agency in 
                                                          
1118 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 3.05. See also Macgregor (n 1020) at 381-382.  
1119 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
1120 Ibid. at para 16 per Lord Drummond Young.  
1121 Macgregor and Whitty (n 1074) at 82.   
1122 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
1123 Ibid. at para 17 per Lord Drummond Young.  
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Laurence McIntosh1124 and John Stirling1125 allows a person the right to claim 
on a contract to which it is not party despite the fact that it has failed to 
comply with the requirements of assignation. Macgregor and Whitty comment 
that assignation is “an important part of the law of obligations, [and so this] is 
highly questionable.”1126 As such, Lord Drummond Young has unjustifiably 
created confusion in the law of assignation. Further, it is illogical to justify 
deviation from the requirements of assignation on the grounds that doing so 
by other means (ad hoc agency) does not involve contravention of the law of 
assignation.  
Regarding the interaction between ad hoc agency and the law on separate 
legal personality, Lord Drummond Young accepts in John Stirling1127 that if 
the “doctrine of separate corporate personality is applied with its full rigour, 
the defenders' argument is clearly correct”.1128 He justified the imposition of 
ad hoc agency on the grounds that in “commercial practice, it is not unusual 
to discover that the niceties of the doctrine of separate corporate personality 
are ignored.”1129 This doctrine has indeed been circumvented in accordance 
with, for example, the well-established law on ‘piercing the corporate veil’,1130 
and parties may choose to ignore the technicalities of separate legal 
personality in commercial practice. However, this does not justify 
circumventing the law on separate legal personality more generally, 
particularly when doing so also contravenes the law on agency. The 
“common thread” unifying Lord Drummond Young’s three cases is the effect 
of the separate legal personality of the companies.1131 Whitbread1132 is 
unproblematic in this respect. Fairbar was not seeking to act as an agent for 
                                                          
1124 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197.  
1125 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
1126 Macgregor and Whitty (n 1074) at 80.  
1127 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
1128 Ibid. at para 16 per Lord Drummond Young.  
1129 Ibid.  
1130 Macgregor and Whitty note that a solution based on this analysis could not have applied 
in the ad hoc agency cases: Macgregor and Whitty (n 1074) at 74.  
1131 Ibid.  
1132 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
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Whitbread; it simply wished to discharge the company’s rent which is, as 
discussed further below,1133 permissible in Scots law. In John Stirling1134 and 
Laurence McIntosh,1135 on the other hand, there existed no legal means by 
which the relevant parties ought to have been entitled to claim debt or raise 
legal proceedings related to another company. Accordingly, the imposition of 
ad hoc agency necessarily involved deviation from the laws on separate legal 
personality.  
Utilising the law of agency to bypass the separate legal personality of 
companies is not uncontroversial. Macgregor notes, in relation to the 
reasoning in Cramaso LLP,1136 that Mr Erskine’s creation of the company 
prevented him from obtaining a remedy in the company’s name.1137 She 
comments that whilst strict application of the law on separate legal 
personality may seem unfair, “arguably Mr Erskine should not have been 
able to pursue rights which he held individually.”1138 She and Whitty comment 
that in both Laurence McIntosh1139 and John Stirling,1140 the relevant parties 
were either ignorant of the importance of proper incorporation, or they were 
aware that they technically ought to ensure that the proper legal procedures 
were completed, in order to correctly transfer the rights and liabilities, but 
they chose not to spend time and money dealing with this issue.1141 As such, 
the doctrine of ad hoc agency “operates in these cases as a ‘get out of jail 
free’ card, available to parties who have failed properly to regulate their legal 
affairs.”1142 Macgregor and Whitty question whether the “distortion” of the law 
                                                          
1133 This is discussed below in this subsection.  
1134 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.  
1135 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197.  
1136 Cramaso LLP v Ogilvie-Grant and others [2014] UKSC 9. The facts of this case are 
discussed above at section 8.2.  
1137 The case was however resolved in Mr Erskine’s favour in terms of continuing liability for 
a negligent misstatement.   
1138 Macgregor (n 1012) at 117.   
1139 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
1140 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.   
1141 Macgregor and Whitty (n 1074) at 80.   
1142 Ibid.  
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on agency and the doctrine of separate legal personality is justified on the 
grounds of providing remedies to those who do not properly protect their own 
legal interests.1143 As they point out, if the relevant parties had not made sure 
to properly incorporate the new company or partnership due to legal advice 
to the effect that this was unnecessary, they could potentially have claimed 
against their solicitors, given that such advice would have been negligent.1144  
The doctrine of ad hoc agency accordingly seems to exist to protect only 
those who have either failed to follow legal advice to properly assign 
contracts to relevant persons, complete incorporation of new legal entities, or 
have failed to seek legal advice. Ad hoc agency could arguably support the 
policy aim of protecting extra-contractual parties. However, as discussed in 
chapter 5, such protection ought only to arise where the extra-contractual 
party did not have the means to protect themselves, or where the party could 
not reasonably be expected to protect themselves.1145 Commercial parties 
ought to properly manage their own legal affairs. Ad hoc agency cannot 
therefore be justified on the basis of the protection of weaker parties.  
Whilst the case did not contravene privity, it should be acknowledged that the 
development of ad hoc agency was not in fact necessary to achieve the 
outcome in Whitbread.1146 Macgregor and Whitty point out that the 
development of ad hoc agency may have resulted from the failure of counsel 
in the case to cite the main Scots authorities dealing with payment of 
another’s debt.1147 The key question was whether payment of another’s debt 
distinguishes the debt, and it was not the case, as counsel assumed, that 
                                                          
1143 Macgregor and Whitty (n 1074) at 80-81.  
1144 Ibid. at 86. In Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the 
National Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197, there had been no formal transfer of the 
partnership’s assets and liabilities to the company because the partners had been told that 
this was not necessary (at para 15 per Lord Drummond Young). Lord Drummond Young 
indicates that this advice was unsurprising given the formalities required for assignation (at 
para 17), but it is submitted that this is illogical given that the case itself illustrates the 
problems which can arise when a new company does not ensure that it has title to sue in 
respect of contracts for which it takes responsibility. 
1145 See subsection 5.4.1.  
1146 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
1147 Macgregor and Whitty (n 1074) at 59.  
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Scots law did not have a position on this matter.1148 A full discussion on the 
relevant law is found in Macgregor and Whitty’s article on the case.1149 
Essentially, the case could and should have been resolved using existing law 
on the payment of another’s debt.1150 Accordingly, the development of a new 
exception to agency law in Whitbread1151 cannot be justified, because there 
was no reason to deviate from the normal principles governing the payment 
of another’s debt. The existence of a current body of law on the payment of 
another’s debt would not however have aided Lord Drummond Young in 
Laurence McIntosh1152 or John Stirling,1153 both of which concern the 
recovery of debt due under another’s contract rather than the payment of 
debt. Nonetheless, these cases unjustifiably breach privity, contract theory, 
the principles of agency, and the law of assignation and separate legal 
personality. The cases are therefore also incorrectly decided.   
8.5. Concluding remarks  
Ad hoc agency is doubtless an interesting development, but it is compatible 
with neither Scots contract nor delict law. Its operation in cases involving the 
transfer of obligations between separate legal entities contravenes the privity 
doctrine, and this cannot be justified on the basis of the contracting parties’ 
intentions. Further, it violates the law of agency, assignation, and separate 
legal personality. In light of the lack of sound policy considerations in support 
of ad hoc agency, the uncertainty in agency law created by the concept, and 
the impact it has on the doctrinal clarity of assignation and separate legal 
personality, it cannot be justified as an exception to privity. Therefore, 
Macgregor and Whitty are correct in their conclusion that the doctrine should 
                                                          
1148 Macgregor and Whitty (n 1074) at 59-60.   
1149 Ibid. at 62-74.  
1150 Ibid. at 79-80.   
1151 Whitbread Group plc v Goldapple Ltd (No 2) 2005 SLT 281. 
1152 Laurence McIntosh Ltd v Balfour Beatty Group Ltd and the Trustees of the National 
Library of Scotland [2006] CSOH 197. 
1153 John Stirling t/a M & S Contracts v Westminster Properties Scotland Limited [2007] 
CSOH 117.   
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be “nipped in the bud”.1154 Ad hoc agency should not continue to be 
recognised in Scots law.  
Fortunately, the concept is in its relative infancy, and does not require 
statutory abolition, because it has only thus far been recognised in the Outer 
House. Ideally, the development of the doctrine should be halted by Inner 
House (or Supreme Court) dicta should a case arise with similar facts to the 
ad hoc agency cases.  
  
                                                          






Chapter 9: Undisclosed agency  
9.1. Overview of chapter 9 
This chapter defines undisclosed agency and provides an overview of its 
development in Scots and English law. It addresses undisclosed agency’s 
compatibility with the privity doctrine, comparing the direct contract thesis and 
the intervention thesis, examines its relationship with the main theories of 
contract law, and determines whether undisclosed agency can be explained 
in terms of delictual liability. The final subsections analyse whether the policy 
considerations put forward in commentary justify the continued existence of 
undisclosed agency, offers arguments against the recognition of undisclosed 
agency, and discusses whether undisclosed agency ought to be abolished in 
Scots law.  
9.2. Undisclosed agency in Scots and English law  
This section defines undisclosed agency and outlines its development in 
Scots and English law.  
9.2.1. Definition of undisclosed agency in Scots law 
In the context of disclosed agency, an agent will negotiate with the third party 
on behalf of its principal, in order to facilitate transactions between the 
principal and the third party, and the third party will know that the agent is 
acting in a representative capacity.1155 Disclosed agency is the norm in 
agency transactions.1156 In contrast, undisclosed agency applies where the 
agent is instructed by the principal not to disclose to the third party that it is 
acting in a representative capacity.1157 The existence and identity of the 
principal is not revealed to the third party.1158 In Lockhart v Moodie,1159 for 
example, the defender, D. Moodie and Company, entered into a joint venture 
                                                          
1155 LJ Macgregor, The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia: Agency and 
Mandate (Reissue) (hereafter “SME”), (LexisNexis/ Law Society of Scotland, London/ 
Edinburgh, 2001) para 1.  
1156 Ibid.  
1157 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.25; Gloag, Contract (n 65) 127; JJH Pearson, “Agency” in 
ADM Forte (ed), Scots Commercial Law (Butterworths, Edinburgh 1997) 272 at 289.    
1158 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.25.   
1159 Lockhart v Moodie 1877 4 R 859.  
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with a merchant based in Dundee. The company authorised the merchant to 
purchase yarn from Lockhart for the purposes of the joint venture, and the 
merchant did so without disclosing that he was working on behalf of the 
company. It was found that there was an undisclosed agency contract 
between the company (the principal) and the merchant (the agent). Lockhart, 
the third party, could sue the company directly when he became aware of the 
joint venture.  
Assuming that the agent has acted within the limits of its authority, the 
undisclosed principal can “sue or be sued by the third party as if the principal 
had been bound in a contract with the third party from the outset”1160 after the 
third party is made aware of the principal’s existence. This contrasts with 
disclosed agency transactions, in which the agent is generally not a party to 
the contract (although the agent can be liable if the contracting parties so 
intend).1161 
The liability of both the principal and third party is alternative, not joint-and-
several.1162 The third party chooses which party to sue by expressly 
informing the agent and principal of its choice,1163 or the third party’s 
selection may be inferred from its conduct.1164 Lord Young states in Meier & 
Co v Küchenmeister1165 that a third party “cannot have two principals to deal 
with, and no double remedy is allowed”.1166 The third party is treated as 
having chosen between suing the principal and agent only after the principal 
is disclosed, and must be in possession of the knowledge necessary to make 
this choice.1167 The third party can claim against the principal regardless of 
                                                          
1160 Macgregor, SME (n 1155) para 147, citing Hutton v Bulloch (1874) LR 9 QB 572. See 
also Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.34; Bell, Principles 1889 (n 52) 224A; Smith, Short 
Commentary (n 36) 777; Gloag, Contract (n 65) 128 and 133; Thomson v Davenport 1829 9 
B & C 78; Bennet v Inveresk Paper Co 1891 18 R 975.   
1161 Bell, Principles 1889 (n 52) 224A.  
1162 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.34; Gloag, Contract (n 65) 140; Pearson (n 1157) at 289.  
1163 Macgregor, SME (n 1155) para 155; Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.34; Meier & Co v 
Küchenmeister (1881) 8 R 642.  
1164 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.40-42.  
1165 Meier & Co v Küchenmeister (1881) 8 R 642. 
1166 Ibid. at 646 per Lord Young.  
1167 Stevenson v Campbell (1836) 14 S 562; A F Craig & Co v Blackater 1923 SC 472; 
Gloag, Contract (n 65) 140.  
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whether the principal has paid the agent.1168 Gloag rationalises this on the 
basis that “if [the principal] chooses to trust his agent, [he] must bear the loss 
if his trust prove misplaced.”1169 Once the third party elects to sue either the 
principal or the agent, the other is liberated and cannot be sued if the third 
party changes its mind.1170 Following disclosure of the principal, the agent 
remains capable of suing the third party.1171 
If the principal discloses itself and attempts to make a claim against the third 
party, it is subject to any defences which the third party could have used 
against the agent.1172 This is because the third party “cannot be deprived of 
the benefit of the securities which he could fairly contemplate as resulting 
from the contract.”1173 Further, the third party can, if sued by the principal, 
claim compensation on any debt owed to it by the agent where the debt was 
incurred prior to the third party’s notice of the existence of the undisclosed 
principal.1174 Macgregor explains that this rule reflects that the third party was 
under the impression that its contract was with the agent, and so the entirety 
of the third party’s claim against the agent must be upheld regardless of the 
principal’s disclosure.1175 This protects the third party from being prejudiced 
by the disclosure of the principal.1176 Similarly, the third party cannot be 
forced to make a payment to the principal if it has already settled the debt 
due under the contract with the agent.1177 The third party cannot, however, 
                                                          
1168 Bell, Principles 1889 (n 52) 224A.   
1169 Gloag, Contract (n 65) 129-130.  
1170 Bell, Principles 1889 (n 52) 224A; Macgregor, SME (n 1155) para 147. See also para 
152: “If the third party elects to claim against the principal, he or she effectively indicates to 
the agent that the agent is released from the obligation. Having elected, the third party 
cannot change his mind and choose instead to claim against the agent.” 
1171 A F Craig & Co v Blackater 1923 SC 472; Macgregor, SME (n 1155) para 157; Smith, 
Short Commentary (n 36) 777.    
1172 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.46, citing Bennet v Inveresk Paper Co (1891) 18 R 975. 
See also Bell, Principles 1889 (n 52) 224A.    
1173 Bell, Commentaries (n 289) I, 527-529. See also I, 537.  
1174 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.46; Bell, Commentaries (n 289) I, 527-9 and I, 537; Bell, 
Principles 1889 (n 52) 224A; Gall v Murdoch (1821) 1 S 77; Bennet v Inveresk Paper Co 
(1891) 18 R 975 at 985 per Lord McLaren; Wester Moffat Colliery Co Ltd v A Jeffrey & Co 
1911 SC 346.   
1175 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.46.  
1176 Ibid.  
1177 Macgregor, SME (n 1155) para 162; International Sponge Importers Ltd v Andrew Watt 
& Sons 1911 SC (HL) 57.  
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use defences which the agent has against the principal, or assert 
compensation on debt owed by the principal to the agent.1178 
Generally, the undisclosed agent cannot act as such where the contract 
between the agent and third party provides that the party with whom the third 
party contracts is not acting for an undisclosed principal.1179 Such provision 
can be express1180 or implied.1181 Further, undisclosed agency cannot 
operate in respect of contracts where delectus personae applies.1182  
9.2.2. Development of undisclosed agency in Scots law   
Scots law has recognised undisclosed agency from at least the late 
seventeenth century.1183 Macgregor stresses that English law has influenced 
the development of the Scots law on undisclosed agency.1184 Bell, for 
example, cites the English case of Paterson v Gandasequi1185 in his writing 
on the Scots law of agency.1186 Macgregor notes, however, that it is uncertain 
whether undisclosed agency is a “native development” or wholly sourced 
from English law.1187 There is a dearth of Scottish case law on undisclosed 
agency, perhaps due to the fact that there is no impetus on the part of the 
principal to disclose itself when the third party makes a claim against the 
agent.1188 
Article 46 of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of 
value added tax applies to “intermediaries” including undisclosed agents,1189 
                                                          
1178 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.46. 
1179 Macgregor, SME (n 1155) para 153.  
1180 Ibid.  
1181 JA Salton & Co v Clydesdale Bank Ltd (1898) 1 F 110. 
1182 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.37.  
1183 See Street v Hume and Bruntfield (1699) Mor. 15122 and Sterly v Spence (1687) Mor. 
15127. These cases do not expressly use the term ‘undisclosed principal’, but the factual 
matrixes match the present-day undisclosed agency doctrine. See also CGH Paton (ed), 
Baron David Hume’s lectures, 1786-1822 vol II (The Stair Society, Edinburgh, 1939-58) 160.  
1184 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.28.  
1185 Paterson v Gandasequi (1812) 15 East. 62.   
1186 Bell, Principles 1889 (n 52) 224A; Bell, Commentaries (n 289) I, 537.     
1187 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.26. She cites Smith, Short Commentary (n 36) 775, and 
notes that Smith concludes that the concept of undisclosed agency was likely adopted from 
England. English law is discussed further below at subsection 9.2.3. 
1188 Macgregor, SME (n 1155) para 160.  
1189 J Paterson, “International Services” 2014 104(Aug) VAT Digest 4 at 23.  
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and section 47 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 specifically applies to 
undisclosed agents. There are no other statutory provisions which recognise 
the existence of undisclosed agency. The Commercial Agents (Council 
Directive) Regulations 1993 apply only where the commercial agent acts in 
the principal’s name, on a disclosed basis.1190 Consequently, these 
Regulations do not cover the actions of an undisclosed agent. Macgregor 
explains that undisclosed agency was omitted because, unlike Scots and 
English law, continental systems do not distinguish between internal and 
external agency relationships.1191  
9.2.3. Undisclosed agency in English law   
English law has recognised the doctrine of undisclosed agency since at least 
the eighteenth century.1192 It operates as an exception to the general rule in 
English law that, as in Scots law, agents are not generally bound in agency 
structures but, rather, only the principal is bound.1193  
According to Munday1194 and Whittaker,1195 factors may have influenced the 
development of undisclosed agency. The term ‘factor’ has had various 
meanings in English law. The ‘original’ factors, a type of mercantile agent 
defined under the Factors Act 1889, are “now practically extinct”.1196 It was, 
however, the development of the function of these factors which impacted on 
undisclosed agency. These factors sold goods for owners who did not reside 
                                                          
1190 Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993 Regulation 2.  
1191 Macgregor, SME (n 1155) para 164.  
1192 CH Tan, “Undisclosed principals and contract” 2004 120(Jul) Law Quarterly Review 480 
at 481. See also Whittaker (n 113) at 269; Powell, Agency (n 1039) 34; Scrimshire v Alderton 
(1743) 2 Stra. 1192; Duke of Norfolk v Worthy (1808) 1 Camp. 227; Skinner v Stocks (1821) 
4 B & Ald. 437; Armstrong v Stokes and Others (1872) LR 598; Siu Yin Kwan v Eastern 
Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 AC 199; Greer v Downs Supply Co [1926] All ER Rep. 675.   
1193 M Conaglen and R Nolan, “Contracts and knowing receipt: principles and application” 
2013 129(Jul) Law Quarterly Review 359 at 363; Watts (ed), Bowstead and Reynolds (n 
1037) 8.071 and 9.012.   
1194 R Munday, “A Legal History of the Factor” 1977 6(4) Anglo-American Law Review 221 at 
244.   
1195 Whittaker (n 113) at 271. See also G Fridman, “Undisclosed Principals and the Sale of 
Goods” in D Busch, L Macgregor, and P Watts, Agency Law in Commercial Practice (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2016) 70 at 70-71.   
1196 Munday (n 1194) at 221, at which Munday also explains the difference between these 
factors and more modern commercial financiers, who sometimes refer to themselves as 
factors. The function of modern factors is described at 221-222.    
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at the place of sale,1197 usually selling in their own names without disclosing 
that they were working on behalf of principals.1198 In the context of factoring, 
the use of undisclosed agency structures appears to have arisen due to 
changes in trading methods which led to greater financial demands on the 
factor.1199 This was recognised in the law by allowing greater flexibility in the 
factor’s authority.1200 The courts recognised the ability of factors to sell their 
principals’ goods in their own names (i.e. as undisclosed agents), for reasons 
of commercial convenience on the part of the factors and principals, despite 
the fact that “persons with whom goods were pledged by a factor might suffer 
great hardship when it subsequently emerged that he was not the true owner 
of the goods.”1201 The development of undisclosed agency in this context was 
thus a response to greater demands on the factor which resulted in the law 
allowing greater flexibility in its and the principal’s powers. 
In accordance with Lord Lloyd’s summary of the relevant English law in Siu 
Yin Kwan v Eastern Insurance Co Ltd,1202 both the undisclosed principal and 
agent acting within the scope of its actual authority can sue and be sued on 
the contract.1203 As in Scots law, the third party can only be treated as having 
chosen to sue the agent or principal after the latter’s disclosure.1204 The third 
party does not have a duty to ascertain whether the agent is acting as 
such.1205 This also correlates with Scots law. Undisclosed agency cannot 
                                                          
1197 Munday (n 1194) at 244.    
1198 Baring v Corrie (1818) 106 ER 317 at 320 per Abbott CJ. 
1199 Munday (n 1194) at 243.  
1200 Ibid.  
1201 Ibid. at 244. See also Baring v Corie (1818) 106 ER 317; Montagu v Forwood [1893] 2 
QB 350.  
1202 Siu Yin Kwan v Eastern Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 AC 199. 
1203 Ibid. at 207 per Lord Lloyd. See further T Krebs, “Some Thoughts on Undisclosed 
Agency” in L Gullifer and S Vogenauer (eds), English and European Perspectives on 
Contract and Commercial Law: Essays in Honour of Hugh Beale (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2014) 161 at 165; Powell, Agency (n 1039) 27; R Munday, Agency: Law and Principles 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 3rd edn, 2016) 10.27.   
1204 Kendall v Hamilton 1849 4 App. Cas. 504 at 542 per Lord Blackburn; Muldoon v Wood 
[1998] EWCA Civ. 588 per Sir John Knox; Munday, Agency (n 1203) 10.28.  




operate in personal contracts.1206 Additionally, Said v Butt1207 provides that 
an undisclosed principal may not sue the third party where the identity of the 
contracting party was a material factor in the formation of the contract 
between the agent and third party.1208 Undisclosed agency can, as in Scots 
law, be excluded by express or implied contractual provision.1209 
The third party has a wider range of defences available when sued by the 
principal in English law than in Scots law. It can use any defences against the 
principal which it would have had if the principal had formed the contract.1210 
Macgregor notes that the contrast between Scots and English law can be 
explained by the fact that, in English law, the initial contract in the 
undisclosed agency transaction is between the principal and third party, 
despite it being made by the agent.1211 Like Scots law, however, the principal 
may not use the defences which it has against the agent in a claim against 
the third party,1212 nor can it apply set-off to a debt owed by the agent in 
respect of the third party.1213 The principal can however use the agent’s non-
personal defences against the third party.1214 The liability of the agent and 
principal is, as in Scots law, alternative rather than joint-and-several.1215 
                                                          
1206 Munday, Agency (n 1203) 10.50; citing Barrett v Universal-Island Records Ltd [2006] 
EMLR 21 at para 233 per Lewison J.  
1207 Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497. 
1208 The case is discussed further below at subsection 9.4.4. See also Rolls-Royce Power 
Engineering v Ricardo [2004] 2 All ER (Comm.) 129 at paras 50 and 56 per Judge Richard 
Seymour QC; Collins v Associated Greyhound Racecourses Limited [1930] 1 Ch. 1 at 18 per 
Luxmoore J; Teheran-Europe Co. Ltd. v ST Belton (Tractors) Ltd. [1968] 2 QB 545 at 555 
per Lord Diplock; Unnamed author, “Agency, ‘No Loss’ and Legal Black Holes” 2004 21(7) 
Building Law Monthly 1 at 2-3; H Bennett, Principles of the Law of Agency (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2013). Macgregor notes the lack of Scots authority on this point: Macgregor, Agency 
(n 224) 12.38.     
1209 Mutual Steamship Assurance Association v Nevill 19 (1887) QBD 110; JA Rayner 
(Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 AC 418 at 516 per Lord 
Oliver of Aylmerton; Munday, Agency (n 1203) 10.39-48.  
1210 Watts (ed), Bowstead and Reynolds (n 1037) 8.099; Powell, Agency (n 1039) 175; 
Munday, Agency (n 1203) 10.65.  
1211 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.46. The question of whether it can be said that the 
contracting parties are the principal and agent at the point of conclusion of the contract is 
discussed further below at subsection 9.3.1.  
1212 Waring v Favenck (1807) 1 Camp. 85; Kymer v Suwercropp (1807) 1 Camp 109. 
1213 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.46.  
1214 Powell, Agency (n 1039) 173.   
1215 Morel v Earl of Westmoreland [1904] AC 11 at 14 per Lord Chancellor Halsbury. 
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Although undisclosed agency does not appear to have been judicially 
discussed before the eighteenth century,1216 Lord Mansfield comments in 
Rabone v Williams1217 that the rules on the doctrine “are long settled”.1218 
Ames remarks that undisclosed agency is “so firmly established” in England 
that it would be “quixotic to attack it in the courts.”1219  
9.2.4. Classification of undisclosed agency  
Whilst the general attitude towards the law on undisclosed agency in England 
is “liberal”,1220 it is viewed as “an anomaly… out of harmony with basic legal 
principles.”1221 Tettenborn describes it as “tricky and unpredictable… 
embodying as it does a volatile cocktail of legal anomaly and commercial 
expediency.”1222 Commentators have attempted to explain undisclosed 
agency in terms of third party rights, assignation, trust, and equity.1223  These 
attempts have been unsuccessful. Undisclosed agency cannot be treated as 
a form of assignation because the principal does not, at the point of its 
disclosure or otherwise, become the agent’s assignee. An assignor cannot 
be sued on a contract once it has been validly assigned, whereas the third 
                                                          
1216 Müller-Freienfels (n 206) at 302; R Powell, “Contractual Agency in Roman Law and 
English Law” 1956 South African Law Review 41 at 49. See also above subsection 9.2.2. 
1217 Rabone v Williams (1785) 7 TR 360.  
1218 Ibid. per Lord Mansfield. 
1219 JB Ames, “The Undisclosed Principal – His Rights and Liabilities” 1909 18(7) Yale Law 
Journal 443 at 443. See also Powell, Agency (n 1039) 152.   
1220 KCF Loi, “Quistclose trusts and Romalpa clauses: substance and nemo dat in corporate 
insolvency” 2012 128(Jul) Law Quarterly Review 412 at 437. 
1221 Müller-Freienfels (n 206) at 299. See also Lord Lindley and Lord Davey’s speeches in 
Keighley, Maxstead & Co v Durant [1901] AC 240; and Durant v Roberts [1901] 1 QB 629 at 
635 per Smith LJ.    
1222 A Tettenborn, “Insurers and Undisclosed Agency—Rough Justice and Commercial 
Expediency” 1994 53(2) Cambridge Law Journal 223 at 223. See also Smith, Short 
Commentary (n 36) 777; R Barnett, “Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract 
Theory” 1987 75(6) California Law Review 1969 at 1970; DJ Hill, “Some Problems of the 
Undisclosed Principal” 1967 Journal of Business Law 122 at 124; Ames (n 1219) at 443. 
Lord Lindley noted at 261 in Keighley, Maxsted & Co v Durant [1901] AC 240 that “there is 
an anomaly in holding one person bound to another of whom he knows nothing and with 
whom he did not intend to contract.”       
1223 See generally Ames (n 1219); A Lang, “Unexpected Contracts versus Unexpected 
Remedies: The Conceptual Basis of the Undisclosed Principal Doctrine” 2012 18 Auckland 
University Law Review 114 at 120-123. Goodhart and Hamsom claimed that undisclosed 
agency could be explained in terms of assignment, and was therefore compatible with privity, 
in AL Goodhart and CJ Hamson, “Undisclosed Principals in Contract” 1932 4(3) Cambridge 
Law Journal 320 at 378. However, this analysis was ruled out by Tan (n 1192) at 496 (see 
also Siu Yin Kwan v Eastern Insurance Co Ltd [1994] 2 AC 199).   
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party in an undisclosed agency transaction can (at the point of disclosure) 
elect to sue either the principal or agent.1224 An explanation in terms of third 
party rights, such that the principal is the recipient of a third party right under 
the contract between the agent and third party, is also unsound. The 
formation of a third party right requires that both contracting parties intend to 
benefit the third party,1225 and it cannot be said that the third party intends to 
confer an enforceable benefit on the principal.1226 In light of the lack of 
coherent doctrinal classification for undisclosed agency, the doctrine can 
likely be classified as a sui generis obligation.1227 
9.3. Compatibility of undisclosed agency with Scots law  
This section considers the interaction between undisclosed agency and 
privity, contract theory, and delict.  
9.3.1. Compatibility of undisclosed agency with the privity doctrine 
There is no potential conflict with the privity doctrine in the internal 
relationship of undisclosed agency, i.e., the contract between the principal 
and agent. This relationship is established by the principal and agent, and the 
agency contract itself, in the sense of the mutual rights and obligations of 
agent and principal, has no bearing on any third parties.1228 The ‘privity 
problem’ lies in the external aspect: whether the contract is between the third 
party and undisclosed principal, or third party and agent.  
In terms of the external relationship, between the principal and third party, 
various commentators have suggested that undisclosed agency does not 
operate as an exception to the privity doctrine.1229 However, it is accepted by 
others that undisclosed agency is an exception to privity. Macgregor states 
                                                          
1224 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.29. 
1225 See subsections 3.2.2.1.-2.  
1226 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.29. The relevance of the third party’s (lack of) intention to 
benefit the principal is discussed further below at subsection 9.3.2. 
1227 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.29, citing Smith, Short Commentary (n 36) 777.  
1228 Lang (n 1223) at 117; Garnac Grain Co. Inc. v H.M.F. Faure & Fairclough Ltd. [1968] AC 
1130 at 1137 per Lord Pearson; section 3.3.1. 
1229 Müller-Freienfels (n 206) at 300; CH Tan, “Undisclosed agency and damages” 2013 8 
Journal of Business Law 799 at 816.   
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that the fact that the “concept should be developed in English law is 
particularly surprising” in light of the traditionally strict approach to privity.1230 
She further comments that it is:  
“contrary to the central role of consent in contract that the third party 
may find that he has contractual rights and duties in a contract with a 
stranger. Normally, privity of contract dictates that individuals, through 
agreement, cannot affect third parties.”1231  
Similarly, Whittaker stresses that undisclosed agency is a “clear exception at 
common law to both aspects of privity of contract”,1232  and Merkin comments 
that the doctrine of undisclosed agency is “[p]erhaps the greatest challenge 
to privity from the rules of agency”.1233 
Lang recognises two principal theories of undisclosed agency.1234 According 
to the intervention thesis, the parties to the contract formed by the agent with 
the third party are the agent and third party. In contrast, the direct contract 
thesis purports that the true contracting parties are the third party and 
principal. Barnett claims that the difference between the two is merely 
academic.1235 Lang disagrees, arguing that the failure of the judiciary and 
contract theorists in distinguishing between the two has prevented the clear 
and consistent application of the undisclosed principal doctrine.1236 Lang’s 
view appears more logical, because the question of whom the third party 
contracts with determines matters such as the party against whom it should 
bring a claim if the principal refuses to perform under the contract.  
Regardless, however, of the practical consequences of the appropriate 
categorisation of the concept, the distinction has great bearing on whether 
undisclosed agency is compatible with the privity doctrine. If the contract is 
between the undisclosed principal and third party from the point at which the 
                                                          
1230 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.29. See also Burrows, Restatement (n 33) §48.  
1231 Macgregor, SME (n 1155) para 148.   
1232 Whittaker (n 113) at 269. See also Müller-Freienfels (n 206) at 301.  
1233 Merkin (n 195) at 2.33. He writes that: “if the law is not prepared to grant rights to third 
parties, it seems inconsistent to allow a third party to jump in and assert that he was always 
the intended beneficiary of the contract.” 
1234 Lang (n 1223) at 115.   
1235 Barnett (n 1222) at 1983 
1236 Lang (n 1223) at 115.  
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contract is concluded, then there is no breach of privity. If, however, the 
contract is between the third party and the agent, and the principal can 
benefit from this contract by suing the third party, undisclosed agency 
breaches the privity doctrine.  
The intervention thesis and the direct contract thesis are considered in turn in 
the remainder of this subsection, in order to ascertain which is the more 
persuasive theory of undisclosed agency. This finding is then applied to the 
question of whether undisclosed agency contravenes privity.  
9.3.1.1. The direct contract thesis 
The direct contract thesis is supported in academic commentary. Müller-
Freienfels argues that the doctrine of undisclosed agency may be compatible 
with privity because the undisclosed principal is not truly in the position of a 
stranger to the contract, because it receives the benefits and burdens of the 
contract.1237 Similarly, Lord Lindley asserts that a contract between an 
undisclosed agent and third party is “in truth, although not in form, that of the 
undisclosed principal himself.”1238 Goodhart and Hamson comment that the 
undisclosed principal has privity of contract because it can sue and be 
sued.1239 The logical fallacy in this is that the undisclosed principal receives 
the benefits and burdens because of the doctrine of undisclosed agency. 
These statements simply point out that the principal is benefited and 
burdened by the contract. They do not explain why the principal is the true 
contracting party. Further, these statements alone do not adequately exclude 
the possibility that the contracting parties are the third party and agent, and 
that the principal can sue and be sued despite this.   
A more vociferous proponent of the direct contract thesis is Tan.1240 His 
position is that the general rule of damages (that one can sue only for one’s 
                                                          
1237 Müller-Freienfels (n 206) at 300.   
1238 Keighley v Durant [1901] AC 240 at 261 per Lord Lindley. See also Ames (n 1219) at 
447. 
1239 Goodhart and Hamson (n 1223) at 352  
1240 Tan (n 1229). Tan arrived at the opposite conclusion in an earlier article: Tan (n 1192) at 
509. This chapter focuses on his more recent work on the assumption that this represents 
his current views.   
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own loss1241) is not violated by undisclosed agency, because the agent does 
not recover its own loss, but instead recovers on the principal’s behalf.1242 
The agent’s right to claim against the third party is “implicit in the relationship 
between the undisclosed principal, the agent, and the third party.”1243 He 
acknowledges that the agent always contracts in a personal capacity, 
because the third party is unaware of the existence of the principal,1244 but 
argues that the agent intends at all times to conclude the contract for the 
principal, and does so only on the principal’s authority.1245 Tan argues that, 
when the principal is revealed, the third party should be viewed as having 
contracted directly with the principal, rather than with the agent.1246 This, he 
submits, avoids doctrinal inconsistency with the principles of disclosed 
agency, and recognises that the agent is subordinate to the principal.1247 Tan 
suggests that the fact that the contract is between the undisclosed principal 
and third party is recognised judicially.1248 He also cites in his favour Diplock 
LJ’s statement that:  
“Although the agent is entitled to enforce the contract in his own name, 
at least until the principal intervenes, he nevertheless does so on 
behalf of the principal and is accountable to the principal for the fruits 
of the action.”1249  
Lang, disagreeing with Tan, claims that the third party’s ability to choose 
whether to sue the agent or principal “significantly minimises the anomalous 
consequences of the undisclosed principal doctrine against the rules of 
agency law”.1250 She points out that offering the third party the choice to sue 
                                                          
1241 See discussion on this rule in subsection 6.3.2.  
1242 Tan (n 1229) at 800. 
1243 Ibid. 
1244 Ibid. at 801. 
1245 Ibid. at 801-2.  
1246 Ibid. at 802. Tan also discounts the possibility that the third party concluded two 
contracts – one with the agent, and one with the principal.  
1247 Ibid.   
1248 Ibid. citing Keighley, Maxsted & Co v Durant [1901] AC 240 at 261 per Lord Robertson. 
See also Gardiner v Heading [1928] 2 KB 284 at 290 per Scrutton LJ and Said v Butt [1920] 
3 KB 497 at 503 per McCardie J.  
1249 Garnac Grain Co Inc v H M F Faure & Fairclough Ltd [1966] 1 QB 650 at 685 per Diplock 
LJ. See also AF Craig & Co v Blackater 1923 SLT 472; James Laidlaw & Sons v Griffin 1968 
SLT 278; Corfield v Grant (1992) 29 Con. LR 58. 
1250 Lang (n 1223) at 118. In other words, this rule protects the third party, rather than 
reflecting which party is the ‘true’ party to the contract.  
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either the agent or the principal does not make the contract any less that of 
the agent than the principal.1251 It is submitted that Lang is correct. The fact 
that the agent was engaged by the principal does not automatically mean 
that contracts concluded between the agent and the third party must be those 
of the principal - this ignores the perspective of the third party. The agent and 
the principal’s alternative liability, at the choice of the third party, indicates 
that either can be treated as full contracting parties, depending on the third 
party’s choice of contracting partner. In other words, the agent’s rights and 
liabilities continue following disclosure of the principal, and this clearly 
demonstrates that the agent is a party to the contract with the third party.   
Further, Lang also notes that there can only be an objective manifestation of 
intention to enter into a contract on the part of the agent and third party.1252 
Krebs indicates that he views undisclosed agency as “a glaring exception to 
privity” because it cannot realistically be said that the principal and third party 
objectively intend to be contractually bound.1253 These commentators are 
correct: the third party cannot realistically be said to intend to contract with a 
person of whom it is not aware. The implications of the third party’s intention 
to contract with the agent, rather than the undisclosed principal, are further 
discussed below.1254 However, the third party’s contractual intentions further 
demonstrate that the contracting parties (at least at the point at which the 
contract is concluded) are the third party and agent.  
In summary, the direct contract thesis does not explain the third party’s lack 
of intention to contract with the principal or reflect the fact that the third party 
is able to sue the agent following the principal’s disclosure. It is not therefore 
a logical view of undisclosed agency.   
                                                          
1251 Lang (n 1223) at 118.  
1252 Ibid. 
1253 Krebs (n 1203) at 161. See also Armstrong v Stokes and Others (1872) LR 598 per 
Blackburn J. At 604, he comments that his doubts as to whether an undisclosed principal 
should be liable to the third party were too late, because the doctrine of undisclosed agency 
was already well-settled. See also Müller-Freienfels (n 206) at 301; Macgregor, Agency (n 
224) 12.29. 
1254 See subsection 9.3.2.  
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9.3.1.2. The intervention thesis  
Lang argues that the rules governing the operation of undisclosed agency 
reflect the intervention thesis. For example, she notes that the fact that the 
third party may use any defences against the principal that it has against the 
agent is the logical consequence of the contract being concluded by the 
agent.1255 Further, the most recent edition of Bowstead and Reynolds on 
Agency suggests that it “is difficult to deny that the undisclosed principal is 
really a third party intervening on a contract which he did not make.”1256 
The intervention thesis also accounts for the fact that, from the third party’s 
perspective, it intends to contract with the agent only. At the point at which 
the contract is concluded, it cannot be said that there is an objective contract 
between the principal and the third party. The principal should therefore be 
viewed as a third party to contracts concluded by the agent.1257 It is accepted 
that the agent will at all times intend to contract for the principal, and, if it 
sues the third party, it does so in order to return the proceeds of the claim to 
the principal. However, the third party’s perspective is of equal relevance 
and, in accordance with the intervention thesis, the agent must be viewed as 
the party who concluded the contract with the third party. 
Confusingly, Lang states that undisclosed agency requires that the agent is 
able to “create privity” between the principal and third party without disclosing 
to the third party that it is doing so.1258 However, she also comments that it is 
not clear whether privity ought to exist between the principal and third party 
as a result of the agent’s actions, noting that privity in this context could arise 
without, or contrary to, the intention of the third party.1259 Essentially, she 
acknowledges that allowing the principal to sue “means that privity of contract 
and certainty of parties cede to commercial convenience.”1260 The 
intervention thesis leads to the conclusion that there is no privity between 
                                                          
1255 Lang (n 1223) at 132.  
1256 Watts (ed), Bowstead and Reynolds (n 1037) 8.071.  
1257 Report on Privity of contract (n 182) 2.15.   





principal and third party until the principal’s existence is known to the third 
party.1261 As such, Lang’s comments regarding the creation of privity 
between the principal and third party are perhaps a minor misuse of the term 
‘privity’.  
9.3.1.3. Summary 
The justifications for the direct contract thesis are insufficient, whereas the 
intervention thesis is logically coherent. It is submitted that the intervention 
thesis is therefore an accurate account of undisclosed agency. This means 
that the contracting parties to the contract between the agent and third party 
are the agent and third party. The principal can sue and be sued under this 
contract, and so undisclosed agency operates as an exception to privity.   
It is acknowledged that there is a limited body of commentary supporting the 
view that the agent creates privity between the principal and the third party 
from the outset.1262 However, this analysis can be swiftly ruled out as a 
means of explaining undisclosed agency’s compatibility with the privity 
doctrine. This is because the third party clearly does not consent to the 
creation of privity (i.e. the creation of a contractual relationship) between itself 
and the undisclosed principal, and privity operates subject to the intentions of 
the contracting parties.1263 
9.3.2. Compatibility of undisclosed agency with contract theory 
As discussed above, it cannot be said that the third party intends to contract 
with the principal.1264 This subsection explores the implications of this for the 
compatibility of undisclosed agency with contract theory.  
Müller-Freienfels notes that:  
                                                          
1261 Lang (n 1223) at 119. 
1262 Munday (n 1194); Goodhart and Hamson (n 1223). See also discussion in S Todd, 
“Privity and Agency” in J Burrows, J Finn, and S Todd, Law of Contract in New 
Zealand (5th edn, LexisNexis NZ Limited, Wellington, 2016) 591 at 608.   
1263 See subsection 3.3.1.1.   
1264 See subsection 9.3.1. 
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“[u]ndoubtedly no theory of contract based on the liberal idea of 
mutual assent can explain how the third party can make a contract 
with a person whose existence he does not even know.”1265  
He explains that undisclosed agency’s lack of coherence with contract theory 
is due to the fact that the doctrine developed before the current dominant 
theories of contract.1266 Reynolds similarly comments that the doctrine is 
“anomalous, in that a person intervenes on a contract who was not at the 
time of contracting in the contemplation of one of the parties at all”.1267 
Lang,1268 Tan,1269 Merkin,1270 and Lord Blackburn1271 take a similar view. 
Krebs further comments that undisclosed agency “has nothing to do with 
consent.”1272 Macgregor writes that it is not possible to base the concept on 
third party rights, because the jus quaesitum tertio rests on the intention of 
the contracting parties, and the agent and third party cannot be said to 
expressly or impliedly intend for the principal to acquire a right to enforce the 
contract.1273 She writes that the claim that the contract is “formed from the 
outset between principal and third party strains the principle of consent in 
contract to an unacceptable degree.”1274 Even if the undisclosed principal 
only becomes a full contracting party upon disclosure, the third party cannot 
be viewed as consenting to the contract with the principal at this point, 
because it has no advance warning of this. As such, consent on the part of 
the third party can at best only be artificially implied. Gloag states that the 
question of whether an individual has the right to enforce a contract, or a 
term of a contract, is determined by the intention of the contracting parties, 
other than one “special case.”1275 The ‘special case’ is undisclosed 
                                                          
1265 Müller-Freienfels (n 206) at 301.  
1266 Ibid.  
1267 FMB Reynolds, “Agency: Theory and Practice” 1978 94(Apr) Law Quarterly Review 224 
at 225.  
1268 Lang (n 1223) at 119.  
1269 Tan (n 1229) at 799; Tan (n 1192) at 481.  
1270 Merkin (n 195) at 2.1. 
1271 Armstrong v Stokes and Others (1872) LR 598 at 603-604 per Lord Blackburn.  
1272 Krebs (n 1203) at 180. See also 161 and 169.  
1273 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.29. See also Müller-Freienfels (n 206) at 308 and 
Whittaker (n 113) at 270-271. 
1274 Macgregor, SME (n 1155) para 149. See also Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.29.  
1275 Gloag, Contract (n 65) 218.  
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agency.1276 These statements lead to the conclusion that undisclosed agency 
is not compatible with will theory, because the third party clearly does not 
intend to benefit the principal in its contract with the agent, and it does not 
intend for the principal to accrue an enforceable contractual benefit under this 
contract.  
It is potentially arguable that undisclosed agency is compatible with will 
theory if it is accepted that the third party consents to the risk that the person 
with whom it contracts is acting for an undisclosed principal.1277 Barnett 
argues that undisclosed agency is in fact best explained in terms of will 
theory. He suggests that whilst the third party does not actively consent to 
contract with a particular undisclosed principal, it accepts the risk that anyone 
with whom it might deal may be an agent acting for another.1278 There is no 
difference, he asserts, between this situation and circumstances in which a 
buyer has exclusive knowledge of the resale value of a particular item.1279 As 
such, undisclosed agency does not “undermine the moral significance of 
consent.”1280 This view is also reflected in a number of English cases.1281 
These comments are to some extent convincing. The third party may not 
consent to contracting with the undisclosed principal in question, but it could 
be viewed as impliedly consenting to contract with any undisclosed principal. 
This is because, in an ordinary commercial contract, it runs the risk of doing 
so if this is not excluded in the contract with the agent. However, this appears 
to misuse the concept of contractual consent, especially in cases where the 
third party would have negotiated differently had it been aware of the identity 
                                                          
1276 Gloag, Contract (n 65) 219.    
1277 This would apply subject to the restrictions on the operation of undisclosed agency 
discussed above at subsections 9.2.1. and 9.2.3. See also Tan (n 1192) at 486. 
1278 Barnett (n 1222) at 1989-1991. 
1279 Ibid. at 1991.   
1280 Ibid. at 1991-1992. See also Tettenborn (n 1222) at 224-225.  
1281 It was said, for example, in Talbot Underwriting Ltd v Nausch, Hogan & Murray Inc 
[2006] EWCA Civ. 889 at para 27 per Moore-Bick LJ that: “The mere identification, whether 
by name or description, of certain persons as assureds cannot be sufficient of itself to 
demonstrate an unwillingness on the part of the insurer to contract with any other person.” 
See also Teheran-Europe Co. Ltd. v ST Belton (Tractors) Ltd. [1968] 2 QB 545 at 555 per 
Lord Diplock.  
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of the undisclosed principal.1282 The contract cannot truly be said to be for the 
benefit of the undisclosed principal because the third party’s consent and 
intention to benefit the principal does not exist. Regarding Barnett’s 
comparison with situations in which a buyer has knowledge of the resale 
value of an item which the seller does not, the parties to a sales transaction 
will be fully aware that they are operating in a competitive economy which 
does not (generally) require disclosure of the seller’s intended purpose and 
profits from the transaction. Parties to sales transactions run the risk that they 
will make a bad bargain, and they have full knowledge of this. However, they 
will generally assume that the person with whom they deal is in fact the 
person with whom they are entering into a contractual agreement. 
Consequently, in line with the commentary discussed immediately above, it 
appears that undisclosed agency cannot be explained by the will theory in 
Scots or English law.  
It is also noted that undisclosed agency cannot be justified by analogy with 
assignation. Gloag notes that where A and B contract, and the contract is 
assignable, A can become liable to B’s assignee with whom it has not 
contracted, and this is justified on the basis that by entering into an 
assignable contract, A undertakes to be bound to an assignee if and when 
the contract is assigned.1283 Similarly, undisclosed agency may involve the 
implied acceptance of the risk of contracting with an undisclosed agent. 
However, a contract which is assigned does not initially involve the limitation 
of a party’s ability to fully exercise its contractual intention simply on the 
grounds of commercial convenience on the part of another party.1284 If the 
agent was bound to reveal that it was acting as such, this would allow the 
third party to decide whether it wished to enter into the contract without 
knowing the identity of its contractual partner. Undisclosed agency, however, 
denies this choice, and is not therefore compatible with consensual theories 
of contract law.    
                                                          
1282 Such cases are discussed further below in subsection 9.4.1. and 9.4.4.  
1283 Gloag, Contract (n 65) 257. 
1284 The rules of assignation are discussed at subsection 5.5.1.1. 
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In terms of promissory theory, there is a limited body of commentary which 
argues that undisclosed agency is compatible with the privity doctrine 
because undisclosed agency enforces promises made by one party to 
another. Müller-Freienfels comments, for example, that the undisclosed 
principal should be bound to perform to the third party, because it authorised 
the agent to bind it by promise to the third party.1285 This is logical, and 
compatible with promissory theory – allowing the third party to sue the 
principal upholds the principal’s promise to fulfil contracts concluded by the 
agent. It is less clear, however, that the third party can be said to have made 
a promise in favour of the principal. In Smith & Snipes Hall Farm Ltd v River 
Douglas Catchment Board,1286 Lord Denning states that the privity ought not 
to overcome the principle that:  
“a man who makes a deliberate promise which is intended to be 
binding, that is to say under seal or for good consideration, must keep 
his promise; and the court will hold him to it, not only at the suit of the 
party who gave the consideration, but also at the suit of one who was 
not a party to the contract, provided that it was made for his benefit 
and that he has a sufficient interest to entitle him to enforce it; subject 
always, of course, to any defences that may be open on the merits. It 
is upon this principle, implicit if not expressed … that Lord Mansfield 
held [in Rabone v Williams1287] that an undisclosed principal is entitled 
to sue on a contract made by his agent for his benefit, even though 
nothing was said about agency in the contract.”1288 
Undisclosed agency could, according to this statement, be justified as an 
exception to privity on the grounds that it gives effects to the intentions of the 
contracting parties by enforcing the promise made by the third party to the 
principal. However, this does not counter the argument that the third party 
does not intend to be bound to perform in favour of the undisclosed principal. 
The third party cannot therefore be said to have voluntarily promised to 
perform in favour of the principal. The third party can only be said to have 
promised to uphold its obligations in respect of the agent.  
                                                          
1285 Müller-Freienfels (n 206) at 307.   
1286 Smith and Snipes Hall Farm LD v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500. 
1287 Rabone v Williams (1785) 7 TR 360 per Lord Mansfield.  
1288 Smith and Snipes Hall Farm LD v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500 at 
514-515 per Lord Denning.  
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Undisclosed agency is also incompatible with assumption theory. It is 
unrealistic to argue that the third party voluntarily assumes liability in respect 
of the undisclosed principal, because it was unaware of the principal’s 
existence until the point of disclosure. The third party has not intentionally 
assumed any liability in respect of the undisclosed principal.  
In summary, undisclosed agency is incompatible with will theory, promissory 
theory, and assumption theory.  
9.3.3. Compatibility of undisclosed agency with delict 
An explanation of undisclosed agency in terms of delictual liability would 
depend on the imposition of a duty of care on the part of the third party in 
respect of the undisclosed principal. In other words, the third party would be 
liable to the principal in respect of loss stemming from its failure to fulfil the 
obligations entered into in the contract concluded with the agent. It is not 
immediately obvious why this should be the case because there is, in Scots 
law, no delictual duty of care to fulfil contractual obligations entered into with 
undisclosed principals. The undisclosed principal and third party are subject 
to contractual obligations to one another based on the contract made 
between the agent and third party, and the liability of the third party ought 
therefore to be contractual. Further, it would be illogical to require 
undisclosed principals to sue the third party in delict whilst their agents are 
able to sue in contract. The scope of their respective claims would be 
different. For example, the principal would need to prove fault on the part of 
the third party to make a delictual claim, whereas this would not be 
necessary for the agent’s contractual claim.1289  
Regarding Hedley Byrne liability,1290 the operation of this form of liability 
requires that the relevant party has a specific individual in mind, in that it 
must know the identity of the person on whom the loss will fall.1291 In the case 
of undisclosed agency, the third party for obvious reasons be unaware of the 
                                                          
1289 Hogg, Obligations (n 433) 3.66.  
1290 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
1291 See above at subsection 4.2.3.1. 
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identity of the undisclosed principal. Indeed, it was confirmed in the recent 
Supreme Court case of Banca Nationale del Lavoro SPA v Playboy Club 
London Limited1292 that an undisclosed agent could not rely on a credit 
reference supplied by a bank which was addressed to the agent’s principal. 
Lord Sumption distinguished the case at hand from Hedley Byrne1293 on the 
grounds that the bank could not have known that the reference would be 
relied on by any party other than the principal, whereas in Hedley Byrne1294 it 
was known that the statement would be relied on by an unidentified client on 
whose behalf the statement was requested.1295 Hedley Byrne liability cannot 
therefore apply.   
In chapter 7,1296 it was submitted that Junior Books liability1297 could 
potentially be imposed in transferred loss situations if that form of liability was 
extended to allow for recovery where the contracting party was not aware of 
the specific third party. This would be justified on the basis that the 
contracting party responsible for the breach could reasonably foresee that 
the loss may be transferred to another. This could not, however, apply in the 
context of undisclosed agency. The third party in such cases has been led to 
believe that it has contracted with the agent, and has no reason to consider 
otherwise. Finding such ‘contemplation’ on the part of the third party would 
be entirely artificial. Even if the third party was specifically asked to consider 
the scope of those who may be affected by its defective performance of the 
contract, it would name only the agent.  
The application of Henderson v Merrett1298 or White v Jones1299 liability to 
undisclosed agency cases is also unsatisfactory. In terms of the former, this 
form of liability requires that the person claiming damages has relied on an 
undertaking on the part of the person who caused the loss. The principal can 
                                                          
1292 Banca Nationale del Lavoro SPA v Playboy Club London Limited [2018] UKSC 43.  
1293 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
1294 Ibid. 
1295 Banca Nationale del Lavoro SPA v Playboy Club London Limited [2018] UKSC 43 at 
para 10 per Lord Sumption.  
1296 See subsection 7.3.3.  
1297 Junior Books liability is discussed in subsection 4.3.1. 
1298 A description of this form of liability is provided in subsection 4.2.3.3. 
1299 White v Jones liability is defined at subsection 4.2.3.4. 
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indeed be said to have relied on the third party’s undertaking to perform 
under the contract concluded with the agent. However, Henderson v Merrett 
liability also requires an assumption of responsibility on the part of the person 
who owes the duty of care in respect of the person who has suffered a loss. 
There is no such assumption of responsibility on the part of the third party in 
respect of the undisclosed principal, because the third party was not aware of 
the principal’s existence. As such, the third party cannot realistically be said 
to have assumed responsibility for the principal. It may be suggested that the 
third party can be deemed to have assumed responsibility for any 
undisclosed principals with whom it may contract. However, the assumption 
of responsibility must be actually undertaken, not deemed to be 
undertaken.1300 This means that Henderson v Merrett liability cannot be 
imposed in undisclosed agency transactions.  
In terms of White v Jones liability, it is arguable that, in undisclosed agency 
cases, the agent contracts with the intention of creating a benefit in favour of 
the principal, just as the testator contracts with the aim of securing the 
conferral of an inheritance upon the intended legatee in disappointed 
beneficiary cases. However, the third party in the context of undisclosed 
agency does not, unlike the careless solicitors, have any knowledge of this 
purpose of the contract. Imposing White v Jones liability in such cases forces 
the third party to uphold and protect the interests of parties of which it had no 
knowledge at the time of formation of contract. An analysis of undisclosed 
agency based on this form of liability is therefore unsuitable.  
It is not, therefore, possible to explain undisclosed agency in terms of 
delictual liability.  
9.4. Policy considerations justifying undisclosed agency  
This section first provides an overview of relevant commentary on 
undisclosed agency to identify the key arguments raised in justification of the 
existence of the doctrine. These justifications are assessed to determine 
                                                          




whether they do in fact offer sound policy considerations in support of 
undisclosed agency. The section then examines whether the policy 
considerations supporting statutory exceptions to privity can be applied to 
undisclosed agency.  
Policy considerations in favour of recognising undisclosed agency which 
have not been considered in commentary are also presented in this section. 
These arguments highlight a narrow set of circumstances in which 
undisclosed agency can be supported by valid policy considerations. The 
final part of this section considers policy arguments against the recognition of 
undisclosed agency.  
9.4.1. Justifications offered in commentary  
Whilst the doctrine of undisclosed agency developed due to concerns 
regarding the insolvency of intermediaries acting in their own names on 
behalf others, it is said to be “useful, and commercially convenient” in other 
contexts.1301 Commentary on undisclosed agency generally casts the 
concept in a positive light. It is said that the law represents:  
“a compromise between the commercial convenience of allowing an 
undisclosed principal to intervene in a contract made by an 
undisclosed agent, and the interest of the third party not to be 
prejudiced in any way by such intervention.”1302  
This subsection examines whether the reasons why undisclosed agency is 
said to be commercially convenient are in fact correct.   
Müller-Freienfels comments that undisclosed agency valuably allows for 
bipartite relationships to be transformed into multi-party relationships.1303 This 
point does not, however, justify undisclosed agency. Tri- or multi-party 
contractual situations can be effectuated in disclosed agency transactions.  
This is not, as Müller-Freienfels suggests, a benefit solely associated with 
undisclosed agency. Similarly, Tan argues that “efficient channels of 
                                                          
1301 Krebs (n 1203) at 164. See also Whittaker (n 113) at 271 and Lang (n 1223) at 114.   
1302 Krebs (n 1203) at 165. See also Watts (ed), Bowstead and Reynolds (n 1037) 8.071; 
Tan (n 1229) at 800-801; EJ Weinrib, “The Undisclosed Principle of Undisclosed Principals” 
1975 21 McGill Law Journal 298 at 298.    
1303 Müller-Freienfels (n 206) at 300.   
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distribution” involving “specialist middlemen” are “essential to a modern 
economy”.1304 However, he does not identify any benefits in terms of the 
commercial efficiency of undisclosed agency as opposed to disclosed 
agency. Whilst he is correct that using middlemen allows, for example, 
producers to delegate distribution activities so that they can dedicate greater 
resources to production,1305 this benefit arises through disclosed as well as 
undisclosed agency.   
Undisclosed agency is also thought of as useful because it protects principals 
where the agent becomes bankrupt, allowing the principal to claim property 
or money due to it by circumventing the bankruptcy proceedings.1306 Krebs 
explains that undisclosed agency protects the principal and third party from 
the impact of the agent’s insolvency, in situations in which the agent would 
otherwise be liable to the third party.1307 Similarly, Tan notes that the earliest 
English cases on undisclosed agency concern the bankruptcy of factors, and 
the principal’s consequent need to intervene.1308 It is unclear in the modern 
law why such protection against the agent’s bankruptcy or insolvency should 
be necessary. The principal and agent should have separate patrimonies, 
meaning that sums transferred from the principal to the agent and intended 
for the third party should not be included in the agent’s patrimony during 
bankruptcy proceedings. This would also be the case if the principal’s 
existence and identity were disclosed.  
Another justification is that undisclosed agency allows the principal to avoid 
adverse conditions and higher prices which it would face if the third parties 
knew with whom they were dealing.1309 For example, the purchase of the 
                                                          
1304 Tan (n 1192) at 482. See also Keighley, Maxsted & Co v Durant [1901] AC 240 at 261 
per Lord Lindley.  
1305 Tan (n 1192) at 482. 
1306 Goodhart and Hamson (n 1223) at 352; Todd (n 1262) at 605; Bennett, Agency (n 1208) 
9.20.  
1307 T Krebs, “Agency Law for Muggles: Why There is no Magic in Agency” in A Burrows and 
E Peel (eds), Contract Formation and Parties (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) 205 at 
212; Bennett, Agency (n 1208) 9.23.  
1308 Tan (n 1192) at 482.  
1309 Lang (n 1223) at 115; A Barak, “On the Nature of Undisclosed Agency” 1976 8(2) Tel 
Aviv University Studies in Law 45 at 47; Tan (n 1192) at 483; Barnett (n 1222) at 1976-1977; 
Fridman (n 1195) at 79.  
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land for the site of Walt Disney World in Florida was completed by 
undisclosed agents working for Walt Disney Productions.1310 The agents 
were employed to ensure that the landowners did not ask for a higher price 
for their land in light of its intended purpose. Undisclosed agency does 
indeed allow a principal to avoid adverse conditions it might face if it 
contracts in its own name. It is submitted that this factor alone is insufficient 
to justify the continued recognition of undisclosed agency. Similarly, 
undisclosed agency allows a principal to contract with a third party who would 
not have entered the contract had it known the principal’s identity (provided 
that the contract is an ordinary commercial contract).1311 Undisclosed agency 
in both situations offers commercial benefit to the principal, however, the third 
party’s interests are not taken into account. The third party ought to be able 
to make an informed choice regarding the identity of its contracting partners, 
or at least to voluntarily assume the risk of contracting with someone with 
whom it may not wish to contract where the principal’s existence is disclosed 
(and identity hidden). In cases where undisclosed agency is used to 
circumvent a third party’s unwillingness to contract with the principal in 
question, this is undoubtedly inconsistent with a will-based account of 
contract law. The third party is forced, under the current law on undisclosed 
agency, to fulfil a contract to which it would not have consented, had it known 
the identity of the other contracting party. A principal could seek to avoid 
adverse conditions by instructing the agent to reveal its existence but conceal 
its identity – where the identity of the contracting party does not matter to the 
third party, this arrangement would be mutually satisfactory. The third party 
may refuse to proceed unless the principal’s identity is revealed, in which 
case the principal may indeed encounter adverse conditions. This is, 
however, simply the consequence of the third party having an opportunity to 
contract on an informed basis.  Allowing this choice provides a fairer balance 
between the interests of the third party and the principal. 
                                                          
1310 R Mann and B Roberts, Business Law and the Regulation of Business (South Western 
College Publishers, Chula Vista, 12th edn, 2016) 624. 
1311 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.31. 
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Additionally, an agent might wish to hide the fact that it is working for a 
principal to avoid the third party bypassing it to negotiate directly with the 
principal in future dealings, which may cause inconvenience to both agent 
and principal.1312 It is true that a principal may have engaged an agent to 
save time and expense in directly managing its own transactions, and may 
wish to remain undisclosed to avoid the inconvenience of being contacted 
directly by the third party. However, this is not a strong argument for the 
recognition of undisclosed agency. It is not burdensome for the agent to 
refuse to pass on the contact details of a principal, nor for the principal, if 
contacted directly, to refer the third party to its agent and refuse to deal with 
the third party directly. The minor inconvenience of a third party seeking to 
bypass the agency structure chosen by the parties does not justify 
circumventing contractual doctrine and theory. Further, practical convenience 
is not a significant policy consideration compared with those discussed in 
chapter 5.1313 
From the agent’s perspective, Tan also argues that the agent might distribute 
goods which it owns as well as those of its principal, and it may not wish third 
parties to distinguish transactions involving the agent’s goods and those of 
principals.1314 Whilst this may be advantageous for the agent in some 
circumstances, this factor alone does not outweigh the disadvantages to the 
third party. It is not particularly onerous for the agent to adequately 
communicate whether the third party is transacting with itself or a principal, 
nor is a commercial third party likely to become confused by the fact that it 
has made certain transactions directly with the agent, and others with a 
principal.   
Macgregor also notes that a principal might be motivated by the protection of 
personal information.1315 She cites MacPhail & Son v Maclean’s Trustee,1316 
                                                          
1312 Lang (n 1223) at 115; Tan (n 1192) at 482-3.    
1313 The policy considerations which justify deviation from privity in the case of certain 
statutory exceptions are summarised in section 5.4.  
1314 Tan (n 1192) at 482-3.  
1315 Macgregor, Agency (n 224) 12.31. The potential value of undisclosed agency in 
protecting anonymity is discussed further below at subsection 9.4.3.  
1316 MacPhail & Son v Maclean’s Trustee (1887) 15 R 4.  
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in which a creditor (Mr Scott) appointed his debtor (Mr Maclean) as the 
manager on his farm without disclosing to the pursuer that he was the owner. 
Mr Maclean had previously owned the farm, but had conveyed it to the Mr 
Scott, as his trustee, to meet his debts. The pursuer, MacPhail & Son, had 
entered into a contract with Mr Maclean for the supply of goods, believing 
that Mr Maclean was the owner of the farm. It was found that Mr Scott was 
liable on the contract, because Mr Maclean was acting as his undisclosed 
agent. It was recognised that Mr Scott did not communicate that Mr Maclean 
was no longer the owner, and reveal himself as the principal, due to 
“considerations of delicacy towards his client and debtor”.1317 Whilst this 
consideration is understandable, permitting the operation of undisclosed 
agency in this circumstance does not account for the interests of the third 
party, MacPhail & Sons, which did not have the opportunity to assess 
whether it wished to contract with Mr Scott.  
As discussed above, the third party must, at the point of disclosure, elect to 
sue either the agent or the principal.1318 It could be said that undisclosed 
agency offers the third party the option of suing two people, when it thought, 
at the point of contracting with the agent, that it could sue only one person 
(i.e. the agent). This “possible advantage” is noted by Fridman.1319 However, 
given that undisclosed agency is used as a means of engaging a third party 
in a contractual relationship with a party with whom it may not otherwise have 
contracted, this is not a realistic benefit to the third party. The third party was 
content to contract with the agent only, and, where the principal has used an 
undisclosed agent to contract with a third party who would not otherwise 
have contracted with it, the third party is unlikely to view the ability to sue the 
principal positively. In other words, the ‘benefit’ of having the option of suing 
the principal is cancelled out by the third party’s liability towards the principal, 
with whom it has not chosen to contract.  
                                                          
1317 MacPhail & Son v Maclean’s Trustee (1887) 15 R 47 at 54 per Lord Young 
1318 See subsections 9.2.1. (Scots law) and 9.2.3. (English law).  
1319 Fridman (n 1195) at 79. See also Bennett, Agency (n 1208) 9.21.  
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Tan identifies that higher prices encountered by the principal if it must be 
disclosed may impact third parties such as consumers.1320 It is acknowledged 
that there may be a degree of truth in this. However, empirical research is 
required to demonstrate whether abolishing undisclosed agency would in fact 
negatively impact consumers. It is also possible that a price adjustment 
would not be necessary if the principal’s existence was disclosed, but its 
identity remained confidential. Disclosure of unnamed principals may offer a 
compromise between deceiving the third party and ensuring that particular 
principals, and their customers, are not unnecessarily penalised. Accordingly, 
it cannot be said that the potential impact on external parties currently 
justifies the continued recognition of undisclosed agency.  
In summary, undisclosed agency is viewed as commercially convenient for 
various reasons. However, none of these justifications stand up to scrutiny, 
primarily because they generally consider only the perspective of the agent 
and principal. As such, none of reasons offered in commentary provide a 
satisfactory justification for the continued existence of undisclosed agency.   
9.4.2. Policy considerations supporting the statutory exceptions 
Undisclosed agency is difficult to justify on the grounds of protecting weaker 
parties. The party who benefits from bypassing the privity doctrine in 
undisclosed agency situations is the principal, which is not protected from 
any adverse situation, but rather is able to circumvent the doctrine to achieve 
commercial gain. It is unrealistic to argue that undisclosed agency ought to 
be recognised to protect the principal from having to contract in its own 
name.   
Undisclosed agency cannot be justified on the basis that it ensures recovery 
of damages for loss caused by breach of contract. The only reason the 
contract is not initially concluded between the principal and the third party is 
because the principal did not wish to disclose its identity. Justifying the 
imposition of liability on the third party’s part on the grounds that this ensures 
                                                          
1320 Tan (n 1192) at 483.  
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its contractual obligations are upheld allows the principal to ‘have its cake 
and eat it’: the principal circumvents the privity doctrine purely for its own 
convenience, and then ensures that it can enforce the resulting contract 
because the third party ought to uphold its obligations.  
In terms of upholding the intentions of the contracting parties, undisclosed 
agency allows the principal’s chosen contractual structure to be upheld. 
However, it is difficult to support the undisclosed agency doctrine on this 
ground, because the third party who finds itself contractually bound to the 
principal does not intend to participate in an undisclosed agency transaction. 
There is no reason to assume that the principal’s contractual freedom should 
outweigh that of the third party.  
In summary, undisclosed agency cannot be justified in accordance with any 
of the considerations underlying the statutory exceptions to privity.  
9.4.3. Other potential justifications for the recognition of undisclosed 
agency  
Undisclosed agency is not justified by the arguments offered in commentary, 
and it cannot be explained in line with any of the policy considerations 
upholding the statutory exceptions to privity. This subsection considers 
whether there may be any other justifications which may provide good reason 
for continuing to uphold the concept in Scots law.  
One potential argument for the recognition of undisclosed agency is that it 
protects against discrimination. Whilst this should not of course be 
necessary, it is understandable that a person may wish to employ an 
undisclosed agent to enter into a contract on its behalf if it knows that it will 
face adverse conditions if it contracts in its own name. If undisclosed agency 
was to be permitted in cases where the principal had used an undisclosed 
agency structure to protect itself against discrimination, any such potential 
discrimination considered in ascertaining the permissibility of the structure 
ought to fall within the scope of protection under the Equality Act 2010. This 
Act prevents discrimination against a closed list of protected 
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characteristics.1321 Those who have experienced discrimination based on a 
protected characteristic, such that they have been unable to access goods or 
services, or access goods or services at a fair price, may wish to contract 
through an undisclosed agent. For example, it has been shown in a US study 
that car dealers tend to quote lower prices to white males than female and 
black test buyers,1322 demonstrating that favourable contractual conditions 
are more readily available to white males in this context. The founder of 
Innclusive, a home sharing platform providing rented accommodation 
primarily to people of colour, created the website after he struggled to secure 
Airbnb bookings in his own name, but found that hosts immediately accepted 
bookings for the same property on the same dates from a profile with a 
picture of a white man.1323 A court procedure is a costly, lengthy process, 
and, whilst those who have experienced discrimination should not be forced 
to contract through agents, undisclosed agency arguably offers a useful 
means of avoiding discrimination without expending time and money on a 
claim under the Equality Act 2010. If undisclosed agency were to be 
abolished generally, an exception could exist to allow the doctrine to be used 
to avoid discrimination. This would only apply to characteristics protected 
under the Equality Act 2010. The Walt Disney Company,1324 for example, 
was protecting itself from being subject to unfavourable prices, and was 
arguably therefore using undisclosed agents to protect against discrimination. 
Corporate identity is not, however, a protected characteristic under equalities 
legislation, and so this would not be classified as a justified use of 
undisclosed agency. If, however, a woman asked a male acquaintance to 
purchase a car for her to secure favourable rates at a dealership, this ought 
                                                          
1321 These characteristics are: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil 
partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation. 
See Equality Act 2010 section 4.  
1322 The study, and difficulties reconciling the market economy with anti-discrimination 
policies more generally, are discussed in I Ayres, “Fair Driving: Gender and Race 
Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations” 1991 104(4) Harvard Law Review 817. The results 
of the study are detailed at 819 - most strikingly, black women were asked to pay three times 
the mark-up of white male test drivers.  
1323 R Gilkes, Innclusive, “Our Story”, available at: https://www.innclusive.com/our-story and 
accessed 3 July 2018.  
1324 See above at subsection 9.4.1.  
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to be a permissible undisclosed agency transaction because the woman was 
protecting herself from being discriminated against on the grounds of a 
protected class (sex). Whilst the acquaintance could purchase the car in his 
own name and then resell it to the woman, undisclosed agency provides a 
more efficient solution.    
If undisclosed agency was to be recognised in such cases, this would be 
subject to the current laws on the situations in which undisclosed agency is 
not permissible, namely, unassignable contracts,1325 as well as the rule from 
Said v Butt1326 that undisclosed agency cannot apply where the identity of the 
contracting parties is a material factor.1327 A simple consumer contract for the 
exchange of goods and services (such as the sale of a car) would not fall 
within either category.  
It could also be argued that undisclosed agency protects a contracting party’s 
privacy. However, this is not a strong argument. Whilst the principal can sue 
only on the point at which its identity is revealed, the anonymity provided by 
undisclosed agency is not necessarily temporary – the lack of relevant case 
law1328 indicates that the principal rarely needs to enforce the contract 
against the third party, who may remain unaware of the principal’s existence. 
However, there is no reason to assume that the principal’s interest in 
anonymity should outweigh the third party’s interest in exercising its ability to 
make informed choices as to the identify of its contracting partners.  
It may be suggested that abolishing undisclosed agency will not improve the 
third party’s position, because the principal can simply engage someone to 
purchase property in its own name and then resell it to the principal. In Nash 
v Dix,1329 a Roman Catholic committee had tried unsuccessfully to purchase 
a Congregationalist chapel to use for Catholic worship. Realising that the 
vendor did not wish to sell to them, the committee engaged the plaintiff to 
                                                          
1325 This restriction on the operation of undisclosed agency is noted above at subsections 
9.2.1. (Scots law) and 9.2.3. (English law).  
1326 Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497. 
1327 See subsection 9.2.3. 
1328 See above at (n 1188).   
1329 Nash v Dix (1898) 78 LT 445.  
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purchase the chapel and resell it to them at a profit. It was found that the 
plaintiff was not acting as an agent, but, rather, had purchased in his own 
name for the purpose of re-sale. The fact that the plaintiff was aware that the 
defendants would not have wished to negotiate with a person acting as an 
agent for the Roman Catholics, “did not touch the case if he were buying… 
on his own account.”1330 If, on the facts of the case, the purchaser was not 
acting as an agent, then the law of agency ought not to prevent resale. 
However, the fact that cases such as Nash v Dix1331 are correctly decided 
does not mean that the abolition of undisclosed agency would have no effect. 
Rather, this would prevent cases in which the third party was forced to 
perform in favour of the principal, and/or enter into a continuing contractual 
relationship with the principal. Additionally, transaction costs associated with 
resale are likely higher than those incurred through agency, particularly in 
cases concerning immovable property. If a principal is faced with the choice 
between operating as a disclosed but unnamed principal or encouraging 
someone to buy property and resell the property to it, it may be disinclined to 
incur the transaction costs of the second sale and the purchaser’s profit.  
A final potential advantage is that, although it is clearly difficult to justify 
undisclosed agency from a doctrinal, theoretical, or policy perspective, the 
doctrine ought to remain in Scots law for reasons of commercial 
competitiveness of the jurisdiction as a whole. In general terms, Continental 
jurisprudence “esteems the institution of undisclosed agency very highly”,1332 
and undisclosed agency is recognised in both the DCFR1333 (in a limited 
form) and PECL.1334 In order for Scots law to be viewed as a modern, 
commercial, and competitive legal system, it arguably must continue to 
                                                          
1330 Nash v Dix (1898) 78 LT 445 at 488 per North J.  
1331 Nash v Dix (1898) 78 LT 445.  
1332 Müller-Freienfels (n 206) at 300. See also H Verhagen and L Macgregor, “Agency and 
representation” in JM Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham/ Northampton, 2nd edn, 2012) 37 at 54-56.   
1333 DCFR Book IV.D.-1:101 allows for agency transactions generally (referred to as 
“Mandate contracts”). Book IV.D.-1:102(e) specifically mentions that “a mandate for indirect 
representation is a mandate under which the agent is to act in the agent’s own name or 
otherwise in such a way as not to indicate an intention to affect the principal’s legal position”.  
1334 PECL Article 3:102(2) provides that where an agent acts on behalf of, but not in the 
name of a principal, the rules on indirect representation apply.  
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recognise a concept deemed sufficiently important to merit inclusion in the 
DCFR and PECL. That said, however, Reynolds has praised the lack of 
recognition of undisclosed agency in the UNIDROIT Principles.1335 According 
to Article 2.2.4(1), an agent acting with authority but without the third party’s 
knowledge that it is acting as an agent (essentially, an undisclosed agent) 
can sue and be sued under the contract, but the principal cannot make a 
claim against the third party. Reynolds describes the provision as “a specific 
rejection of the common law undisclosed principal doctrine”.1336 Commenting 
on the UNIDROIT Principles Working Group’s potential omission of 
undisclosed agency in 1999, DeMott noted that “I do not think that deleting 
this aspect of the doctrine represents a major loss.”1337 Lord Sumption 
recently commented that, in English law, undisclosed agency “survives in the 
modern law on account of its antiquity rather than its coherence.”1338 Further, 
civilian systems do not generally recognise undisclosed agency.1339 Thus, 
undisclosed agency is recognised in some jurisdictions and cross-border 
instruments, but it enjoys neither widespread recognition nor full academic 
support. Such limited recognition in proposed harmonisation measures does 
not justify its continued recognition in Scots or English law.   
In essence, there are no convincing policy reasons justifying the continued 
recognition of undisclosed agency. Its abolition ought to seriously be 
considered. If undisclosed agency was to be abolished, an exception could, 
                                                          
1335 FMB Reynolds, “Authority of Agents” in ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 
Special Supplement on UNIDROIT Principles: New Developments and Applications (2005) 9 
at 10. See also F Reynolds, Letter dated 12 December 1999, in D DeMott and F Reynolds, 
Comments on the Revised draft Chapter on Authority of Agents (Study L – Doc. 63) 
(International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Rome, 1999) para 4, available at: 
https://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/proceedings/1999/study/50/s-50-63add1-e.pdf.  
1336 Reynolds, “Authority” (n 1335) at 11.   
1337 D DeMott, Letter dated September 23 1999, in D DeMott and F Reynolds, Comments on 
the Revised draft Chapter on Authority of Agents (Study L – Doc. 63) (International Institute 
for the Unification of Private Law, Rome, 1999), available at: 
https://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/proceedings/1999/study/50/s-50-63add1-e.pdf.  
1338 Banca Nationale del Lavoro SPA v Playboy Club London Limited [2018] UKSC 43 at 
para 12 per Lord Sumption.  
1339 Verhagen and Macgregor (n 1332) at 54-55 and 58-61. Many civilian systems do 
recognise the similar concept of undisclosed indirect representation, which is discussed in S 
Kortmann and J Kortmann, “Undisclosed Indirect Representation—Protecting the Principal, 
the Third Party, or Both?” in D Busch, L Macgregor, and P Watts, Agency Law in 
Commercial Practice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) 83 at 85-87.    
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however, remain to allow undisclosed agency to be used to protect against 
discriminatory practices, because this is justified by reference to the policy 
consideration of protecting weaker parties.  
9.4.4. Arguments against the recognition of undisclosed agency  
Firstly, undisclosed agency does not offer an adequate balance between the 
principal’s convenience and protection of the third party. Said v Butt1340 
provides that an undisclosed principal may not sue the third party where the 
identity of the contracting parties was a material factor in the formation of the 
contract. In that case, the plaintiff wished to attend the opening night of a 
play, but he had had a personal disagreement with the owner of the theatre 
and knew that he would be unable to purchase a ticket in his own name. He 
thus instructed a friend to buy his ticket for him, but was refused admission 
on the night of the play. It was determined that the identity of ticket-holders is 
a material factor in contracting for the purchase of tickets for a play’s opening 
night, because this is a special occasion. The purchaser’s identity was 
therefore material in determining whether a contract between the undisclosed 
principal and the third party owner should be upheld. It was found that the 
theatre was entitled to refuse entry to the plaintiff because the management 
would not have contracted with the plaintiff or his representative had they 
known his true identity. This is a somewhat narrow judgment, resting upon 
both the importance of the identity of ticket holders in the particular 
circumstance of the opening night of a play. In other undisclosed agency 
cases, it may be that the third party had not considered whether it would like 
to contract with the undisclosed principal in question – in which case, the 
requirement that undisclosed agency was being used to bypass a conflict 
between principal and third party would not be met. The Disney Land 
example above clearly illustrates the consequences of the loss of the third 
party’s bargaining position, and in land transactions the identity of the buyer 
is not generally considered to be a material factor.  In other words, the 
requirement of materiality of identity is unjustifiably weighted more heavily 
                                                          
1340 Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497. See above at subsection 9.2.3.  
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than the third party’s freedom not to contract with those with whom it does 
not wish to enter a contractual relationship. The principle of Said v Butt1341 is 
accordingly too narrow to properly protect the third party from the principal’s 
deception.  
A further policy consideration against the recognition of undisclosed agency 
is that it allows parties to act in a deliberately deceptive manner. In Dyster v 
Randall and Sons,1342 for example, a plaintiff sought to contract through an 
undisclosed agent to purchase two plots of land. The plaintiff had formerly 
worked for the defendant landowner, and had been discharged “from his 
office… under circumstances which to his knowledge caused the defendants 
profoundly to distrust him”.1343  The contract was upheld. This case provides 
an example of the use of undisclosed agency for the purposes of deception. 
Whilst the position of good faith in Scots contract law is tenuous,1344 a 
doctrine which achieves little other than allowing parties to act in a deceptive 
manner is difficult to justify. The law ought not to facilitate deception at the 
expense of the interests of other contracting parties. If a stronger concept of 
good faith is to be recognised in Scots law, undisclosed agency will 
undoubtedly breach this principle.    
As noted above, allowing principals to use undisclosed agents interferes with 
a third party’s ability to fully inform itself of its contractual partner.1345 Collins 
submits that the right to choose a contractual partner reflects individual liberty 
and personal autonomy (“values that lie at the core of a liberal society”) and 
allows individuals to achieve their aims through contractual transactions.1346 
                                                          
1341 Said v Butt [1920] 3 KB 497.  
1342 Dyster v Randall and Sons [1926] Ch. 932.  
1343 Ibid. at 933 (Witness Action).  
1344 Whilst Scots law does not expressly recognise an obligation to contract in good faith, the 
concept is arguably reflected in a number of contractual rules. See further HL MacQueen, 
“Good Faith in the Scots Law of Contract: An Undisclosed Principle?” in ADM Forte (ed), 
Good Faith in Contract and Property Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999) 5. Further, a 
contract will be voidable if one party is under an error in motive which is known and not 
corrected by the other: Steuart’s Trs v Hart (1875) 3 R 192 (although see Gloag, Contract (n 
65) 438).  
1345 See subsection 9.3.2. 
1346 H Collins, “The vanishing freedom to choose a contractual partner” 2013 76(2) Law and 
Contemporary Problems Spring 71 at 71. See also 77. 
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He submits that the exceptions to a general freedom to choose one’s 
contractual partner reflect the public policy considerations of equal 
opportunities and preventing social exclusion.1347 For example, Collins 
accepts that the right to choose a contractual partner should be restricted 
such that a party operating in the public market ought not to refuse to 
contract with another on grounds of (for example) sex, race, or religion.1348 In 
the case of undisclosed agency, however, the third party’s ability to choose a 
contractual partner is restricted by the principal’s ability to bypass its wishes 
by using an undisclosed agent. Collins notes that:  
“in general the law invalidates agreements when there has not been 
consent to the choice of contractual partner… Exceptions to the 
principle such as… the doctrine of undisclosed agency are strictly 
confined and treated as anomalous.”1349  
Courts, according to Collins, tend to explain this on the basis that the contract 
has been “agreed and relied upon”, and this outweighs the infringement of 
the third party’s ability to choose its contractual partner.1350 Collins does not 
indicate whether he agrees with this reasoning, and it is submitted that this 
justification is inadequate. Contracts concluded by undisclosed agency are 
only agreed upon following deception on the part of the agent and principal, 
which is not an adequate reason to usurp the third party’s right to choose a 
contractual partner. This reasoning certainly does not cohere with the other 
existing restrictions on the right to choose a contractual partner, which are 
aimed at promoting a more equal market society, other than situations in 
which the agent is used to bypass discrimination which would otherwise be 
experienced by the principal, as discussed above.1351 Undisclosed agency is 
thus incompatible with the right to choose a contractual partner, particularly in 
light of the fact that exceptions to this right reflect considerations of equal 
opportunities. Bennett justifies undisclosed agency by reference to a general 
policy that “personal scruples should not outweigh efficient business”.1352 
                                                          
1347 Collins (n 1346) at 71-74. 
1348 Ibid. at 72.  
1349 Ibid. at 80. 
1350 Ibid. at 78.  
1351 See subsection 9.4.3. 
1352 Bennett, Agency (n 1208) 9.22.  
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However, this choice of language belittles what could be significant issues of 
morals or conscience on the part of the third party, and the law certainly does 
not actively prevent any party, commercial or consumer, from making 
informed decisions about their transactions. This further supports the 
conclusion that undisclosed agency should be abolished, save for its use in 
protecting against discrimination.  
9.5. Concluding remarks   
Undisclosed agency is an exception to the privity doctrine. It is not 
compatible with Scots contract theory because it cannot be explained on the 
basis of the intentions of the contracting parties. The concept cannot be 
accounted for in terms of delictual liability.  Whilst Tan submits that 
undisclosed agency is a “well recognised exception to the privity doctrine and 
need[s] no further justification”,1353 it is shown in previous chapters that 
exceptions to privity must be clear, well-defined, and based on sound policy 
considerations.  
The justifications offered for the existence of undisclosed agency in 
commentary are inadequate, and undisclosed agency is not supported by 
any of the policy considerations underlying the statutory exceptions to privity. 
Whilst the justifications for the statutory exceptions ought not to be viewed as 
the only possible benchmarks for satisfactory exceptions to privity, there are 
no other defensible arguments in favour of the recognition of undisclosed 
agency. The only exception to this is situations in which undisclosed agency 
is used to avoid discrimination. Undisclosed agency ought to be permitted in 
such contexts, subject to restrictions where undisclosed agency is expressly 
or impliedly excluded, and the identity of the contracting party is a material 
factor in the formation of the contract.  
  
                                                          






Chapter 10: External network liability   
10.1. Overview of chapter 10  
The previous four chapters have examined whether various existing concepts 
ought to continue to exist in Scots contract law. This chapter examines 
whether a normative concept, external network liability, should be doctrinally 
recognised in Scots contract law.  
The chapter defines network theory and the concepts of internal and external 
network liability. The latter forms the focus of the chapter. Network theory is 
not currently recognised in Scots or English law, however, a brief discussion 
of the recognition of networks in other jurisdictions is provided. The chapter 
then explains how external network liability deviates from the privity doctrine, 
and examines its relationship with contract theory and delictual liability. The 
final subsections assess whether there are justifiable policy reasons for the 
recognition of external network liability as a new exception to privity.   
10.2. Network theory  
This section defines network theory, explains the difference between internal 
and external network liability, and provides brief comment on relevant 
comparative law.  
10.2.1. Defining network theory  
According to network theorists, a business network arises where a number of 
independent economic entities enter into a series of interrelated contracts.1354 
In other words, a network is “a cluster of contracts set up to serve a principal 
organising purpose.”1355 The definitions of networks reflect the cooperation of 
network actors and mutual pursuit of common goals within a network. Walter 
Powell describes “lateral or horizontal patterns of exchange, interdependent 
                                                          
1354 H Collins, “Introduction” in G Teubner, Networks as Connected Contracts (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2011) 1 at 1.  
1355 JN Adams and R Brownsword, “Privity of Contract – That Pestilential Nuisance” 1993 
56(5) Modern Law Review 722 at 727.   
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flows of resources, and reciprocal lines of communication”,1356 and Sydow 
refers to networks as:  
“modes of organising economic activities that bind formally 
independent firms who are more or less economically dependent upon 
one another through stable relationships and a complex reciprocity 
that is more co-operative than competitive in form.”1357  
In Teubner’s words, “business networks pursue common projects making use 
of co-operation between autonomous firms.”1358 A further important element 
of networks is the trust between the various network members – Teubner 
draws a comparison between commercial networks and the Mafia.1359 
Networks take numerous forms, ranging from ‘stars’ in the case of franchises 
(with the franchisor as the central figure, surrounded by numerous 
franchisees which constitute the spokes), to hubs with ‘arms’ of contractual 
chains (for example, large construction projects).1360 Indeed, Brownsword 
has commented that “once we start thinking about networks… we see them 
everywhere”.1361 Network structures arise primarily in commercial 
situations.1362 Teubner notes their use in contexts including energy and 
telecommunications markets, banking structures, and transport networks.1363 
He also refers to “information networks”, of which the internet is the most 
                                                          
1356 WW Powell, “Neither market nor hierarchy: Network forms or organization” 1990 12 
Research in Organizational Behaviour 295 at 296. 
1357 J Sydow, Strategische Netzwerke: Evolution und Organisation (Gabler Verlag, 
Wiesbaden, 1992) 82. 
1358 Teubner, Networks (n 24) 92. 
1359 Ibid. 91-92.  
1360 M Wellenhofer, “Third Party Effect of Bilateral Contracts within the Network” in M 
Amstutz and G Teubner (eds), Networks: Legal Issues of Multilateral Co-operation (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2009) 119 at 119; A Schwartz and RE Scott, “Third party beneficiaries 
and contractual networks”, 2015 working paper, 13-14, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2550436; B Lomfeld and D Wielsch, 
“The public dimension of contract: contractual pluralism beyond privity” 2013 76(2) Law & 
Contemporary Problems 1 at 11.  
1361 R Brownsword, “Review: Networks as Connected Contracts” 2012 75(3) Modern Law 
Review 455 at 455.  
1362 Brownsword (n 462) at 48; Adams and Brownsword (n 1355) at 727-728.  
1363 G Teubner, “‘And if I by Beelzebub cast out Devils, …’: An Essay on the Diabolics of 
Network Failure” 2009 10(4) German Law Journal 395 at 398; Teubner, Networks (n 24) 90.   
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prominent.1364 ‘Business networks’ includes supply networks, innovation 
networks, producer networks, and distribution networks.1365  
Networks are not easily explained in terms of currently recognised legal 
concepts. Whilst they share similarities with other competitive market 
structures and hierarchical businesses, Walter Powell outlines three 
competitive advantages which networks have over these forms: they possess 
collective know-how, enjoy mutual trust, and demand speed of 
transaction.1366 Additionally, George Richardson points out that networks are 
distinguishable from other business forms and markets because the latter do 
not reflect “the dense network of co-operation and affiliation by which firms 
are inter-related.”1367 It is also thought that networks are multilateral, whereas 
firms are unilateral.1368 Teubner writes that networks are “extraordinarily 
confusing phenomena”, which cannot be accounted for by existing definitions 
of markets or organisations.1369 Whilst he acknowledges the parallels 
between networks and corporate groups (both involve the dual elements of 
cooperation and competition), he feels that the complex regulatory context of 
corporate groups is unsuitable for the flexibility currently reflected in the 
concept of networks.1370   
Prior to Teubner’s seminal work on network theory,1371 legal discussion of 
networks was sparse.1372 There were only pockets of commentary, such as 
Buxbaum’s remarks that ‘network’ is a “fashionable” term denoting a 
“construct in autopoietic theory”.1373 However, networks have recently been 
                                                          
1364 Teubner, Networks (n 24) 90-91.  
1365 Ibid. 98-99. 
1366 Powell (n 1356) at 324.  
1367 GB Richardson, “The Organisation of Industry” 1972 82(327) The Economic Journal 883 
at 883.  
1368 RM Buxbaum, “Is ‘Network’ a Legal Concept?” 1993 149(4) Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics 698 at 703.  
1369 Teubner, Networks (n 24) 73. 
1370 Ibid. 133-136.  
1371 Teubner, Networks (n 24).  
1372 Collins (n 1354) at 2.  
1373 Buxbaum (n 1368) at 698. Buxbaum recognises the prevalence of networks in many 
situations, although his analysis in this article is limited to production networks.   
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increasingly discussed and recognised. Teubner (writing in 2009) comments 
that:  
“[t]he last thirty years have seen a network revolution that resulted in a 
thorough erosion of organizational hierarchies in both the private and 
the public sector.”1374  
Brownsword notes that the popularity of networks in the early twenty-first 
century is due in part to the trend of increased consumer activity in 
networked electronic environments.1375 There is a “growing European interest 
in the regulation of contractual networks”,1376 and some say that the world is 
now a “network society.”1377 Accordingly, networks are likely to become an 
increasingly prominent topic in private law, and research on whether the 
concept should be recognised in Scots law is timely.   
10.2.2. Distinguishing internal and external network liability  
Network liability allows for the recovery of damages for losses suffered by 
both those within a network (internal network liability) and those outwith a 
network (external network liability), regardless of whether the relevant parties 
are connected by contract.1378 The difference between these two forms of 
liability is illustrated through an example.  
If a customer at a fast-food restaurant falls seriously ill after eating an 
improperly prepared hamburger, this will have a negative impact on the 
reputation of the restaurant franchise as a whole.1379 The individual 
franchisees are unlikely to be in direct contractual relationships with one 
another. However, the franchisees and the central franchisor might be in a 
                                                          
1374 Teubner (n 24) at 396.  
1375 R Brownsword, “Contracts in a Networked World” in LA DiMatteo and Q Zhou (eds), 
Commercial Contract Law:  Transatlantic Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2013) 116 at 116. See also Collins (n 1354) at 71 and M Amstutz, V Karavas, G 
Teubner, “Preface” in M Amstutz and G Teubner (eds), Networks: Legal Issues of 
Multilateral Co-operation (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009) vii at vii.   
1376 Brownsword (n 1361) at 455.  
1377 Teubner (n 1363) at 396. Castells similarly comments that networks “are the 
fundamental stuff of which new organizations are and will be made”: M Castells, The Rise of 
the Network Society: Economy, Society and Culture vol 1 (Wiley Blackwell, Hoboken, 2000) 
180.   
1378 Teubner, Networks (n 24) ch 5 (internal network liability) and ch 6 (external network 
liability).  
1379 This example is outlined in Collins (n 1354) at 14 
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business network. Internal network liability allows for network parties to sue 
one another to recover losses caused when one party breaches the network 
purpose. In this example, the network purpose is the maximisation of the 
franchise’s profits, and other franchisees could sue the franchisee 
responsible for the customer’s illness for profits lost as a result of the damage 
to the franchise’s reputation.1380  
The customer, on the other hand, may have recourse through external 
network liability. This applies where a third party suffers loss as a result of the 
actions of a network party, but cannot sufficiently recover for those losses in 
an action against that network party. The customer is a party external to the 
network, and may wish to sue the franchisor directly, despite not being in a 
contractual relationship with it. External network liability allows third parties to 
bypass the contractual structure of the network, in order to recover their 
losses caused by a member of the network.1381  
10.2.3. Comparative law  
Neither Scots nor English law explicitly recognises networks. This contrasts 
with the situation in, for example, Germany1382 and the USA, where courts 
have enforced credit card networks,1383 networks involving hospitals, hospital 
service providers, patients, and insurers,1384 and franchise networks.1385 The 
German notion of connected contracts, which is similar to network theory, 
was developed in response to the specific problem of finance purchasing, 
                                                          
1380 Teubner, Networks (n 24) 235.  
1381 Ibid. 207-209.    
1382 Connected contracts are recognised at §358 BGB in the context of revocation of 
consumer contracts. See further G Teubner, “Coincidentia Oppositorum: Hybrid Networks 
Beyond Contract and Organisation” in M Amstutz and G Teubner (eds), Networks: Legal 
Issues of Multilateral Co-operation (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009) 3 at 20.  
1383 Sovereign Bank v BJs Wholesale 533 F 3d 162 (2008); Schwartz and Scott (n 1360) at 
13-15.    
1384 Joseph v Hospital Service District No. 2 of Parish of St Mary 939 So. 2d 1206 (2006); 
Schwartz and Scott (n 1360) at 17.  
1385 Chu v Dunkin’ Donuts Inc 27 F Supp. 2d 171 (1998); Schwartz and Scott (n 1360) at 17-
18.   
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and was later applied to other forms of financed property transactions.1386 
Italy has recently adopted new legislation on business networks.1387 
Networks are analogous to the concept of linked contracts. The latter term 
denotes “a plurality of separately concluded contracts that are somehow 
interrelated.”1388 Linked contracts are recognised in Dutch law. Van Dongen 
refers to “groups of contracts, i.e., linked or connected contracts.”1389 This 
refers to “all situations in which several contracts are not independent, but 
rather form part of a ‘larger whole’.”1390 Linked contracts arise in a wide 
variety of contexts: Samoy and Loos mention, for example, purchase 
financing, contracts linked in large construction projects, chains of contracts 
between producers and consumers, and cartel agreements.1391 In order for 
the linked contracts to be legally recognised, the contracts within the group 
must be “factually and economically connected.”1392 In the thesis, the 
concepts of linked contracts and contract networks are treated as 
equivalents. Linked contracts are not explicitly recognised in Scots or English 
contract law.  
As noted above,1393 network theory is likely to be of increasing prominence in 
future academic research. Reform in Scots and English law could perhaps 
draw upon the current doctrine and commentary in Germany, the 
                                                          
1386 Teubner, Networks (n 24) 74. Teubner addresses whether networks can be explained in 
terms of connected contracts. This is outwith the scope of the thesis, because Scots law 
does not recognise this concept. See further Teubner, Networks (n 24) ch 3.  
1387 C Ferrari, “The Italian ‘Network Contract’: A New Tool for the Growth of Enterprises 
within the Framework of the ‘Small Business Act’?; Brief Comments on the Italian Law” 2010 
16(1) Columbia Journal of European Law 77. Ferrari is critical of the new Italian law, but 
comments that doctrinal recognition of networks is to be “welcomed positively” (at 81-82).   
1388 I Samoy and MBM Loos, “Introduction” in I Samoy and MBM Loos (eds), Linked 
Contracts (Intersentia, Cambridge, 2012) 1 at 1.   
1389 S van Dongen, “Groups of contracts. An exploration of types and the archetype from a 
Dutch legal perspective” in I Samoy and MBM Loos (eds), Linked Contracts (Intersentia, 
Cambridge, 2012) 9 at 9.  
1390 Ibid. at 10.  
1391 Ibid. at 11. See also R Momberg Uribe, “Linked contracts: Elements for a general 
regulation” in I Samoy and MBM Loos (eds), Linked Contracts (Intersentia, Cambridge, 
2012) 153 at 155.  
1392 van Dongen (n 1389) at 10.   
1393 See subsection 10.2.1.  
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Netherlands, Italy, and the USA in enacting laws on networks in a manner 
suitable for modern commerce.  
10.3. Could external network liability be recognised as a normative 
exception to privity in Scots law?  
This section examines whether external network liability, if it was recognised 
in Scots contract law, would constitute an exception to the privity doctrine, 
and whether the concept would be compatible with Scots contract theory. 
The section also considers whether external network liability ought instead to 
be explained in terms of delict, or as a form of hybrid liability. The final 
subsection examines whether there are compelling policy reasons for the 
doctrinal recognition of external network liability.  
10.3.1. External network liability and the privity doctrine  
External network liability would, if it was recognised in Scots law, operate as 
an exception to the privity doctrine. In the example concerning the improperly 
prepared hamburger discussed above,1394 for example, the customer can 
make a claim to recover its losses in reliance on the contract between the 
franchisee and the franchisor, to which it is not party.  
The tension between external network liability and privity is also recognised 
in commentary. In the US, MacDonald has identified that consumers are 
unable to bring successful claims against the manufacturers of foods falsely 
labelled as ‘all natural’ due to a lack of privity between them. She argues that 
consumers should have the ability to bypass privity by applying network 
liability in such cases, so that they can recover damages in respect of harm 
suffered, such as unintentionally ingesting high amounts of artificial 
ingredients.1395 Samoy and Loos mention that Europe’s traditional civil codes 
were produced in a far less complex society than today’s, at a time when 
great weight was placed on the “traditional pillars” of contract law, such as 
                                                          
1394 See above at subsection 10.2.2.  
1395 C MacDonald, “Not ‘All Natural’: Modernizing Privity to Allow Breach of Contract Claims 
for Mislabeled Food Products” 2018 103(2) Iowa Law Review 785 at 786 and 793-801.  
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freedom of contract and privity of contract.1396 They contrast the development 
of historical law with the fact that contractual structures in modern commerce 
mirror the increasing complexity of society, explaining that private law has not 
been able to keep up with network trends.1397 Momberg Uribe argues that 
privity is the main principle of traditional contract law preventing recognition 
of the multi-party contexts in which bilateral agreements are concluded.1398 
He suggests that the multi-party context of transactions ought to be reflected 
in the obligations and expectations between parties to a bilateral 
agreement.1399 In particular, he stresses that current contract doctrine, 
including privity, is outdated because linked contracts:  
“are products of contemporary economic external requirements such 
as the division of labour, specialisation, supply chains, technological 
complexity and high flexibility of the production process.”1400  
Teubner similarly argues that legal doctrine must be reformed to allow for a 
“social model” of networks which takes into account their risks and provides a 
“normative perspective within which they may be combated.”1401 It is thus 
accepted in commentary that external network liability would be an exception 
to privity, and this commentary is correct. The question of whether it would be 
a justifiable exception is discussed further below.1402 
10.3.2. External network liability and contract theory 
Network parties might expressly agree to confer rights on third parties. For 
example, a franchisor and franchisee might agree that those who contract 
with the franchisee can claim against the franchisor in the event of breach of 
contract. In such a case, the liability of the franchisor to the external party 
would be based on third party rights.1403 However, network parties will 
sometimes have chosen network structures to limit means of redress for 
                                                          
1396 Samoy and Loos (n 1388) at 2. For example, the Napoleonic Civil Code clearly provides 
in Articles 1134 and 1165 that separate contracts cannot be treated as interlinked.  
1397 Samoy and Loos (n 1388) at 2.  
1398 Momberg Uribe (n 1391) at 153. 
1399 Ibid. 
1400 Ibid. at 154.  
1401 Teubner, Networks (n 24) 74. 
1402 See subsection 10.3.4. below.  
1403 See subsection 3.2.2.1.  
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those external to the network. In such cases, the imposition of external 
network liability will directly contradict the intentions of the relevant network 
parties. External network liability cannot therefore be explained in terms of 
the will theory.  
Hogg notes that the view that contractual structures are always adopted for 
the purpose of distancing particular contracting parties from external parties 
“superimposes” onto network actors a “sophistication of intention which may 
hardly, if ever, be present.”1404 Rather, networks may be adopted simply for 
reasons of convenience.1405 However, even where the network has not been 
set up with the aim of evading external liability, the relevant parties do not 
intend to allow external parties to bypass the network structure to recover for 
losses they suffer because of network activity. External network liability is not 
compatible with the will theory because the network parties are liable to 
external parties with whom they have not contracted regardless of whether 
they consent to such liability.   
External network liability is also incompatible with promissory theory because 
the network actors have not voluntarily promised any benefits to external 
parties. Assumption theory does not account for external network liability, 
because this form of network liability does not involve the voluntary 
assumption of network actors of liability towards external parties.  
10.3.3. Theoretical classification of external network liability  
This subsection explores whether external network liability should be classed 
as a contractual, delictual, or hybrid form of liability.  
Whilst, as discussed above,1406 external network theory is not compatible 
with will-based theories of contract law, it is possible that the concept could 
be justified as an exception to privity based on justifiable policy 
considerations. Potential policy justifications are discussed below.1407 It is 
                                                          
1404 Hogg, Obligations (n 433) 3.133. See also Whittaker (n 273) at 199. 
1405 Hogg, Obligations (n 433) 3.133.  
1406 See subsection 10.3.2. 
1407 See subsection 10.3.4. 
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noted at this stage that a contractual analysis of external network liability is 
recognised by commentators including Teubner and Wellenhofer. Contract, 
according to Teubner, is the “correct systematic arena”, although he 
comments that contract law requires reform in order to fully recognise the 
benefits and burdens of networks.1408 Wellenhofer remarks that networks can 
be placed schematically between contract law and the law of 
corporations.1409 There is no immediate barrier to the classification of 
external network liability as an exception to privity, provided that it reflects 
justifiable policy considerations. If external network liability is to be 
recognised in Scots law, its boundaries must be defined such that not all 
network parties are liable for the impact of one party’s behaviour on an 
external party.1410 Permitting the external party’s ability to sue only network 
parties which are in a contractual relationship with the party who caused the 
loss (for example, the franchisor in a direct contractual relationship with the 
franchisee) would assist in limiting the liability of those within the network. 
This would be a key benefit of a contractual analysis of external network 
liability.  
Given that the imposition of external network liability is ultimately involuntary, 
it is also relevant to consider whether a delictual analysis is suitable. An initial 
point is that the external party may have a direct delictual claim against the 
party who caused the loss. However, whilst the customer in Collins’ ‘snail in a 
burger’ scenario may be able to sue the franchisee in delict, the franchisee 
may be bankrupt or insolvent, or lack liability insurance.1411 External parties 
are not therefore necessarily fully protected by the fact that they may in some 
circumstances have a delictual claim against the party with whom they 
contract, because the network may have been set up so as to ensure that 
network members which contract externally have little funds to offer 
                                                          
1408 Teubner (n 1382) at 14. See also JN Druey, “The Path to the Law - The Difficult Legal 
Access of Networks” in M Amstutz and G Teubner (eds), Networks: Legal Issues of 
Multilateral Co-operation (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009) 87 at 87.  
1409 Wellenhofer (n 1360) at 120. Wellenhofer notes that corporate law alone does not 
adequately account for networks (at 120). 
1410 This is also discussed in subsection 10.3.4.   
1411 Collins (n 1354) at 16-18.  
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recompense for any claims by those external parties. Accordingly, it may be 
necessary for the external party to consider a claim against another network 
party. The current law does not provide scope for a delictual claim against a 
network actor connected to the party who caused the loss. In the case of 
franchising, a delictual claim against the franchisor is unlikely to be 
successful,1412 because franchisors are not usually liable for the negligence 
of franchisees in respect of the latter’s customers.1413 Vicarious liability 
cannot generally be applied to “pierce through contracts between 
independent businesses.”1414 This would prevent a claim against a separate 
legal entity in a network structure. A delictual classification of external 
network liability would therefore require significant reform of the law on delict 
to permit recovery by the external party.  
Some commentators have specifically argued that delictual claims ought not 
to subvert network structures. Hutchison and van Heerden state that where 
there is “a contractual web or matrix,” delictual claims which undermine the 
deliberate arrangements chosen by the contracting parties ought not to be 
permitted.1415 They assert that imposing delictual duties on the agreements 
of network actors unjustifiably disturbs their business activities.1416 However, 
as discussed in chapter 4,1417 parties ought not to have the ability to 
deliberately evade delictual liability in respect of third parties if the 
requirements of a delictual claim are present. The expectations of the 
external party should not be altered by the network structure chosen by the 
network parties.  
Brownsword suggested prior to Murphy v Brentwood District Council1418 that 
the perceived confusion between contract and tort could be resolved by 
viewing groups of cognate contracts as networks, and that such contracts 
                                                          
1412 Collins (n 1354) at 14-17; Wellenhofer (n 1360) at 124.   
1413 Collins (n 1354) at 18.   
1414 Ibid. at 17.   
1415 Hutchison and van Heerden (n 479) at 114. 
1416 Ibid. 
1417 See subsection 4.3.2. 
1418 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398.  
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could be subject to a “focused relaxation” of privity.1419 The literature on this 
issue is scarce, and does not specifically address the use of network theory 
in cases in which the boundary between contract and delict is unclear. 
Brownsword does not explain whether the network liability imposed would be 
in terms of contract or delict. As discussed in chapter 4,1420 privity is a 
contractual concept which should not be used to prevent the imposition of 
delictual liability. We can perhaps therefore assume that Brownsword meant 
for privity to be relaxed to allow network liability to operate as a contractual 
exception to the doctrine.  
A delictual classification of external network liability would require significant 
reform to the current laws of delictual liability, whereas a contractual analysis 
would require only the creation of an isolated exception to privity.  A 
contractual classification of external network liability is therefore preferable.  
It is of course possible that external network liability could be classified as a 
sui generis form of liability. Teubner questions whether networks are “sui 
generis legal institutions sailing in the Bermuda-triangle between contracts, 
torts and corporations.”1421 He rules out company law, because the 
systematised and centralised process of decision-making in corporations is 
not compatible with decentralised networks, and he states that agency is an 
unsuitable analysis due to its similar inability to recognise the decision-
making processes in networks.1422 Future research must examine further 
whether external network liability ought to be classed as sui generis.1423 As 
has been discussed above, however, a contractual analysis is potentially 
feasible, and is preferable to a delictual analysis. The remainder of this 
chapter addresses whether external network would be a justifiable exception 
to the privity doctrine in Scots law.  
                                                          
1419 Brownsword (n 462) at 32. Brownsword submits that similar reasoning can be seen in 
Marc Rich and Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine Co Ltd [1996] AC 211, although in the case the 
judges ultimately relied on contractual liability to prevent a tortious claim.     
1420 See subsection 4.3.2. 
1421 Teubner (n 1382) at 13-14. See also Teubner, Networks (n 24) 130-131 and 139. 
1422 Teubner (n 1382) at 14.  
1423 This is further discussed in subsection 11.2.3.   
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10.3.4. Policy considerations justifying the recognition of external 
network liability   
Numerous commentators suggest that the law ought to explicitly recognise 
networks.1424 This section explores whether external network liability could be 
recognised as a justifiable exception to the privity doctrine in Scots contract 
law.  
The first policy justification to consider is the protection of weaker parties.1425 
If an external party is injured by the actions of a network party, it may not be 
able to fully account for its losses by pursuing that network party in delict.1426 
In such cases, enabling the external party to bypass the network structure 
and pursue a claim against a network party who is able to compensate for 
the losses is undoubtedly practically useful from the external party’s 
perspective. In cases where the franchisee does not have sufficient funds to 
compensate the customer for its injuries, for example, external network 
liability protects the external party in the event of loss caused by the 
franchisee by allowing it to claim against the franchisor.  
Amstutz, Karavas, and Teubner have specifically recommended that the law 
is reformed to minimise the risks of network activity to third parties.1427 Collins 
has also recognised that the lack of recognition of network responsibility 
causes hardship to external parties,1428 noting that firms are able to exert a 
great deal of freedom as to how they structure themselves, such that they 
can determine the limits of their liabilities towards external parties.1429 
Teubner recognises that networks generate profit because of their ability to 
present themselves as highly organised and efficient entities, with a strong 
                                                          
1424 See, for example: Brownsword (n 1375) at 116-117; Collins (n 1346) at 71; Amstutz, 
Karavas, and Teubner (n 1375) at vii. Further views are mentioned above in subsection 
10.2.1. 
1425 This is discussed in depth at subsection 5.4.1.  
1426 This is noted above at subsection 10.3.3. Similarly, if the external party is in a contractual 
relationship with the network party, a contract claim is of little use if the network party does 
not have the funds to meet this claim.  
1427 Amstutz, Karavas, and Teubner (n 1375) at viii.  
1428 H Collins, “Ascription of Legal Responsibility to Groups in Complex Patterns of Economic 
Integration” 1990 53(6) Modern Law Review 731 at 734.  
1429 Ibid. at 736. See also 732. He refers to this as the ‘capital boundary problem’ (at 737). 
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sense of corporate identity and continuity between branches or offices.1430  
He contrasts this aspect of networks with the fact that networks can ‘self-
dissolve’ into bilateral contracts, and this dissolution also means that external 
parties may be prevented from recovering damages from appropriate 
network members.1431 This “room for manoeuvre” allows networks to act 
irresponsibly, with little regard for external parties.1432 External network 
liability could redistribute liability in transactions with external parties, so as to 
limit the ability of networks to escape external liability through network 
structures. This would reflect a policy consideration of protecting external 
parties.  
In chapter 5,1433 it was ascertained that this policy justification should be 
upheld, and the external party’s loss should be recoverable, where the third 
party could not have reasonably been expected to protect itself, and the loss 
was reasonably foreseeable to the relevant contracting party.  
Dealing firstly with the question of whether the loss was reasonably 
foreseeable, one can view the activities of the entire network as the actions 
of the network party or parties in control of the network purpose. For 
example, the franchisees are ultimately acting for the benefit of the franchisor 
and can be viewed as carrying out the actions of the franchisor. Collins 
stresses that where a defective product is the result of teamwork, “it should 
be the responsibility of the group to establish an organisation which prevents 
such defects”.1434 Similarly, Schwartz and Scott comment that where network 
goals are furthered by the participation of third parties, the interests of those 
third parties should be recognised through network liability.1435 In the 
instances of both franchise networks and production networks, it is 
foreseeable to parties other than the party which transacts with the consumer 
that the consumer will be harmed by, for example, improperly prepared food 
                                                          
1430 Teubner, Networks (n 24) 100.  
1431 Ibid.  
1432 Ibid. 108.  
1433 See subsection 5.4.1. 
1434 Collins (n 1428) at 731. See also MacDonald (n 1395) at 806.  
1435 Schwartz and Scott (n 1360) at 3 and 28.   
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or a defective product. The foreseeability requirement is met, because the 
network parties which share responsibility for the experience of the consumer 
can foresee the impact of defective network behaviour to the consumer. 
Further, in cases where the network is set up with the deliberate aim of 
restricting liability to third parties, the effects on the third party are 
foreseeable, because the network parties have contemplated the harm which 
the third party might suffer and they have actively chosen to evade this.  
In terms of whether the third party should have protected itself, the relevant 
factors are: whether the party is a consumer or commercial entity; the third 
party’s bargaining position; whether the third party expected the loss to be 
recoverable; and whether the third party had access to legal advice.1436 
Parties external to networks are diverse, and so the question of whether a 
third party should be expected to protect itself would be dealt with on a case-
by-case basis. Where the third party is a consumer, this will greatly increase 
the likelihood that it should be protected. A consumer, such as a customer of 
a franchise, will have a weak bargaining position. Everyday consumers do 
not have the power to negotiate the distribution of liability for any loss they 
might suffer at the point at which they contract with a franchisee. The 
average consumer would lack both the time and requisite legal knowledge to 
do so. It is however likely that a consumer would expect that it would be able 
to obtain full legal redress against the network party with whom it contracted. 
A consumer will have an impression of the size and reputation of any 
business with which it interacts. In the case of a franchisee, the customer 
would, it is submitted,1437 assume that the responsibility for any loss it suffers 
lies with the franchisor. Finally, a consumer is extremely unlikely to obtain 
legal advice prior to interacting with network entities. It is unrealistic to expect 
a consumer to ascertain the intended liability distribution across a business 
network with which it will interact. Accordingly, the requirements for 
                                                          
1436 See subsection 5.4.1. 
1437 The need for empirical research on this point is discussed in subsection 11.3. 
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protecting the third party will be met in some cases, particularly where the 
third party is a consumer.  
As noted above, network parties will not always deliberately have structured 
the network so as to limit liability towards external parties. It is accepted that 
the difficulties faced by external parties in recovering for their losses or 
injuries may be an incidental consequence of a network structure set up for 
reasons other than the evasion of external liability. Nonetheless, network 
structures may result in unjust consequences for external parties regardless 
of the intentions of the relevant network actors, and external network liability 
avoids these unfair consequences. The third party’s ‘worthiness’ of protection 
should not be determined according to whether the network parties intended 
to limit a customer’s means of redress against a particular network party. 
Alongside the policy justification of third-party protection, recognition of 
external network liability would help adjust the ‘image problem’ currently 
encountered by networks. Amstutz, Karavas, and Teubner suggest that 
networks do not enjoy a positive reputation, due to their “organised 
irresponsibility” and the risks their “chameleon-like character” pose to third 
parties.1438 If we are truly living in a ‘network society’, it is worth pursuing a 
set of legal rules which enable consumers to have fair redress against 
networks when they suffer harm at the hands of network actors. This would 
ensure that consumers have sufficient trust in networks to transact with them, 
and do not live in a society in which they feel they are taken advantage of by 
large network structures. If Amstutz, Karavas, and Teubner are correct that 
networks are not viewed positively, then proper recognition of the effects of 
networks would perhaps lead to an adjustment in public, academic, and legal 
perception of networks. Doctrinal recognition of networks would thus achieve 
the policy justification of ensuring that the law reflects developments in how 
businesses are structured, and would lead to workable laws on networks. 
Brownsword comments that we must “set limits to self-governance; business 
                                                          
1438 Amstutz, Karavas, and Teubner (n 1375) at viii.  
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networks cannot be permitted to rule the world.”1439 The current situation is 
that networks operate without legal recognition in numerous jurisdictions, and 
the activities of networks are therefore not properly kept in check. Teubner 
summarises that the law’s failure to recognise network liability for the 
negative impact of network behaviour on third parties is a “major hang-up, as 
a consequence of which private law is co-responsible for the failure of 
networks.”1440 Whilst the prevalence of networks in today’s society1441 
demonstrates that networks have not yet failed, doctrinal recognition of 
networks and coherent laws determining their liabilities in respect of external 
parties are necessary to ensure that networks are properly regulated.  
Once it is accepted that the external party should be protected, the next 
question is to narrow down the scope of network parties who might be liable 
to the external party under the principles of external network liability. A 
franchise network, for example, might encompass hundreds of franchisees 
across an international business model. External network liability ought not to 
allow the external party to sue any of the franchisees with sufficient funds to 
compensate its loss or injury. It is submitted that any statutory or judicial 
reforms of network liability should distinguish between network actors 
‘vertical’ to the party responsible for the loss, and those who are ‘horizontal’ 
to that party. For example, a fellow franchisee is at the same ‘level’ of the 
network structure and has no authority over the restaurant which served the 
improperly prepared hamburger in Collins’ example. The customer ought not 
to be able to sue parties horizontal to the restaurant, such as other 
franchisees. However, the franchisor is a network party ‘vertical’ or senior to 
the restaurant, which has authority over the franchisees. The customer 
should be able to use external network liability to sue ‘vertical’ network 
actors, but not those who are ‘horizontal’ to the party with whom it is in a 
contractual relationship. This ensures that only the network actors who are 
directly benefiting from the actions of the network party responsible for the 
                                                          
1439 Brownsword (n 1342) at 460. 
1440 Teubner (n 1361) at 413.  
1441 See above at subsection 10.2.1.  
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loss are forced to bear the burdens of their wrongful actions, whilst those in 
the network who are merely contributing to the overall purpose are not 
obliged to compensate external parties for the actions of those at the same 
‘level.’  
As noted above,1442 a contractual analysis of external network liability would 
assist in narrowing the scope of network parties liable in accordance with 
external network liability. Doctrinal rules on external network liability could 
therefore provide that the third party could sue network actors vertical to the 
entity which caused the loss, and with whom the entity which caused the loss 
is connected to by contract.  
It is therefore possible to justify the imposition of external network liability in 
certain situations. Brownsword stresses that a regulatory environment 
sensitive to the public interest is necessary where networks interface with 
their clients.1443 Accordingly, external network liability could be a useful tool in 
balancing the freedom of commercial actors with the need to protect external 
parties (usually consumers and other economically weaker individuals and 
entities).   
10.4. Concluding remarks   
Networks are increasingly prevalent in today’s commercial landscape. Legal 
systems must recognise networks if they are to remain efficient and 
commercially competitive. Whilst networks raise questions regarding both 
internal and external liability, this chapter has focused on the latter. It has 
been shown that external liability could be explained in terms of contract or 
delict, or it may be a form of hybrid liability. A delictual classification of 
external network liability is not desirable, because this would necessitate 
significant reform of delictual law. If external network liability was to be 
treated as a contractual concept, it would operate as an exception to privity. 
External network liability cannot be explained on the basis of the intentions of 
the contracting parties and is therefore incompatible with Scots contract 
                                                          
1442 See subsection 10.3.2.  
1443 Brownsword (n 1361) at 460.  
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theory. The concept is, however, supported by justifiable policy 
considerations, namely, protecting weaker parties, ensuring that the law is 
fair, and ensuring that private law adequately reflects developments in 
commercial practice. Doctrinal recognition of networks would also increase 
trust in networks, such that further regulation and legal recognition would be 
well-received. The current law allows networks full flexibility to evade 
responsibility for their wrongful actions which impact on external parties. 
Doctrinal recognition of external network liability could allow losses and 
injuries caused by network actors to be fully accounted for, by overcoming 









Chapter 11: Conclusion  
11.1. Overview of chapter 11 
This chapter provides a summary of the conclusions of the thesis and 
discusses potential areas for future research leading on from this work.  
11.2. Summary of findings  
This section summarises the findings of the thesis on the privity doctrine, the 
concepts examined in the thesis (contracts for the benefit of another, 
transferred loss, ad hoc agency, and undisclosed agency), and potential 
future exceptions to privity, including external network liability.  
11.2.1. The privity doctrine 
A historic examination of relevant case law revealed that Scots law has 
recognised the privity doctrine from at least the nineteenth century, although 
there is a dearth of judicial comment on the precise scope and meaning of 
the doctrine. It is, however, clear that Scots law recognises both aspects of 
privity: preventing third parties from accruing enforceable contractual rights 
under contracts to which they are not party, and preventing contracting 
parties from conferring burdens on extra-contractual parties. The ‘benefits’ 
aspect of privity does not prevent the conferral of incidental benefits on third 
parties.  
Scots law has historically upheld privity alongside its recognition of the jus 
quaesitum tertio. The continued recognition of third party rights demonstrates 
that privity operates in Scots law subject to the intentions of the contracting 
parties. Privity is compatible with will-based theories of contract, which are 
dominant in Scots law, because it applies in accordance with the intentions of 
the contracting parties. The doctrine is also compatible with freedom to 
contract, because privity upholds the parties’ freedom to not become liable to 
those with whom they do not intend to contract. Third party rights are a 
voluntary curtailment of freedom of contract, and so privity is also compatible 
with freedom of contract.  
282 
 
Regarding the relationship between privity and delictual liability, a claim in 
delict is sometimes successful where a contractual claim was not possible 
due to the privity doctrine. This is a natural consequence of the permissibility 
of concurrent liability in Scots law. Various commentators and judges have 
viewed this as problematic and have asserted that delictual liability in such 
cases is contravening privity. However, delict and contract are different types 
of liability. The fact that particular conduct on the part of a contracting party 
might constitute a breach of contract does not, and should not, prevent a 
third party from making a delictual claim against the contracting party if the 
third party suffers loss as a result of the conduct. Delict cannot operate as an 
exception to privity.  
There are numerous statutory exceptions to privity. The number and range of 
these exceptions demonstrate that privity is a porous doctrine. However, 
rather than abolishing privity in light of its exceptions, the doctrine should 
generally continue to be upheld.  If privity was abolished, third parties could 
enforce contracts as they chose, and could always recover for losses 
sustained as a result of breach of contract. This would result in an 
unacceptable degree of uncertainty for contracting parties. Privity should 
therefore be upheld, subject to exceptions justified by sound policy reasons.   
There are accordingly two ‘classes’ of exceptions to privity. The first are 
those justified by contractual intention – for example, third party rights. The 
second are those justified by policy reasoning. The protection of weaker 
parties justifies deviation from privity where the third party could not 
reasonably have been expected to protect itself, and where the loss was 
reasonably foreseeable to the contracting parties. Ensuring recovery for loss 
caused by breach of contract is a desirable policy objective, which can 
support exceptions to privity. However, this consideration alone would not 
justify the development of a new exception. Finally, an exception can be 
justified on the grounds that it is commercially convenient for both the 
contracting parties and the third party.   
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The ‘no burdens’ rule (i.e. the second aspect of privity) should also continue 
to be enforced in Scots law. Exceptions to this aspect of privity are justified 
where the burden is commercially convenient for the contracting parties 
without undue hardship for the third party.  
11.2.2. The concepts which permit recovery of extra-contractual 
loss  
The thesis provides an in-depth examination of four concepts: contracts for 
the benefit of another, transferred loss, ad hoc agency, and undisclosed 
agency. 
Contracts for the benefit of another are not an exception to privity, because 
the external party cannot enforce the benefit conferred on it in its own name. 
The concept is also compatible with contract theory, because it operates in 
accordance with the intentions of the contracting parties. Both (or all) parties 
to the contract intend for the contract to confer a benefit on the external party, 
and they intend for the party who contracts on the external party’s behalf to 
have the ability to recover in respect of the external party’s loss if the contract 
is not properly performed. These contracts are compatible with will-based 
contract theories, because the contracting parties’ intentions are upheld. 
Accordingly, a contract for the benefit of another can be treated as a passive 
form of third party rights. The key distinction between a contract conferring a 
third party right and a contract for the benefit of another is that the recipient of 
a third party right can enforce the contractual benefit in its own name, 
whereas the beneficiary under a contract for the benefit of another cannot. As 
well as upholding the intentions of the contracting parties, contracts for the 
benefit of another can also, depending on the situations in which they are 
used, reflect a policy consideration of protecting external parties from 
financial and physical harm, and the concept ensures recovery for loss 
caused by breach of contract. It is recommended for these reasons that 
contracts for the benefit of another continue to be recognised in Scots law. 
Whilst the concept is not an exception to privity, these policy considerations 
may justify contracts for the benefit of another as an exception to the rule 
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against recovery for damages in respect of another’s loss. In Scots law, 
expansion of the concept should be permitted to encompass the recovery of 
damages for distress and disappointment experienced by the external party 
in the event of defective contractual performance. Commentators examining 
this concept in future should reflect that contracts for the benefit of another 
are a distinct form of third party rights, rather than treating authorities on 
contracts for the benefit of another (for example, Jackson v Horizon Holidays 
Ltd1444) as third party rights cases. In both jurisdictions, the law should be 
clarified to allow the external party to claim damages recovered on its behalf 
from the contracting party.  
According to the current law on transferred loss, the third party cannot make 
a claim against the party in breach in its own right. As such, transferred loss 
does not currently operate as an exception to privity. However, preventing 
the third party from recovering its loss is illogical, and transferred loss should 
be reformed to permit such recovery. A reformed transferred loss doctrine 
would deviate from the privity doctrine, because this would allow the third 
party to recover under the contract between the original contracting parties. 
Transferred loss allows for the recovery of third-party losses regardless of the 
intentions of the contracting parties. It is therefore not compatible with Scots 
contract theory (and would not be compatible if it was reformed). Transferred 
loss could potentially be explained as an extended form of Junior Books1445 
liability, however, this form of liability is controversial. Consequently, 
recognition of transferred loss in delictual terms would not aid doctrinal 
clarity. Transferred loss is also said to protect third parties, but this policy 
objective is not currently consistently recognised in the operation of the 
doctrine. This is because the contracting party which did not cause the loss 
must pursue a claim against the responsible contracting party on the third 
party’s behalf. In order for the transferred loss doctrine to be justified by 
reference to the protection of weaker parties, it must be reformed such that 
the third party is able to bring a claim against the relevant contracting party in 
                                                          
1444 Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468. 
1445 Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 520.  
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its own name. Such reform would allow for transferred loss to be recognised 
as a justifiable exception to privity. Transferred loss should also be reformed 
such that the third party is protected only where it could not reasonably have 
been expected to protect itself. This means that the transferred loss doctrine 
will mainly be applicable where the third party is a consumer – for example, 
an individual purchaser of a residential property – and where it was not 
feasible to obtain a collateral warranty. Transferred loss also reflects a policy 
consideration of ensuring recovery of loss caused by breach of contract. 
However, this factor alone does not justify deviation from privity. The thesis 
recommends that transferred loss continues to be recognised in Scots law 
subject to reform providing that the third party can recover its loss in a direct 
contractual claim against the contracting party which caused the loss.  
Ad hoc agency has not contravened privity in all of the cases in which the 
concept is recognised. However, it does operate as an exception in cases in 
which it is used to transfer rights and obligation between separate legal 
entities, such that a new entity can enforce a contract previously concluded 
between two other parties. The original entity is no longer in existence, and 
so cannot consent to the ‘new’ party’s claim under the contract. As such, ad 
hoc agency cannot be justified as an exception to privity based on 
contractual intention. It cannot be explained in terms of delictual liability. 
There are no policy objectives which can support ad hoc agency as a 
justifiable exception to privity, and its existence also creates uncertainty 
within the laws of agency, assignation, and separate legal personality. 
Additionally, the case in which concept did not violate privity was incorrectly 
decided. Therefore, there is no reason to continue to recognise the concept 
in Scots law. It is recommended that ad hoc agency is abolished.  
Undisclosed agency is also problematic. It is an exception to the privity 
doctrine, because the principal can enforce contractual rights under the 
contract between the third party and the undisclosed agent. The principal can 
sue the third party despite the fact that the third party did not intend to 
contract with it, and so undisclosed agency is incompatible with contract 
theory. Undisclosed agency is not a form of delictual liability. It cannot be 
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justified by reference to the considerations behind the recognition of the 
statutory exceptions to privity. Whilst the doctrine is commercially convenient 
from the perspective of the principal and agent, this justification does not 
extend to the third party, who may be detrimentally affected by the 
undisclosed agency transaction. The principal is not generally a weaker party 
which the law should protect. In terms of ensuring recovery for breach of 
contract, it is the principal’s choice of contractual structure which leads to the 
contract between the third party and principal, rather than the third party’s 
choice, and so this justification is also unrealistic. Recognition of undisclosed 
agency also contravenes the principles of good faith and freedom of contract. 
However, in cases where undisclosed agency is used to protect the principal 
against discrimination based on characteristics recognised under equalities 
legislation, undisclosed agency does uphold the justifiable policy 
consideration of protecting weaker parties. It is therefore recommended that 
undisclosed agency is abolished, other than in situations in which is it used to 
protect against discrimination.  
In summary, contracts for the benefit of another can be recognised in Scots 
law as a passive form of third party rights. A reformed transferred loss 
doctrine should, where this protects weaker third parties, be recognised as a 
‘second class’ (i.e. policy-based) exception to privity. Undisclosed agency 
can be justified in very narrow circumstances and should otherwise be 
abolished. Ad hoc agency should not continue to be recognised in Scots law.  
11.2.3. Future exceptions to the privity doctrine  
It is possible to justify new exceptions to privity. For example, Chapter 10 
demonstrated that doctrinal recognition of external network liability would 
reflect a policy consideration of protecting third parties and would ensure that 
Scots law was sufficiently modernised to account for the increasing 
prevalence of business networks. However, the manner in which external 
network liability, or any other new exception to privity, is introduced into Scots 
law must protect and uphold the privity doctrine, contract theory, and 
justifiable policy considerations. If the law on the privity doctrine and its 
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exceptions is to be clear and intelligible, the creation of new exceptions must 
align with well-defined policy objectives.   
The Law Commission has stated that, despite its contribution to the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, it has “no desire to hamper 
judicial creativity” regarding the privity doctrine.1446 However, the ‘creativity’ 
which has occurred in Scots law in the creation of ad hoc agency has not 
fully taken into account the underlying privity doctrine or contract theory. The 
development of this concept has further failed to reflect adequate policy 
considerations which justify deviation from privity and contract theory. This 
demonstrates the importance of ensuring that new exceptions to privity 
uphold sound policy justifications, in order to protect underlying contract 
doctrine and to ensure that the law is clear and workable.   
Judge Richard Seymour QC warns that:  
“Although the law is always capable of development, it is, in my 
judgment, necessary to proceed with particular caution in the area of 
developing novel ways of providing remedies. The implications of the 
proposed new way of permitting a recovery to be made are unlikely to 
be readily apparent beyond the circumstances of the particular case. 
Moreover, unless the law is moving to a stage in which there is to be a 
remedy for every perceived wrong, there must be some justification in 
policy for developing the law in favour of a particular claimant beyond 
that he contends that he has suffered a loss which will otherwise go 
uncompensated unless the law is developed.”1447 
This can certainly be applied to the expansion of common law exceptions to 
privity. Ad hoc agency was developed with good intentions, and Lord 
Drummond Young was no doubt seeking to ensure a fair outcome in the case 
at hand. However, it is not possible to taxonomise this concept as a justifiable 
exception to privity. The creation of new exceptions to privity should not arise 
in individual cases as ‘sticking plasters’ to prevent losses in particular 
situations. Scots law does not reflect a principle that all losses should be 
compensated. Implementing such a rule would result in an unacceptable 
                                                          
1446 Report on Privity of contract (n 182) 1.10. 
1447 Rolls-Royce Power Engineering v Ricardo [2004] 2 All ER (Comm.) 129 at para 103 per 
Judge Richard Seymour QC. 
288 
 
degree of uncertainty and make it impossible for contracting parties to 
accurately predict their liabilities. Sometimes, cases will arise in which losses 
should be recoverable. However, those responsible for deciding such cases 
should not create new legal concepts which are not grounded in contract 
doctrine and sound policy. The creation of new exceptions should instead be 
the result of extensive deliberation on whether the exception reflects 
justifiable policy considerations. This may have allowed for the creation of a 
transferred loss doctrine as a justifiable exception to privity which protects 
third parties in a consistent manner,1448 and would have curtailed the 
development of ad hoc agency, which is not supported by any reasonable 
justifications.   
The simplest way to ensure that new exceptions to privity are sufficiently 
clear and well-supported by policy reasoning is for reform to be left in the 
hands of the legislature and Law Commissions. If the exceptions are 
enshrined in statute, then the intentions of the contracting parties are not 
violated when the third party’s entitlements are upheld.1449 Ad hoc judicial 
reform of privity has jeopardised doctrinal and commercial certainty. 
However, if privity is to be reformed at common law, new exceptions should 
only be recognised following full consideration of privity itself, contract theory, 
and policy considerations. Whittaker observed, prior to the enactment of the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, that:  
“any creation of exceptions to privity of contract requires clear 
justification by the courts, taking into account all the relevant factors 
which apply in the particular context”.1450  
This sentiment ought to continue to apply to the development of any further 
exceptions. MacQueen argues that the progress of Scots common law relies 
on judicial development “as principle and pragmatism suggest.”1451 The 
                                                          
1448 According to the current law on transferred loss, the third party’s ability to recover the 
loss depends on whether the relevant contracting party is willing to make a claim on the third 
party’s behalf. This results in inconsistent outcomes for third parties. See subsection 7.2.5. 
1449 This is because the contracting parties impliedly consent to contracting in accordance 
with the law. This is discussed in subsection 3.2.3.  
1450 Whittaker (n 273) at 216.  




concepts considered in this thesis provide clear examples of legal doctrine 
justified by pragmatism, but which do not reflect underlying principles of 
Scots contract law. They are a useful illustration of the need for judicial 
reform to reflect both pragmatism and doctrinal principle, as MacQueen 
suggests.  
11.3. Areas for further research 
Various issues raised in this thesis would benefit from further examination 
and research in future works. These are: the potential positive impact of 
undisclosed agency on consumers; the rationale for the use of undisclosed 
agency in legal practice; developing clear and workable laws on networks; 
the rule against the recovery of another’s loss; and the ‘no burdens’ aspect of 
privity. The remainder of this section considers these issues in turn.  
Chapter 9 mentioned Tan’s view that higher prices encountered by a 
principal if it must contract in its own name will impact third parties such as 
consumers.1452 Empirical research on the use of undisclosed agency would 
be beneficial in clarifying whether this is correct. One such avenue of 
research may be the use of undisclosed agency in the purchase of ‘ransom 
strips’.1453 This refers to a small piece of land that is crucial to the completion 
of a proposed development. For example, a ransom strip might constitute 
part of an area of land on which a road must be built to access a supermarket 
development.1454 Analysing the difference in price between the sale of 
ransom strips encountered by undisclosed agents and entities which contract 
in their own names, and any consequent impact on consumers, may confirm 
                                                          
1452 See subsection 9.4.1. 
1453 The key English case is Stokes v Cambridge Corp [1961] 180 EG 839. Two relevant 
Scottish cases are Morton Whitecross Limited v Falkirk Council [2012] CSOH 97 and 
Elmford Limited for Judicial Review of Actings by Glasgow City Council (No. 2) (Outer 
House, 12 September 2000, Unreported). These cases do not discuss undisclosed agency, 
but they provide an overview of the law on ransom strips and the practical problems 
associated with their sale. In Scotland, there is an ongoing dispute concerning the building of 
a wall on a ransom strip owned by the Grange Trust, but over which the Edinburgh 
Academical Club have the right to control development: Trustees of the Grange Trust v City 
of Edinburgh Council [2017] CSOH 102.  
1454 See further J Sidders, “A small piece of real estate in the right place can make its owner 
millions” Estates Gazette (7 June 2014) 754.  
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or disprove Tan’s claims. This research may influence the question of 
whether limited forms of undisclosed agency should continue to exist in Scots 
law.  
The dearth of case law on undisclosed agency perhaps reflects the fact that 
the principal’s existence is often not revealed. This means that examining 
case law and commentary cannot offer a complete perspective of the 
reasons why undisclosed agency is used in practice. Further empirical 
research on undisclosed agency more generally would therefore be 
beneficial in attempting to ascertain the rationale behind the use of 
undisclosed agency structures in legal practice. This in turn may identify any 
remaining policy considerations that could justify undisclosed agency. 
Chapter 10 discussed the increasing prevalence of networks. It is imperative 
that the phenomenon of legal networks is subject to both doctrinal and 
empirical study. This will ensure that networks are properly understood by 
policymakers, and that the law on networks is workable and up-to-date. In 
particular, doctrinal research on networks could usefully ascertain whether 
networks ought to be treated as contractual or sui generis. Empirical 
research on consumer perspectives of networks could influence potential 
reforms aimed at protecting consumers from the impact of network 
behaviour.  
The thesis has briefly addressed the interaction between the privity doctrine 
and the rule that a contracting party cannot recover for another’s loss.1455 
This rule, like privity, is subject to a number of exceptions – for example, 
transferred loss and contracts for the benefit of another. Historical 
examination of this rule and the policy rationale behind its exceptions would 
ensure that the law on cases where contracting parties can recover for 
another’s losses is doctrinally coherent. Both rules concern the interaction 
between contracting parties and external parties, and so future work on the 
                                                          
1455 See subsections 5.4.2 and 6.3.2. 
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intersection of these two rules would contribute to doctrinal clarity in Scots 
law.  
Finally, this thesis has focused on the ‘benefits’ aspect of the privity doctrine. 
It has however identified that exceptions to the ‘no burdens’ rule are 
permissible where the contractual arrangement is commercially convenient 
for the contracting parties as well as the third party.1456 The exceptions to this 
aspect of privity are limited in comparison to the ‘benefits’ aspect of the 
doctrine, and the ‘no burdens’ rule is relatively uncontroversial. Nonetheless, 
future research on further potential exceptions to this rule would allow for a 
fuller understanding of this aspect of privity.  
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